The Chumir Foundation for Ethics in Leadership convened the World Commission on Forced Displacement and assembled a Steering Committee to advise, define, design and review research into the matter. The Foundation joined with the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) to undertake research on existing best practices. It examined impacts, identified issues, and sought indications for new solution-oriented policy actions to alleviate the adverse consequences and challenges posed by the more than 68.5 million people forcibly displaced around the world. The research studied impacts over time; trends in public attitudes and demographics; and the economic impacts of forced displacement on both those displaced and the communities to which they migrated.

The Report looks at four case studies - Canada, Germany, Jordan and Kenya - to identify best practices for the integration of the forcibly displaced. The results of this research are reflected in the recommendations found in the Report of the World Commission on Forced Displacement www.chumirethicsfoundation.org/ForcedDisplacement and in the primary conclusion that a development investment-led response is critical to any meaningful policy. Among other recommendations, the Commission proposes the establishment of a Merchant Bank www.chumirethicsfoundation.org/MerchantBank to utilize the limited amount of public sector funds available for the purpose to remove impediments and de-risk projects. This would stimulate the amount of private investment funds needed to generate the scale of projects necessary to provide meaningful employment opportunities for the displaced and residents of host communities.

We hope this research and the Reports will provoke a dialogue on the requirements and methods for meaningful results. We welcome any opportunity to engage on these topics in pursuit of policies toward a more effective and compassionate response to the displacement issue.

Sincerely,

H.E. Heinz Fischer
Chairman
World Commission on Forced Displacement

Joel Bell
Chairman
Chumir Foundation for Ethics in Leadership
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Research Report on Forced Displacement: An Overview

Humanitarian Policy Group of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and the Chumir Foundation for Ethics in Leadership
June 2019

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Introduction

Forced displacement is a defining issue in global politics. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), some 70 million people are displaced as a result of conflict, violence or persecution. Many of these people can expect to be in displacement for years, if not decades. In 2014, in preparation for the Congress of Vienna 2015, the Chumir Foundation for Ethics in Leadership identified the growing number of people affected and the increasing duration of their displacement as an issue calling for attention in the public interest. Convinced that current approaches to forced displacement, developed in the wake of the Second World War, were inadequate to meet the challenges of today’s displacement crises, in late 2016 the Chumir Foundation asked the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at ODI to join its effort to critically analyse the architecture underpinning the global regime governing displacement, with a view to supporting a Commission the Foundation was in the process of convening in its mission to test policy ideas and develop more precise proposals for a more inclusive, equitable, sustainable and humane response to one of the key challenges of our time.

The timing was opportune. In September 2016, UN Member States met at the UN General Assembly in New York for the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants. The New York Declaration that emerged from the summit included a pledge by states to work towards a Global Refugee Compact, the first comprehensive review of the refugee regime since its inception almost 70 years ago. The key objectives of the Compact – formally approved in December 2018 – are to ease the financial and political pressures on host countries, the vast majority of which are in the global South; enhance the self-reliance of refugees in their displacement; increase access to third-country settlement; and support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. While these are not in themselves either new or radical proposals, the Compact does nonetheless provide a substantive agenda for addressing some of the constraints evident in the current architecture through a much stronger commitment to responsibility-sharing, incorporating sustainable development-led responses to forced displacement and providing for longer-term, more predictable funding for responses to displacement.

About the Chumir/ODI research project

Given the scale of forced displacement and the generally hostile political climate surrounding it, there seemed a clear need for reliable facts and balanced analysis to inform a policy debate. Furthermore, the Chumir Foundation was in the process of developing recommendations for which data would be important. The aim of this project was to provide an agnostic ‘state of knowledge’, peer-reviewed product in response to its defined research questions, to serve as input for the Chumir Foundation’s World Commission on Forced Displacement.¹ Formed of notable political and policy leaders respected on the topic, the Commission sought to come closer to a shared characterisation of the relationship between

¹ See https://chumirethicsfoundation.org/programs/forced-displacement/world-commission-on-forced-displacement-members.
policy choices and impacts so as to shape ongoing debates and encourage informed and constructive public dialogue and opinion, creating an environment for effective policy action.

Posing fresh questions against available secondary literature, the project sought to inform the deliberations of the World Commission by exploring how much can be learned from an examination of historical experience, including the social, economic and political impacts of forced displacement over time, its responsiveness to policy and the interplay between public policy and public perceptions. The work aimed to bring together key available data and research on impacts of forced displacement, including over time, and how these impacts have interacted with public attitudes, demographics, forcibly displaced and host population characteristics, economic and other salient community conditions and public policies.

The project began with a core set of hypotheses and resulting research questions, agreed between the Chumir Foundation and ODI:

- What was the empirical reality of displacement and what are the multi-variate causes and consequences of migratory movements?
- On a global level, what have been the major paradigms in responses to forced displacement (e.g. containment, care and maintenance, development approaches)? How and why have these evolved, and what have been the major shifts?
- What are the impacts of forced displacement on host societies, including over time in selected case study countries, and what conditions and variables have shaped the direction, magnitude, timing and evolution of those impacts?
- What have public attitudes been towards forcibly displaced communities? How has this differed between different countries/regions and over time, including between different waves of refugees? What are the key drivers of public opinion? What can we learn from history about what influences public opinion towards the forcibly displaced?

Based on these research questions, ODI, in collaboration with the Chumir Foundation, prepared reports and country case studies (listed in the Annex) to support the policy deliberations of the World Commission.2 Key findings are summarised below.

1 Conceptual and legal frameworks
1.1 Defining refugees
The conceptual and legal frameworks governing forced displacement, and states’ responsibilities therein, were developed immediately following the Second World War, and in their essentials have remained largely unchanged since. The specific protections set out under the 1951 Refugee Convention are limited to refugees fleeing persecution and who have crossed a national border. However, multiple factors precipitate forced displacement, and it is often a combination of drivers that accounts for the majority of forcibly displaced. People move within or leave their countries of origin for many reasons, including poverty, lack of

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livelihood opportunities, food insecurity, depletion of natural resources, land-grabbing and contested land rights, state fragility and the erosion of essential public services, religious or ethnic discrimination and human rights deprivation, repression, violence and conflict. Precisely because the drivers of displacement are often indistinct, involuntary migrants in this space are highly vulnerable as they fall through the net of humanitarian assistance and ‘refugee status’ recognition as defined by the Refugee Convention. While UNHCR has for many years used terminology such as ‘people in a refugee-like situation’ and ‘others of concern’, these descriptive sub-categories still privilege those who have refugee status: they address neither the situation of those who fall outside the Convention, nor the obligations on states and inter-governmental bodies towards them.

Several regional instruments adopt a broader approach. The 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems extended refugee status beyond persecution, moving the 1951 Convention’s conception of refugeehood to a more general framework and setting the basis for the prima facie recognition of refugee status. The 1984 Organization of American States (OAS) Cartagena Declaration went further, advancing a refugee definition that includes among refugees ‘people who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order’ (Castillo, 2015). The Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (the Kampala Convention) – adopted by the AU in 2009, and entered into force in 2012 – was drafted with a view to making the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement legally binding in Africa. The Convention recognises that states have a primary responsibility to protect and assist those within their borders, and that IDPs should be assured the same rights as all other citizens. However, by definition these agreements do not have global reach, and few of the countries to which these instruments apply have incorporated their principles into national legislation.

In the case studies for this project, refugee status and associated elements such as asylum are conceptualised in different ways in national legislation. In Germany, the right to asylum is codified in the country’s Basic Law and in specific legislation. The country also offers subsidiary protection based on the European Convention on Human Rights on Subsidiary Protection, which has been transposed into national legislation through the Asylum Act. In Kenya, the Refugees Act, introduced in 2006, recognises two classes of refugees: statutory and prima facie refugees (defined in accordance with the OAU Convention). The Act stipulates that refugees are protected from arbitrary arrest, detention or expulsion. Jordan, which is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention, does not in practice use the term ‘refugee’ in its own discourse, and prefers to label displaced people and labour migrants alike as ‘guests’. Although the Constitution prohibits the extradition of ‘political refugees’, the country does not have a highly developed domestic legal framework for dealing with refugees.

Given the multiple factors and motives propelling forced displacement, and the complex and fluid patterns and processes of displacement, we argue that international intervention should be predicated on the needs and rights of the forcibly displaced, irrespective of the category
or cause of displacement. Rights to protection and other entitlements belong to everyone, and most certainly to forcibly displaced people. They are not contingent on a particular legal status. Conceptualised in this way, forced displacement can reveal the diversity of protection situations and gaps (such as rights violations and acute socio-economic deprivation and needs) to which forcibly displaced people are exposed, and for which protection must be invoked.

1.2 ‘Durable solutions’
The three so-called ‘durable solutions’ of UNHCR are return to the country of origin, local integration and third-country resettlement. While return is generally seen as the preferred option by states, in many contemporary situations of displacement it may be neither possible for, nor desired by, displaced people themselves, which is one reason why, in 2017, just 667,000 refugees went back to their country of origin (a further 4.2 million IDPs returned to their area of origin, against a global IDP population of 40 million). Third-country resettlement likewise is extremely unlikely: in 2017, just over 100,000 refugees were admitted for resettlement, representing around 4% of the global total. De facto, therefore, for the vast majority of refugees in the world local integration in the first country of asylum (overwhelmingly neighbouring states in the global South) will be the only available option – and one that these states are increasingly resisting or preventing.

Refugee integration occupies a central space in forced migration research and policy engagement, including for the case study countries examined for this project. In Canada, for instance, refugees are given access to a Settlement Program aimed at supporting integration and the successful participation of resettled refugees in Canadian life through a range of services, including language classes, employment assistance and settlement information and support. While public unease with large-scale refugee flows has seen Germany tighten its asylum policies in recent years, integration policies have been accelerated and more holistic and expansive policies have been introduced. In Jordan policies towards integration have fluctuated. During the 1940s and 1950s, government policy aimed at political assimilation of Palestinian refugees, but the country’s approach to integration has subsequently become more restrictive, and the government has made it clear that it will make no moves towards de jure naturalisation of the current Syrian refugee caseload in the country.

From a policy perspective, resources and instruments to promote integration tend to focus on the acquisition of skills and competences, for example in language and employment, as in Canada, and the removal of social and welfare inequalities, for example in access to housing, education and welfare entitlements. However refugee integration is defined, it is not value-free but the outcome of structural factors: refugee integration is a historically embedded process and inextricably bound up with the political discourse on immigration, at least in Europe and the global north (Zetter, 2014). Refugees and asylum-seekers may be perceived as potential threats to ‘national identities’, and their integration may as a result be less actively or overtly promoted. In the global South, where the vast majority of refugees are located, integration is part of very similar processes of national identity and self-understanding. Local integration in these countries occurs largely spontaneously, without the proactive policy direction typical of rich resettlement countries.
While integration can be understood as taking place across a number of domains – functional, social, legal, governance – policies addressing it tend to focus on its economic aspects, and specifically employment and labour market participation. Employment is pivotal to the process of settlement and integration (Phillimore and Goodson, 2006; Ager and Strang, 2004), as well as meeting wider psychosocial aspirations, such as dignity and identity, independence and agency, and underpins or reinforces other integrative objectives, such as stronger interaction with hosts, increasing opportunities for learning the host language, enhanced social inclusion and mobility. Encouraging refugee participation and advancement in the labour market also chimes with the objective of host governments in industrialised countries to manage migration (including refugees) for the economic benefits it brings and the scope to fill skills gaps.

In practice, displaced people are typically regarded as a burden on the economies of destination countries. These views have been reinforced by populist and nationalist stances in public debate in recent years (discussed below). There is little conclusive empirical evidence on how refugees affect the economies of host countries, and the picture emerging from the case studies for this research is mixed. In Kenya, refugees tend to be regarded as a burden, and as competitors for Kenyan jobs. In Germany, one study concluded that increases in employment are being outstripped by the increase in labour supply, leading to higher unemployment and lower wages for workers entering the labour market with lower qualifications. Jordan is, in this as in other ways, something of a special case: Palestinian refugees actually outperform (Trans)Jordanians economically, and labour force participation is high, at least for men. By contrast, Syrian refugees of much more recent vintage than Palestinians are much less likely to join the labour market, and a significant proportion – up to half – are economically inactive, either not in work or not looking for work. Foreigners are also more likely to claim welfare benefits and other forms of state support, and benefits received are typically less than taxes paid. Data from the case studies also suggests that refugees can expect to earn less than host populations. In Canada, ten years after arrival refugees earn on average CAD 27,000, or about CAD 14,000 below the average for Canadian-born workers. In Kenya, one recent study suggests that almost 70% of refugees in Nairobi earn below the Kenyan national average income. In Germany, employment rates among recent arrivals were around 14%, though one recent study suggests that refugee labour market integration progressively increases over time: while only 9% of those who arrived in 2015 were working, 22% of arrivals in 2014 and 31% of arrivals in 2013 or earlier were employed (IAB/BAMF/SOEB, 2016).

The ability of a host country to absorb an inflow of unskilled refugees also depends on the characteristics of its labour market: countries with highly institutionalised markets and high minimum wages that require high levels of productivity may find it more difficult to absorb refugees with very low productivity. Conversely, countries with less institutionalised markets and larger shadow economies – in our case studies, Jordan and Kenya – can more easily absorb low-productivity individuals. In Jordan, refugees in urban areas – i.e. most of them – are primarily employed in the informal sector, where they compete with natives and economic migrants. Refugees living outside of Kenya’s camps have obtained a form of de
facto integration as many are self-reliant thanks to employment in Nairobi’s thriving informal sector (Jacobsen, 2001; Crisp, 2004; Campbell et al., 2011).

Labour market effects, fiscal consequences and the career profiles of migrants and refugees all interact. For instance, the better educated they are on arrival, the larger their economic contributions are likely to be, and therefore their net fiscal contributions. The type of refugees who arrive (broadly speaking, skilled or unskilled) determines the economic effects they will have on the labour market. Critically, research shows that the greater the investment in their skills and integration at the start of their displacement, the higher will be their net contribution to host economies. This points to the critical importance of development investment to maximise the long-term economic potential of the forcibly displaced for hosting countries. In this context, a key issue promoted by this World Commission is to advance sustainable, development-led strategies to address conditions of protracted displacement.

2 Developmental approaches to forced displacement
The large-scale and protracted displacement of refugees and other forcibly displaced people constitutes a significant developmental challenge for host countries, as well as for donors and international actors responding to refugee crises. Developing countries host 89% of refugees and 99% of IDPs. Since 1991, most refugees have been hosted by around 15 countries – also overwhelmingly in the developing world (World Bank, 2016). As the case studies for this project attest, the scale of the demographic pressure this creates can be enormous: since the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011, for example, the refugee influx into Jordan has seen its population swell by 10%. The country is also home to over two million Palestinian refugees and almost 150,000 Iraqis. Kenya hosts almost half a million refugees and asylum-seekers out of a total population estimated at 48 million.

In the second half of the twentieth century, under the auspices of UNHCR, a dominant paradigm of response to forced displacement emerged in these contexts, as mainstream humanitarian emergency response gradually transitioned into something called ‘care and maintenance’. This was predicated on the assumption that, in most refugee situations, displacement was temporary and follows a linear path, with a single displacement event followed by a short period of exile and then collective return (Crawford et al., 2015). Consequently, in developing countries with large numbers of forcibly displaced people, assistance is primarily in the form of short-term interventions by humanitarian actors, whose focus tends to be on the provision of protection and basic needs, including food, nutrition, education, health and shelter.

Growing recognition that displacement is overwhelmingly protracted, not a short-term aberration, has brought the care and maintenance paradigm into question, both in terms of its underlying rationale and its practical viability. With donor interest dropping off as crises become protracted, attention has also been paid to the sustainability of the funding model behind care and maintenance, which prioritises emergency assistance over longer-term developmental support designed to promote refugee self-reliance and strengthen states’ capacities to support large displaced populations (Crawford et al., 2015). Recent years have
seen a resurgence of interest in longer-term approaches, coupled with significant buy-in from development actors and concrete action.

The Syrian refugee crisis has in many ways become a testing ground for development-led approaches. The Syria Regional Refugee Resilience Plan, first operational in 2015, has crystallised this approach, though new instruments have also been introduced in Jordan and Ethiopia, such as the Compact between international donors and recipient countries to promote development and refugee employment, and locally designed sustainable responses in countries such as Uganda.

This reconfiguration is still largely experimental, pragmatic and fragmented; it does not, as yet, constitute a coherent and systematic model in the same way as humanitarian assistance has come to be structured through many decades of experience. Longer-term development strategies are also not an alternative or substitute for humanitarian assistance and protection: both are essential. The larger challenge is to ensure coherence between the two forms of intervention, which will require effective synchronisation and coordination of strategies, policies and implementation. Operational questions include programme scope and priorities, funding cycles, coordination and partnership of multiple stakeholders and donors, programme evaluation and, particularly, timing. The research shows that developmental strategies should commence simultaneously with the humanitarian effort, i.e. at the start of a refugee crisis. However, this presupposes certain assumptions about the scale of the crisis and how protracted it will be. It also bears on the political willingness of receiving states to contemplate the longer-term settlement of refugees in their countries.

3 New funding and financing for situations of forced displacement
The developmental paradigm (medium-term, sustainable, economic priorities) has required new modalities of funding, and new modes of funding have enabled more sustainable approaches to the socio-economic needs of refugees, and their host communities and countries. Recognising that large-scale displacement crises put decades of development investment and development gains at risk, there has been a significant transformation in the way multilateral and bilateral donors finance responses to forced displacement. Principally, this has been by expanding fiscal and macro-economic support and development funding, revising lending criteria to include middle-income countries that previously were normally excluded from lending portfolios; and shifting from ad hoc measures to interventions more systematically aligned to the scale of impacts and needs, and country development strategies and poverty assessments.

The World Bank has been key in advancing a greater role for development actors in responses to displacement. Recent initiatives include a Global Concessional Financing Facility, aiming to grant a total of $6 billion in concessional loans to low- and middle-income refugee-hosting countries over the next five years. The European Investment Bank (EIB) has also significantly expanded its lending facilities, with volumes expected to be in excess of €15 billion, primarily for Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt (EIB, 2016). These large inter-governmental banks are also working in partnership with others to mobilize and leverage other financing facilities, for example multi-donor trust funds (World Bank, 2017: 123–37). As with the other structural
changes already discussed under the development-led paradigm, the effects of these changes in the funding regime are medium term, and thus definitive conclusions are premature.

Another significant challenge is the reluctance of host governments to sign up to medium-term developmental strategies for refugees. In terms of macro- and micro-economic policy engagement and fiscal support, much depends on how multiple, potentially competing objectives are reconciled. Such interventions may be designed to encourage greater inclusion of forcibly displaced populations within the economic and social development strategies of the receiving country; or mitigate the negative macroeconomic and fiscal impacts of forced displacement on host countries; or reduce the socio-economic vulnerabilities of both displaced people and host communities. The short- and medium-term time periods for financing programmes to tackle these different challenges introduce further complexity.

Operationally, it will be critical to ensure that there is funding additionality not funding substitution, where donors might be tempted to switch from humanitarian to development assistance. More developmental funding is not a substitute for humanitarian assistance and protection, which are already inadequately funded. Likewise, it is too soon to gauge whether development funding in situations of forced displacement will be as susceptible to donor fatigue as humanitarian funding. Finally, it is essential to ensure that there is balanced action by donors to deliver defined and achievable economic objectives for beneficiary countries.

Developmental approaches to refugee crises are also increasingly dependent on private sector commitment. While governments and donors can set the framework, for example by easing restrictions on work permits, offering tax incentives and building infrastructure, private sector investment will actually create the employment opportunities that are the core objective of this strategy. Making markets work in this way is a fundamentally different world from the traditional livelihoods projects long-favoured by NGOs, and requires new actors, skills and resources. The private sector also offers a major new funding stream for refugee assistance programmes.

The market opportunities driving this engagement range from telecommunications, information technology and data management to banking and mobile money services, education, medicine, procurement, logistics and shipping, water and sanitation, energy supply, private security and insurance. High-profile players including Siemens, IKEA and DHL, alongside ‘reconstruction’ firms such as Halliburton and Blackwater, are increasingly finding ways of working in the risk-prone and fragile markets of major refugee-hosting countries. The scale of private sector finance is hard to assess, but, for comparison, 30% of the $1 billion Haiti relief effort came from private sector resources (ALNAP, 2012: 33), while the IKEA Foundation has committed almost $200 million to UNHCR’s programmes in cash and kind since 2010 (UNHCR, 2017) for shelter development and emergency relief for Syrian refugees. Private sector companies are also increasingly engaged in supporting refugee resettlement and integration, with initiatives in North America and Europe that attempt to better match refugees’ skills with employers’ needs in resettlement states. In Germany, a network of businesses comprising 300 companies supports refugee integration into the labour market through various initiatives. In Kenya, the Kalobeyei Integrated Social and Economic
Development Programme (KISEDP) in Turkana County has as one of its aims fostering private sector engagement to improve the socio-economic conditions of refugees and host communities in Turkana County.

From the perspective of investors, development situations offer opportunities for high yields, while also creating sustainable livelihoods for refugees and receiving communities. However, weak governance and struggling economies, made more fragile by the impact of large numbers of forcibly displaced people, constitute major investment risks. Thus, despite the opportunities and the potential to inject major new financial capacity into countries and populations impacted by forced displacement, the key constraint is how to ‘de-risk’ investment in what would otherwise be commercially unsustainable undertakings. Alongside the principal task of developing the means to underwrite risk and thus maximise the flow of investment capital, operational conditions such as the local regulatory environment, compliance with standards, the effectiveness of anti-corruption controls and the investment environment also bear on risk and need to be taken into account. A number of new financing mechanisms have been proposed to leverage private sector investment, for example bonds guaranteed by donors (World Bank, 2017: 129–30) and the establishment of a Merchant Bank to mediate investment, which is one of the principal aims of this World Commission. This would be designed to attract private sector investment and activity to locations of large-scale displacement by enhancing sustainable employment opportunities and promoting conditions conducive to commercial activity.

4 Ensuring fairer responsibility-sharing
A more durable international response to displacement will also require a more equitable sharing of the burden involved in supporting large displaced populations in the global South. ‘Burden-sharing’ was first used to refer to the need for sharing responsibility for protection of refugees in situations of mass influx, with the preamble to the 1951 Convention stating that granting asylum ‘may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries’, implying a requirement for ‘international cooperation’.3 While the principles and objectives of burden-sharing are obvious – rebalancing the grossly unequal global distribution of refugee impacts and responsibilities – the conceptual and operational limitations, together with the clear lack of any actual rebalancing of the burden (Roper and Barria, 2010; Betts et al., 2012; Barutciski and Suhrke, 2001), have prompted new thinking around how to approach the challenge.

Responsibility-sharing represents not just a change of terminology from burden-sharing, but also a reconceptualization of the problem, from an expectation that host countries might receive international support to a positive obligation on the international community to provide that support. This is particularly important in light of the concerns that have been voiced about the extent to which financial assistance can be considered an appropriate substitute for burden-sharing in the form of resettlement places. While the end goal of successful burden-sharing might be to foster a sense of solidarity with countries disproportionately affected by forced displacement, research shows that financial packages

3 While not a specific focus of the case study research for this project, responsibility is analysed in the accompanying policy review (Zetter, 2018a).
have been perceived by major hosting states as countries in the global north ‘pay[ing] out to avoid taking refugees’ (Hargrave and Pantuliano, 2016: 21).

Responsibility-sharing seeks to address two long-standing gaps in the refugee regime – sustaining the quality of protection and promoting durable solutions. Reasserting the primacy of protection restates the purpose of the refugee regime and the global obligations it demands. Likewise, by reasserting the central task of promoting durable solutions, responsibility-sharing shifts the focus from the palliative responses implicit in burden-sharing. By focusing on underlying causes, it also relocates responsibility from the national/local level of remedial action to a global level. The argument here is that protection is a global public good, from which all states benefit: ensuring the quality of protection and its delivery in complex and diverse situations of forced displacement is a global responsibility. Similarly, durable solutions are by definition global in scope (resettlement for example is pre-eminently a global responsibility), and the means by which they are achieved require concerted global action. Finally, and as a corollary, disposing of the word ‘burden’ removes the negative connotations of this policy. In this respect, responsibility-sharing acknowledges the other fundamental shifts in the refugee regime noted by this study.

5 Changing the public narrative
Addressing the causes, consequences and outcomes of mass displacement requires more than just new paradigms, new sources and forms of funding and a fairer distribution of burdens and responsibilities – essential though all of these are: policies towards refugees – both in terms of direct assistance and in terms of the outcomes of their displacement, in particular integration or eventual resettlement – do not form in a vacuum, but are developed against a wider political and public discourse in both donor and hosting countries. Evidence on public opinion is contradictory and highly specific to locality, socio-economic group and circumstance, and it is very difficult to draw general conclusions, either around the state of public opinion over time and across societies, or the most effective ways to influence and shape it. Public opinion is not fixed, either in place or over time, and even in relatively welcoming contexts particular incidents or events can unsettle public opinion and lead to a spike in concern around refugees more broadly.

The case studies for this World Commission research present a mixed picture. Canada, for instance, is regarded as relatively positive and welcoming towards refugees; Canadians tend to see themselves as hospitable and generous, and regard their refugee resettlement programmes as a success. Surveys show that two-thirds of Canadians feel positively about immigration in general (Bloemraad, 2012), and Canadians are also more likely to favour policies that are more generous to refugee resettlement than in the United States or Europe. In Germany, the political discourse around refugees is dominated by the large influxes of recent years. An estimated 890,000 asylum-seekers arrived in Germany in 2015, with a further 280,000 in 2016 and 190,000 in 2017 (for a total of 1.36 million). On the whole the German public welcomed refugees and asylum-seekers, and they were provided with wide-ranging assistance and language support, though this has eroded over time, and the issue very nearly collapsed Chancellor Angela Merkel’s coalition government in July 2018. Despite a thread of African hospitality running through Kenyan public and political discourse on
refugees (Lindley, 2011; Campbell, 2006), attitudes there have been largely negative. Negative perceptions of refugees are linked to crime, illegality and insecurity, particularly regarding Somali refugees, who are commonly stereotyped as terrorists (Kagwanja, 2000; Jaji, 2014). For its part, Jordan has struggled to accommodate a huge refugee population, including over 2 million Palestinians (accounting for around 43% of the population), 660,000 Syrians and an estimated 140,000 Iraqis. Public attitudes have dramatically shifted over time, from sympathy and solidarity with the initial influx of Palestinians in 1946 to more guarded attitudes towards more recent arrivals; recent research on the experiences of Syrian refugees, for instance, reports discrimination and verbal abuse, and bullying of children at school (Bellamy et al., 2017), and there is growing public frustration with the pressure Syrian refugees in particular are placing on public services.

Taken together, the case studies for this research highlight the complexity and fluidity of public attitudes towards refugees over time and context. These findings in relation to specific case countries are supported by other research on global patterns and trends (Dempster and Hargrave, 2017), which paints a similarly mixed picture of public attitudes towards refugees and migrants, with groups strongly in favour or opposed sandwiching a larger part of the public falling within a ‘conflicted’ or ‘anxious’ middle – ‘less ideologically motivated than groups most confidently “for” or “against” immigration, and much more ambivalent towards refugees and migrants and their impacts on society’ (Purpose, 2017; Katwala et al., 2014). Negative attitudes cannot simply be dismissed as racism or xenophobia: while there is certainly a racial element in the way some segments of a society feel about the presence of foreigners in ‘their’ schools, hospitals and shopping centres, attitudes are much more fundamentally driven by genuine, real-world concerns, around the economy, work, culture, identity, religion and insecurity, linked both to the specific issue of refugees and to anxieties around change more broadly.

6 Summary of recommendations

Based on this research and wider consultation, the World Commission has proposed a set of recommendations grouped under six pillars. Key points are summarised here; fuller recommendations are provided in the World Commission’s Final Report. In each case, the World Commission’s recommendations derive directly from the findings of the Chumir/ODI project on the economic dimensions of migration in host societies; the protection regime for refugees and migrants; responsibility-sharing and a more equitable balance of the burden between the developed and developing worlds; the vital importance of influencing the public narrative around migration; integration; and the role of new technologies.

- **Pillar I: Development: an investment-led strategy.** A ‘Merchant Bank’ should be established dedicated to the development, from conception to implementation, of sustainable commercial investment opportunities that are reasonable for private sector investment in difficult contexts.

- **Pillar II: Protection/coverage.** Forcibly displaced people should be covered by minimum international standards of protection and support, regardless of cause and location, including employment as a durable response.
• **Pillar III: Responsibility-sharing and coordination.** A senior-level ‘platform’ should be established to recommend best practices, coordinate responses, propose methods and standards for shared responsibilities and, where possible, prevent displacement in the first place.

• **Pillar IV: Narrative.** Public opinion should be addressed to cultivate narratives that permit solution-oriented political action. Policies addressing the real impacts of displacement on host societies would ease tensions and help support more positive public attitudes.

• **Pillar V: Inclusion.** The integration of displaced people into their host societies is essential if they are to become contributing members of their community. The responsibility for successful inclusion lies with both host and newly arrived populations.

• **Pillar VI: Technology.** The best modern technologies should be deployed for identification, connectivity, support and social services to support development and integration opportunities for the displaced.

Annex

**Full list of papers for the World Commission on Forced Displacement**


**Bibliography**


Purpose (2017) *Germany and France segmentation research study, in collaboration with Ipsos MORI and IFOP*.


16

Conceptualising Forced Displacement

Roger Zetter
HPG Working Paper
June 2019


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1 Introduction

Neither ‘forced displacement’ nor ‘forcibly displaced persons’ is a ‘term of art’ in the same way as ‘refugee’. However, the increasingly widespread use of these terms is a recognition that the word ‘refugee’ is failing to describe the millions of people driven from their homes and in need of some form of protection, as well as other assistance, but who are not subject to persecution – the determining criterion of refugee status and protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention/1967 Protocol and the mandate of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). For many years, UNHCR has used terminology such as ‘people in a refugee-like situation’ and ‘others of concern’, but these descriptive sub-categories still privilege those who have refugee status: they address neither the situation of those who fall outside the Convention, nor the obligations on states and intergovernmental bodies towards them in a comprehensive and comparable way. Both the Africa Union Convention of 1969 and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration adopted by a group of Latin American states invoke a wider definition, but these instruments do not, of course, have global reach, and their application still depends on precise legal definitions which constrain their use and obligations in the same way as the 1951 Convention. The 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the 2009 Kampala Convention for AU member states also offer, in theory, a wider scope of protection for an additional group of forcibly displaced people – those remaining within their own countries. However, in practice few countries have incorporated these principles into their national legislation or constitutions, and those that do rarely implement these principles systematically or with conviction.

In the search for a more all-encompassing designation, ‘forced displacement’ and ‘forcibly displaced persons’ have gained increasing traction. Despite the lack of global consensus, this terminology moves beyond the circumscribed international legal and normative meaning (and international obligations) of the 1951 Convention and the regional instruments. It seeks to capture the complex drivers, processes, impacts and consequences, and the multiplicity of categories, which characterise displacement. It also seeks to capture the complex mix of rights and legal protection which these populations require, and their socio-economic needs.

Recent international initiatives have recognised the needs of different groups of forcibly displaced people without resort to specific legal and normative categories or conventions: for example, the Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative; the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) Migration Crisis Operational Framework (MCOF); the Nansen Initiative on cross-border displacement in the context of disasters; and the Hyogo and Sendai Frameworks, which recognise the significance of natural disasters as a driver of forced displacement. These initiatives, and the intensifying global challenges presented by increasingly complex patterns and processes of international migration and population displacement, also provided the impetus for both the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) and the UN High-level Meeting on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants in 2016. Both summits make frequent use of the term forced displacement, but equally both avoid defining and elaborating an understanding of the concept and how this might foster new approaches to addressing this major global phenomenon. Both fora stick to the politically acceptable formulation of refugees and migrants (including internally displaced people (IDPs)).

Curiously, the research literature is equally ambivalent. While some researchers draw a sharp analytical distinction between the terms ‘refugee’ and ‘forced displacement’, others elide the two terms or use them interchangeably. For some academics, the starting point is the differentiation offered by the international legal and normative status of refugee. Others question this exceptionality
and the singularity of the label; they advocate the more inclusive terminology of forced displacement, but without defining the concept. Other researchers suggest that there is a continuum of migratory movement, between voluntary at one extreme and forced at the other. This recognises that there are many different types of migration and (forced) displacement that do not easily lend themselves to discrete typologies: they frequently merge with one another, and the drivers of displacement are often multi-causal rather than unique.

The key point here is to recognise the multi-variate causes and consequences of all migratory movements; there are many different motives and drivers of migration and displacement, including conflict, livelihood vulnerability, environmental change and multiple political, economic and social factors. What this means is that the relatively ‘simple’ cause–effect conjuncture of persecution and refugees does not capture the diversity of contemporary displacement processes that underpin the growing popularity of the term forced displacement. The subjective and restrictive privileging of refugees is challenged by a wider perspective on rights, needs and different forms of protection of the increasing numbers of involuntary migrants who fall outside the 1951 Refugee Convention. This diversity is no longer simply contingent on a status-based category such as refugee.

In summary, reflecting the complex dynamics of forced displacement, and significant though innovative international initiatives are, what is missing is a robust conceptualisation of forced displacement. This is the analytical challenge.

2 A conceptualisation of forced displacement

Analysing the complex empirical reality of displacement reveals two over-arching and complementary parameters – the drivers of displacement, and the patterns, processes and channels of displacement. These parameters constitute one way of developing a coherent conceptualisation of forced displacement.

2.1 Drivers and scenarios of forced displacement

Whereas persecution is the archetypal ‘driver’ of refugee movements, multiple factors precipitate forced displacement and shape and influence each context and situation. Moreover, it is a combination of drivers that most often accounts for the majority of those who are forcibly displaced, and that renders them highly vulnerable. Reflecting this multivariate character, a conceptualisation of forced displacement would comprise six broad drivers/scenarios covering contemporary and emerging situations.

2.1.1. Voluntary migration and involuntary displacement: socio-economic and state fragility and potentially existential threats

The impression that voluntary migration and involuntary displacement are two clearly distinct phenomena breaks down because increasing numbers of migrants neither leave their homes and countries of origin entirely voluntarily nor enter transit or destination countries by regular means. Millions of people move within or leave their countries because of a multiplicity of structural conditions, including:

- poverty, lack of livelihood opportunities, food insecurity, depletion of natural resources;
- ‘land-grabbing’ by elites, the dramatic expansion of agro-industrial land use in the global South and contested land rights;
- state, governance and political fragility, together with the failure of public institutions and the erosion of essential public services;
• religious or ethnic discrimination; and
• human rights deprivation, repression, low-level generalised violence and failure of the rule of law.

While there may be no obvious or immediate ‘force’ which precipitates displacement, it is rarely a voluntary decision, and in some cases, it may be in anticipation of existential threats. This type of forced displacement is often incremental, slow-onset and associated with pre-existing vulnerabilities; it is thus harder to detect and define than the more familiar crisis/rapid-onset processes of forced displacement. Impoverishment, socio-economic and political marginalisation and loss of rights are the inevitable outcomes of these drivers of forced displacement.

Highlighting this blurred space between voluntary migration and displacement which is more recognisably forced clarifies the existence of a very broad grouping of structural factors which, while not obviously forcing people to leave, are nevertheless precipitating substantial and increasing levels of displacement. This may initially be internal, for example associated with cyclical food insecurity in the Sahel, but sustained out-migration from West African states such as Gambia, Mali and Nigeria, and escape from human rights violations in Zimbabwe, Eritrea and Colombia over long periods of time, illustrate how internal displacement typically expands into international movement.

Sharpening our conceptualisation of forced displacement in this way shows why this space is highly problematic for displaced people. Precisely because the observable drivers of displacement are often indistinct, involuntary migrants in this space are highly vulnerable: they fall through the net of humanitarian assistance and ‘refugee status’ recognition, which brings with it rights protection, security and other entitlements from the governments of transit or destination countries.

A better understanding of how these structural weaknesses can generate conditions of forced displacement produces a more robust conceptualisation of the phenomenon. For humanitarian and development policy-makers, this knowledge could help in promoting policies and actions, such as conflict prevention, respect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and peace-building, that would diminish these conditions.

2.1.2 The nexus of armed conflict, other situations of violence and human rights violations

Armed, increasingly intra-state, conflict plays a crucial role in forcing people to flee – see Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Iraq and South Sudan. Conflict and violations of IHL and human rights frequently co-exist (Bosnia, Rwanda, Syria). These situations are usually the outcome of, and exacerbated by, the structural conditions discussed above. Thus, post-election violence in Kenya in 2007, and continuing ethnic/religious tension in Iraq and Libya, illustrate how these structural conditions can shift from incremental to crisis levels of internal (and some external) forced displacement. Again, as these examples show, the nexus of conflict violence and human rights violations generates both internal and international displacement; the latter predominates.

Invoking the label of refugee is again problematic because the proliferation of largely indiscriminate and generalised violence and human rights violations does not typically involve persecution in the legal and normative sense enshrined in international refugee law. As in the first typology, a more explicit conceptualisation of how the nexus of human rights violations, violence and armed conflict (as well as structural weaknesses) in affected countries precipitate forced displacement can help to better shape humanitarian, developmental, peace-building and political interventions.
2.1.3. Environmental degradation and climate change
Environmental degradation and climate change are increasingly associated with population displacement. Like the drivers discussed above, these phenomena operate in conjunction with economic, social and political factors, and are linked to existing vulnerabilities. They are rarely unique cause–effect drivers of displacement, but they may produce a ‘tipping point’.

Resonating with the earlier discussion of structural conditions, environmental factors generally precipitate ‘slow-onset’ and thus hard-to-detect displacement; this is compounded by uncertainty around the scale, distribution and timing of potential displacement. These conditions pose new and unfamiliar challenges in understanding the concept of forced displacement, which is generally deployed in the context of crisis/rapid-onset displacement.

While it may be plausible that environmental degradation/climate change might exacerbate competition for scarce resources (such as water, or grazing land for nomadic pastoral communities), thus leading to violence, conflict and forced displacement, these links have yet to be firmly established. It is more likely that such displacement is the outcome of pre-existing political, social and economic conditions within which resource scarcity exists.

However, irrespective of exactly how environmental degradation/climate change drive population displacement, contemporary research shows that displacement will overwhelmingly be internal rather than international. This is of course a very distinct contrast with the typologies so far discussed. The volume and consequences of displacement will still be substantial, posing not only conceptual but also humanitarian, development and human rights challenges, but the locus of displacement means that these impacts and concerns will vary greatly between affected governments, international and inter-governmental bodies and humanitarian and development actors. The lack of traction of the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the 2009 Kampala Convention for AU member states has already been noted.

2.1.4. Natural disasters
Disasters – precipitated by natural hazards such as floods, cyclones, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, droughts and landslides – are a major driver of forced displacement. Climate change is also thought to be a cause of the increasing global incidence of extreme weather events. Overall, natural disasters account for significantly greater numbers of forcibly displaced people than conflict and violence.4

Pre-existing vulnerable groups are overwhelmingly the most exposed to these hazards and experience the greatest impacts in terms of loss, damage and displacement. This is because socio-economic marginalisation combines with both the physical risks of living on marginal land (e.g. land that is susceptible to flooding or landslides) and the limited economic capacity to minimise risks or recover from disaster impacts. These groups have more limited access to support, for example through mitigation and resilience programmes or to ease their return after disaster.

4 In 2017, in the 50 countries with the highest levels of internal displacement, 11.8 million people were displaced by conflict, against 18.8 million displaced by natural disasters (IDMC, 2018). According to UNHCR there were 25.4 million refugees in the world at the end of 2017 (UNHCR, 2018). Lack of data means that the picture for people fleeing conflict hazards and crossing national borders is less clear (Opitz-Stapleton et al., 2017).
Two significant features of disaster displacement should be highlighted. First, displacement is almost exclusively internal rather than international, with the same implications for limited protection as already discussed. Second, unlike the other typologies discussed so far, evidence shows that the vast majority of people displaced by disasters do eventually return home. These dynamics introduce modalities of intervention very different from those where displacement is either protracted or permanent.

2.1.5 Development-induced displacement

Development-induced displacement – government or internationally/multilaterally financed development projects, for example urban infrastructure and renewal or dam construction – is a major driver of dislocation for millions of people each year. Sometimes eviction takes place because economically powerful interests want land. Affected communities are usually poor and marginalised, and are almost always worse off as a result of displacement, even if there are formal plans for resettlement. The lack of empowerment, inadequate protection and denial of rights of the dispossessed – for example the lack of legal instruments related to housing, land and property rights – resonate with the conditions of other, more recognisably forcibly displaced populations.

Given the drive in most developing countries for economic growth and development, this trend is likely to intensify. As with the environmental and disaster scenarios, displacement is internal. International human rights and advocacy agencies draw attention to the violation of housing, land and property rights and norms, and invoke the 1998 Guiding Principles. Yet these principles are low on the agenda of most governments and international actors in the context of development-induced displacement.

2.1.6. Intractable crises, protracted displacement

In the past many refugees eventually returned home, especially in the so-called ‘decade of return’ in the 1990s – Mozambicans from refuge in Malawi, Angolans from Zambia, Bosnians from temporary protection in Europe, Nicaraguans, Salvadorans and Guatemalans from refuge elsewhere in Central America. Return – one of three so-called durable solutions5 – took place as civil wars abated and the peace-building efforts of the international community gained traction. Although organised voluntary repatriation took place, the majority returned spontaneously when conditions were right for them.

By contrast, many contemporary situations of forced displacement are protracted or permanent: according to a recent World Bank estimate, on average a refugee is displaced for just over ten years. Large-scale displacement is protracted and dominant because the drivers that give rise to displacement are politically intractable – Somalia, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Colombia (until the recent accord) are displacement scenarios lasting between three and four decades; Syria will likely be the same. For many, forced displacement will be permanent in the case of displacement drivers such as development and land-grabbing.

The point here is that protractedness is not just symptomatic: it is a driver of displacement or onward displacement from host countries. Affected populations see no viable long-term future for themselves in their own countries or in countries hosting millions of other refugees, and little prospect of return.

5 The three so called ‘durable solutions’ of UNHCR are return to country of origin, local integration and third-country resettlement. While return to country of origin is generally seen as the preferred option by states, in many contemporary situations of displacement return may be neither possible for, nor desired by, displaced people.
2.2 Patterns, processes and channels of forced displacement

The second overarching conceptual characteristic is the processes, patterns and channels of movement that forcibly displaced people follow. Not surprisingly, trajectories are diverse and often complex and fluid – dislocation takes place within countries, across borders, with forward, onward and backward movements from the place of origin.

2.2.1. The time–space discontinuities of displacement

Refugee displacement is usually characterised by large-scale exodus, sometimes in a single event or at recognisable intervals. By contrast, the factors propelling forced displacement frequently oscillate unpredictably around different phases of conflict or other threats: acute, de-escalation, escalation and stability. Thus, forcibly displaced people may be in transit or stationary, temporarily settled or temporarily returning, permanently exiled or permanently returning, and their trajectory is not necessarily predicated on a clear status, a fixed host-country destination or a permanent ‘solution’ – conditions that describe the situation of refugees. The displacement of Somali and Afghan refugees over recent decades exemplifies these temporal patterns.

2.2.2. Internal displacement

Most people do not willingly leave their home environments even under life-threatening pressure, and still less do they wish to leave their country of origin. They often believe displacement will be temporary and may thus move locally and adopt self-protection strategies. The dominance of internal displacement is exemplified by the ratio of IDPs to refugees displaced by conflict of 2.5:1, and almost 4:1 if all IDPs including those displaced by disasters are added in.

2.2.3. Routes and pathways: mixed movements and irregular migration

Unusual routes, diverse means of travel, increasing reliance on smugglers, the lack of formal visa documentation and clandestine entry all now characterise the patterns and processes of forced displacement, illustrated by the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Syrians, Afghans, Eritreans and West Africans (among many others) at Europe’s borders. The term ‘irregular migration’ is often used to describe these complex, diverse and informal processes of mobility, processes which challenge assumptions about the ‘conventional’ refugee journey in which refugee status is implicitly embedded.

Moreover, multiple drivers produce ‘mixed movements’ of people – voluntary migrants, putative refugees, former IDPs, other forcibly displaced people and trafficked and smuggled persons, travelling together, along the same routes and with broadly the same hopes of gaining entry, usually though not exclusively to rich countries. Since many of those caught up in ‘mixed movements’ are also considered to be ‘irregular migrants’ the two descriptors are often used synonymously. While ‘irregular migrant’ is not a legal status per se, many affected governments use it as a quasi-legal, largely negative, term.

2.2.4. Camps

The archetype of refugee exile, the camp, is now in decline despite the desire of many host countries to ‘contain’ refugees, and the belief among humanitarian actors that camps provide better conditions for protection. Camps often act as holding/processing centres, for example in Greece, rather than long-term settlements, but given the unsystematic patterns and processes described above, forcibly displaced people and refugees are much less likely to be in camps than in the past. The majority of these populations now migrate to urban areas where economic opportunities are generally better, even if living conditions, the quality of protection and material assistance are substantially worse.
2.2.5. From voluntary migrant to forcibly displaced
Regular migrants leave their country of origin voluntarily and through formal channels, but may subsequently become stranded or trapped by conflict or crisis and thus subsequently forcibly displaced. This was the case for 800,000 mainly South-East Asian migrant workers legally resident in Libya. With the collapse of the Gadhafi regime in the so-called Arab Spring, they were exposed to situations that endangered their lives, freedom and livelihoods, rendering them as vulnerable as Libyan refugees fleeing the civil war. As a result, they were forcibly displaced to border regions with Tunisia, but no effective protection norms or assistance were available for them until a UNHCR/IOM humanitarian operation was mounted.

2.2.6. Onward trajectories, global mobility
In the past, most refugees and others who were displaced were contained in their regions of origin, usually in neighbouring countries – Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, Sudanese refugees in Uganda and Ethiopia, Sierra Leonean refugees in Ghana. This is no longer so much the case: onward trajectories are a salient feature of forced displacement. Transit countries have now entered the vocabulary of displacement; the arrival of millions of forcibly displaced people in mixed and irregular migration flows at the borders of rich countries testifies to the global reach of the phenomenon. These trajectories are underpinned by transnational social networks and diaspora communities as receptors, facilitated by social media, entrepreneurial agents and smugglers. Onward trajectories and global mobility are a direct consequence of the complex multiple drivers of forced displacement, which inevitably create the ‘need’ for new channels and patterns of mobility.

3 Implications and key messages for policy-makers
While neither the diversity of drivers nor some of the patterns and processes of forced displacement are completely new per se, many of the characteristics are unfamiliar. Moreover, the scale, multi-causality and protracted nature of forced displacement are unprecedented. A forced displacement lens offers a significantly different way of conceptualising and analysing these contemporary phenomena in a holistic way.

Although distinctions between different categories of people forcibly on the move are not in reality either categorical or always clear-cut, the concept of forced displacement presented here seeks to distinguish between different types of forcibly displaced people. It seeks to capture the episodic nature of this ‘displacement continuum’, the diversity and complexity of patterns, processes and channels, and the ‘shifting statuses’ of mixed and irregular migration. At the same time, the analytical approach adopted here highlights the interplay between two structural components of forced displacement: the complexity and variety of drivers that lead to forced displacement are echoed in the complexity and diversity of mobility trajectories that forcibly displaced people undertake, and vice versa.

This analysis presents a number of key messages for policy-makers.

3.1. Internal displacement
Internal displacement is both a symptom and an accelerator of the structural conditions of socio-economic impoverishment and political instability which drive forced displacement, described in the first scenario. Moreover, the conditions that lead to internal displacement create a reservoir that inexorably spills across international borders – exemplified by the sustained flow of Colombian refugees to Ecuador and Venezuela (totalling almost 310,000, alongside 6.3 million IDPs), from the 6.6
million IDPs in Syria alongside 4.8 million refugees and 300,000 refugees from the Central African republic (CAR) alongside 370,000 IDPs. International preoccupation with people forced to leave their countries ignores this close connection between internal and international displacement. Not only is the presence of IDPs a humanitarian and developmental challenge in itself: it inevitably and directly connects with the cross-border forced displacement that preoccupies international and inter-governmental stakeholders.

Key message

- **International actors should be proactive in tackling the conditions that precipitate internal displacement by enhancing governance and civil society, promoting rule of law and, when conflict breaks out, promoting conflict reduction, mediation, peace-building and the protection of IDPs. Addressing the root causes of forced displacement within countries is key to reducing spontaneous and large-scale international movements of people.**

### 3.2. Protracted and permanent displacement – sustainable development responses

In many countries there is no quick or easy resolution to socio-economic and state fragility, existential threats and the nexus of armed conflict and human rights violations that will enable forcibly displaced people to go home. Highlighting the lack of politically feasible ‘durable’ solutions such as return challenges the underlying precept on which the conceptualisation of refugees and IDPs is based – that displacement is a temporary and short-term phenomenon.

Key message

- **The protractedness or permanence of displacement highlights the need for far greater recognition by governments, inter-governmental and development actors of the harmful and destabilising long-term socio-economic consequences of such displacement for the displaced and host countries alike. While humanitarian responses will remain essential and must be maintained, in parallel development-led strategies are also required to support long-term livelihoods; mitigate the negative macro- and micro-economic impacts and costs for host countries and populations; and capitalise on the paradox that forced displacement, if effectively and comprehensively managed, can bring development opportunities for hosting countries.**

### 3.3. Legal channels for migration and refugee resettlement, not barriers, walls and fences

Whereas orderly, managed international migration regulated by international conventions, visa controls and the like is the desirable norm, ‘mixed flows’ and ‘irregular migration’ – the defining characteristics of contemporary forced displacement – combined with the unprecedented number of people on the move have created both unmanageable consequences and political turmoil in many impacted countries. These outcomes indicate profound weaknesses in the international migration regime, and the systemic failure of the refugee regime. Managed migration is increasingly challenged by the mixed and irregular movement of people who fall between voluntary migration and involuntary displacement, as well as the lack of viable means of entry. Innovative approaches are needed to open up channels for regular migration and ensure better protection for migrants en route.

Refugee resettlement is a key option at the disposal of the international refugee regime, yet barely 10% of the million or so refugees applying for resettlement each year are accepted by receiving
countries. Yet resettlement offers receiving countries a manageable alternative to the reactive policies currently deployed to tackle large-scale spontaneous arrivals. While refugee resettlement will not in itself address the large scale of forced displacement, it will relieve some of the intense pressures on the main host countries and may help reduce the irregular patterns and processes of onward migration.

**Key message**

- To tackle these systemic weaknesses and failures, more legal channels, more innovative strategies and better migrant protection are needed in order to manage international migration more effectively. At the same time, strategies for refugee resettlement should be substantially enhanced.

### 3.4. The power of categories: status, rights and needs

Political leaders and government policy-makers require clear legal and normative categories to determine entitlements and responsibilities, hence the enduring power of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The exclusivity of refugee status and its categorical interpretation serve the interests both of states (in managing entry, most noticeably in the pushback from European governments and the securitisation of migration) and humanitarian actors (in targeting assistance).

The problem, however, is that the multivariate factors and motives that propel forced displacement, and the patterns and processes of displacement, call into question the well-established ‘status-based’ category of refugee as the primary determinant of protection and other rights and needs. Forced displacement is a highly significant cause of vulnerability, irrespective of the exact category or cause of displacement. The conceptualisation of forced displacement outlined above emphasises precisely the significance of separating the legal and normatively bound status definition of the displaced person (such as a refugee) from the drivers and processes of forced displacement.

A key theme underpinning this analysis is the concept of ‘displacement vulnerability’, which applies to all forcibly displaced people. The categorical identity of a pre-determined group disregards and indeed risks increasing the vulnerability of excluded members of the affected population as a whole. Transcending a ‘status-based’ criterion of eligibility for protection and assistance, international intervention should be predicated on a needs-based and rights-based response to these vulnerabilities, not a specific legal status. In other words, the right to protection and the upholding of many other rights are entitlements of all human beings, and most certainly of forcibly displaced people. They are not contingent on a particular legal status. Likewise, a needs-based approach recognises that many different kinds of protection are needed, contingent on: first, the type of forced displacement that is experienced (the drivers and scenarios described above); and second, on the situations in which those who are displaced find themselves on their journey (the patterns, processes and channels of displacement). Mainstreaming protection into humanitarian assistance and development programmes is predicated on adopting a wider definition of protection which embraces both needs- and rights-based approaches.

**Key message**

- Governments, inter-governmental agencies and humanitarian and development actors must address more fully the interplay between vulnerability and protection of forcibly displaced people based on needs- and rights-based precepts, rather than status-based criteria.
4 Conclusion

Conceptualising forced displacement from these two perspectives – drivers and scenarios, and patterns and processes – is not merely an academic exercise. It also provides a crucial analytical tool for humanitarian and development practitioners, human rights actors and international agencies writ large by opening up new ways of understanding the vulnerabilities, rights and needs of forcibly displaced people beyond a status-based entitlement such as refugee. Conceptualised in this way, forced displacement can reveal the diversity of protection situations and gaps (such as rights violations and acute socio-economic deprivation and needs) to which forcibly displaced people are exposed, and for which protection must be invoked. Such an approach to protection requires linking humanitarian, migration, human rights and developmental perspectives, which a forced displacement lens facilitates. Likewise, a forced displacement lens helps to reveal the wider challenges that lie at the core of humanitarian and longer-term developmental precepts, such as sustainable responses, building resilience and recognising the agency of displaced people, and the strengthening nexus between these elements.

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Roger Zetter, Karen Hargrave and Sarah Deardorff-Miller

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1 Introduction

This review explores the origins and traces the main contours of the refugee and humanitarian regime as it has evolved and developed in the second half of the twentieth century. It explores the changing dynamics of forced displacement, the principal challenges this has presented to the international community and the institutional and policy responses intended to address them. It elaborates the key debates that have motivated the refugee regime, critically assesses policy successes and the key ingredients of these successes as well as their limitations, and highlights lessons learned from best practice.

2 The origins of the refugee and humanitarian regime

2.1 Historical origins

Although international institutional responses to forced displacement formally took shape in the latter half of the twentieth century, the phenomenon of forced displacement has a much longer history. As Forcade and Nivet (2008) emphasise, populations displaced by war have been a recurring feature of history – including in Europe – since at least the sixteenth century. While earlier forced population movements were generally smaller-scale, some were sizeable, including the expulsion of at least 240,000 Moors from Spain in 1609 and the departure of over 170,000 Huguenots from France in 1685 (Elie, 2014).

Over the twentieth century the phenomenon of forced displacement took on several distinctive features (Elie, 2014). First, its scale increased as new means of warfare developed, causing wider levels of destruction and growing impacts on civilians (Loescher, 2001; Bessel and Haake, 2009). Second, the character of displacement changed, instigated by political, as opposed to religious, conflicts (Elie, 2014). Third, it took on a different domestic resonance with the growth of ethno-nationalist sovereignty, related suspicion of ‘outsiders’, and the development of immigration laws and border regimes (Marfleet, 2007; Marrus, 2010; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). Finally, international institutions developed as it became clear that the private charitable initiatives hitherto deployed in response to displacement were not sufficient to meet the evolving scale and nature of the issue (Elie, 2014; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004).

International institutions began to take shape in the inter-war period in parallel with various waves of mass displacement instigated by events including the 1922 Greco-Turkish war and the rise of the new Soviet regime (Loescher, 2001). In 1921, the League of Nations appointed Fridtjof Nansen the first High Commissioner for refugees, initially with a mandate to assist the millions of people displaced from Soviet Russia, though this role was gradually expanded to cover other groups (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). Western governments avoided instituting a universal ‘refugee’ definition, instead preferring to extend assistance to specific national groups designated as ‘refugees’ (Betts et al., 2012). While Nansen achieved concessions in numerous key areas – including mobility, through the now-famed ‘Nansen passport’, and employment opportunities for refugees – ultimately his office remained constrained by its narrow mandate and subject to the political interests of states (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Loescher, 2001). The significance of the former limitation was made clear
through the failure of the International Nansen Office to respond to the horrors of Nazi persecution and genocide.

2.2 UNHCR
The international ‘refugee regime’, as it is known today, has its more direct roots in the period immediately following the Second World War. As the Western powers calculated their response to the tens of millions of people displaced by the war, the post-war years saw the creation of a number of institutions, starting with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) – widely criticised by the US for its role in repatriations to Soviet territory – which was swiftly replaced by the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) (Loescher, 2001). The IRO achieved rapid success in resettling most of its caseload from Europe’s displacement camps, finding new homes for refugees who (as seen in the Canada case study for this project) were viewed in Europe and elsewhere as a means of addressing post-war labour shortages (Betts et al., 2012).

With the resolution of the immediate post-war displacement crisis, these initial emergency measures eventually gave way to a longer-term institutional apparatus, as the onset of the Cold War and events in China, Korea and Palestine made clear that the refugee issue was not a temporary post-war phenomenon, but a problem of sustained global significance (Betts et al., 2012). In 1950 the United Nations established the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). UNHCR started life with limited autonomy and financial resources, as well as a limited mandate, extending only to the legal protection of people displaced as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). However, as discussed below, UNHCR’s mandate has gradually widened to incorporate material assistance and an expanding ‘population of concern’.

2.3 The 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol
This new institutional landscape was accompanied by the introduction of a new international legal framework with the adoption of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951 (henceforth the ‘1951 Convention’). Among other things, the 1951 Convention introduced a universal ‘refugee’ definition, though one reflective of the early Cold War context in which the Convention was drafted, and in response to political pressure from various world powers to maintain a narrow definition (Loescher, 2001; Betts et al., 2012). Article 1(A) defines a refugee as someone who has fled their home country, in doing so crossing an international border, and who is unable or unwilling to seek the protection of their country of origin due to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. While the 1951 Convention initially limited ‘refugee’ status to those in such a position as a result of events occurring in Europe before 1951, these geographical and temporal requirements were subsequently removed through the 1967 Protocol, which made the definition truly universal (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, 2007).

Notably, the 1951 Convention does not go so far as the preceding Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which in Article 14 proclaimed the right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution (Chatham House, 2005). The most substantive right afforded to refugees is that
of non-refoulement (Article 33), which prohibits the return of a refugee to a country where he or she faces serious threats to life or freedom. Other substantive rights guaranteed by the 1951 Convention include the right to work (Articles 17–19), the right to freedom of movement (Article 26), the rights to housing and education (Articles 21–22), and the right not to be punished for illegal entry into the territory of a contracting state (Article 31).

Refugee crises in the wake of decolonisation in Africa marked the emergence of a global mandate for refugee protection and humanitarian assistance. Accordingly, the 1951 Convention was amended by the 1967 Protocol, which removed the Convention’s temporal and geographical limitations (events before 1951 and in Europe). Thus, the Convention and the definition of a refugee became truly global. However, it was not until 2003 that UNHCR was made a permanent institution of the UN.

2.4 Palestinian refugees and UNRWA
Whereas the international community largely ignored the huge refugee crisis that accompanied the partition of India in 1947 (12–14 million people are estimated to have been displaced), the creation of 700,000 Palestinian refugees from the civil war which created the state of Israel in 1948 prompted international action. This was because, unlike the partition of India, where the refugees fled to the two new states of India and Pakistan, there was no ready or permanent ‘solution’ to Palestinian displacement. A separate organisation was formed in 1949, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), responsible for meeting the basic humanitarian needs of Palestinian refugees – for example health, social needs, education and shelter. Almost seven decades later, UNRWA’s separate existence points to the international community’s reluctance to embrace these refugees within the global refugee apparatus. With more than five million Palestinian refugees now under its care, UNRWA’s continued existence is also a mark of the international inability to reach political agreement on how to resolve the displacement of these refugees.

2.5 The humanitarian paradigm
In the second half of the twentieth century a paradigm response to forced displacement evolved, largely under the auspices of UNHCR. Underlying this approach was the notion of ‘durable solutions’, whereby three possible solutions to displacement were put forward:

- Repatriation: where a refugee voluntarily returns to their country of origin.
- Local integration: where a refugee is permanently integrated into the host country where they reside.
- Resettlement: where a refugee is offered a home and protection in a third country.

Beneath each of these approaches lies the assumption that the permanent solution to ‘displacement’ is emplacement within either one’s original or a new political community (Haddad, 2008). As time progressed, international responses varied in the priority given to each of these solutions. Chimni (2004) outlines two distinct phases: from 1945 to 1986, when resettlement was promoted in practice, while voluntary repatriation was in principle
accepted as the preferred solution; and 1985 onwards, when ‘voluntary repatriation came to be promoted as the durable solution’.

Given the assumption that, in most refugee situations, displacement was temporary and that a ‘durable solution’ would be swiftly forthcoming, a dominant assistance paradigm developed that is today labelled ‘care and maintenance’. In this model, assistance is primarily in the form of short-term interventions by humanitarian actors, whose focus tends to be on the provision of protection and basic needs, including food, nutrition, education, health and shelter (Crawford et al., 2015). This model also assumes that displacement follows a linear path, from a single displacement event, followed by a short period of exile and concluded by collective return (ibid.). This conceptualisation has been reinforced by the actions of host states, which – as evidenced in the Kenya case study here – have over time maintained the notion of displacement as a temporary phenomenon, leaving UNHCR and other aid organisations with limited space to develop alternative responses.

In cases such as Kenya, care and maintenance has often been accompanied by policies of encampment, with refugees confined to camps, their freedom of movement restricted, and often their status and wider rights limited, in particular access to legal employment. Use of encampment expanded as responses to displacement developed, with some suggesting that the use of camps over time evolved to become a ‘fourth solution’ (Agier, 2011). However, while camps may have the benefit of simplifying the process of providing humanitarian aid in the short term, they have been roundly criticised for limiting refugees’ ability to contribute to host societies and violating refugees’ rights. In 2004, the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) wrote that ‘Condemning people who fled persecution to stagnate in confinement for much of the remainder of their lives is unnecessary, wasteful, hypocritical, counterproductive, unlawful, and morally unacceptable’ (Smith, 2004: 38).

3 The evolution of the refugee and humanitarian regime

This section, which draws on the background concept paper on forced displacement, explores how the refugee regime has evolved since its inception in the early 1950s along three axes: the changing dynamics of forced displacement; changes in the international architecture in response to the challenges these changes have posed; and the changing political context within which forced displacement takes place.

3.1 Changing dynamics of forced displacement

3.1.1 Protracted displacement

There have been numerous key shifts in the dynamics of forced displacement since the institutional and normative frameworks around it took shape. First, it has become increasingly clear that displacement is not a temporary phenomenon, but is in most cases protracted. UNHCR estimates that, at the end of 2017, two-thirds of all refugees were in a ‘protracted refugee situation’, defined as a situation in which over 25,000 refugees of the same nationality have been in exile in a particular country for five consecutive years or longer (UNHCR, 2018). This includes over four million refugees who had been displaced for over 20 years, including Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran and Palestinian refugees in Egypt. One
HPG study found that, once refugees have been displaced for six months, they are unlikely to be able to return home within three years (Cosgrave et al., 2016).

Protracted displacement raises key questions and challenges. Most importantly, it has brought the once-dominant care and maintenance paradigm into question, not only regarding its underlying rationale – which, as discussed above, is premised on humanitarian assistance as a short-term solution to temporary displacement – but also its practical viability. With donor interest dropping off as crises become protracted, attention has been paid to the unsustainable funding model behind care and maintenance, which prioritises emergency assistance over refugee self-reliance (Crawford et al., 2015). Other questions include the security implications of protracted refugee situations, the importance of political economy analysis and open mobility policies to unlock protracted crises, and the role of longer-term development actors in responding to forced displacement (Milner and Loescher, 2011; Long, 2011).

### 3.1.2 The changing nature of conflict

Another key trend – driving rises in overall and specifically protracted displacement – has been the changing nature of conflict, which has become increasingly frequent, complex and long (Bennett et al., 2016). Changes have included a shift from ‘classic’ international armed conflicts to ‘a complex array of internal or cross-border confrontations, many involving regional and world powers’, in addition to a growing variety of militant non-state armed actors (ibid.: 28). This has been accompanied by an evolution in the methods of warfare, for example the increasing use of drones and automated weapons. These shifts in the nature of conflict have prompted debates around the role of the humanitarian, peacebuilding and broader UN architecture in responding to complex crises and addressing root causes of displacement.

### 3.1.3 Internal displacement

A related key shift has been the marked rise in internal displacement. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimates that, by the end of 2017, 40 million people were living in internal displacement as a result of conflict and violence, a number which has almost doubled since 2000 (IDMC, 2018). Primarily, internal displacement has raised questions around the ability of the international refugee regime, which was created to address cross-border displacement, to adapt to the challenges associated with displacement within a country’s own borders. There have been important developments in recent decades on the normative and institutional frameworks surrounding internally displaced persons (IDPs), but overall progress on this agenda has been slow given severely limited political will. IDPs pose a unique challenge to an international architecture already politically constrained in relation to cross-border displacement: namely, how to facilitate assistance to this group without threatening or undermining the sovereignty of the states in which these individuals continue to reside, and whose actions may in many cases be the cause of their displacement.

### 3.1.4 Urban displacement

Displacement has become an increasingly urban phenomenon, in line with broader global processes of urbanisation (Jacobsen, 2006; Landau, 2014). UNHCR estimates that in 2017 just
under 60% of refugees were living in urban areas (UNHCR, 2018), a trend particularly pronounced in regard to the Syrian refugee crisis, with 90% living in private or rented accommodation, and less than 10% in camps (UNHCR, 2018). While it is likely that a similar – if not greater – number of IDPs live in urban areas, IDMC notes that the ‘little data available is not enough to assess the true scale of the phenomenon’ (IDMC, 2016: 3).

Like protracted displacement, urban displacement has challenged the dominance of the care and maintenance model by undermining the underlying assumption that refugees predominantly live in camps. In 2009, UNHCR revised its policy on urban refugees, recognising urban areas as legitimate protection spaces and moving away from its previous ‘institutional scepticism’ on the issue, but critics have noted that the policy remains vague and offers little in terms of concrete good practice (Landau, 2014). One of the most significant challenges relates to the distinct protection concerns experienced by the urban displaced – particularly those whose status is irregular – including threats of deportation, discrimination and gang violence (Crisp et al., 2012; Haysom, 2013).

Responses to urban displacement – as opposed to camp-based assistance – are likely to involve a distinct set of actors, including a greater role for local and national authorities and the private sector (Zetter, 2014). In urban settings, international responses also face heightened challenges in ensuring that responses avoid creating parallel assistance structures, while also avoiding being seen as prioritising the needs of the displaced over vulnerable members of the host community (Landau, 2014). Many studies have underlined the important role that the displaced can play in contributing to the economies of host cities (see Pantuliano et al., 2011; Campbell, 2006). However, any attempts to harness the opportunities which urban areas provide must also account for refugees’ and IDPs’ participation in informal urban economies (Landau, 2014).

### 3.1.5 Climate displacement

Recent years have also seen increased attention to displacement in the context of climate change and environmental degradation. While people have always been prompted to move as a result of environmental change, current debates work on the assumption that these processes will be accelerated as a result of climate change. The climate displacement agenda has seen significant debate over terminology, with the term ‘environmental refugee’ popularised from the 1970s onwards, while at the same time being widely criticised as poorly defined and legally meaningless (Black, 2001). There has been significant interest among policy-makers in causal relationships between climate change and displacement, though academics have cautioned that, except in rare cases where areas may become entirely uninhabitable, the relationship between migration and climate change is inherently complex and subject to a number of political, social and economic mediating factors (Betts, 2010; Zetter and Morrissey, 2014; Zetter, 2017). Many have distinguished between displacement due to rapid-onset extreme weather events and slow-onset displacement related to factors such as desertification and rising sea levels, with related challenges likely to include deforestation, rapid urbanisation, declining agricultural production and water shortages (Boano et al., 2008).
In line with disputed definitions and challenges posed by multi-causality, the data on climate displacement is thin, with many frequently used estimates criticised by academics as empirically weak (Betts, 2010). At present it is likely that the majority of such displacement remains internal, with IDMC estimating that, in 2016 alone, 24.2 million were internally displaced by disasters, over three times the number internally displaced by conflict (IDMC, 2017). Nonetheless, as analysts look to the future there is growing recognition of the challenges that climate displacement may pose. First and foremost are concerns that the relatively small number of people driven to flee across borders for reasons relating to climate change will fall between the gaps of existing legal and normative protection frameworks, prompting discussions that sit within broader debates over the relevance of the 1951 Convention in responding to the challenges of contemporary displacement. Rather than developing new legal standards, the Nansen Initiative (2012–16) and the successor Platform on Disaster Displacement have pursued a state-led consultative process at regional levels to build consensus among states on the elements of a protection agenda.

3.1.6 Mixed flows
Finally, forced displacement has, particularly in recent years, become part of a broader discourse on ‘mixed flows’. These are cross-border population flows that, alongside those meeting the formal ‘refugee definition’, are also made up of individuals who might be considered ‘forcibly displaced’ in a broader sense, as well as those who may be more accurately classed as voluntary migrants, though who may also face acute vulnerabilities while on the move. The debate around mixed flows recognises that these different groups are increasingly using the same routes and means of transport, often involving irregular movement and smugglers. Although ‘mixed flows’ are not a uniquely new phenomenon, they have been a prominent topic of policy debates since the early 2000s, and in 2007 gained formal recognition by UNHCR through a 10-Point Plan of Action on Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration (UNHCR, 2007). In recent years, discussion of mixed flows has risen up the world agenda in the context of flows of refugees and migrants across the Mediterranean and into Europe.

Mixed flows pose both an analytical and a practical challenge (Long, 2013a). Analytically, they call into question the possibility of distinguishing between forced and voluntary movement, a question thrown into sharp relief by mixed movements sharing common migratory routes. UNHCR has maintained that refugees possess a unique legal status, and there are valid concerns around the co-opting of narratives on mixed flows to reduce space for refugee protection, bringing it under a broader debate on migration management (UNHCR, 2007; Crisp, 2003). However, overall there is growing recognition that few population movements are wholly voluntary or forced, and that most involve some degree of both (Van Hear et al., 2009). Practically speaking, the challenge is who to prioritise for assistance, and how best to deliver it. Many have pointed to shared vulnerabilities between forcibly displaced people and voluntary migrants on the move, raising questions over whether those fitting the formal ‘refugee’ definition should be privileged for special assistance or assisted as part of a broader response. Moreover, while those working on refugee and migration issues have previously worked within largely siloed communities, the increased prominence of mixed flows has prompted calls for better coordination and more joined-up ways of working between the two
groups. Nevertheless, the development of the two separate international compacts in 2018 – one for refugees and one for migrants – suggests that conceptual and operational coherence and coordination may be hard to achieve.

3.2 Changes to the international architecture
In response to these and other challenges, there have been various key changes in the international architecture around forced displacement, with several notable shifts.

3.2.1 UNHCR’s changing role
UNHCR’s mandate and activities have evolved significantly since the agency came into existence in 1950. As Betts et al. (2012: 21) write, over the decades UNHCR transformed itself from ‘a marginal international agency encumbered with numerous restrictions to a global organization with growing autonomy and authority’. From 1950 onwards, UNHCR gradually expanded its mandate and activities, first from a narrow protection mandate to one encompassing material assistance, and subsequently from an original European focus to increasingly global operations (Loescher, 2001). As decolonisation prompted violent conflicts for independence and created a new set of UN member states, and Cold War politics spawned proxy wars and a wider struggle for international influence, by the 1980s UNHCR had become a truly global agency (ibid.).

Mirroring its geographic expansion, UNHCR has also seen significant growth in terms of the population covered by its activities. From a narrow focus on ‘convention’ refugees, UNHCR’s ‘population of concern’ has gradually widened to include refugees (both as defined by the 1951 Convention and persons in ‘refugee-like situations’), asylum-seekers, returnees, IDPs and stateless persons. In 2017, UNHCR’s population of concern totalled 70 million people, only 20 million of whom were refugees in the strictest sense (UNHCR, 2018). UNHCR’s adoption of IDPs under its mandate – it assumed lead responsibility for IDP protection, shelter and camp coordination and management in 2006, under the cluster system – is particularly significant, as it formalises UNHCR’s ad hoc involvement with IDPs since the 1970s. It also adds to UNHCR’s population of concern a group of people who consistently outnumber refugees by a significant margin (Crisp, 2010).

3.2.2 The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
UNHCR’s new institutional responsibility for IDPs forms part of a broader process through which assistance to IDPs became institutionalised from the early 1990s onwards, beginning with the appointment in 1992 of Francis Deng as the first UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons. In 1998 the UN General Assembly adopted the ‘Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’, pioneered by Francis Deng in partnership with the Brookings Institution. The Guiding Principles represented the first set of international standards focused solely on IDPs. Rather than attempting to produce a new set of binding norms – which was considered by Deng a too difficult and time-consuming task – the Guiding Principles apply relevant parts of international human rights law, humanitarian law and refugee law to the situation of IDPs, restating these commitments in more specific language (Koser, 2011). The Principles provide 30 standards detailing rights relevant to internal
displacement, from prevention and assistance during displacement to the provision of durable solutions.

Although – unlike the Refugee Convention – this is not a binding treaty, the Guiding Principles have gained some traction and progress has been made on a national and regional level. For example, Colombia’s 2011 Victims and Land Restitution Law allows for comprehensive reparations to IDPs, though this is mostly in terms of financial compensation rather than long-term support for reintegration (Gottwald, 2016). More widely, regional organisations in Latin America have developed frameworks to address internal displacement, including the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on IDPs by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 1996. In 2009, the African Union, building on the IDP Guiding Principles, adopted a Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (the Kampala Convention), the world’s first legally binding instrument on IDPs (discussed in further detail in Section 4.1.2).

3.2.3 UN humanitarian reforms

In recent decades, responses to forced displacement have also featured within the context of wider humanitarian reforms. In 1991 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 46/182 to strengthen the coordination of humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies and natural disasters by taking the first steps towards bringing humanitarian assistance, including responses to forced displacement, under a single coordination system. Resolution 46/182 included the creation of an Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) to coordinate humanitarian assistance in designated countries; the establishment of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) as a primary mechanism to achieve coordination between UN and non-UN humanitarian partners; and the establishment of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) to provide institutional support to humanitarian coordination, with offices in New York and Geneva (OCHA, 2016). As Loescher (2001) explains, at the time UNHCR perceived these reforms as a threat to its mandate and autonomy. While the DHA was eliminated by 1997, following significant opposition, in 1998 it was reinvented as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), with a new position of Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs as OCHA head and chair of the IASC (ibid.).

Attempts to improve humanitarian coordination continued into the following decade, with a new raft of reforms spearheaded by the 2005 IASC Humanitarian Response Review (McNamara, 2006). The review was followed by the establishment of the cluster system, which today divides humanitarian response into 11 key sectors, each populated by a number of relevant NGOs and agencies and coordinated by a designated lead agency reporting directly to the ERC. UNHCR is the designated lead of the protection cluster, and co-leads the shelter and camp coordination and management clusters, through which its responsibilities to IDPs are discharged.

3.2.4 The growing role of development actors and the private sector

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6 In full, the clusters are: camp coordination and management; shelter; education; food security, telecommunications; health; logistics; nutrition; protection; early recovery; and water, sanitation and hygiene.
Recent decades have also seen an expansion in the role of development actors in responding to forced displacement, alongside corporate and private sector involvement. While development has a long history in the context of refugee assistance, reaching back as far as the League of Nations and support for the resettlement of Greek refugees exchanged in the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, recent decades have seen a resurgence of this approach and a reconfiguration of the policy apparatus. Since the late 1970s, the idea of incorporating development approaches into displacement responses gained traction as the international community, frustrated with the dominant care and maintenance model, and receiving countries contesting the unfair burden placed on them, proposed a new model of refugee assistance that would be development-oriented and allow refugees to develop self-sufficiency (Crisp, 2001). At the 1984 Second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (‘ICARA II’), $362 million was requested for 128 refugee aid and development projects in Africa. However, largely due to insufficient funding initial initiatives in the 1980s aimed at integrating refugee and development responses produced weak results (ibid.).

Debates in the 1990s over the role of development assistance in responding to protracted displacement formed part of broader discussions around the integration of humanitarian and development objectives and activities (Bennett, 2015). Aspirations towards enhanced humanitarian–development coherence were formalised in the UN system through the 2005 humanitarian reforms with the creation of an early recovery cluster, led by UNDP (Zetter, 2014). Since 2005, UNHCR has become progressively more vocal in recognising the importance of development-led responses to displacement crises, starting with statements on the centrality of development assistance at the 2005 High Commissioner’s Forum and through ExCom in 2008 (Zetter, 2014). The Transitional Solutions Initiative in 2010 marked a further stage in international momentum for a stronger development response to situations of forced displacement. It delineated the scope for collaboration between the World Bank, UNHCR and UNDP in order to ensure more long-term engagement of development actors with humanitarian partners (UNHCR, 2010).

Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in such links, coupled with significant buy-in from development actors and action rather than debate. There is growing understanding of the need for longer-term approaches to displacement, particularly in the context of protracted refugee crises. Humanitarian–development coherence was a key theme in the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, with the summit’s ‘Agenda for Humanity’ making direct links between humanitarian action and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and incorporating displacement under the core responsibility of ‘leave no one behind’ (UNGA, 2016). This momentum was sustained by the 2016 New York Declaration, which stated that ‘in order to meet the challenges posed by large movements of refugees, close coordination will be required among a range of humanitarian and development actors’.

A fundamental, but as yet inadequately explored, challenge underlying the transition to development-led responses is the impact of population growth on the economic development of receiving countries, and thus their capacity to absorb and promote development strategies for refugees. As long as conditions exist where a host country’s
population of young people is growing at a faster rate than the economy can cope with, the potential to absorb refugees will be reduced without significant economic support and investment. Local economic development efforts to assist displaced people and their host communities need to be part of a much wider package that prioritises education and reproductive health to reduce birth rates as a key demographic requirement to reach the SDGs (Lutz, 2017). Policies, programmes and financing to encourage the education of children – both host populations and refugees (Syrian refugee children have been labelled the ‘lost generation’) – and to make reproductive health programmes available in impacted regions must aim to delay marriage and childbearing, thus freeing young people to increase their economic wellbeing and rise above poverty in a sustainable way. Such an approach, moreover, exemplifies the need for a holistic and comprehensive approach to development-led responses in protracted refugee crises which currently is missing with the excessive focus on employment creation.

The Syrian refugee crisis has in many ways become a testing ground for development-led approaches. The Syria Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (UNHCR-UNDP, 2014; 2016; 2017; 2017a), first operational in 2015, has crystallised this approach; the outcomes of this and wider experiences of the development-led approach are discussed in detail in Section 5.2.

3.2.5 The 2016 UN Summit and the 2018 Compacts

The most recent institutional shift on forced displacement came in September 2016, when UN member states met at the UN General Assembly in New York for the United Nations Summit for Refugees and Migrants. The summit was billed by the UN as ‘a historic opportunity to come up with a blueprint for a better international response’ and a ‘watershed moment to strengthen governance of international migration’ (UNGA, 2016a). Aiming to bring countries together behind a more coordinated approach, the summit addressed issues and challenges particular to large movements of refugees and migrants. While states shied away from binding commitments, the summit resulted in an outcome document, the New York Declaration. The declaration was the result of fierce negotiations, with different states raising objections to various key pieces of language, including references to burden-sharing and human rights, and blanket condemnation of child detention (Sengupta, 2016). Given the difficult political climate in which it was adopted, in most respects the declaration merely reaffirms the status quo. One critic described the resulting language as ‘so vague that it is likely to bring little comfort to the millions who are seeking safety and opportunity abroad’ (ibid.).

Others, however, have pointed to key substantive commitments made in the Declaration, in particular the agreement to key elements of a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) to be applied to large-scale movements of refugees and protracted refugee situations and a pledge by states to work towards a set of separate twin Compacts on refugees and migrants, (the Global Refugee Compact (GRC) and the Global Compact for Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration), formally adopted by UN member states in December 2018.
In developing the Compacts and the CRRF approach, UNHCR was tasked to promote four key objectives (UNHCR, 2017b), effectively covering the whole territory of the current regime, which are to:

1. Ease the pressures on host countries and communities.
2. Enhance refugee self-reliance.
3. Expand third-country solutions.
4. Support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.

The CRRF approach, tailored to specific circumstances and agreed by the countries concerned, is now formally applied in a dozen countries including Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Honduras, Mexico and Guatemala; with regard to the Somali refugee situation, this has involved the Somali government and its neighbours in a regional approach.

The GRC is the first comprehensive review of the refugee regime since its inception almost 70 years ago. It comprises two elements: the CRRF, and a Programme of Action (PoA) to underpin and implement the principles of the Framework. Country and/or regional strategies will remain the operational tools for addressing refugee crises on the ground, but they will be strengthened by the principles and clearer obligations which the CRRF will impose on the international community. The essential overarching goals and principles of the GRC are:

- A reassertion of the basic principle of international cooperation and burden- and responsibility-sharing underpinning the comprehensive refugee response.
- The PoA, with concrete commitments to ensure more equitable and predictable responsibility-sharing to support host countries and communities, through flexible and adequate humanitarian funding and development strategies, and resettlement and complementary pathways for third-country admission.
- A Global Refugee Forum every four years, which will review these arrangements.
- The continued search for solutions that depend on resolute and sustained international cooperation.

Commitment to these inputs is essential, but clearly the effectiveness of the GRC will be tested by the outputs, the PoA and the traction they achieve. The Compact has not, for example, adopted metrics for responsibility sharing or target-setting for resettlement and complementary admission pathways, leaving open how these fundamental principles will effectively be delivered. On the other hand, measures to institutionalise the involvement of development actors and engage the private sector have been affirmed.

While the GRC does not offer the radical principles that might fundamentally reframe the refugee regime that many hoped for, by recognising the reality of states’ interests the Compact has an important function in reasserting commitments to the fundamental principles on which the refugee regime is based. The CRRF and PoA provide a substantive agenda for addressing some of the very significant constraints evident in the current architecture, and which this review has highlighted, including the importance of sustainable development-led responses to forced displacement; a much stronger commitment to burden-sharing;
reasserting commitments to resettlement; and longer-term, predicable funding. The two-tier approach may also provide the institutional flexibility that has been lacking. But significant gaps remain: most fundamentally, the basic principle of protection remains limited to refugees, and is not extended to the much larger number of forcibly displaced people that fall outside the 1951 Convention definition, and who are one of the key concerns of this World Commission. It also remains to be seen how coherently the continuum of migratory processes, from forced to voluntary, will be tackled in policy terms, especially as the Compacts retain the binary between refugees and migrants which many argue is the core problem in addressing population movements.

Another key outcome of the 2016 Summit came with the formal adoption of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as a ‘related agency’ of the UN. As the then IOM Director General William Lacy Swing put it, with the signing of the agreement ‘for the very first time in 71 years, the UN now has a “UN Migration Agency”’ (IOM, 2016). The move reflects international recognition of the growing importance of large and mixed migratory flows, suggesting a need to expand the formal UN architecture beyond UNHCR in order to respond to the challenges posed by migration more broadly.

3.3 Securitisation and the changing political context of forced displacement

3.3.1 Securitisation

Finally, recent decades have also seen notable shifts in the political context within which forced displacement takes place. Most prominent has been a trend known as the ‘securitisation’ of forced displacement. ‘Securitisation’ refers to the process by which an issue is constructed as a security threat, thus raising its urgency and necessitating emergency or ‘special’ measures (Hammerstad, 2014; Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2013). In terms of forced displacement, securitisation describes a growing tendency among states – both in the global north and south – to approach displacement as a security threat, prompting restrictive policy measures that subsume responses to displacement under a broader narrative around securing borders and stopping flows.

The trend towards securitisation in responses to forced displacement is widely considered to have begun in the decade immediately following the end of the Cold War, though earlier precedents can be identified. This period saw growing international attention to the security dimensions of refugee flows, and refugee issues were increasingly discussed in security fora such as the UN Security Council and NATO as the international community debated responses to conflicts in Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Kosovo (Chimni, 2000). Meanwhile, a broader understanding of ‘security’, encompassing identity threats and economic concerns, engendered a new kind of security discourse, under which the forcibly displaced were conceived of as threats and seen as the deserving targets of a raft of restrictive policies (Hammerstad, 2014).

3.3.2 Modes of securitisation

Restrictive policies are driven by security concerns of three kinds: that forcibly displaced people posed a threat to human security, given alleged connections with violence and
instability; a threat to communal identity; and a threat to economic security, given the idea of the forcibly displaced as a ‘burden’ (Cosgrave et al., 2016a).

In the global north, the idea of the forcibly displaced as a threat to human security gained prominence in the aftermath of 9/11, with direct links made between weak immigration control and international terrorism, a theme that has once again gained renewed prominence following the rise of Islamic State and recent terror attacks in Europe (Hammerstad, 2014; Zetter, 2014a). Although no connection has been found between forced displacement flows and the 9/11 hijackers, or with the perpetrators of terror attacks in Europe, the post-9/11 era has nonetheless seen hardening state policies towards refugees and asylum-seekers, framed in the discourse of protecting national security.

Fears about threats to human security have also driven securitisation in the global south. Kenya provides a context where, as in the global north, refugees have been linked to an emerging terror threat, in this case connecting the planning and preparation of terror attacks by Al-Shabaab to residents of Dadaab refugee camp (Hargrave and Pantuliano, 2016; see also the Kenya case study prepared for this World Commission). In numerous cases, connections have also been drawn in the global south between the presence of refugees and national or regional instability. Although noting the lack of systematic literature exploring the connection between refugees and conflict, Milner (2000) distinguishes between a ‘direct security burden’ associated with refugees and an ‘indirect security burden’, where the presence of refugees may exacerbate existing tensions in host countries. Milner explores these ideas in relation to the hardening of Tanzanian policy towards Rwandan refugees in 1996, who were widely considered to be Hutu génocidaires fleeing justice (Milner, 2000).

As discussed above, both in the global north and south securitisation has also been driven by the idea of the forcibly displaced as a threat to communal identities and economies in host countries. With regard to the former, Hammerstad (2014) discusses how the literature on the securitisation of identity politics builds on earlier studies of nationalism, with the identification of ‘outsiders’ crucial in establishing the identity of a national community and its ‘insiders’. According to Hammerstad, securitised language and practices ‘create or reinforce divisions between “us” and “them”, using the enemy “other” on the outside as a tool for strengthening the community bonds between insiders’ (2014: 267–68). In this way, harsh state policies have been justified by the argument that flows of forcibly displaced people pose an existential threat to national communities, either by their sheer size or ethnic make-up. This trend has been particularly visible in Eastern European countries’ reluctance in recent years to accept refugee flows from predominantly Muslim countries (HRW, 2016).

Similarly, in both the global north and south, more restrictive policies have been driven by the idea of the forcibly displaced as an economic threat, both in terms of their fiscal impact and the burden they are thought to place on public services. The case studies presented here of countries hosting particularly large refugee populations suggest that there may be some substantive (although hard to quantify) basis for these claims in terms of negative impacts on labour markets and pressure on public services, such as schools and healthcare facilities. These impacts are noted in the Jordan and Kenya case studies, for example. However, as
discussed below, these concerns are to some extent balanced by evidence showing the
significant economic contributions that forcibly displaced people (and indeed all migrants)
can make, particularly in a context of liberal employment policies and assistance promoting
self-reliance. Yet, somewhat separate from this empirical evidence base, policy narratives
across numerous countries have over the years consistently cast the forcibly displaced as an
economic burden, and at worst a threat to host country economies. In the global north, the
post-2008 economic downturn has been identified as a key factor driving the securitisation
of narratives and policies around both migration and forced displacement, as well as
imigration in general, painting the forcibly displaced and immigrants as threats to jobs and
public services, exacerbated by interventions by far right and populist politicians
(Hammerstad, 2014; Dempster and Hargrave, 2017).

Given their relationship to public opinion, these narratives have been a powerful driving
factor behind policy developments. The literature remains unclear on whether political
narratives shape public attitudes, or whether political narratives are driven by politicians’
perceptions of public opinion that already exists – with the most likely argument that the
relationship is bi-directional (Geddes and Scholten, 2016; Dempster and Hargrave, 2017).
However, securitised narratives have gained traction globally and are ultimately translated
into policy in part because they resonate with the domestic constituencies for which
politicians are ultimately responsible. Existing research shows that, while public opinion
towards forced displacement is shaped by specific national and local contexts, common
concerns arise around economic, cultural and security axes (ibid.). Although research
demonstrates that, in many cases, concerns are balanced by more positive sentiments
amongst a ‘conflicted’ middle (Purpose, 2017), one 2016 survey of ten European countries
found that, in eight, over half of respondents were worried about the security implications of
accepting refugees. Such polling demonstrates the extent to which securitised narratives
have found purchase among domestic populations, lending support to subsequent policy
measures justified on the basis of national security (Wike et al., 2016).

3.3.3 Increasing restrictions
The trend towards the securitisation of forced displacement has resulted in the development
of a number of harsh and exclusionary policies towards forced displacement, and immigration
more broadly. Restrictive and deterrence measures imposed from the late 1980s onwards,
and now almost universal across the global north, include sanctions on airlines found to be
carrying passengers without correct documentation, visa restrictions on key refugee-
producing countries, the widespread use of immigration detention for people arriving by
irregular means, expedited processing of asylum-seekers from designated ‘safe countries’,
and the increasing use of deportation and interdiction of boats carrying asylum-seekers
(Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2013). Australia is often held up as particularly restrictive, having since
2001 pursued a policy whereby arrivals by sea are prevented from entering Australian
territory, and are instead detained and processed in centres on Manus Island and Nauru
(Hargrave and Pantuliano, 2016).

The so called ‘European migrant crisis’ of 2015, which witnessed the spontaneous arrival of
over a million mostly Syrian refugees, reinforced the socio-economic dimensions of the
securitisation agenda. At the same time, it propelled a marked upswing in nationalist politics in many European countries, with right-wing governments elected on anti-immigrant and anti-refugee platform, and for whom national borders and the European frontier have been a key priority.

These trends are reflected in the way national governments, and the European Union as a whole, in recent years have increasingly resorted to physical barriers such as border fencing and fortifications to prevent the arrival of people who might lodge a claim to asylum, particularly over the course of Europe’s recent so-called refugee and migrant ‘crisis’, when fences were erected along the ‘Balkan route’, including at the borders of Hungary, Austria, Latvia, Slovenia and Estonia (Cosgrave et al., 2016a). These responses challenge the fundamental principle of a border-free Europe and critically undermine the Common European Asylum System, which took more than a decade to agree. Simultaneously, the EU has boosted the role and resources of FRONTEX (the border agency tasked with coordinating and implementing European border management), as well as strengthening border controls in transit countries and countries of first asylum outside Europe. This externalisation policy has been pursued through various bilateral agreements – for example between Italy and Libya – in addition to formal EU measures. In 2016, the EU announced a new Partnership Framework on Migration to ‘seek tailor made partnerships with key third countries of origin and transit using all policies and instruments at the EU’s disposal to achieve concrete results’ (European Commission, 2016). In this context, the €6 billion EU–Turkey agreement in 2016, in which Turkey agreed to restrict the westward movement of refugees and migrants to Europe through its territory, is the latest example of restriction and securitisation. It provoked outrage from human rights advocates arguing that the deal denies fundamental principles of the Refugee Convention.

Countries in the global south have also tightened their borders and increased restrictions on entry. The years from 2013 onwards have seen the progressive closure of borders in countries surrounding Syria, including the construction of a 500km border wall along the Turkish border. As the Kenya and Jordan case studies discuss, in a bid to prevent the long-term settlement of refugees and encourage their return many countries in the global south have restricted access to freedom of movement and legal employment.

3.3.4 Consequences and critiques
Restrictive and securitised policies have been criticised on a number of grounds. First, questions have been raised over the compatibility of a number of these measures with countries’ obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention, in addition to broader ethical concerns (Hargrave and Pantuliano, 2016). In fortifying borders and employing other means to prevent arrivals, global north countries have effectively closed off legal access to protection on their territory – aside from resettlement routes available to very limited numbers – pushing people seeking asylum into increasingly irregular routes. Evidence from the US and Europe consistently shows that measures aiming to halt flows largely fail, instead simply pushing people into new and often more dangerous routes (De Giorgi, 2010; Samers, 2004; Koser, 2005; Bloch, 2014). An ODI study found that, while between 2014 and 2016 Europe spent (on a very conservative estimate) at least €17 billion on measures to prevent
arrivals, they were largely ineffective, instead directing refugees and migrants towards more covert means of arrival (Cosgrave et al., 2016a).

The human cost of securitised policies is significant. The closure of legal routes to asylum in the global north is largely considered to have created demand for burgeoning smuggling services, with forcibly displaced people among increasing numbers relying on traffickers and smugglers to make dangerous journeys through Sub-Saharan Africa and across the Mediterranean. A survey of 9,000 individuals who had travelled overland through North Africa and into Europe found that 70% had at some point in their journey become a victim of human trafficking, organ trafficking or other forms of exploitation (IOM, 2016b). In 2017, over 3,000 were reported as either dead or missing as a result of dangerous journeys across the Mediterranean (IOM, 2018). While this was a decline on the more than 5,000 migrant deaths the previous year (IOM, 2017), given the overall decline in migrants as a result of tighter border controls (especially between Turkey and the EU), the proportion of deaths to the number of migrants remains broadly the same. Meanwhile, in the global south tighter border policies have made it increasingly difficult for refugees to exit insecure countries of origin: for example, 60,000 Syrians are trapped at Jordan’s border with Syria, in an area of desert known as the Berm (Arraf, 2017).

As will be discussed in greater detail below, restrictive policies also come at an opportunity cost, as policies aimed at preventing refugees’ integration into host societies miss opportunities to benefit from the economic and social contributions that, if adequately supported, refugees might make.

4 Key debates

4.1 Relevance of the 1951 Convention

As discussed above, since the 1951 Convention was drafted there have been various key shifts in the character of displacement, alongside changes to the institutional and political landscapes surrounding policy responses. From the 1980s onwards, these shifts sparked a long-running debate among academics and policy-makers over the extent to which, as the primary international normative framework guiding responses to displacement, the 1951 Convention is a sufficient instrument to meet the challenges of contemporary displacement. Those arguing against the continuing relevance of the 1951 Convention come from two ideologically very different starting points: those calling for the expansion of the protections offered by the 1951 Convention to cover a wider range of people considered forcibly displaced in a broader sense (a context elaborated in this Commission’s background concept paper on forced displacement), and those seeking reconsideration of the 1951 Convention as a means to justify restrictions on access to durable asylum (Fitzpatrick, 1996). In view of this tension, debates over the 1951 Convention’s relevance should be viewed within the politically charged context in which they are taking place, with the debate often becoming less a question of legal reform than a proxy for deeper, more ideological and value-laden considerations. For these reasons, while criticism of the 1951 Convention has been commonplace among those in favour of widening the protections offered, few recommend renegotiation of the Convention for fear that this would result in a narrower instrument.
4.1.1 Scope of the Convention definition

Perhaps the most common charge against the 1951 Convention is that its definition of ‘refugee’ fails to reflect the scope of contemporary displacement. Many have argued that, in focusing so specifically on individualised persecution tied to a number of delimited grounds, the Convention definition fails to directly cover a number of forcibly displaced groups deserving of international protection, including those fleeing ethnic violence, generalised conflict, gender-based persecution and persecution based on gender identity or sexual orientation (Chatham House, 2005; Wilde, 2001; Zetter, 2018).

As Fitzpatrick (1996) argues, the vagueness of parts of the 1951 Convention’s provisions have allowed for generous interpretation in some regards, facilitating the incorporation of new groups not explicitly included within the Convention’s parameters. For example, over the years a substantial body of case law has developed incorporating victims of gender-based persecution under the 1951 Convention’s definition through their inclusion under the convention category of ‘membership of a particular social group’ (Querton, 2012). Similarly, UNHCR’s guidelines regarding Syrian refugees argued for the inclusion of those fleeing generalised violence in Syria under the 1951 Convention definition, on grounds that even the targeting of particular areas for military operations may be considered persecution based on imputed political opinion given one party to the conflict’s control over that area (UNHCR, 2015). However, legal challenges in Germany show the extent to which Syrian refugees’ inclusion under the 1951 Convention definition remains an issue of ongoing debate (Knight, 2016).

Attention has also been paid to groups who have not benefited from generous legal interpretations, and who have as a result fallen between the gaps in normative regimes. As the accompanying concept paper on forced displacement (Zetter, 2018) outlines, the term ‘forced displacement’ in use here is intended to go beyond those covered by the formal ‘refugee’ definition, who have been displaced as a result of a broad range of drivers, including food insecurity, poverty, land-grabbing, state fragility, human rights deprivation, low-level generalised violence and failures in rule of law, development-induced displacement, natural disasters and environmental degradation and climate change. Where these individuals fall outside the 1951 Convention, they exist in something of a normative protection void, while forming part of the ‘mixed flows’ discussed above, sharing routes, risks and vulnerabilities with those meeting the 1951 Convention refugee definition.

Some refugee lawyers are wary of opening up debate and expanding the scope of protection offered in the 1951 Refugee Convention, arguing that this could diminish its unique protective strengths (Hathaway, 2007). Nevertheless, addressing protection frameworks for this broader category of forcibly displaced persons has become a growing concern (see for example McAdam, 2006; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, 2007; Betts, 2010). Offering a minimal form of protection to individuals forcibly displaced in a broader sense, well-established practices of complementary protection – under, amongst other instruments, the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – retrain the return of any forcibly displaced individuals to a situation where they would face torture or
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. However, these practices assure few rights beyond that of non-return, nor do many groups of forcibly displaced individuals meet the threshold required to benefit from these protections.

Numerous legal scholars have emphasised that the 1951 Convention was from its first formulation an ‘incomplete’ document, constrained by the interests of the states that negotiated it (Fitzpatrick, 1996: 231). Goodwin-Gill has emphasised that, in the final act of the conference of plenipotentiaries through which it was finalised, hope was expressed that the Convention might ‘have value as an example exceeding its contractual scope’, and that member states might be guided by it in granting similar protection to ‘persons in their territory as refugees and who would not be covered by the terms of the Convention’, perhaps expressing an understanding among the Convention’s drafters that the future would present new waves of refugees lying outside its scope, but who might nonetheless hope to receive similar protection (Chatham House, 2005; UNGA, 1951). Regardless of the drafters’ original intentions, the reality that various groups of forcibly displaced persons remain unprotected by existing normative standards gives weight to a need for, if not full reform, then at least some level of normative development. It is clear that, while the forthcoming 2018 Refugee Compact will not reopen fundamental debates over the scope and interpretation of the 1951 Convention, the Compact itself, and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) which it embraces, will reinforce the need for generosity in applying the protection afforded by the Convention.

4.1.2 Regional frameworks
Various regional frameworks have advanced a broader ‘refugee’ definition than the 1951 Convention, extending the scope of refugee protection to a wider group of recipients. However, these frameworks do not go so far as to incorporate all persons considered forcibly displaced in the sense adopted here, again leaving significant normative gaps.

Key regional frameworks include the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems, which extends refugee status beyond persecution to cover people who have fled their country of origin due to ‘external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order’, reflecting the circumstances of the Convention’s drafting in the midst of violent struggles for independence from colonial powers (Okello, 2014). The OAU Convention moves away from the 1951 Convention’s individualised conception of refugeehood to a more general framework, setting the basis for the prima facie recognition of refugee status, a mechanism which has played a key part in African states’ responses to forced displacement over the decades, and allowed for mass refugee recognition in the case of large influxes (ibid.).

The 1984 Organization of American States (OAS) Cartagena Declaration goes further in terms of those included under its scope, advancing a refugee definition that ‘in addition to obtaining the elements of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, includes among refugees persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order’ (Castillo,
Unlike the OAU Convention, however, the Cartagena Declaration is not legally binding and has seen somewhat weaker incorporation into domestic legislation within the region (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, 2007). In both cases, concerns have been raised regarding these wider definitions’ lack of legal clarity, which in the case of Cartagena has led to cautious interpretations rooted in legal precedents developed from the 1951 Convention (Hanna, 2008; Cantor and Mora, 2013). Even so, both instruments have been progressive in advancing broader normative frameworks, encompassing many falling outside the scope of the 1951 Convention by adopting a wider ‘refugee’ definition.

A different approach has been taken by the EU, which continues to interpret the term ‘refugee’ in line with the 1951 Convention, but through the 2004 Qualification Directive has extended the benefits of international protection within the EU to an additional class of those receiving ‘subsidiary protection’. This is offered to those at ‘real risk of serious harm’ if returned to their home country, with ‘serious harm’ defined as including the death penalty, torture or inhumane or degrading treatment, or ‘serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict’. While some have praised the EU for going some way towards closing ‘the yawning protection gap that faces war refugees’ (Fullerton, 2011: 132) through subsidiary protection provisions, others have criticised significant ambiguities within the definition of those eligible for this additional form of protection. Durieux (2012) has criticised the ‘nonsensical wording’ of the EU Qualification Directive’s Article 15(c) for leaving legal representatives and adjudicators in the difficult position of attempting to square the circle between claimants being eligible for subsidiary protection in situations of indiscriminate violence, while also being required to show evidence of an ‘individual’ threat. While individuals receiving subsidiary protection have in general been afforded rights similar to those bestowed on refugees, major differences have emerged in domestic legislation in regard to family reunification, with Austria and Germany among those who have narrowly limited rights to family reunification for those with subsidiary protection status (ECRE, 2016).

Finally, African states have also been progressive in adopting the world’s only set of legally binding principles in relation to IDPs. As already discussed, while some steps forward were made in relation to IDPs in the 1990s through the adoption of the Guiding Principles, the fact that the principles are not legally binding has left IDPs largely outside the scope of the 1951 Convention by virtue of their not having crossed an international border. The Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (the Kampala Convention) – adopted by the AU in 2009, and which entered into force in 2012 – was thus drafted with a view to making the Guiding Principles legally binding in Africa. The Convention specifically situates itself within wider international law, in its preamble mentioning a number of international legal instruments including the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (Abebe, 2010), as well as regional standards. The Kampala Convention starts from the recognition that states have a primary responsibility to protect and assist those within their borders, and that IDPs should be assured the same rights as all other citizens. Obligations are also articulated for international organisations, humanitarian agencies, the AU and non-state armed groups
Although the Kampala Convention represents a significant step forward in terms of expanding the legal protections afforded to IDPs, many have pointed to its uneven ratification. While it has to date been signed by 40 states, just 25 have ratified it, and fewer still have taken significant steps towards implementation (Brookings-LSE, 2014; NRC, 2016).

4.1.3 The 1951 Convention and state practice

There has also been debate over the extent to which the 1951 Convention offers sufficient protection even to those falling within the scope of its narrow definition, raising a different set of questions over its relevance in contemporary circumstances. In large part, such critiques are driven by a notable gap between the protections offered by the 1951 Convention and state practice. On this line of criticism, it is not necessarily the normative framework offered by the 1951 Convention itself that is failing to meet the challenges of contemporary displacement, but the reality of this normative regime as manifested in state practices.

While, as discussed above, the 1951 Convention’s vagueness in various aspects has allowed for generous interpretations of key components, this vagueness has also been used to allow restrictive interpretations justifying exclusion. For example, Fitzpatrick (1996) has highlighted how the elasticity of the term ‘persecution’ has left the Convention’s refugee definition subject to states’ political will, which has at times often favoured restrictive interpretations. The wide variety in recognition rates across European countries for refugees from the same countries of origin demonstrates the wide room for manoeuvre in how the 1951 Convention’s provisions are interpreted, which has allowed for politically motivated restriction on a state-by-state basis. For example, from mid-2015 to mid-2016 over 95% of Afghan applicants were granted asylum in Italy, as opposed to less than 25% of cases approved in Denmark (Cosgrave et al., 2016a).

Even once refugees are recognised, there is substantial variation in how far the rights contained within the Convention are met by state practice. For example, one recent study focusing on the right to work (contained in Articles 17–19 of the 1951 Convention) found that, even among the 75 out of 145 states parties to the Refugee Convention that formally grant refugees the right to work, there is a ‘remarkable diversity in legal provisions and constraints’ surrounding this particular right, with most states taking a restrictive approach, driven by political, economic and security concerns (Zetter and Ruaudel, 2016). Similar restrictions relate to the right to free movement.

In some cases, states have violated key protections outright. The case studies on Kenya and Jordan presented here highlight allegations of deportation to Somalia and Syria respectively that appear to be in clear contravention of the principle of non-refoulement. The right of non-refoulement has in the past also been undermined by large-scale involuntary repatriation operations, including Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh in 1994, Rwandan refugees from Tanzania and Congo in 1996–67 and Burundians from Tanzania in 2012 (Long, 2013). In addition, in recent years attention has been paid to how the securitised border regimes outlined above have undermined, or at the very least significantly stretched, reasonable interpretation of the 1951 Convention. Hyndman and Mountz (2008) have characterised
Australian and European practices of externalisation as a type of ‘neo-refoulement’, whereby forcibly displaced people are returned to transit countries or countries of origin before reaching the sovereign territories in which they might hope to make a claim, in a sense using ‘geography to suspend access to asylum’. While these practices do not violate the principle of non-refoulement in its strict legal sense, they nonetheless push its legal and moral boundaries to clear limits (see also Section 3.3.4 above).

4.1.4 Non-signatories

Finally, the fact that a significant number of states have not signed or ratified the 1951 Convention, or have done so with key reservations, constitutes another clear gap in the international normative framework offered by the Convention. According to UNHCR, 144 states have signed one or both of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol without reservations, leaving 45 that have signed neither and four that have signed with reservations (UNHCR, 2015a). In 2016, of the three top refugee-hosting countries in the world – Turkey, Pakistan and Lebanon, together hosting 5.3 million refugees – none had signed the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol without reservations (UNHCR, 2017). While neither Lebanon nor Pakistan has signed either instrument, Turkey has signed both, but with the reservation of maintaining the 1951 Convention’s original circumscribed geographic scope, limiting its international responsibilities only to refugees created as a result of events in Europe (UNHCR, 2015a).

The majority of countries that have signed neither instrument are in the Middle East or Asia, both regions hosting significant proportions of the world’s refugees. Chatty (2016; 2017) has highlighted how, in the absence of adoption of international legal frameworks, refuge in Middle Eastern countries has been structured around local cultural precepts of hospitality and generosity, as opposed to ‘rights-based’ international frameworks. However, others have noted that – despite significant generosity shown by states in the region in the context of informal frameworks – lack of accession to international frameworks and limited domestic legislation have at times resulted in an unpredictable and fragile protection context, as seen in the Jordan case study (Khallaf, 2014).

In Asia, various arguments have been advanced to explain the lack of accession to the 1951 Convention. In particular, Davies (2006) has pointed to the 1951 Convention’s drafting process and outcome as heavily Eurocentric, with the few Asian governments present during the process, such as India and Pakistan, marginalised. Davies argues that ‘Asian rejection’ can be explained by an ongoing perception among Asian states that the 1951 Convention does not reflect their distinct needs, interests and experiences. As in the Middle East, lack of accession to international frameworks has left refugees in many Asian states in precarious situations, with domestic policies ad hoc and fragmented. For example, in Thailand Human Rights Watch has described refugee policies as ‘fragmented, unpredictable, inadequate and ad hoc’ (HRW, 2012). Similarly, Malaysian refugee policies have been characterised as ‘ad hoc, inconsistent and often subjective’ (Wake, 2016). Although in Malaysia some refugees have benefited from informal arrangements and the authorities’ willingness to ‘turn a blind eye’ to their presence (ibid.), as in other non-signatory states lack of accession raises clear questions around the reliability of the protection being received, and potential protection
gaps. Asian objections over the 1951 Convention’s ‘Eurocentricity’ make clear that future accession to the instrument is unlikely in the region, prompting questions over how and through which other instruments such protection gaps might be filled.

4.1.5 From refugees to forced displacement

The dynamics of displacement have changed fundamentally since the inception of the refugee regime almost 70 years ago. An increasing number of people are being forcibly driven from their homes, but are not able to avail themselves of the label ‘refugee’, with its specific meaning as enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention/1967 Protocol and the mandate of UNHCR.

The terms ‘forced displacement’ and ‘forcibly displaced persons’ have been increasingly used to define categories of people outside the provisions of international normative and legal protection. Even UNHCR, in its annual Global Trends report, now uses the term forced displacement, including in this definition IDPs displaced by conflict, as well as registered refugees and asylum-seekers. However, this still leaves many millions of people subject to displacement by a range of drivers, often in combination, but without protection. The accompanying concept paper on forced displacement prepared for this World Commission (Zetter, 2018) elaborates these multi-variate drivers and the complex patterns and processes which forcibly displaced people undertake. Briefly, the nexus of armed conflict, other situations of violence and human rights violations constitutes the underlying conditions of forced displacement in many of today’s humanitarian crises, from Chad to the Rohingya in Myanmar and from Syria to South Sudan. Environmental and climate change, natural disasters, food insecurity and weak governance and political fragility also constitute drivers of forced displacement.

The growing number of people unable to avail themselves of the protection and humanitarian assistance that is accorded to refugees is a growing, but as yet largely unrecognised, challenge to the international community and a central concern of this World Commission. Neither the Refugee nor the Migration Compacts being developed for 2018 are addressing this growing protection gap for the forcibly displaced, not least because these populations of concern fall between these two constituencies. Unlocking this impasse and raising recognition of the need for innovative thinking to address the situation of forcibly displaced people is a major objective of the World Commission.

4.2 From burden-sharing to responsibility-sharing

4.2.1 Global inequalities

Long-standing debates have also developed in terms of global burden-sharing over assistance to refugees and other forcibly displaced persons. Annual statistics regularly reveal sharp inequalities between numbers of refugees hosted by various countries worldwide, with particularly stark inequalities between countries in the global north and south. According to UNHCR, in 2017 85% of refugees under its mandate were hosted in developing regions (UNHCR, 2018). Conversely, the countries hosting the smallest proportion of the world’s refugees are also those that, financially and institutionally, might be in the best position to cope. While recent flows of refugees and migrants into Europe have, for some European
countries such as Greece and Italy, significantly increased the scale of the challenges faced, this has done little to change the overall global balance. Interestingly, the markedly uneven distribution of asylum applications among member states has rekindled a decades-old debate over burden-sharing within the EU (Hatton, 2016).

As discussed below (Section 4.4), the idea of the forcibly displaced as a burden is challenged by recent shifts in thinking that recognise the contribution that refugees have in many cases made to host societies. However, these shifts aside, it is impossible to deny that, at the very least, where large population inflows have come about as a result of forced displacement, these movements have posed numerous challenges for host states. Thus, while the term ‘burden-sharing’ is problematised here, it is used in recognition that the challenges associated with responding to forced displacement have not been evenly distributed worldwide. Inequalities in numbers of refugees hosted from country to country evidence a reality where – purely by virtue of geography – for some states (such as the case study of Canada prepared for the World Commission), involvement in addressing the global challenge of forced displacement has been a choice, while for others (such as Kenya and Jordan) it has become an inescapable necessity.

4.2.2 Mechanisms and forms of burden-sharing

The 1951 Convention’s preamble emphasises that ‘the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries’, recognising that ‘a satisfactory solution … cannot therefore be achieved without international co-operation’ (UNGA, 1951). However, the 1951 Convention did not establish a mechanism for burden-sharing, nor has any such mechanism been established through subsequent institutional developments. While various academics have argued for the creation of international norms to address burden-sharing around refugees (see, for example, Hathaway and Neve, 1997), and many others have suggested institutional mechanisms to achieve this (Schuck, 1997; Thielemann, 2004), the lack of substantive progress is testament to the political difficulties involved in persuading states currently shouldering a lesser burden to commit to significantly greater efforts. While the New York Declaration commits signatory states to ‘a more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees’, it is unclear how this commitment will be taken up in concrete terms through the global Compacts.

Proposals aiming to achieve greater equality in burden-sharing focus on two key routes: one calls for wider resettlement efforts by third countries, and the second greater financial assistance to countries hosting large forcibly displaced populations. As discussed in greater detail below, while some positive examples can be found of successful resettlement programmes – including the case of Canada discussed in this report – overall, global resettlement numbers have remained very low. Although there has been some mobilisation around resettlement efforts in response to the recent Syrian crisis, there have also been sizeable steps backwards in key resettlement countries, for example a notable decline in resettlement to the United States under the Trump administration (Siddiqui, 2017; see Section 4.3.2 below).
With resettlement numbers low, and little clear signs of a marked increase in the near future, many have instead looked to financial compensation to refugee-hosting states as a means to achieve more equal global burden-sharing on forced displacement. As discussed in the Kenya and Jordan case studies for this project, calls for greater financial assistance as a means of achieving more equal burden-sharing have often come directly from refugee-hosting countries in the global south, who have expressed dissatisfaction with levels of support received to date. The UK is a key example of a country which, while hosting relatively small numbers of refugees, has explicitly pursued a strategy aimed at fulfilling international obligations to the world’s forcibly displaced through predominantly financial means. In particular, while the UK government has pledged to assist relatively small numbers of Syrian refugees through resettlement channels, it has regularly championed the extent of its financial assistance to Syrian refugees in neighbouring host countries. The UK is the second largest donor to the Syrian crisis, and has committed £2.46 billion to forcibly displaced people in Syria and the region since 2012 (McGuiness, 2017).

While sizeable financial flows from countries such as the UK to countries hosting large forcibly displaced populations are in many ways a positive step, such single-minded focus on financial expressions of burden-sharing have been criticised on a number of fronts. First, many have questioned the motivations behind such investments, which have been considered by some as an arm of broader securitised policies (as discussed above) intended to prevent flows of forcibly displaced people to richer nations by improving conditions in regions of origin. For example, in 2017, when the UK government announced a new package of support for Syrian refugees, its press release pitched these efforts as ‘creating new incentives for refugees to remain close to home so they don’t feel forced to make the perilous and potentially life-threatening journey to Europe’ (DFID, 2017). While this investment may in itself be seen as a positive step, concerns have been expressed around the incentive structures created when financial assistance to host countries is mobilised as a form of deterrence, with the overriding goal of controlling borders, as opposed to rebuilding the lives of people forced to flee their homes.

Concerns have also been raised about the extent to which financial assistance can be considered an appropriate substitute for burden-sharing in the form of resettlement places. While the end goal of successful burden-sharing might be to foster a sense of solidarity with countries disproportionately affected by forced displacement, it has been reported that financial packages have been perceived by major host countries as countries in the global north ‘pay[ing] out to avoid taking refugees’ (Hargrave and Pantuliano, 2016: 21). In this context, it seems plausible that any genuinely successful burden-sharing would need to involve meaningful resettlement pledges in addition to financial assistance.

Finally, while sizeable financial commitments have been made in the context of the recent Syrian crisis – though, as described above, even in this case many have claimed that assistance has fallen short of needs and expectations – there are also important questions around the extent to which comparable assistance, and the political will required to mobilise it, is likely to be forthcoming in response to lower-profile crises. For example, in June 2017 a UN Solidarity Summit for Uganda raised pledges of $358 million, far short of the $2 billion the UN
and Uganda had hoped to raise (Siegfried, 2017). An inter-agency briefing produced before the summit presented it as a ‘test of the international community’s commitment to responsibility sharing’, aiming to show international solidarity with Uganda – often praised for its progressive model of refugee assistance – in the face of rapidly rising refugee numbers from South Sudan, and in the context of a 17%-funded South Sudan Refugee Response appeal (Save the Children, 2017). The somewhat lukewarm response suggests that, at least in financial terms, this test of responsibility-sharing has yet to be met, raising clear questions over the political will that might be available in even lower-profile responses.

4.2.3 International cooperation through regional agreements

Many debates over burden-sharing draw on key regional agreements that have been achieved for specific refugee populations, notably the Indochinese Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) (1979/1989) and the International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA) (1989). These agreements are held up as evidence that successful burden-sharing can be achieved, at least at a regional level (see Schuck, 1997). The overall aim of the CPA was to institute a comprehensive solution to the displacement of millions of refugees in South-East Asia following the communist victories in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (epitomised by the ‘problem’ of the Indochinese Boat People). It was constructed around a three-way commitment by countries of first asylum in the region, counties of resettlement beyond the region and the main country of origin. By contrast, CIREFCA took an integrated developmental approach, managed by UNHCR and UNDP, which aimed to facilitate the integration and self-sufficiency of refugees, returnees and IDPs in Central America following the civil wars in Nicaragua and Guatemala. Return was the key, and resettlement, which was a significant element of the CPA, did not feature.

The CPA can be viewed as a qualified success in increasing asylum space in the region; creating legal migration channels to reduce clandestine departures; significantly increasing resettlement; and demonstrating a level of multi-stakeholder engagement and partnership amid ideological differences and divergent national interests that is rare in both historical and contemporary responses to large-scale forced displacement (Towle, 2006: 538). For CIREFCA, the voluntary repatriation of refugees and the resources to support their reintegration, together with the local integration of smaller numbers of refugees in host countries such as Mexico, were a key achievement (Betts, 2006: 12).

Several academic studies – and increasingly policy-level discussions – have explored these agreements in detail, aiming to draw out key lessons for future international cooperation (see for example Betts, 2006; UNHCR, 2017). Analysis of these two main regional agreements suggests a number of conclusions. First, their success in resolving the displacement of millions of refugees lies in establishing three core elements: they were comprehensive ‘in terms of drawing on a range of durable solutions simultaneously; cooperative in terms of involving additional burden- or responsibility-sharing between countries of origin and asylum, and third countries acting as donors or resettlement countries; and collaborative in terms of working across UN agencies and with NGOs’ (Betts, 2006: 5).
A second conclusion is that coming to any such regional agreements is a monumental task for international diplomacy, suggesting that a significant level of cooperation and partnership is necessary to forge more equitable responses to global refugee crises. Broader lessons can be also drawn regarding getting stakeholders with diverse interests to discuss, reach and implement such an agreement, as well as the compromises this is likely to involve (in the case of the CPA, for example, accepting non-alignment of the agreement with legal and human rights standards). Likewise for CIREFCA, the importance of regional ownership, and the strong commitment of the Central American states to the peace process which underpinned the agreement, were critical components leading to its broadly successful outcomes (Betts, 2006: 28). In both cases, the involvement of countries of origin of refugees in the agreements is perhaps the most significant lesson to draw from these experiences of international cooperation.

Third is the importance of realistic assessments of any such models, taking into account their successes as well as failures. For example, while the CPA is presented as a qualified success, its legacy within the region has been seen as contributing towards the markedly narrow asylum space in South-East Asia which has ‘consolidated South-East Asia as a region outside the global refugee regime and entrenched the belief among those nations that the global refugee regime was not in their regional interests’ (McConnahie, 2014: 632). Moreover, the controversial imposition of strict cut-off dates for those considered eligible for refugee status determination and/or resettlement led to strong criticism that refoulement was trumping the protection of people who had fled their countries of origin, despite Vietnam’s commitment to the voluntary return of ‘non-refugees’. With respect to CIREFCA, a remarkably self-critical review by UNHCR points to significant failures in assisting the very large number of IDPs displaced by conflict in the region, as well as programmatic weaknesses (UNHCR, 1994). Even so, CIREFCA provides a potentially valuable model for tackling contemporary refugee crises in the way it managed to create important links between the consolidation of peace, relief to development-led responses for impacted countries (both countries of return and local settlement) and durable solutions for the refugees.

It is also important to position such agreements within their historical context, to understand the particular conditions that facilitated their success. For example, while the CPA is sometimes cited as a ‘model’ for multilateral agreements on refugees (Robinson, 2004: 331), the CPA was contingent on factors (such as geopolitical, regional and historical context; large-scale resettlement commitments; and perhaps most importantly the cooperation of the country of origin) that are unlikely to be replicated on a commensurate scale in many present-day displacement situations. Much the same conclusion can be reached for CIRFCA, where geopolitical and regional interests were aligned in ways that might be hard to accomplish with contemporary refugee crises.

Of some significance in this historical context – though how much is an open question – is the fact that both the CPA and CIREFCA were developed at the end of the Cold War, when the shifting relationship between the superpowers created possibilities for engagement and a new commitment to peace and international cooperation. Respect for and trust in the role of UN and its constituent organisations including UNHCR was also significant. A similar
conjunction of interests in peace and cooperation, as well as the expression of political will that the agreements represented, is not currently available, with respect to the Syrian crisis for example.

Another consideration relates to the geopolitical underpinnings of regional agreements vis-à-vis international aid. In regard to the CPA, Davies (2008: 203), drawing on earlier work, notes that South-East Asia ‘had a history of using its non-signatory status to extract more assistance from the international community and, due to the Cold War origins of the Indo-Chinese refugee problem, disowned any responsibility to deal with the crisis for political or humanitarian reasons’. CIREFCA was also heavily dependent on international donors (notably Europeans, including both the European Community (EC) and bilaterals) to mobilise the integration programmes for returnees and locally settled refugees (UNHCR, 1994).

While in many ways a converse example, parallels can be drawn with the contemporary refugee crisis in the Middle East. Jordan, while framing its current responsibilities in terms of its historic role as a refugee host, has also made clear that it cannot be expected to be a perpetual and ever-receptive host, and has leveraged assistance from the international humanitarian system in ways that suit its domestic priorities, rather than simply accepting the terms on which donors and aid actors would like to operate in the country (Bellamy et al., 2017). Likewise, Turkey and Lebanon have also ‘accepted’ conditional responsibility, in different ways, for Syrian refugees.

4.2.4 Responsibility-sharing

Like most international regimes and conventions, there is a delicate balance between collective aspirations and obligations on the one hand, and individual national interest on the other. As discussed above, the refugee regime is an archetype of this balance, and the principle of burden-sharing within it a long-established and significant exemplar (Suhrke, 1998; Loescher, 2001a). While the principles and objectives of burden-sharing are unarguable – rebalancing the grossly unequal distribution of refugee impacts and responsibilities – the conceptual and operational limitations, together with the clear lack of any significant rebalancing of the burden, call into question its salience in recent years (Roper and Barria, 2010: Betts et al., 2012; Barutciski and Suhrke, 2001), and have prompted a rethinking of how to approach the challenges.

To be sure, the need to redress the negative impacts on host countries and populations is still essential. Humanitarian assistance and resource redistribution remain critical ingredients, but they are significantly strengthened by other major changes in the refugee regime, notably development-led responses (Sections 3.2.4 above and 5.2 below) and recognition of the agency of refugees (Section 4.4 below). With this is a given, responsibility-sharing represents not just a change of terminology, but also a reconceptualization of the problem, from an expectation that host countries might receive international support to a positive obligation on the international community to provide that support. Responsibility-sharing reframes the challenge in three ways. First, and most importantly, it seeks to address two long-standing systemic gaps in the refugee regime – sustaining the quality of protection and promoting
durable solutions. The argument here is that burden-sharing is a symptomatic response which fails to address fundamental underlying conditions. Reasserting the primacy of protection reasserts the raison d’être of the refugee regime and the global obligation it demands. Likewise, by reasserting the central task of promoting durable solutions, responsibility-sharing shifts the focus from the symptomatic palliative responses implicit in burden-sharing. Second, by focusing on underlying causes it, of necessity, repositions responsibility from the national/local level of remedial action to a global level. Together with the first objective, the argument here is that protection is a global public good from which all states benefit: ensuring the quality of protection and its delivery in complex and diverse situations of forced displacement is a global responsibility. Similarly, durable solutions are by definition global in scope (resettlement for example is pre-eminently a global responsibility), and the means by which they are achieved require concerted global action. Third, and as a corollary, disposing of the word ‘burden’ removes the negative connotations of this policy. In this respect, responsibility-sharing acknowledges other fundamental shifts in the refugee regime noted above – refugee agency and development-led approaches.

For responsibility-sharing to progress beyond a conceptual appeal and deliver operational traction, two essential preconditions are obvious. The first is to establish suitable institutional mechanisms to ensure the more equitable distribution of responsibilities. The second is to overcome the largely discretionary application of these responsibilities via more predictable delivery of these responsibilities by the wealthiest but least-impacted states. Equitable and predictable outcomes would, for example, tackle enduring weaknesses in the short-term funding model of the refugee regime, and deliver resettlement to scale as a genuinely durable solution.

What progress has been made? The 2016 UNGA High Level Summit on Refugees and Migrants and the subsequent New York Declaration provided a forum for exploring the concept of and modalities for responsibility-sharing. These fora also provided a point of departure to develop the substantive content and an institutional framework: to this end, the 2018 Global Compact was tasked with delivery. As discussed above (3.2.5), the prognosis is not good.

Can responsibility-sharing deliver where other initiatives, including burden-sharing, have failed? Analytical clarity is needed in relation to synonyms such as solidarity (much used in the EU), burden-sharing and cooperation, as is clarity on the norms of responsibility that might be invoked. At one extreme, it could embrace the responsibilities necessary to support the whole of the refugee regime – inter alia durable solutions, funding, protection and assistance and institutional capacity. More effective is likely to be a more limited portfolio, and while the GRC aspires to wide ambitions, its approach to responsibility-sharing has been more modest.

Next, should responsibility-sharing be institutionalised, and if so how? Burden-sharing was an oft-cited mantra but was never institutionalised. Did this contribute to its failure? The same impasse seems to have been reached again since the GRC has neither defined the process in specific operational terms, nor has it reached a consensus on the metrics of responsibility-sharing. The emerging reconfiguration of the refugee regime in the 2018
Compact envisages a two-tier structure for the CRRF (laying out overarching principles and strategies) and the Plan of Action (implementing the CRRF), which then define the operating parameters for the country/region responses to specific refugee situations. Rather than a monolithic organisation, the flexibility of such a structure, with ‘guiding principles’ through to ‘detailed actions’, and therefore commitments, might lend itself to operationalising responsibility-sharing. However, the experience of many of the structures and strategies of the refugee regime discussed in earlier sections tells us that aspirations and commitments do not necessarily lead to desired outcomes.

4.3 Durable solutions
This section reviews the search for durable solutions – return, local integration and resettlement – a responsibility embedded in the original mandate of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees. It considers successes, or examples of refugees that found an end to their displacement via one or a combination of the solutions. The discussion then turns to why the durable solutions have, by and large, failed to address the majority of refugee situations around the world. With the number of displaced people stands at some of the highest recorded levels in recent times, creative thinking around displacement, solutions and citizenship is needed to better address both crisis and protracted displacement situations.

4.3.1 What are the success stories?
Return has traditionally been posited as the ‘preferred solution’ to displacement. It is seen as the ideal option for all involved: refugees theoretically want to return home; host states are happy to no longer have the responsibility of hosting them; the international community is relieved of assisting them; and their home country is, in theory, happy to have them back. Academic literature is more divided on the meaning of and attachment to home. It is meant to apply to the largest number of refugees, and to mark the end of their need for protection from persecution. Long writes: ‘Return has evident benefits for many refugees and IDPs. Compared to other solutions, it provides a more obvious foundation for compensatory justice and it allows for the protection of collective political interests’ (Long, 2011: 2).

There are cases where repatriation has been accomplished relatively well: Guatemalans returning from Mexico (Jamal, 2000); Bosnians (Capo, 2015); Burundians returning from Tanzania (Oda, 2011); Tamil returns inside Sri Lanka (George et al., 2016). Some of the factors that went into these successful repatriation examples include:

- voluntariness;
- economic and social absorption capacity of areas of return;
- trust of local actors, international actors and returnees;
- access to justice/peace and reconciliation;
- dignified return;
- appropriate reconstruction/restoration of infrastructure and economic activities; and
- access to land and land rights, social programmes, education and health services (Harild et al., 2015).
Other studies demonstrate the overlapping nature of return and reintegration, arguing that the successful reintegration of returnees requires social programmes, services and resources that benefit the entire population (Kibreab, 2010; Harrell-Bond, 1989).

Local integration, previously regarded as the ‘forgotten solution’, has received increased attention from scholars and practitioners in recent years (Jacobsen, 2001; Fielden, 2008; Dryden-Peterson and Hovil, 2003; 2004; see also the background integration policy paper prepared for this Commission (Zetter, 2018a). Generally, they argue that local integration can be a better solution to encampment, and that, under the right circumstances, it can benefit the host community (see Section 4.4 below). A well-documented success story is Uganda’s policy of allowing refugees to self-settle (Hovil, 2007; Dryden-Peterson and Hovil, 2003; 2004). Allowing refugees freedom of movement and the right to work enables them to become more self-reliant, which means they are less dependent on aid and better able to contribute to their local communities. The Uganda case is explored in more detail in Section 5.2.3. Another example of refugees becoming self-sufficient after gaining freedom of movement includes Tibetan refugees in Nepal (Jacobsen, 2001). In Cyprus, an extensive government and self-build housing programme for the displaced population facilitated self-sufficiency and stimulated economic recovery (Zetter, 1991). Similarly, until 1990 refugees in Kenya were able to work; indeed, in the 1980s many Ugandan refugees in Kenya filled teacher and doctor shortages (Harrell-Bond, 2002: 9). Harrell-Bond also notes self-settlement policies in Uganda and the Ivory Coast (2002). Likewise, the Costa Rican government was encouraged by international assistance through CIREFCA to allow permanent residency for displaced families wishing to remain in the country following the peace process. Belize and Mexico are other examples where long-staying refugees were offered permanent residence. The integration of an older caseload of Burundian refugees in Tanzania has also been viewed as a success story of local integration, but as discussed in Section 4.3.2, might not be as positive a case as many had hoped (Long, 2011: 25).

Thus, some key ingredients for successful local integration include:

- freedom of movement;
- right to work, alongside employment and economic opportunities;
- access to education and other public services;
- documentation (e.g. visas establishing formal rights or residency and/or to own property and businesses);
- engagement of development actors;
- openness and stability of the host community; and
- lack of animosity from hosts.

In other cases, refugees have managed to obtain documentation through informal channels, thus giving them some rights, including freedom of movement and the right to work.

Reviewing local integration in Nepal, Pakistan and Kenya, Banki (2004) notes that, while there is no magic solution for what enables refugees to integrate easily or not in a host country, political considerations, social similarity and the size of refugee flows are important factors.
The longer refugees remain, the more likely they are to integrate (Banki, 2004).

Since 2003, resettlement has been promoted by UNHCR and resettlement states as a ‘strategic’ durable solution that might help to ‘unlock’ other solutions for refugees (UNHCR, 2009). As discussed in the next section, it remains to be seen whether this has actually been the case, particularly as resettlement generally reaches barely 1% of all refugees applying for this option. That said, there are successful examples that point to the positive potential of resettlement. The United States and Canada provide some of the most compelling success stories of refugee resettlement. Between November 2015 and the end of January 2017, Canada took in more than 40,000 Syrian refugees. While the US has drastically cut its resettlement slots under the Trump administration, it has historically taken in the largest number of refugees for resettlement. In the past, the ‘ceiling’ for the number of refugees to be resettled has been as high as 231,700 (in 1980); more recently it has been around 85,000 (Capps and Fix, 2015; Capps et al., 2015). The US resettlement programme emphasises self-sufficiency, and the majority of refugees that resettle in the US find employment at higher or equal rates to the US-born population. As discussed below (Section 4.4), over time refugees earn more, rely less and less on public assistance, and become productive members of their communities. Specific US resettlement cases demonstrating success include Hungarians in the 1950s, who were seen as valuable as exiles from the Soviet regime, as well as meeting labour supply needs (Zieck, 2013). More recently, the large-scale resettlement of Bhutanese to the United States has been seen as a successful solution to a protracted refugee situation in Nepal. Between November 2007 and August 2011, 50,000 Bhutanese (out of 110,000) were resettled in the United States, with others going to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK (Long, 2011: 19). Studies of the Hmong in the US (specifically Texas) and Germany highlight successful resettlement models that draw on different economic and social tools to help refugees succeed in their local communities (Nibbs, 2014). Likewise, Clarkin (2005) discusses Hmong resettlement in French Guyana.

Common themes among successful resettlement models include:

- adequate preparation of refugees in the lead-up to the resettlement process;
- flexibility of the resettlement programme – timing, locations;
- funding support for organisations facilitating settlement;
- sufficient and varied employment opportunities;
- language tuition, skills training, recognition or upgrading of previous professional qualifications;
- a welcoming population;
- community-building processes and programmes to mitigate racial/ethnic tensions and build mutual trust between refugees and hosts;
- sustained social and institutional support for resettled refugees; and
- political value.

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7 Figure as of January 2017: [http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/welcome/milestones.asp](http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/welcome/milestones.asp)
As this analysis indicates, the metrics of successful resettlement, rightly, focus on the social and economic wellbeing of the resettled refugees. If one were to consider success in terms of the effectiveness of resettlement as an international political instrument to resolve refugee crises, then the fact that barely 100,000 refugees a year on average are resettled indicates a more pessimistic outcome.

4.3.2 Overall limitations of the three durable solutions

Despite these examples of success of the traditional durable solutions, the reality is that they are simply not an option for the vast majority of refugees. In 2017, just 667,000 refugees were able to go home (UNHCR, 2018). In the same year, 102,800 refugees were submitted for resettlement (UNHCR, 2018). In other words, only a very small number of refugees around the world are finding an end to their displacement with a durable solution. Only 10% of those refugees identified as in need of resettlement by UNHCR actually resettle, and many face long and uncertain waits (Chatty and Mansour, 2011; Long, 2011: 20). The existence of protracted refugee situations is perhaps the most glaring evidence that the durable solutions have failed.

Of several different estimates and definitions of protracted displacement, one indicates that the average length of time in displacement is 26 years, and 23 of the 32 refugee situations at the end of 2015 were considered protracted.

Why does displacement continue and why do solutions continue to fail? The easiest answer is that conflicts continue, and politicians remain unable to resolve them. But Long (2011) also emphasises that the traditional durable solutions framework has not succeeded in part because states are more concerned about the refugee and IDP ‘problem’ in terms of refugee numbers on their territory, rather than refugees’ access to basic rights and meaningful citizenship (Long, 2010; 2011; Zetter, 2007). The durable solutions also fail because many states are simply unable to create circumstances conducive to them. Durieux and McAdam (2004), for example, argue that, no matter how good their intentions, a large number of refugee-hosting states lack the resources to fully protect refugees according to the 1951 Refugee Convention, particularly in large-scale flows. The capacity to offer protection during exile is closely linked to the ability to facilitate solutions.

Return, as we have seen, is generally seen as the ideal solution. Unfortunately, it often fails for a host of political, economic and security reasons (Harild et al., 2015; Loescher et al., 2008; Bakewell, 2000, Black and Koser, 1999). First and foremost, return must be voluntary. But many host states have tried to force return on a refugee population, either directly by coercive means, using police or military force, or indirectly, by cutting services and making life untenable. Long (2011) writes: ‘Explaining the failure of repatriation programmes is also closely tied to the lack of asylum protection. Too often, repatriation efforts have been premature, precipitated by a desire to remove refugee populations from host states and to point to a visible sign of “resolved” crises moving into a post-conflict phase’ (Long, 2011: 10; see also Turton and Marsden, 2002).

It is also common for states to prioritise return at the expense of other solutions. For example, a host state might proclaim return as the only viable solution, and thus insist on limiting refugees’ rights until they can return home. The problem, of course, is that when fighting
becomes protracted and return unfeasible, the refugee situation also becomes protracted, creating a stalemate where refugees are kept in camps or settlements, or with very limited access to their rights to work or to free movement. The Kenya case study illustrates some of these seemingly irreconcilable dynamics. Equally, international donors are keen to expedite return to relieve themselves of the burden of funding humanitarian programmes, and ‘encourage’ return by the gradual withdrawal of assistance, but this may be premature in countries emerging from conflict, or where the conditions for successful return have not been put in place. This ‘return bias’ is a significant reason why other attempted solutions never even get off the ground (Long, 2011; Loescher et al., 2008a).

Local integration has also generally not worked as a solution for most refugees. Host states often deny integration (de facto or de jure) due to reasons of national security, economic concerns and social cohesion. In the case of Syrian refugees, host countries such as Lebanon and Jordan are reluctant to allow Syrian refugees full access to rights and integration, partly due to their past experiences with hosting Palestinian refugees; partly because of the very large numbers of refugees that a country like Jordan has absorbed over many decades; and partly due to the political instability associated with their presence (Ferris and Kirisci, 2016; Miller, 2017). Among Somali refugees in Kenya, fears of Al-Shabaab and concerns over communal relations impede local integration (Long, 2011: 9). Economic concerns, most often displayed as a fear that refugees will take jobs from locals, are also a key reason why local integration is not pursued.

Among the most well-known cases of a recent attempt at integration is the 2007 Tanzanian decision to naturalise 162,000 Burundians from an ‘old’ refugee caseload from 1972. While it has been touted as a possible success story of local integration (Fielden, 2008), concerns remain over how well it has been carried out (Long, 2011: 10). Most notably, refugees to be naturalised have been required to relocate elsewhere in Tanzania before receiving citizenship. This is arguably counter-productive, as they had been de facto integrated and had not received assistance since 1985, and were even producing a small surplus of cash crops (Long, 2011: 25). In other words, this attempt at integration actually served as a new displacement. The result has been a stalled process, tensions with hosts and complicated domestic politics for Tanzania.

One of the most notable limitations of resettlement is that it only reaches a very small proportion of refugees. As Long writes: ‘If the failure of repatriation is closely linked to the quality of return, the failure of resettlement must be understood at least in part as a failure of quantity’ (2011: 11). There has been an expansion in the number of refugee resettlement countries working with UNHCR, including countries in Eastern Europe, South America and Asia, but the numbers are still very small (Long, 2011: 18). Likewise, it is not clear whether resettlement has successfully ‘unlocked’ any protracted refugee situations, and it is not a likely solution for other displaced groups, such as IDPs (Bradley, 2011; Lindley and Haslie, 2011).

Another limitation of resettlement is the susceptibility of the process to the socio-economic and political preferences of resettlement states, rather than the objective needs and rights
of the refugees. This is played out in a number of ways. For example, states may choose groups that are seen as potentially integrating more easily or having more skills to offer over other groups in resettlement – for example Germany and France only resettling Christian Iraqis (Chatty and Mansour, 2011: 22, in Long, 2011). Some are viewed as ‘difficult’ cases, and religious discrimination is also suggested as a factor, for example in resistance to Muslim refugees. Likewise, bringing Bhutanese to resettle in the US was a largely political decision, as they were seen as ‘unthreatening refugees’ (Laenkholm, 2007: 59, in Long, 2011: 19).

Resettlement programmes are often politicised in more obvious ways: countries select groups to resettle based on what is in their strategic interest. Somalis, for example, might not be seen as having strategic value (Lindley and Haslie, 2011: 39). Conversely, the case of resettled refugees from Hungary, noted under the success stories above, served the anti-communist political interests of Western governments alongside the refugees’ self-evident need for protection. Favourable reception conditions for Cuban refugees in the United States over many years are part of a wider strategy of denying the legitimacy of the Cuban government. Certainly, Trump’s rhetoric and policy shifts on resettlement, not just with respect to Cubans, demonstrate the political challenges resettlement faces as an effective durable solution. A parallel concern is that refugees will ‘hold out’ for resettlement over other durable solutions because of the opportunities it brings.

4.3.3 De facto local integration
While states are seldom open to de jure integration for most cases, de facto integration, sometimes called invisible integration (Hovil, 2014), is far more common. Formal status is still very important, but some level of de facto integration, particularly in protracted refugee situations, is inevitable. Rather than remaining in a camp or settlement, many refugees take great risks to leave in order to find work, often in urban areas. Their lack of legal status makes them very vulnerable to exploitation, and they are unable to enter local labour markets, set up businesses or access education or health services (Long, 2011: 22). Despite this precarious position, very large numbers of refugees around the world integrate, a process that may be underscored by marriage to nationals of the host country, raising families in the country of exile, and social cohesion with co-ethnics of the host country (Hovil, 2014). The Kenya case study for this project illustrates how these complex conditions of local integration play out for Somali refugees in the country. If de facto integration is inevitable, ‘the challenge for the international community is to consider how best to maximize the benefits gained from such practical integration, and minimize the risks that a lack of accompanying de jure status involves’ (Long, 2011: 22).

4.3.4 New approaches
Given the obvious shortcomings of the durable solutions, and the difficulties in applying them to wide swaths of the refugee population, some scholars and practitioners are pushing for new approaches. New conceptions of ‘mobility’, for example, argue that the labels of ‘forced’, ‘voluntary’ or ‘mixed’ migration are problematic (this is discussed in more detail in the background concept paper on force displacement (Zetter, 2018)), and that the language of ‘durable solutions’ may even be creating more problems for hosts and refugees (Long, 2011; Zetter, 1991; 2007). Likewise, categorising groups as ‘displaced’ or ‘hosts’ can block potential
solutions (e.g. Long, 2011: 24). Long writes that, while not a fourth durable solution, mobility can be a part of accessing protection, and can reaffirm refugees’ autonomy during displacement: ‘meaningful citizenship is not necessarily sedentary. What needs to occur to “solve” a protracted displacement is not necessarily an end to movement, but rather an end to forced movements that offer only partial or inadequate protections’ (Long, 2011: 15–16). The idea that labour migration should also be considered a durable solution to displacement has also gained traction (Long, 2010).

Many of these ideas are not new. Easton-Calabria (2015), for example, emphasises the need to revisit how ‘solutions’ have been employed over the *longue durée*: some of what seems innovative and new has been tried before, and can be learned from. For example, there has been no shortage of calls for greater partnership with development actors and the need for a reduction in policies of closed encampment (Harrell-Bond, 1989; Long, 2011: 28; Crisp, 1986: 163), a narrative explored in detail in Section 5. As demonstrated in Section 4.4, this also requires a recognition of the positive impacts that refugees can make to local economies.

There has been a push among scholars and practitioners to specifically address protracted displacement (and hence explore why the durable solutions have failed in so many cases) (Bradley, 2011; Chatty and Mansour, 2011; Lindley and Haslie, 2011). Likewise, new energy and resources have gone towards technology to help bring about solutions to displacement and to improve protection and assistance to refugees and others in exile. These efforts have helped to bring in new actors, notably from the corporate world.

Finally, there is momentum in favour of expanding resettlement programmes. It is unclear how current US policy will affect these efforts, but as of 2015 new resettlement states, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay (Ruiz, 2015), have accepted small numbers of refugees for resettlement. Canada in particular has been praised, not only for the large number of Syrian refugees it has welcomed since 2015, but also for its private sponsorship options, discussed in Section 5 of this paper.

There is, clearly, much scope for the 2018 Migration Compact to promote innovative channels to population mobility, which may also simultaneously help to serve the specific needs of forcibly displaced people. The extent to which this potential can be delivered rests on the willingness of states to think critically and positively about the global challenges of migration in the twentieth century.

4.4 Refugees as agents and contributors

In recent years, scholars and practitioners concerned with refugees and other forced migrants have emphasised the importance of recognising refugees as agents and contributors to their communities. Rather than the conventional view of them as simply ‘passive aid recipients’, they have skills and potential to contribute (see, for example, Harrell-Bond, 2002a; Ghorashi, 2005; Easton-Calabria and Omaha, 2017).

There is increasing scholarship demonstrating the positive economic impacts that refugees can make when given the opportunity to integrate into a host community (Jacobsen, 2001).
Examples from refugees self-settling in Uganda and those resettled in the United States show the positive economic impacts that displaced populations can have, particularly when they are viewed, not as a burden or passive aid recipients, but as individuals with skills and potential. One study by the European Commission found that refugees can positively affect the European economy over the long term by addressing demographic trends, and contributing to innovation, entrepreneurship and GDP growth (European Commission, 2016a). It argues that refugees can fill niches in sectors of the economy, and contribute to labour market flexibility. The study also found that, if well-integrated, refugees can contribute to greater market flexibility, help address demographic challenges and improve fiscal sustainability, conclusions endorsed by a recent Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) study on the labour market integration of refugees in Germany.

A World Bank study on Kenya has found that refugees can be an economic benefit through the multiplier impact of the international aid they attract (Sanghi et al., 2016; see also the Kenya case study for this Commission). The refugee presence in Kakuma boosted gross regional product by over 3% and increased employment by a similar margin (Sanghi et al., 2016). Turkana also experienced additional development as a result of the refugee presence, and economic integration raised per capita host incomes by 6% (Sanghi et al., 2016). Other research cites examples in Malawi, Albania, Macedonia, Jordan, Pakistan and Tanzania where refugees have had positive effects, either through camps stimulating local economies through increased demand, or by attracting resources, technology and jobs to otherwise poor or remote areas (Landau, 2008; Milner, 2009; Harrell-Bond, 1986; 2002; Jacobsen and Fratzke, 2016; Kuch, 2017).

A Tent Foundation report (Legrain, 2016) emphasises the positive contributions that refugees can also make to developed economies, arguing that one euro invested in refugees can yield nearly two euros in economic benefits over time; as refugees are given the opportunity to become entrepreneurs, innovators, taxpayers, consumers and investors, so they create jobs, raise productivity and the wages of local workers, lift capital returns, stimulate international trade and investment and boost innovation, enterprise and growth. The study cites International Monetary Fund (IMF) evidence that additional spending in the EU on refugees of 0.09% of GDP in 2015 and 0.11% in 2016 will raise GDP by 0.13% by 2017 and 0.23% by 2020. The study further argues that younger, working-age refugees can support ageing societies such as Germany or Italy, while also providing remittances that boost economies in home countries. Studies on Syrian refugees have also indicated their economic potential. One study by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) found that, while Syrian refugees create some economic strain upon immediate arrival, they are also consumers and economic actors that can boost local markets (2014). Syrian refugee entrepreneurs have also boosted the economy with new firms, jobs and services or products, investing $1 billion in Jordan in 2013 (Karasapan, 2015; see also Rubin, 2017).

To a considerable degree, these positive outcomes of refugees as agents of development and their own self-sustainability happen autonomously, rather than as the product of explicit policy interventions (Betts et al., 2014). Nonetheless, a recent OECD meta-evaluation, among many other analytical studies, emphasises how policies promoting access to employment and
business creation can provide important preconditions to boost these outcomes (OECD, 2017: 33–52). The emerging development-led paradigm (discussed in detail in Sections 5.2 and 5.3) provides a vital buttress for refugee agency.

Research on refugees that have been resettled also points to positive economic contributions. Data for refugees in the US, for example, indicates that, despite an initial cost in assistance, over the years refugees are a net gain to the economy (RCUSA, 2017; Capps et al., 2015). Local studies in Ohio argue that refugees have been an asset over the years (Chmura Economics and Analytics, 2013; US Together et al., 2015); refugees tended to find employment within five months of their arrival, and worked their way off government assistance within the first few years. The total economic impact of refugees in the area was $48 million in 2012 (Chmura, 2013). Refugees purchased 248 homes over the last decade, and were above average compared to national norms in socioeconomic integration (Chmura, 2013). Refugees who own businesses create jobs and provide goods and services; resettlement agencies spend money to provide services, and refugee workers contribute to the local economy (US Together et al., 2015). Another study on the economic impact of refugees and immigrants in Akron, Ohio, also points to positive returns via taxes, purchased homes and work in manufacturing and service sector jobs. It notes that some 86% of refugees were of working age in 2013, helping to support an ageing population (Partnership for a New American Economy and the Knight Foundation, 2016).

The case of Ohio is supported by national research on resettlement in the US by other scholars. Capps et al. (2015), for example, observe that refugees resettled in the US are more likely to be employed than the US-born population, and that their incomes rise substantially as a function of the length of time they are in the country. Over time refugees’ participation in benefit programmes declines, and they generally own their own homes and become US citizens (Capps et al., 2015; Kallick and Mathema, 2016). Policies of self-reliance and a focus on refuge livelihoods have the potential to provide refugees with greater choice and access to protection, and to contribute to host state development (Barbelet, 2017; Wake, 2016; Machiavello, 2003; UNHCR, 2004). Examples from Germany and Uganda demonstrate how livelihood and self-reliance policies can lessen the strain of initially hosting refugees (World Economic Forum, 2016). Perhaps the most prominent example is Uganda, at least as far as compelling research evidence is concerned, where refugees have had a positive economic impact under policies that grant them freedom of movement and the right to work, suggesting there may be further benefits to be gained by directly including refugees in national and local economic development plans and strategies. There are also numerous examples of refugees in Uganda becoming successful entrepreneurs (Betts et al., 2014; see also Machiavello, 2003).

Other innovative approaches to support refugee agency and self-sufficiency focus on legal assistance. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), for example, offers information, counselling and legal assistance programmes in 20 countries, including Afghanistan, Ukraine and Lebanon. This provides access to legal clinics and information, which then connects refugees to job offers, legal and health services and help with legal status, housing, land and property rights and work (NRC, 2017). More holistic programmes have the potential to
provide for greater refugee protection, and thus better opportunities for self-reliance, than chipping away at any one issue. Indeed, while the focus on the right to work, self-reliance and access to job opportunities is important, this should not be at the expense of advocacy on other legal and physical protections.

5 Current trends and policy agendas

This section explores contemporary trends, emerging policy agendas and strategies to tackle the global challenges of large-scale and protracted forced displacement. Although the regime has adapted over the decades to meet the changing characteristics of forced displacement, current trends suggest that we are at a transformative rather than a transitional moment in the way forced displacement is conceived, and the architecture of the international response to it.

This section explores three major areas of innovation. A short initial section reviews new thinking and practice broadly related to durable solutions. Two subsequent sections discuss in detail the profound and related changes taking place in the architecture of the international response to forced displacement, notably the shift towards sustainable development-led approaches alongside humanitarian assistance, and the changing landscape of funding and financing in situations of forced displacement.

5.1 Innovative responses for durable solutions

In recent years, there has been momentum towards more innovative solutions outside the traditional durable solutions of return, local integration and resettlement (reviewed in Section 4.3). This section highlights three significant examples: the private sponsorship model employed in Canada’s resettlement of Syrian refugees; projects that attempt to better match refugees’ skills with the needs of resettlement states; and visa schemes that grant refugees greater rights and freedoms to cross borders and seek protection. While these new practices are unlikely to make a significant difference to the number of refugees benefiting from a durable solution to their displacement, they do illustrate how it is possible to develop new thinking about what seem to be persistent structural failings within the current regime, and also to reinforce means of protection for forcibly displaced people.

5.1.1 Private sponsorship in Canada

While most states have been reluctant or even outright hostile to receiving Syrian refugees, Canada has explicitly welcomed them. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau made Syrian refugee resettlement a cornerstone of his election campaign, and by the end of January 2017 Canada had resettled 40,081 Syrian refugees (Government of Canada, 2017). Canada has a unique combination of approaches to resettling refugees. It deploys the traditional approach used by most countries, which resettles refugees through government programmes. But it also has a private sponsorship model, whereby groups of citizens – families, churches, community groups – can bind together and sponsor a refugee’s first full year of resettlement while the government covers healthcare and children’s education; in the second year, refugees are eligible for welfare benefits (Hyndman et al., 2017). Since 1978, more than 200,000 refugees have been privately sponsored to come to Canada. Besides the recent resettlement of
Syrians, the largest groups to have been resettled via this method were Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians who arrived in the 1970s and early 1980s (Hyndman et al., 2017). Canada also has a ‘blended’ version, which combines a government-sponsored, federal programme with the private sponsorship model. According to Hyndman et al. (2017):

Direct participation by civil society in resettlement has been the hallmark of Canada’s private sponsorship programme, and a major element in its success. The majority of PSRs are supported by Sponsorship Agreement Holders (SAHs), who have formal agreements with the federal government, or by constituent groups that fall under the auspices of the SAHs. Some 75% of SAHs are faith-based organisations, and consist of ‘constituent groups’ of at least five sponsors who contract to assist a refugee family for twelve months. A smaller number of refugees are sponsored not by SAHs but by ‘groups of five’ – groups of individuals who sign a commitment of support for a specific refugee or refugees.

For the most part, this innovative approach has been deemed a success. Privately sponsored refugees slightly outperform government-assisted refugees in their ability to find jobs faster (though the data is more complicated regarding whether or not they are more successful). There are however some concerns with the private sponsorship model, including that some sponsors were excessively intrusive and not well-supported, but improvements have been made, and by and large private sponsorship, while not reducing the costs to the Canadian government of resettlement, has increased protection space. Hyndman et al. (2017) write that: ‘Private refugee resettlement cannot be about the privatization of states’ international obligations and related costs. In Canada, the principle of additionality ensures that private efforts expand refugee protection spaces by complementing government commitments to resettlement’.

Canada is also unique in that there is public support for refugee resettlement and strong government leadership. At the UN Summit in 2016, Canada promised to export the private sponsorship model to other states through the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative, including Australia and the UK.

5.1.2 Refugee skills matching
Jones and Teytelboym (2017) propose a ‘matching system’ that uses an algorithm to attempt to match refugees’ preferences with those of host countries (relating to skills, capacities, etc.). The ‘matching markets’ system enables refugee and host country preferences to be collected and shared (OECD, 2016), potentially giving refugees greater say in where they are resettled, and states more say in which refugees they take in. Refugees ‘would rank their preference destinations, and states could rank the types of refugees they seek based on skills and language criteria. To be fair to all refugees, there would also need to be quotas for diversity and based on vulnerability’ (Resilience Exchange, 2017). Clearly, safeguards need to be in place to ensure that vulnerable refugees with limited skills are not excluded, but the idea holds potential and represents the creative thinking taking place beyond the traditional discourse of durable solutions.
5.1.3 Visa schemes
Brazil has been praised for allowing Syrian refugees (the scheme also applies to non-Syrians, including Palestinians and Kurds) to obtain humanitarian visas to enter Brazil. Building on the practice of issuing humanitarian visas to Haitians after the 2010 earthquake, the visas provide a faster and more direct route to entry (Jubilet et al., 2017; Canineu and Frellick, 2016; UNHCR, 2013). According to Jubilut et al. (2017): ‘It is the Brazilian government’s position that it is important for refugees to have access to procedures for applying for asylum, that it recognizes the disproportionate burden that countries neighbouring conflicts may endure, and that the international community needs to take action as these are matters of international law’. Brazil recognises that people fleeing persecution or conflict may not be able to present the bank statements, invitation letters or round-trip airline tickets that would normally be required for a visa. The scheme, though praised by UNHCR and others, has its shortcomings, most obviously that it is susceptible to ad hoc or discriminatory practices. Nevertheless, humanitarian visa schemes such as this hold great promise for future efforts to provide improved protection for refugees (Jubilet et al., 2017).

Mexico allowed 30 Syrian students from refugee camps in Jordan to finish their studies at some of the country’s best universities. Under the Habesha Project, they were given student visas, full scholarships, health insurance, accommodation with a local family and a monthly stipend during their studies. The ultimate goal is to enable the students to finish their degrees and return to Syria to help with reconstruction (PRI, 2015).

Since 1978, Canadian students have privately sponsored more than 1,400 refugee students through the NGO World University Service Canada (WUSC). Since 2016, WUSC has funded almost 160 students a year. It is recognised as a model that offers both protection and the opportunity to access higher education and work experience in Canada (Jubilet et al., 2017). Like the Mexican student visa scheme, it does not reach a large number of refugees, but is nonetheless an innovative attempt to think beyond the traditional durable solutions.

5.2 The transformation to development approaches – regional and country examples
One profound change in the international architecture of the refugee regime has been the expanding role of development actors and the promotion of more sustainable development-led responses to refugee crises, especially in the context of protracted displacement (see Section 3.2.4), sometimes termed the humanitarian–development nexus and, by some stakeholders, the triple nexus (humanitarian–peace–development). Broadly speaking, this approach aims to tackle two enduring challenges: mitigating the impacts of forced displacement on receiving countries and communities; and addressing the longer-term livelihood needs of displaced people in sustainable ways.

Operating at different spatial scales (regional, national, local and household), different timescales (medium-term, with a sustainability perspective) and engaging different actors (inter-governmental agencies, governments, refugees, host populations), the ‘developmental approach’ comprises new and diverse strategies and policy instruments that go beyond protection and subsistence to foster economic opportunities. This part of the review explores
three prototypical examples: regional strategies exemplified by the Regional Refugee Resilience Programme (3RP) in response to the Syria crisis; new instruments in Jordan and Ethiopia, such as the Compact between international donors and receiving countries to promote development and Special Enterprise Zones (SEZs) to fast-track refugee employment; and indigenously designed sustainable responses in countries such as Uganda. These innovations link to transformations in the funding of refugee response programmes, which are explored in the following section (Section 5.3), namely the increased engagement of the private sector, new possibilities for engaging private development finance, fiscal support and concessionary loans for impacted governments and cash programming for refugee assistance.

This reconfiguration remains largely experimental, pragmatic and fragmented; it does not, as yet, constitute a coherent and systematic model in the way that the paradigm of humanitarian assistance has come to be structured through many decades of experience. However, the 2016 New York Declaration on the CRRF embeds developmental approaches in at least two of its four objectives. Further reinforcing the CRRF in the GRC, and indeed the whole thrust of the GRC itself towards sustainable solutions to protracted refugee crises, will help consolidate the substantive and operational architecture of the sustainable development approach embedded in the nexus. More generally, it also resonates with the 2015 SDGs.

While the changing vocabulary, from assistance to development, is symptomatic of the changing structural responses to refugee crises, it is important to stress that longer-term development strategies are not an alternative to or substitute for humanitarian assistance and protection. Both are essential. The greater challenge is to ensure coherence between the two paradigms; this requires effective synchronisation and coordination of strategies, policies and implementation between different actors with different ways of working, different funding modalities and different timescales.

5.2.1 Syria: The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)
The social and economic impacts of the influx of 4.6 million Syrian refugees on neighbouring countries have been profound, widespread and well-documented (Cagaptay, 2014; EU, 2016; Government of Jordan, 2014; IMF, 2016; World Bank 2013; 2013a; 2014; 2015; World Bank-UNHCR, 2016). The pattern and incidence of macro-economic shocks, reductions in GDP and foreign direct investment (FDI) and the extent of fiscal stress on national budgets have been a consistent feature across all the impacted countries, with some variations contingent on pre-existing economic and human development circumstances and the specific underlying sectoral weaknesses in their economies. The impacts on living standards and livelihood conditions of the refugees themselves have been equally devastating. At a household level, living conditions for host populations, especially for the poorer socio-economic categories and in the deprived neighbourhoods where refugees have mainly settled, have eroded under the triple impact of stressed public services, escalating prices for basic goods, food and services and declining incomes in overheated labour markets. Increasing pressure on national safety nets has led to rising levels of vulnerability and poverty among host populations in communities exhibiting high levels of deprivation even before the crisis.
By 2014, there was growing recognition that the structural impacts (economic, social and environmental) of the protracted displacement of millions of refugees required a strategy that was both development-oriented and regionally based. The foundations of such a response were put in place through the 3RP (UNHCR-UNDP, 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017). The 3RP, which is revised annually, provides an overarching instrument to coordinate national strategies tailored to the stabilisation and medium- and longer-term development priorities of the five most affected countries, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt and Iraq (Bailey and Barbalet, 2014). The third iteration of the 3RP, which covered the period 2017–18, retained the thematic focus on sectors such as economic recovery, job creation and livelihoods and education and health services, while introducing new themes, including national leadership and enhanced accountability, outreach and partnerships. The intention is to include Syria in the next annual cycle.

The fourth iteration of the 3RP for 2018–19 sustains the coordination of over 270 partners in a budget programme of $4.4 billion, some 45% of which is directed to resilience, in other words broadly speaking development-led responses. Protection frameworks and national-level leadership of the 3RP are retained as is the ‘no lost generation’ education strategy. However, in the current context significant weight is given to building on the Dead Sea Resilience Agenda and further enhancing economic opportunities and durable solutions for Syrian refugees is now also on the agenda.

Although there have been previous international strategies to tackle the regional dimensions of refugee crises (notable examples being the CPA and CIREFCA (see Section 3.2.3 above)), the 3RP is a significant innovation in a number of respects. First, integrating humanitarian and development interventions within a single crisis response programming platform – the so-called nexus – is a fundamental change, and the substantive focus on economic and developmental impacts and strategies is a major addition to earlier approaches, which prioritised refugee protection, resettlement and return. Second, mitigating negative impacts on the living standards and quality of public services for host communities is embedded as a core component. Third, signalling a move away from previous, more internationally focused approaches, although 3RP provides trilateral coordination between the UN, international financial institutions and national governments, it is nationally owned and country-led. Facilitated by the UN, national and local delivery systems drive the process, with planning and implementation at country and municipal levels now involving 270 humanitarian and development partners. Fourth, the funding architecture has shifted to multi-year programming, ensuring greater predictability and bringing new funding institutions on board, notably the World Bank. Funding requirements for the 2017–18 3RP were $4.68 billion and only slightly less at $4.4 billion for 2018–19. Finally, the engagement of private sector actors, largely responsible for delivering the 1.1 million jobs by 2018 envisaged in the 3RP (UNHCR-UNDP, 2017), as well as other components such as e-banking and cash programming, is also a major innovation (discussed below in Section 5.3).

At the London Conference in February 2016 – ‘Supporting Syria and the Region’ – refugee-receiving countries committed to increasing economic opportunities for refugees and host
communities, principally by agreeing the politically sensitive strategy of opening up their
labour markets. Donors committed to: supporting receiving countries by underwriting some
of the costs of opening up labour markets, giving preferential and tariff-free access to their
own markets; concessionary development financing; and increased public and private sector
job creation (Gonzales, 2016).

Clearly, the 3RP marks a departure from past interventions in large-scale refugee crises. It has
transformed, in theory at least, the long-established but poorly articulated principles of
burden-sharing. Given that structural changes of the kind envisaged in the 3RP may take
several years to work through national economies, it is too soon to conclude that there have
been definitive transformative results. But some trends are apparent.

The expansion of labour markets, a key objective of the 3RP, has proved difficult. For
example, by the end of 2016 scarcely more than 13,000 formal sector jobs had been created
for Syrian refugees in Turkey (Korkmaz, 2017: 5), a picture repeated in the other countries in
the region. Overall, only marginally more than 11,000 refugees benefited from supported
access to employment in 2016, while 65,700 are targeted for employment and self-
employment in 2017–18 (UNHCR-UNDP, 2017a: 48 and 44). From the perspective of both
refugees and receiving countries, there are many bureaucratic, socio-economic and individual
reasons for this slow take-up.

A more recent IRC report (IRC 2018: 9), itself partly collating other data sources, indicates
that by the end of 2017, 83,507 work permits had been issued to Syrian refugees in Jordan
and significant progress had been made towards the government’s 200,000 target. However,
as the report points out many of these are actually reissued permits, just under half are in
active use and a negligible 3,485 (4.17%) have gone to women.

To some extent the ‘regional’ prefix is misleading: the 3RP is not a regional plan per se. How-
ever, it does provide a holistic analytical and planning framework for the region within
which the individual country plans are located; this enables their priorities to be treated as
complementary, rather than in competition. The 3RP framework incorporates integrated
strategic planning instruments such as the Jordan Response Plan (JRP) and the Lebanon Crisis
Response Plan (LCRP), as well as more piecemeal approaches in the other countries. The 3RP
also takes account of other instruments such as the Jordan Compact (see below), and the
EU’s commitment to provide €3 billion in financial assistance to Turkey under the Facility for
Refugees in Turkey, and the Dead Sea Resilience Agenda (DSRA).

The concept of resilience remains vague (Bailey and Barbelet, 2014) and, inevitably, there are
many operational questions about synergising humanitarian and development strategies,
including programme scope and priorities, funding cycles, coordination and partnerships
between multiple stakeholders and donors and programme evaluation. Of particular
significance is the question of timing. While emergency conditions necessitate an immediate
humanitarian response, when is the optimum time to plan and implement longer-term
developmental strategies, especially as structural changes require much more time to take
effect? In the Syrian case, the 3RP began rolling out, somewhat reactively, about three years
after refugee outflows started to escalate. This has led many commentators to suggest that developmental strategies should commence simultaneously with the humanitarian effort, i.e. at the start of a refugee crisis. However, this presupposes certain assumptions about the scale of the refugee crisis, and how protracted it will be. The latter point raises questions which bear on the wider issue of the political willingness of receiving countries to contemplate the longer-term settlement of refugees in their countries.

Significant though the 3RP is, it was prompted by the fact that the Syrian refugee crisis has impacted strategically significant middle-income countries close to Europe. Refugee burden-sharing is not new, but low-income countries have not in the past succeeded in mobilising transformative resilience programmes of this kind; only Ethiopia has managed to access international support for a limited suite of longer-term developmental policies for refugees. The resilience model has also not been transferred to Uganda, for example, or other middle- and lower-middle-income countries further from Europe, such as Iran and Pakistan, countries still accommodating over two million registered Afghan refugees between them, suggesting that the underlying motive of refugee containment is less pressing in these cases.

5.2.2 The Compacts and Special Economic Zones (SEZs) – Jordan and Ethiopia

One of the most high-profile instruments of the regional resilience strategy discussed above has been the Jordan Compact, part of the three-year rolling JRP. Designed to stimulate investment and economic growth in Jordan, the main objective of the Compact, launched in 2016, is to create employment opportunities for Syrian refugees and Jordanians. Domestic and international business investment and development is promoted as the pathway to these aspirations, with the core components of the Compact comprising policy changes and structural reforms to the work permit and business registration processes, infrastructure investment and the opening up of economic activity in refugee camps. Critical to the success of the Compact, which is estimated to cost $1 billion over 2016–19, are: a new Extended Fund Facility with the IMF, which will enable Jordan to mobilise international grants and concessionary financing to support its macroeconomic framework; and the expansion of concessionary access and preferential rules of origin to EU markets linked to trade liberalisation in Jordan (Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2016), designed to attract business investment and stimulate economic growth, thus expanding the labour markets on which the resilience strategy is built (ibid.; IRIN, 2017). SEZs operationalise the Compact. Eighteen have been designated, offering substantial financial and tax incentives and a reduced regulatory environment to investors contingent on employing agreed percentages of Syrian refugees. Cumulatively, these measures are projected to provide up to 200,000 job opportunities for Syrian refugees (the timeframe appears flexible), enabling them to contribute to the Jordanian economy, but through labour market expansion rather than substitution, minimising competition for jobs with local Jordanians.

Evidence on the outcomes of the Compact is limited, not least because structural change will take several years to work through Jordan’s economy. However, there is evidence that, while SEZs can increase job creation, the scale of their impact ‘may not be large enough to justify using them as a stand-alone or primary approach to increasing employment’ (IRC, 2017: 3). Formal employment take-up under the aegis of the Compact appears to be limited: work
permits are still not easy to obtain, either by refugees or their employers (Zetter and Ruaudel, 2017; Stave and Hillesund, 2015, cited in IRC, 2017: 4), and for refugees, alongside anxiety about registering with the government, there is concern that getting a job in Jordan may risk losing access to humanitarian assistance or the chance of third-country resettlement (IRIN, 2017). In any case, work permits are limited to certain employment sectors: 17 professions, including engineering, medicine and teaching, are excluded, and some of the preferred sectors are dominated by well-established migrant, rather than Jordanian, labour, and are proving resistant to change. As the earlier discussion of the Compact under the 3RP section above has indicated, progress, if measured in terms of work permits, as opposed to average income levels, livelihood impacts or economic growth, has been disappointing. Many permits are reissues or un-activated, or are formalising those who were already employed; the gender gap is enormous. The SEZs are mostly located far from the cities and camps where the majority of Syrian refugees live, and difficulties of access are compounded by the country’s very poor public transport infrastructure (IRIN, 2017).

Concerns have also been raised about employment outcomes and the lack of social protection for Syrian refugees, with the suggestion that it is the attitudes of employers rather than work permits per se that have secured decent working conditions and wages (ILO, 2017a: 12, 14). Indeed, an IRC meta-evaluation is unequivocal in warning that SEZs in other contexts (not in refugee situations) ‘entrench existing inequalities related to workers’ marginalized status, and in turn may enable exploitative work and wage discrimination … Overall, there is strong evidence supporting the existence of harms associated with SEZs, such as risks to health, safety, and human rights’ (IRC, 2017: 3). Conversely, it is clear that external stakeholders (inter-governmentals, NGOs, donors) are supportive of the strategy, funding or promoting specific initiatives such as skills training and supporting reforms in the government’s labour market policies and regulatory machinery, as well as direct investment in new enterprises.

Beyond these operational considerations, a survey commissioned by the ILO illustrates how the Compact/SEZ job strategy is inevitably susceptible to structural conditions such as seasonal variations in employment (particularly in agriculture), changing market demand reflected in international trade flows (ILO, 2017), and the well-established and often protected position of manufacturers in other countries in sectors such as the garment industry, which Jordan is trying to promote. More generally, the IRC meta-evaluation cautions against the possibly rather simplistic and optimistic expectations of the Jordan Compact, citing evidence of limited impact in specific elements (such as trade liberalisation, work permits and business promotion) drawn from experience in other countries, albeit not all in the refugee context (IRC, 2017). Taken together, these factors may help to explain why neither the commercial take-off anticipated from investment and entrepreneurial opportunities nor large-scale employment gains have yet occurred in the SEZs: investment in business enterprises is limited, and entrepreneurs remain cautious despite the incentives available.

While there are some positive indicators, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Compact’s labour market impacts are piecemeal and have been slow to gain traction, though
given the Jordanian government’s understandable political sensitivity to labour market liberalisation an incremental and experimental approach is not unexpected. More generally, there is as yet no comprehensive econometric analysis of the wider structural impacts of the Compact on the Jordanian economy. Such analysis is probably premature. Yet, in its unexpected role as the guinea pig for profound international changes in how refugee crises are managed, measuring how the Jordanian economy and its labour market have performed in response to the battery of macro- and micro-economic policy levers it has been exposed to remains a vital question. In this regard, it is of concern that a systematic and sufficiently robust apparatus for monitoring and analysing the interventions does not appear to be in place (IRC, 2017: 5).

Paralleling the Jordan Compact and SEZ programme, a similar but smaller programme is being rolled out in the Ethiopia Jobs Compact, with the aim of creating employment for 100,000 people including up to 30,000 refugees, drawn from Ethiopia’s current refugee population of 830,000. Concessionary debt financing of $500 million for the Compact from the European Investment Bank (EIB), the World Bank and the UK, and about 10% from the Ethiopian government, is linked to the granting of employment rights and opportunities for refugees by the Ethiopian government. The Compact involves the construction of up to ten industrial parks and associated infrastructure (in effect SEZs), as well as funding for training, housing and relocation support for refugees in these new communities (EIB, 2016; UNHCR, 2017c). In addition, the Ethiopian government has pledged to provide a proportion of ‘out of camp’ refugees with work permits, facilitate local integration for refugees who have lived in Ethiopia for over 20 years and make land available to 20,000 refugees and host community households (comprising a total of 100,000 people) (UNHCR, 2017c). The employment aspects of the Compact are a significant departure from Ethiopia’s long-standing policy of allowing refugees the right to work solely in camps (Zetter and Ruaudel, 2017). As with the Jordan Compact, it is too early to assess the structural impacts of the Ethiopia Jobs Compact, but a strong focus on numbers and targets, together with the apparent lack of proposals for the systematic analysis of impacts, suggests that objectives such as sustainability, the quality of jobs and enhancing refugee protection may drop down or off the agenda.

The Ethiopia Jobs Compact fits into the wider international policy context in three respects. For UNHCR, it is seen as a contribution to the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) platform supporting a comprehensive approach to delivering sustainable peace, prosperity and regional integration among the eight countries of Central Africa and the Horn. In this respect, it is a pilot for multi-year multi-planning processes to tackle refugee protection and durable solutions in a sustainable way. Likewise, the Compact is one instrument supporting the delivery of the CRRF. Third, the Compact is part of a wider EIB effort to tackle the challenges of mixed migration, which includes the €7.5 billion Economic Resilience Initiative for Europe’s Southern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans and the €800 million Africa-Caribbean-Pacific ‘migration package’ (EIB, 2016a).

In conclusion, the 3RP, the Compacts and the SEZs evidence a determined effort by the international community to rethink their response to protracted refugee situations. As components of the new CRRF architecture, they provide a powerful new impetus for
responsibility-sharing to address the needs of heavily impacted countries. Two cautionary reflections are relevant here. First, with respect to the core strategy of employment creation, we know that the impacts of forced displacement on labour markets and of policy interventions to expand labour markets, as in Jordan and Ethiopia, are complex (World Bank, 2016a). Initial conditions – the structure of the labour market, skills, wages, levels of unemployment, investment climate – are highly significant factors in the potential success of any labour market expansion strategy. There is no quick fix, and it seems likely that high expectations will not be satisfied.

Second, in supporting the capacity of these countries to cope with large numbers of refugees, the ‘containment objectives’ of the global north, together with the Migration Partnerships the EU has negotiated with transit countries, cannot be ignored. In this respect, while enhancing employment opportunities for refugees in the main receiving countries is a necessity for many reasons (economic, dignity and respect, livelihoods, protection), these policies are unlikely to be sufficient to satisfy refugees’ aspirations or alleviate the pressures on fragile local labour markets, and thus stem irregular migration by refugees and other migrants transiting through these countries to the global north. Evidence shows that SEZs and Compacts have had little impact on these wider migratory drivers, motivations and trajectories (Hagen-Zanker and Mallett, 2016). They are not a substitute for a comprehensive global approach to managing migration and displacement. Moreover, it remains to be seen if the separation, rather than the harmonisation, of refugees and migrants in the two Compacts will fully address these linked challenges. Nor is this new policy apparatus a substitute for upholding the highest standards of refugee protection: the risk is high that, under the twin axes of the economic imperatives for impacted countries and the containment objectives of the global north, the quality of protection will diminish.

5.2.3 Uganda: an indigenous model of sustainable response
Uganda stands somewhat apart from other, higher-profile experiments with developmental initiatives for refugees. This is curious given that Uganda’s progressive approach and its unusual experience are in many respects exemplary and distinctive. The focus on rural refugees contrasts with the focus on urban refugees in the other examples reviewed here. Moreover, compared to other countries, the policy apparatus underpinning its inclusive socio-economic approach has been both more longstanding and a largely indigenously designed response to successive refugee inflows projected to reach 1.5 million by the end of 2017 (Reliefweb, 2017), principally from South Sudan, but also DRC and Burundi.

Originally formulated in 1999, a joint Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS) was prepared by the Office of the Prime Minister and UNHCR (Government of Uganda (GoU) and UNHCR, 2004). The policy framework has evolved through the 2004 Development Assistance for Refugee-Hosting Areas (DAR) strategy and a more recent revision in 2009 (Krause, 2016). Meanwhile, the 2006 Refugee Act introduced policies for the local integration of refugees. Unlike other countries facing mass influxes, Uganda has incorporated core rights of the 1951 Refugee Convention into domestic legislation, including the right to work and own property and freedom of movement (the latter with some limitations) – rights rarely upheld outside the global north. Refugees are also included in the government’s National Development and Poverty Reduction
Plans, as well as in local government public service delivery plans – all essential institutional preconditions for effective development planning and policy-making which, again, is rarely the case in other heavily affected countries.

Self-reliance and resilience, for both refugees and their host communities, lie at the heart of Uganda’s refugee inclusion policy, characteristics that help to promote sustainable livelihoods. As Clements et al. (2016) emphasise, ‘this pioneering approach is based on two premises: firstly, that displacement is an area of shared responsibility for governmental, humanitarian and development actors; secondly, that it is an area of shared opportunity for refugees and Ugandans alike’. The most recent iteration of Uganda’s policy framework is a five-year strategy commencing in 2015, the Settlement Transformative Agenda (STA), which is incorporated in the National Development Plan (NDP II). This brings together the Ugandan government, UN agencies and the World Bank (UNHCR, 2015c). Notably, Uganda’s policy apparatus also includes private sector development actors – for example microfinance institutions and employers – to promote livelihoods, employment and business skills training. The policy is rurally-based, with more than 3,300km² of agricultural land allocated to settle refugees, mainly for subsistence farming, though larger-scale commercial farming opportunities for refugees are planned. Local services are integrated into this settlement strategy (Krause, 2016).

Recent research finds that refugees in Uganda also constitute a vibrant and economically diverse urban sector, display a high degree of economic inclusion, and expand rather than compete with Ugandans for economic space in the urban arena (Betts et al., 2014). This has been achieved without the strong government policy engagement in rural refugee inclusion. The government’s prolonged predisposition to refugee inclusion through its positive political and policy environment has established benign conditions for such outcomes. More critical assessments (Hovil, 2007; Krause, 2016) note that full consultation and involvement of local communities has not always been achieved, while the concentration of large numbers of resettled refugees in Northern Uganda has put additional pressure on local infrastructure and host communities. In some cases, refugees are being allocated sparsely settled, remote land isolated from markets, leaving them reliant on external assistance. Hovil (2007) argues that refugee settlement was essentially encampment under another name. Plots can be too small and of poor soil quality (Ulrich, 2017), and not all resettled refugees come from rural or agricultural backgrounds, and so do not have relevant skills. Securing adequate funding is also problematic in a low-income country, rendering the policy hard to sustain, and it is unclear whether the policy can cope with the pressure of rising numbers of refugees. In principle, refugees have the right to work and to establish their own businesses, but in practice they face various legal and socio-economic constraints (Zetter and Ruaudel, 2017). A more fundamental criticism is that Uganda’s refugee inclusion policy serves the Uganda’s interests at the expense of refugee self-reliance. Uganda, it is contended, is using development assistance as ‘a smart way to improve the infrastructure of the refugee-hosting region which is often remote and neglected’ (Krause, 2016: 54), while confining refugees in a settlement strategy which has camp-like characteristics. Although undoubtedly the country does benefit in this way, one rejoinder is that this strategy is another form of burden-sharing.
Despite these ambiguous conclusions, the positive lessons from Uganda’s experience tend to outweigh the ever-present operational and implementation limitations. The structural critique has some validity, but the fundamental structural lesson is that developmental strategies in refugee-impacted countries depend on prolonged political commitment by the government, backed up by a consistently applied and coordinated policy apparatus involving all stakeholders. In this regard, the Uganda experience has considerable value.

5.3 Funding and finance in situations of forced displacement

International humanitarian assistance quadrupled between 2000 and 2017, from $7.2 billion to $27.3 billion – approximately one-fifth of total Official Development Assistance (ODA) financing. The steep rise reflects three factors: the large increase in people supported by assistance; the rising costs of providing this support in the middle-income countries that are increasingly affected; and, significantly, the protracted nature of displacement crises, with two-thirds of assistance expended in crises lasting for eight years or more, and an additional quarter going on crises lasting between three and eight years (World Bank, 2017).

Given these factors the steep rise in spending is not, of itself, unexpected. Lying behind this increase, however, is a much more profound change in the funding regime. The move towards development approaches discussed above has been paralleled by structural changes in funding in response to forced displacement. The development-led paradigm (medium-term, sustainable, economic priorities) has required new modalities of funding, and new modes of funding have enabled more sustainable approaches to the socio-economic needs of refugees, and their host communities and countries.

This section reviews three major trends in the transformation of the financing landscape: the increasing privatisation of funding in situations of forced displacement; new modalities of public finance; and cash programming for refugees.

5.3.1 The privatisation of funding in situations of forced displacement

Since the inception of the refugee regime in the 1950s, its governance has been dominated by a public responsibility/public welfare construct sustained by NGOs and international and inter-governmental organisations. Private sector involvement has been limited – mainly locally-based subcontracting to the main stakeholders, for example transport of food supplies to refugee camps and infrastructure construction. The last decade has witnessed a remarkable transformation. Increasingly, the private sector has become directly engaged as commercial and entrepreneurial stakeholders in the humanitarian and development effort (Binder and Witte, 2007; Zyck and Kent, 2014; Boyer and DuPont, 2016). Critics contend that this represents the further penetration of the neo-liberal agenda into yet other arenas of economic activity and the commodification of humanitarianism (Barnett and Weiss, 2008; 2011; Duffield, 2001; Kapoor, 2013; Ticktin, 2014). Nevertheless, this restructuring is evident in numerous dimensions: the involvement of corporate institutions, not just local small and medium-sized enterprises; internationally based organisations, not only local contractors, as partners and stakeholders, rather than as service suppliers; and independent market actors and profit-seekers, not merely pro bono actors supporting public service delivery.
Private sector actors are now mainstreamed across the IASC clusters, in telecommunications, information technology and data management, banking and mobile money services, education, medicine, procurement, logistics and shipping, water and sanitation, energy supply, private security, protection and insurance, among many others. Some of these industries are new to the field of humanitarian aid, others are well-established. High-profile players such as Siemens, IKEA and DHL, as well as ‘reconstruction’ firms such as Halliburton and Blackwater, are working in the risk-prone and fragile markets of refugee-impacted countries. The scale of private sector finance is hard to assess, but for comparison 30% of the $1 billion Haiti relief effort came from private sector resources (ALNAP, 2012: 33), while the IKEA Foundation has committed almost $200 million to UNHCR programmes since 2010 (UNHCR, 2017d) for shelter development and emergency relief for Syrian refugees – the largest corporate sector donation in UNHCR’s history.

The development-led approach to refugee crises is heavily dependent on private sector commitment. Whilst governments and donors can set the framework for Compacts and SEZs, for example by easing the supply of work permits, offering fiscal incentives and building infrastructure, it is private sector entrepreneurs and investors who actually create the employment opportunities for refugees which are the core objective of this strategy. Making markets work in this way is a fundamentally different commercial world from the traditional livelihoods projects long-favoured by NGOs, and requires new actors, skills and resources.

The private sector also offers a major new income stream for refugee assistance programmes, with the potential to transform the funding architecture of the humanitarian regime. Ensuring that this is ‘new’ money, and that private entities do not consume public resources, some major humanitarian actors such as ECHO and some other European donors prohibit funding to profit-making entities for humanitarian response programming. Because they are working in a competitive environment, there is a constant incentive for private sector actors to add value to existing efforts, provide new products and ways of working, and deliver efficiencies in the distribution of assistance (Thomas and Fritz, 2006). Business and electronic media can offer new and different forms of access to humanitarian services to the benefit of refugees and impacted communities. For example, the innovative shift to cash programming for refugees (see below, Section 5.3.3) is inconceivable without private sector engagement in e-banking, telecommunications and data management and control.

The private sector, and the substantial new sources of finance it offers, have been almost unreservedly welcomed and solicited by traditional stakeholders, with ‘benefits to businesses in engaging in solutions for displacement as well as the benefits of engaging businesses in solutions for displacement’ (Boyer and DuPont, 2016: 36). From the perspective of investors, unfamiliar development situations offer opportunities for high yields, while serving the main purpose of creating sustainable livelihoods for refugees and receiving communities. But weak governance and national economies, made more fragile by the impact of large numbers of forcibly displaced people, constitute major risks for investors. Even though Jordan is a relatively stable economy and country, there has been sluggish investment in the Compact. Thus, despite the opportunities and the potential to inject major new financial capacity into countries and populations impacted by forced displacement, the key constraint is how to ‘de-
risk’ investment in what would otherwise be commercially unsustainable undertakings. Alongside the principal task of developing the means to underwrite risk and thus maximise the flow of investment capital, operational conditions such as the local regulatory environment, compliance with standards, the effectiveness of anti-corruption controls and the lack of a holistic investment environment also bear on risk and need to be taken into account. A number of new financing mechanisms have been proposed to leverage private sector investment, for example bonds guaranteed by donors (World Bank, 2017: 129–30) or the establishment of a Merchant Bank, which is one of the principal aims of this World Commission.

The extension of what has traditionally been public service action in the humanitarian sphere to private sector entities also poses complex new governance challenges. Whereas humanitarian NGOs are to a large extent self-regulating (e.g. through their precepts and performance standards), and in other ways are regulated by the international community, this is not the case for the private sector. Since private corporations largely act in self-interest, a laissez-faire approach potentially leaves refugee aid recipients vulnerable to the profit-based motives of corporate decision-making and the power of the marketplace – though private sector involvement in humanitarian aid should not necessarily be denied merely because private sector conduct is self-interested. A related major challenge is that many of the private sector organisations now engaged in refugee assistance are transnational corporations, which often appear to be immune to international or national regulation. There may often be no conflict between private and welfare interests in situations of forced displacement, but the potential impacts of market inequalities for already vulnerable refugee communities and the lack of transparency in the business sector are far greater than they would be for a more resilient population or more financially stable environments.

Beyond contract mechanisms between individual aid organisations and companies, wider discussion has hardly begun around the appropriate forms of regulation (or self-regulation) of private entities working in the humanitarian arena. Various platforms are exploring ways in which business initiatives can link with parts of the humanitarian apparatus, such as the World Humanitarian Summit and the Global Forum for Migration and Development (GFMD). Some form of SPHERE standards, as currently applied in the aid world, might be appropriate. More specific national regulation might be another option, for instance through the licensing of corporations involved in humanitarian aid at their point of incorporation or at the point of action/delivery (parallel to the mandating of NGOs by governments), or perhaps by engaging in public–private partnerships (PPPs) with relevant government agencies. National regulation and enforcement (or partnership) would be more likely to reflect local interests than a one-size-fits-all international approach. Licensing would be contingent upon adhering to standards that ensured the protection of refugees from exploitation, or the privileging of economic and market behaviour over the social and political rights and aspirations of refugees. It is not yet clear how these initiatives for private sector investment and funding will be embedded, if at all, in the 2018 Refugee Compact. The risk of letting direct private sector involvement expand without some wider national or international regulatory framework is that, once private sector governance has been established, it will be harder for governments and inter-governmental actors to exercise an overarching public interest.
A final emerging challenge is to ensure a balance between the contribution of national and local private sector entities and the increasing penetration of the ‘refugee market’ by global corporates and foreign direct investment. In the past, locally based suppliers and contractors were the main players: this is no longer the case. But if, as demonstrated above (Sections 3.2.4 and 5.2), large-scale protracted refugee situations are now seen as development opportunities, then it is essential that national and local private sectors (as well as refugee entrepreneurs) play a central role in the development of their countries, so that they can benefit from new commercial opportunities, and are not crowded out by more powerful international entities. Linking local enterprises to the value chains of more established companies may be one way forward in ensuring the viability of the local private sector, achieving scale and sustaining the impact of interventions in what are essentially fragile development contexts (Boyer and DuPont, 2016: 37).

### 5.3.2 Forced displacement and new modalities of public finance

In parallel with the reconfiguration of the role of private finance, there has also been a significant transformation in the way multilateral and bilateral donors fund responses to forced displacement. Principally, this has been by expanding fiscal and macro-economic support and development funding for impacted countries; revising lending criteria to include middle-income countries that were previously normally excluded from the lending portfolios of many donors; and shifting from ad hoc measures to interventions much more systematically aligned with the scale of impacts and needs, and country development strategies and poverty assessments. Institutions such as the World Bank also support countries in the analytical work necessary to guide economic policy-making and strengthen institutional capacity and the investment framework.

From modest lending levels, in recent years inter-governmental actors such as the World Bank (see e.g. World Bank, 2016a; 2016b; 2017), the European Investment Bank (EIB) (EIBa, 2016: 36–39), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Islamic Development Bank Group have substantially increased their lending in protracted displacement crises. These broadly comprise three main forms: project development funding; revised country programmes, for example for related poverty reduction strategies, infrastructure development and public services; and special lending to stabilize countries experiencing the fiscal and macro-economic shocks and short-term disequilibria precipitated by forced displacement.

In 2009, the World Bank, a key development actor in situations of forced displacement, established a Global Program on Forced Displacement, signalling its aspiration to increase its involvement in displacement crises. In doing so, the Bank is building on a history of successful smaller-scale activities in response to displacement. In the 1980s, for instance, the Income-Generating Project for Afghan Refugees (IGPAR) – a joint project between the Pakistani government, the World Bank and UNHCR – created over 21 million days of employment, over three-quarters of which went to Afghan refugees in Pakistan (Crisp, 2001). According to a 2016 World Bank report released in partnership with UNHCR, development actors’ involvement has two main axes: reducing vulnerability among forcibly displaced people...
(arguably an area of overlap with humanitarian actors), and minimising the impact of refugee flows on host countries’ development prospects (World Bank, 2017). Recent World Bank initiatives include a Global Concessional Financing Facility, which aims to disburse $6 billion in concessional loans to low- and middle-income refugee-hosting countries, as an expansion of the original Concessional Financing Facility for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA CFF), which primarily targeted Lebanon and Jordan (World Bank, 2016b). Underscoring the powerful role that these donors can play in protecting the economic stability of these countries, and leveraging other financing facilities, these changes now recognize the scale of displacement and the impacts it has on the development trajectories of refugee-hosting countries. New, fast-response financing facilities are needed. The potential is significant: every dollar in grant contributions can leverage around $3–4 in concessional financing (World Bank 2017: 131). Up to $2 billion will also be made available to International Development Association (IDA)-eligible countries hosting refugees (World Bank, 2016b). The EIB has also significantly expanded its lending facilities, with volumes expected to be in excess of €15 billion for Turkey and the MENA region (EIB, 2016a). EIB support for the Ethiopia Compact has been noted above (Section 5.2.2). In addition to their own lending, these large inter-governmental banks work in partnership with others to mobilize and leverage other financing facilities, for example multi-donor trust funds, blending grants with loans to lower the interest costs for countries in debt distress, partnerships with grant contributions and new mechanisms such as bonds and risk sharing (World Bank, 2017: 123–37).

On the analytical level, some obvious constraints emerge (Zetter, 2017a). Surprisingly, there are significant limitations in the availability of data on, for example, the behavior of national economies affected by large-scale forced displacement; refugees’ economic vulnerabilities; and the socio-economic impacts on host populations. This hampers the quality of the analysis needed to design effective development policies. Likewise, the use of econometric modelling techniques to assess the scope and extent of economic shocks caused by forced displacement, and the likely effectiveness of interventions, is in its infancy (Zetter, 2017a). In terms of economic policy engagement and fiscal support, much depends on how multiple, potentially competing, objectives are reconciled. For example, such interventions may be designed to encourage greater inclusion of forcibly displaced populations within the economic and social development strategies of the receiving country; and/or mitigate the negative macroeconomic and fiscal impacts of forced displacement on host countries; and/or reduce the socio-economic vulnerabilities of both the displaced and their host communities. The different time horizons of programmes to tackle these different objectives introduce further complexity.

Operationally, it will be critical to ensure funding additionality, not funding substitution, where donors might be tempted to switch from humanitarian to development assistance. More development funding is not a substitute for essential humanitarian and protection assistance to meet refugees’ needs. There are already huge shortfalls in or tardy delivery of annual requests for and pledges of humanitarian funding – up to 70% in the case of the 3RP for 2016 (UNHCR-UNDP, 2016); just under 50% of the $4.6 billion appeal for 2017 had been met by October that year. It is too soon to gauge whether development funding in situations of forced displacement will be as susceptible to donor fatigue as humanitarian funding. Long-
term sustainable funding is a prerequisite for sustainable development approaches to forced displacement.

Finally, it is essential to ensure that there is balanced action by donors to deliver defined and achievable economic objectives for beneficiary countries. For example, where the fiscal shocks of forced displacement are alleviated by budget support, the benefits of this support must be directed to reducing the vulnerabilities of refugees and host communities and protecting the quality of public services, not reducing the fiscal burden on taxpayers. Likewise, expanding economic opportunities must deliver beneficial impacts for host communities and displaced populations, and not encourage rent-seeking behaviour by entrepreneurs and governments.

5.3.3 Cash transfers
The use of cash transfers to distribute assistance to refugees has rapidly expanded in recent years, to the extent that humanitarian actors are now portrayed as being at the forefront of a ‘cash revolution’ (Arnold et al., 2011: 11; ODI, 2015; 2015a; 2015b) across the development sector as a whole (Bastagli et al., 2016). Aid agencies have rapidly expanded their cash-based programming, supported by initiatives such as the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP), an extensive global network of humanitarian actors engaged in promoting policy, practice and research in this field. UNHCR, which has traditionally delivered in-kind assistance through NGOs, now directly delivers cash transfers to refugees, for example in its programmes in Jordan.

While still accounting for only a small proportion of overall humanitarian assistance – estimated at 7% in 2015 (Spencer, Parrish and Lattimer, 2016) – and subject to conceptual challenge as a further expansion of neo-liberal economics (Barnett and Weiss, 2008; 2011; Ferguson, 2015) – programme evaluations invariably demonstrate substantive and operational benefits and outcomes of cash-based programming (Bastagli et al., 2015; ODI, 2015; 2015a; Smith and Mohiddin, 2015). For UNHCR, cash transfers ‘allow refugees … to live with greater dignity’ (UNHCR, 2016: 2). Cash programming has the potential to achieve long-standing objectives to reduce paternalism and empower beneficiaries by enabling them to decide their own priorities and spending needs (Berg et al., 2013). They also offer humanitarian actors and donors alike multiple efficiencies (economies of scale, better value for money, flexible targeting) compared with in-kind assistance, and, by extension, it is claimed that they provide a more sustainable form of support. Refugees use cash transfers for a wide variety of self-defined needs and purposes – paying rent; purchasing food; saving cash for potential return; supplementing the social protection provisions of humanitarian assistance programmes in healthcare and education (Ulrichs et al., 2017). Cash transfers can also enable refugees to restart their livelihoods, for example as micro-enterprise start-up capital, and access to cash overcomes one of the main constraints to livelihood restoration (Jacobsen, 2014: 7; Smith and Mohiddin, 2015). Perhaps unsurprisingly, programme evaluations record the unrivalled preference that refugees have for cash transfers (ODI, 2015a: 28).
Cash programming connects to the wider agenda of development-led innovation and policy responses to refugee crises. Giving refugees cash makes them market actors, directly incorporating them into local (and ultimately global) economies as consumers and, potentially, producers. As cash-based interventions frequently (and, in the case of UNHCR, invariably (UNHCR, 2016: 6)) take place through commercial arrangements with private sector partners, this encourages sub-contracting the private sector in electronic cash delivery logistics (e-transfer actors include mobile phone companies and electronic payment providers, in addition to card- and bank-based distribution) and expands private sector engagement in the humanitarian space (ODI, 2015b) – another key strategic innovation in development-led responses to displacement crises.

There are also some important limitations. Injecting cash into a local economy can generate inflation and push up the cost of goods and services (basic food items, building materials, housing), penalising both refugees and host communities that do not have access to cash transfers. As such, cash programmes should only be mobilised after their potential impacts on key micro-economic sectors are taken into account. Cash programming is also very context-specific: cash works best in urban areas in the larger, more robust economies found in middle-income countries; for refugees in rural areas, where markets are much smaller, more limited in the range of goods and services they provide and more susceptible to supply-demand distortions, cash programmes may not yield the same benefits, and the impacts on local host communities may be more severe. Again, careful reading of the local economy is called for. A third limitation is conditionality: though in theory cash allows recipients to decide their needs for themselves, conditions are often attached that specify what cash can be spent on and where, for instance through vouchers linked to predetermined suppliers, or how it is to be ‘earned’, such as through cash for work. Conditionality reduces freedom of choice, replicates the limitations of in-kind aid and increases transfer costs.

There is as yet no longitudinal evidence that cash programming has a transformative impact or supports sustainable income security. The long-term returns from cash transfers are heavily contingent on effective targeting, overcoming insecurity and corruption, gendered analysis, market analysis and developing knowledge of small-scale business management capabilities (Smith and Mohiddin, 2015a: 12). Unless cash programming is located within wider, comprehensive micro- and macro- economic strategies for displacement-impacted countries, their capacity to produce structural changes in refugee livelihoods and wellbeing is likely to remain limited.

The use of electronic transfers bears on a wider issue associated with the growing use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in areas as diverse as identity documentation, assistance delivery, telemedicine and protection. Just as ICTs create opportunities for efficiency and flexibility, as well as the potential to empower refugees with new means of social networking, so too it creates new opportunities for the governance of refugees through enhanced data collection, management, control, surveillance and tracking through the use of biodata (Wilding and Gifford, 2013; Ajana, 2013). Paradoxically, e-technology may not reduce refugees’ dependence on assistance, but merely change the technology by which that dependence is exercised.
6 Lessons and ways forward

Although very much a creation of its time, the refugee and humanitarian regime has been both durable and adaptable in accommodating profound changes in the scope, scale, dynamics, impacts and political contexts of forced displacement in ways that could not have been envisaged at its inception in 1950 and 1951. Hundreds of millions of people have been protected from existential threats in the almost seven decades since the Refugee Convention was adopted. This review has described the main contours of change and explored the circumstances in which they have taken place: the anchor provided by the normative bases of protection, and its gradual, though still limited, expansion; the growth of humanitarian assistance as a core element in UNHCR’s mandate; the reconfiguration of delivery through the cluster system, and now the crucial step change to synergise with development-led responses as part of the wider reframing of the refugee regime in the Global Refugee Compact; ongoing responses to refugee emergencies juxtaposed with ad hoc instruments such as CPA and CIREFA to unlock some refugee crises; the incorporation of new ‘geographies’ of forcibly displaced people, from the original focus on Europe, and the inclusion of new categories of the forcibly displaced, though with significant limitations, such as IDPs; and recognition of the agentive power of refugees and the need for constructive engagement with this.

As this review has shown, this adaptability is most often reactive and incremental, rather than proactive and anticipatory. Inevitably, the refugee regime falls short of aspirations and intentions since these are always mediated by the political interests of states. To the extent that reform has taken place this has usually been partial rather than comprehensive, operational rather than structural. Now, however, after almost 70 years, a moment of potentially profound transition was demarcated by the 2016 General Assembly High Level Summit on Refugees and Migrants, the subsequent New York Declaration and the construction of the Global Refugee Compact. This is the first truly comprehensive review of the refugee regime since the inception of UNHCR in 1950. While it will not change the fundamental principles and structure of the regime – the norms of refugee protection enshrined in the 1951 Convention and the mandate of UNHCR – the Compact holds the promise of much more coherent institutional and operational engagement with refugee crises, combined with a much more coherent portfolio of strategies, policies and funding mechanisms. Principally, the two-tier model of the CRRF (providing overarching ‘guiding principles’ and strategies) and the Plans of Action (providing the operational modalities which can implemented to tackle specific refugee situations at regional or country level) offers a more flexible structure than the essentially monolithic approach currently in place. Of course, the GRC is likely to be a work in progress for a long time, set in a complex and elaborate history and international political context, which this review has documented. The shape of the GRC represents a determined attempt to address some of the structural and operational shortcomings this review has also highlighted. Equally, there are crucial areas that the GRC is unable to address directly or only in part, or is not mandated to address.
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The Impact of Forced Migration on Receiving Economies

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1. Introduction

According to the latest UNHCR statistics available for the end of 2016, there are 17.2 million refugees (plus 5.3 million Palestinian refugees registered by UNRWA), 2.8 asylum seekers and 36.6 internally displaced people around the world. Of all countries, Turkey sheltered the greatest number of refugees, followed by Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Uganda and Ethiopia. Given the projected population growth in Africa and the Middle East – regions where at the same time those countries are located that are characterized by a recent UN report as the most unstable – these numbers are likely to increase. The consequences of increased forced migrations into developed countries, in particular European countries, are likely, as the most recent refugee waves that targeted Europe have illustrated. These consequences will be partly of economic nature, as the challenges to accommodate large numbers of individuals with often low levels of skills are enormous. However, even more important may be the political costs, as right-leaning populist parties are thriving on anti-immigration agendas, and likely benefit from events such as large refugee movements.

This report focuses on the economic impact that forced migrations have for the receiving country. It is structured in four parts. The first part investigates the effects of refugee migrations on the labor market of destination countries. Part two is concerned with the fiscal effects refugee migrations have for receiving countries. Part three discusses the choices of migrants about their country of destination, the possibilities destination countries have in influencing the type of migrants or refugees they receive, and the factors that determine the selection of refugees into different destination countries. Finally, part four discusses the career paths of refugees in the destination countries, their incentives to invest into training and skills, their labor market attachment, and the factors that facilitate their integration into the labor market.

While an extensive economics literature has studied these different areas in detail for economic migrants, far less studies exist for forced migrants or refugee migrants. The existing economic literature consists (a) of conceptual models, and (b) empirical assessment and analysis. This report focuses on forced and refugee migrations, but we will nevertheless touch on the more general literature that is concerned with economic migrations, as this literature covers conceptual models and underlying frameworks. We will interchangeably refer to forced migrants as refugee migrants and vice versa, as distinction between the two groups is unclear in the existing literature. Further, we will use the term "migrant" to refer to both refugees and economic migrants.

The reminder of this report is organized as follows. The next section discusses the labor market effects of migration, starting with a conceptual discussion about the various channels along which immigration can affect the labor market of destination countries. We will then discuss the empirical evidence, with a focus on refugee migrations. Section 3 discusses the fiscal effects of migration, and reviews the literature that investigates welfare dependency and fiscal costs of refugee migrations. Again, this section starts with a conceptual discussion. Section 4 investigates the choice of migrants and refugees about the destination country, and the determinants of migrants’ selection into destination countries. Section 5 investigates the

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career paths of migrants. We will discuss their incentives to invest into training and to participate in the labor market, and review the existing literature that focuses on refugee migrations. Finally, section 6 concludes. At the end of each of the four main sections of this report, we provide a brief summary with the main findings.

2. Immigration and the Effect on Labor Markets of Destination Countries

One useful starting point to think conceptually about the labor market effects of immigration is to consider it as an unexpected labor supply shock to the receiving economy. The simplest possible economy is one that produces one output good, combining capital and unskilled and skilled workers, using a technology where doubling all inputs leads to a doubling of the output good (which is referred to as “constant returns to scale”). Suppose that initially, there are no immigrants, and the economy is in an equilibrium, where all workers and capital are fully employed at equilibrium wages and capital prices, and where all prices are equal to the marginal productivity of each factor. Assume further that capital is fully elastic, i.e. it is available at constant prices, and that workers offer their labor at any wage. Suppose now that such an economy experiences immigration. Consider first the case that immigrants consist of skilled and unskilled workers in exactly the same proportion than the skill mix in the native population. As capital is available at constant prices and infinitely elastic, all that will happen to the economy in this case is that all immigrants will be absorbed and output will increase, with wages remaining the same as before immigration. Now suppose that immigrants differ in their skill composition from the native population. As capital is available at constant prices and infinitely elastic, all that will happen to the economy in this case is that all immigrants will be absorbed and output will increase, with wages remaining the same as before immigration. Now suppose that immigrants differ in their skill composition from the native population. Assume for instance that immigrants are all unskilled. In this case, the economy will exhibit an increase in the supply of unskilled workers, keeping the number of skilled workers (who are all natives) the same. This will lead to an increase in the productivity (and therefore the wage) of skilled workers, as they become now relatively scarcer, but to a decrease in the productivity of unskilled workers, who have increased in numbers. A new equilibrium in this economy will be restored only when the wages for each type of workers will again be equal to their marginal productivity. For our example, this implies that wages of unskilled workers will have fallen, while wages of skilled workers will have increased. Therefore, immigration in this case will have let to distributional effects: Those who compete with migrants will have seen their wages decreasing, while those who are complementary to migrants (in our example the skilled workers) will have seen their wages increasing. If immigration is sufficiently large, wages of skilled workers will have increased by more than wages of unskilled workers will have fallen. Thus, there will be a surplus, which in this example will have benefitted skilled workers.

We can extend this example to the case where the supply of capital is not infinitely elastic. It is often assumed that in the short run, capital supply is inelastic. In that case, an inflow of unskilled migrants will also increase the return to capital, and the surplus will be shared by capital owners and skilled natives.

Further, if the supply of labor is not fully elastic, i.e. if some native workers may be unwilling to offer their labor at lower wages than those in the initial equilibrium, immigration will also have employment effects. We next illustrate the way in which the economy can absorb an immigration-induced shock to labor supply, based on the same assumptions, and using simple graphical representations. As before, we start from the simplest case of an economy which produces only one output good, and we then show what happens when this assumption is

2.1 One output, skilled and unskilled labor
As before, consider an economy that produces only one output good with a constant returns to scale technology, i.e. a technology where output is doubled if all factors of production are doubled. The only factors of production are skilled and unskilled labor, and for the moment we assume their supply is completely inelastic, which implies that workers are willing to work at whatever wage is offered to them. This economy now receives an inflow of immigrants, who are all unskilled. Immigration thus brings an excess supply of unskilled labor at the going wage rate. Because unskilled labor is now in excess supply, firms will therefore be able to satisfy their demand for labor even at lower wages. This leads to a decrease in wages of unskilled workers, which, in turn, increases their demand, until all unskilled workers (immigrants and natives) are employed, but at a lower wage than the pre-migration wage. At the same time, the immigration-driven shock to the supply of unskilled labor makes skilled workers relatively more scarce, driving up their wages. While wages of unskilled workers fall, wages of skilled workers will therefore rise. In this simple economy, the gains for skilled workers will be higher than the loss for unskilled workers, as we demonstrate in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Effects of Unskilled Immigration

![Diagram of Effects of Unskilled Immigration]

On the vertical axis of Figure 1 we report wages of unskilled workers, whereas on the horizontal axis their employment. Before migration (period 0), all native workers (N) are

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9 Assuming that the supply of capital is perfectly elastic is equivalent to assuming that no capital is used in the production process.
employed at wage $w_0$, and the period 0 equilibrium is in point A, where the perfectly inelastic unskilled labor supply curve crosses the downward sloping curve representing the marginal product of unskilled labor and thus its demand. Immigration of M unskilled workers leads to an outward shift in labor supply, which – given the constant supply of high-skilled labor – drives wages down along the demand curve. The post-migration equilibrium is in point B, where unskilled wages have declined to $w'_1$. In the new equilibrium, the total output share that goes to unskilled labor has shrunk from $(w_0 - A - N - 0)$ to $(w'_1 - C - N - 0)$. The difference between these two areas, represented by the rectangle $(w_0 - A - C - w'_1)$, now belongs to skilled native workers. The share of total output that accrues to skilled workers is now represented by the triangle $(D - B - w'_1)$, up from their initial share represented by $(D - A - w_0)$. Beyond the fraction of initial output that was before going to unskilled labor, skilled workers have also gained the triangle $A - B - C$, an additional surplus generated by the inflow of migrants that has driven down the marginal productivity of unskilled labor. The triangle $A-B-C$ is what is typically referred to as the “Immigration surplus”.

Immigration has therefore created an aggregate gain, but also redistribution. Importantly, skilled workers gain more than unskilled workers lose, leaving the receiving economy with a surplus. More generally, in such an economy, per capita income of the native population will increase as a consequence of migration, as long as immigrants differ in their skill composition from natives, but the gains of migration are unequally distributed: wages of workers that compete with immigrants will decrease while those of workers who have complementary skills will instead increase.

We have so far assumed that labor supply is perfectly inelastic, i.e. that workers supply labor at any wage rate. While this assumption is convenient for expositional purposes, it may be too restrictive in practice. If we now allow labor supply to be at least partly elastic, some workers will decide not to work anymore if wages fall. In this situation, immigration may therefore also have employment effects, causing (voluntary) unemployment among those native workers whose wages fall. We represent this situation in Figure 2, where the labor supply curve is now upward sloping, and an increase in labor supply through migration leads to some native workers not being prepared any more to work at the new, lower equilibrium wage. These workers (N0-N1 in Figure 2) remain therefore voluntarily unemployed.
While we have so far illustrated the case of unskilled immigration, the same mechanisms would also be at work in the case of high skilled immigration, which would harm skilled native workers while leading to higher equilibrium wages for unskilled workers. More generally, as long as immigration affects the relative supply of skills in the economy, there will be winners and losers: the winners will always be those skill groups whose relative supply has decreased as a consequence of immigration, whereas skill groups whose relative supply has increased because of immigration will lose.

If we give up the assumption that capital is perfectly elastic in supply (at least in the short run), then immigration will lead also to an increase in the return to capital, and capital owners will enjoy some of the immigration surplus. As a consequence, both wages of unskilled workers and average wages will fall. As capital is likely more elastic in the longer run, the situation of fixed capital is sometimes thought of as the short run response to immigration, while the one with elastic capital supply is referred to as the long-run response.

This simple model we have sketched above allows capturing the main insights into the mechanisms through which immigration affects the host country labor market. At the same time, however, it is slightly simplistic and it neglects other potential channels of adjustment of the host economy to immigration. We discuss some such channels in the next section.

2.2 Multiple outputs and technological changes
We have so far illustrated the case of a one-sector economy, where the only way in which the host country can adapt to changes in relative skill supply is through changes in wages. However, if we consider the – more realistic – case of a multi-sector economy, there are now additional adjustment channels. One obvious way in which a multi-sector economy may
adjust to the changes in the skill composition of its workforce brought about by immigration, is through changes in the mix of outputs produced.

Consider a stylized economy, characterized by two sectors, and let us again abstract from capital (which we assume to be perfectly elastic in supply). Most importantly, let us assume that the economy we consider is a small open economy, which trades the goods it produces on international markets. The prices of these goods are set on international markets, and therefore cannot be influenced by the economy. An example are cars, where the price of say a medium sized car is set on international markets by all competitors, and is unlikely to change if one particular company tries to increase the price for this car, as consumers will simply buy the car from another producer. Assume further that production is exhibiting constant returns to scale (as before), and one sector is intensive in the use of unskilled labor, while the other sector uses intensively skilled labor. Let us now assume, as before, that this economy receives an inflow of unskilled immigrants. As a result, as discussed above, low-skilled wages will decrease and investments in the low-skilled intensive sector become more profitable, as output prices cannot adjust. The increased profitability of this sector will attract more investments and lead to its expansion which, in turn, pushes up demand for unskilled labor. This will then again increase unskilled wages and eliminate profits, until wages reach the initial pre-immigration equilibrium. In this case therefore immigration changes the industry structure – toward the production of goods that use more intensively the skills possessed by immigrants – but wages remain on the pre-immigration level. The long run impact of immigration will therefore be a change in the output mix of the economy, rather than in wages. Note that, also in this case, there will be no effects of immigration on wages or output mix unless the skill composition of the immigrant population is different from that of natives.

Another way in which the economy may adjust to immigration without long run changes in factor prices or in output mix is through changes in technology. Suppose that there are alternative production technologies available to produce the same output good. In this case, following an inflow of immigrants, firms will select a production technology that uses more intensively the type of labor whose relative supply is increased by immigration, since its remuneration is lower in the short run. These changes in production technologies affect relative labor demand, counterbalancing the initial effect of immigration and thus restoring the equilibrium without changes in wages or in output mix (see Lewis, 2013 for more details and a review of recent literature).

There is indeed evidence from several countries that immigration has affected the choice of production technologies. Lewis (2011) has for instance shown that, even within the same narrowly defined industrial sector, firms in US metropolitan areas that have received more low-skilled immigrants have decreased their use of automation equipment for each unit of output. Similarly, Doms and Lewis (2006) have demonstrated that in the 1990s, the adoption of PC technologies was faster in areas with a relatively large immigration-induced increase in the skilled workforce than in areas with a lower skilled immigration. More generally, Peri (2012) has shown that the long-run changes in technology may have offset most of the labor market effects of immigration in the US. In a recent contribution, Dustmann and Glitz (2015) decompose the impact immigration has on the German economy into effects on the industry structure, and effects on technological change. They find that most of the adjustment takes
place through technological changes, a result which complements and supports the conclusion of previous analyses for Israel (Gandal et al, 2004), Spain (Gonzalez and Ortega 2011) and the US (Lewis 2003; Card and Lewis 2007).

2.3 Task specialization
A further mechanism of adjustment that is not captured by the basic model rests on the possibility of native workers to move away from the type of tasks supplied by immigrants and towards those tasks that are complementary to the tasks immigrants are able to perform. The basic idea is that natives possess particular skills, such as language abilities, that allow them to move into other positions in the labor market after migrants have filled the type of jobs natives have previously occupied. For instance, consider a plumber, who works as blue collar workers. After the arrival of immigrants who are well able to do his job, he decides to move to a managerial position, where he now oversees a group of migrants who do the type of work he has previously done. The reason why he can move up, but migrants cannot (at least initially), is that he has additional skills necessary for his new position, such as language skills and institutional knowledge. This idea has been suggested by Peri and Sparber (2009) who also provide empirical evidence that immigrants to the US have specialized in occupations requiring manual and physical skills, while natives have been pushed to specialize in language-intensive occupations, a pattern of task specialization that has happened also among highly educated workers (Peri and Sparber, 2011). A similar pattern of native task specialization in response to immigration has also been documented for Spain (Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica, 2011) and for Western Europe in general (D’Amuri and Peri, 2014).

A related adjustment mechanism is through educational choices: when faced with an inflow of unskilled immigrants, natives may decide to acquire additional years of education in order to obtain skills that are complementary to those supplied by immigrants. Hunt (2016) has shown for instance that in areas that have received more low-skilled immigrants, US natives have higher high school completion rates.

2.4 Empirical evidence
The previous theoretical discussion has highlighted a number of channels through which the economy can respond to immigration-induced changes in labor supply. These channels apply to both voluntary and forced migration, and point to a variety of possible responses. Over the past few decades, a large literature has tried to empirically assess the relative importance of these channels, and the overall impact of immigration on host country labor markets. While many studies do not explicitly distinguish between economic and refugee migrants, in most cases the attention has been on economic migrants (see, for instance, a survey of this literature by Kerr and Kerr, 2011, a meta-analysis by Longhi et al, 2010, or the latest OECD publication on this topic in OECD, 2016). Nevertheless, refugee migration received substantial attention in this literature because in many cases refugees arrived in significant numbers and in a short period of time, thus creating sizable exogenous shocks to host country labor markets that enable researchers to identify the causal impact of immigrant inflows on native workers. In this section we provide a brief review of the existing empirical evidence of the labor market effects of refugee migration, distinguishing between studies that have focused on advanced economics, and studies focusing on developing and emerging countries. See Dustmann, Schoenberg and Stuhler (2017) for a conceptual and critical review of this literature.
2.4.1 Advanced countries

Card (1990) is a seminal paper in this research area. It examines the impact on the Miami labor market of the so-called Mariel Boatlift: an unexpected episode of mass migration of Cuban refugees who left their country on small boats from the port of Mariel directed to Florida. As a result of this inflow, the Miami labor force increased by 7%. Yet, Card (1990) finds no effect neither on wages nor on employment of less-skilled workers in Miami. This paper was the first to use an exogenous refugee supply shock to labor force in the host country and was followed by a large number of studies covering different countries and periods. One explanation Card provides for this finding is that the Miami labor market responded to this labor supply shock by increasing the production of goods that make more intensive use of the type of labor provided by the new immigrants – see our discussion in section 2.5.

European countries also experienced labor supply shocks because of a mass arrival of refugees. Braun and Mahmoud (2014) look at the employment effects on the native West German population following the influx of refugees from East Germany and the areas Germany lost as a result of the second World War, which is one of the largest forced population movements in history (in 1950, every sixth West German resident was an expellee). The authors study the employment rate of native West Germans using the 1950 census and find that refugee inflows substantially reduced native employment: a 10 percentage point increase in the refugee share in a state-occupation cell decreased the employment rate of natives in the same cell by 4 percentage points. The displacement effect was, however, highly nonlinear and limited to labor market segments with very high inflow rates (above 15 percent). Hunt (1992) studies the impact of the 900,000 people repatriated from Algeria in 1962 on the French labor market five years later\(^{10}\) and concludes that it was small: native unemployment increased by at most 0.3 percentage points and the average annual salaries were at most 1.3% lower. Carrington and de Lima (1996) use a similar natural experiment and look at the forced migration of Portuguese back to Portugal after Portugal’s loss of its African colonies. They find that the refugee inflow caused some short-run unemployment in Portugal (an immigration rate of 5% raised unemployment by 1.25 percentage points in the following year), but the impact was small relative to the Europe-wide increase in unemployment that began in the mid-1970s. They also find that high-immigration districts had much slower wage growth in the decade after the arrival of the refugees than before, implying that immigration was harmful to native wages. The authors however comment that the timing and persistence of the wage effects seems to be too long and too strong to attribute the cause of this wage downturn to refugee arrival. Foged and Peri (2014) look at the occupational choices of native workers following inflows of immigrants into local labor markets after introduction of the refugee allocation policy aiming at randomly dispersing refugees across Danish municipalities. They find that inflow of immigrants from refugee-sending countries pushed less educated native workers to change occupation from manual to non-manual, especially the young and low-tenured ones. Employment and wages of native workers do not decrease because of refugee inflows; on the contrary, the authors

\(^{10}\) When the next census was conducted.
estimate that wages of both low-skilled and high-skilled workers go up. The authors attribute their findings to the complementarity between native and immigrant skills.\(^\text{11}\)

Although refugees are usually perceived to be low educated, advanced countries had episodes when refugees were more skilled than the native population. Friedberg (2001) studies the impact of Soviet immigrants, who were more educated in comparison to natives, on the Israeli labor market and find no evidence to support the view that immigrants adversely affect the earnings and employment opportunities of native workers. On the contrary, she finds that immigrants enter occupations with low wages, low wage growth, and contracting employment, rather than adversely affecting labor market outcomes of natives. Borjas and Dolan (2012) study the more specific case of a large inflow of Soviet mathematicians into the US. They find that incumbent US mathematicians working in the same fields as immigrants publish less in top journals. Top journal space is, however, a finite resource, so Borjas’s and Dolan’s result cannot be generalized to the whole economy, where the number of jobs is not fixed. In a similar study, Moser, Voena, and Waldinger (2014) estimate the impact of Jewish chemical scientists fleeing from Nazi Germany on patented innovations by US chemists. Unlike journal space, the number of patents is not fixed, so this setting resembles more the way an entire economy works. They find that patenting by US chemists working in research fields of refugees increased by 31% relative to innovations by US chemists working in other fields, implying transmission of knowledge from refugee scientists to native researchers. As a final example of skilled refugee inflows, Hornung (2014) studies immigration of religiously persecuted French Huguenots to Prussia in the 17th century. In this case, the refugees were more skilled in textiles and clothing and set up more successful manufactories in comparison with native ones. The author finds that Prussian towns, which received a higher share of refugees, had a higher productivity in textile manufacturing one hundred years later, implying that refugees’ technological knowledge was transferred to native textile industry and boosted its productivity.

Recently, the analysis conducted by Card (1990) was reconsidered in the light of the new knowledge on the estimation of the labor market impact of immigration, which was accumulated over the last 25 years, and with modern econometric methods. In particular, research showed that when estimating impact of immigration on native employment and wages, the skills of immigrants should be carefully matched with the skills of natives in order to define which native workers are more likely to lose because of immigrant labor. Furthermore, the labor market that experienced an inflow of immigrants (i.e. the labor market that was treated, thus constituting the treatment group), should be compared to labor markets that were similar before the inflow but had not received immigrants (these were labor markets that were non-treated, thus constituting the control group), because the impact of immigration is calculated by comparing what happened in the treated labor market after immigration relative to what happened in the same period of time in the control group of similar labor markets that did not receive immigrants. Borjas (2017) argues that, first,

\(^{11}\) See also Angrist and Kugler (2003) who estimate the impact of immigration across Western European countries using refugee immigration from former Yugoslavia during the Balkans wars as an exogenous shock. They find negative, though mostly insignificant, impact of immigration on employment in host countries, especially in those with restrictive labor and product-market institutions.
Cuban refugees in Miami were most likely to be in direct competition with native high school dropouts, so the negative impact of refugee arrival on native wages, if any, should be most pronounced for this group of workers, which was not studied in the original analysis.\textsuperscript{12} Second, he uses a “synthetic control method” developed in the 2000s (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2010), which assigns weights to all US cities and combines them into one synthetic city, which best resembles Miami’s labor market according to pre-treatment characteristics. This is different from the original study, which combines four cities, chosen on the basis of economic conditions not only before, but also after the arrival of refugees. He finds that wages of low-skilled non-Hispanic male high school dropouts in Miami did actually decrease by 10-30\% in the 1980s and recovered only by 1990. In a subsequent paper, Peri and Yasenov (2017) argue that Borjas (2017) focuses on a too small subgroup of low-skilled native workers, so that large measurement error may cause his results. The authors use another data source with more observations on low-skilled native workers and create the synthetic control city matching Miami and other US cities on city characteristics over more years before the arrival of refugees than Borjas\textsuperscript{13} to further alleviate the measurement error problem. They conclude that arrival of Cuban refugees has no significant impact on the wages of workers in Miami. In addition, Clemens and Hunt (2017) point to large compositional changes in the data used by Borjas (2015) that influence which observations are included in the group of native workers competing with refugees. Addressing this issue makes the negative impact of refugees on native wages disappear.

Borjas and Monras (2017) also revisit results from other earlier paper that look at refugees described above: Hunt (1992) who found a small negative effect of refugee immigration on native employment in France, Friedberg (2001) who found no significant impact of refugees on native wages in Israel, and Angrist and Kugler (2003) who found negative but most insignificant impact on native employment in Europe. Borjas and Monras (2017) use census data for host countries and apply the same theoretical framework and empirical model to estimate the impact of refugee immigration. They find that refugees adversely affect the labor market opportunities of native workers competing with them and often have a positive impact on workers whom they complement in the production process – very much in line with the simple model that we describe above. In a reply to their work, Clemens and Hunt (2017) criticize their empirical approach arguing that it leads to a spurious negative correlation between refugee inflows and labor market outcomes of natives. Correcting the approach reproduces the results found in the original studies.

\subsection*{2.4.2 Developing and emerging countries}

A recent series of papers is studying the effects of the recent wave of Syrian refugees on labor markets in nearby countries, and especially in Turkey. These studies tend to show that recent refugee migration had a negative impact on the informal employment in the Turkish labor market (Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015; Tumen, 2016; Ceritoglu et al, 2017). Syrian refugees did not receive work permits in Turkey, but have high labor force participation rates (77\% of refugees not living in camps were looking for a job, according to AFAD, 2013), thus representing a supply shock for informal sector jobs. For instance, Del Carpio and Wagner

\textsuperscript{12} Card (1990) splits his sample by race and quartile of the predicted wage distribution, which he uses as a proxy to skill level.  
\textsuperscript{13} Instead of four years as in Borjas (2015).
(2015) estimate that for every 10 refugees 6 native workers are displaced from the informal sector, regardless of gender, age and education. On the contrary, refugee arrival had a positive impact on Turkish formal sector employment, with around 3 additional natives for every 10 refugees. However, only men without a completed high school education gained from refugee immigration; formal employment of women and high-skilled natives did not increase. Furthermore, native men are mainly displaced into unemployment and women withdraw from the labor force. Ceritoglu et al. (2017) get similar results for native employment and show that the job finding rate is negatively impacted by refugee arrival, but not the job separation rate. As for wages, there is no impact on the average native wage according to Ceritoglu et al. (2017) and Del Carpio and Wagner (2015). The latter study however shows that the average native wage has not decreased because workers with lower productivity had dropped out of the labor force.

Tumen (2016) obtains similar results for native employment and average native wages. He also finds that consumer prices decreased after refugee arrival for both goods and services produced in both the formal and informal sectors, whereas the rents for accommodation went up. In a related study, Fakih and Ibrahim (2015) analyze the impact of refugees on the Jordan labor market and find no effect on average labor force participation, employment and unemployment rates, and on economic activity measured as the percentage change in the number of construction permits (in thousands of square meters). The authors exploit only aggregate indicators and no microdata, so they cannot test for heterogeneous impact of refugees on subgroups of natives, as in studies for Turkey.

Moving to other geographic areas, Calderon-Mejia and Ibanez (2016) examine the impact of internally displaced people on urban labor markets in Colombia and find that inflows of internal refugees have statistically significant negative effects on average city wages. The impact is large for low-skilled workers, in particular those in the informal sector. They explain that finding by a high minimum wage in the Colombian formal sector.

Several studies have analyzed the economic consequences of refugee migration in the Kagera region in Tanzania, which experienced a huge inflow of refugees from Burundi and Rwanda in 1993-1994. Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2015a, 2015b) show that, as witnessed in many advanced economies, refugee migration led to substantial mobility of natives between occupations. Maystadt and Verwimp (2014) use the same historical episode to study the impact of refugee arrivals on native consumption and conclude the effect is heterogeneous, though positive on average. For instance, they find that agricultural workers suffered from fiercer competition in the labor markets and faced increased prices in the goods markets, whereas self-employed farmers have benefited from the supply of cheap labor. Alix-Garcia and Saah (2010) also find heterogeneous effects on household assets in the same setting: positive wealth effects of refugee camps on nearby rural households and negative wealth effects on households in urban areas. The refugee inflow also changed the relative price structure in the region: Alix-Garcia and Saah (2010) find large increases in the prices of non-aid food items and more modest price effects for aid-related food items. It is worth noting, however, that the Kagera case is quite distinct from the type of refugee inflows that are normally experienced in developed countries: first, the shock was much bigger (the influx represented more than one-third of the regional population and even more than one half in case of some districts), and second, it led to a massive flow of money entering the local
economy through the humanitarian pipeline (which, among other things, dramatically improved the transport infrastructure), leading to an upsurge of business in the previously remote and poor region.

Immigration and the Effect on Labor Markets of Destination Countries—Summary

- Economic theory suggests that the impact of immigration of both voluntary and forced immigrants on the labor market depends on the relative skill composition of the immigrant and native populations. If the skill composition of immigrants matches that of natives (and if capital is perfectly elastic), then immigration has no effects on wages; it will just increase output. Wage effects only occur when immigrants differ from natives in their skill composition. In that case immigration puts pressure on wages and employment prospects of those natives whose skills are substitutable to those of immigrants, whereas it will benefit natives whose skills are complementary.

- In the medium run a small open economy may also react to changes in relative skill supply through changes in the mix of output goods produced or through technological changes, through the adoption of production techniques that use more intensively the type of labor whose relative supply has been increased by immigration. In that case, immigration may have no effects on wages and employment of native workers.

- Another possible adjustment of the economy to immigration is that native workers move out of occupations that require tasks supplied by immigrants, and into occupations that require skills immigrants don’t have, such as communication-intensive occupations.

- Many empirical studies have investigated the labor market effects of immigration, in some cases focusing on refugee migrations. Most of these studies fail to find any larger negative effects of refugee migration on native wages, be it in the case of Cuban immigration in Florida, of French repatriates from Algeria or Portuguese repatriates from former African colonies, of Russian Jews to Israel after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

- Some of these studies have recently been reconsidered with new data and new estimation techniques. These studies suggest that refugee migrations studied in earlier work may have had more negative effects on wages and employment of natives than previously suggested.

- A series of recent studies has analyzed the labor market effect of the inflow of Syrian refugees to Turkey. The effects found are heterogeneous, with a substantial displacement of Turkish employment in the informal sector, and conversely a positive effect on employment in the formal labor market, mostly concentrated among less skilled natives in the formal sector. There is no effect on average native wages, largely because the least productive (and thus less paid) workers have dropped out of the labor force. A study for Jordan instead fails to find any effect of Syrian refugees on the Jordanian labor market.

- Evidence of refugee migrations from Burundi and Rwanda to the Tanzanian Kagera region shows that refugee inflows induced considerable changes in the type of occupations performed by natives, consistent with the theoretical channel highlighted above and with evidence in advanced economies.
Overall, the evidence suggests that the impact of refugee migration on destination countries’ labor markets is not dissimilar from that of economic migrants. Its overall effect depends on natives and immigrant skills as well as on the extent to which the productive and institutional structure of the receiving economy is able to accommodate the type of skills brought by immigrants.

3. Welfare and Fiscal Effects

The fiscal consequences of immigration are a further important channel through which immigration can affect the host country. This aspect is also salient in public concern about immigration: Dustmann and Preston (2007) show that concerns of the majority population about the fiscal impact of migration are more relevant than concerns about labor market competition. Boeri (2010) comes to similar conclusions.

Concerns about fiscal consequences of immigration for receiving countries are two-fold. One first potential concern is that immigrants may contribute less than they take out of the public coffers. Unskilled immigrants may end up on the receiving end of the welfare state, because they are employed in poorly paid occupations and may, for instance, have high fertility rates and high welfare dependence, leading to considerable benefit transfers and tax credits, while at the same time paying little income taxes. In this case, immigrants would be a net fiscal cost to the country purely because of their socio-demographic characteristics: native households with similar characteristics would also be a fiscal cost. A related concern is that immigrants may have a tendency to over-rely on the welfare states of receiving countries, relative to natives with similar characteristics. This may happen because welfare-dependent migrants may self-select into countries with more generous welfare states, which would act as a “magnet” for immigrants that are more likely to depend on social security benefits, as suggested by Borjas (1999). The evidence in support of the “welfare magnet” hypothesis is however weak, as most literature has highlighted that labor market opportunities are usually the main determinant of immigrants’ location choices (see Preston, 2014 for a review, and section 4 for a discussion of immigrants’ selection).

Obtaining reliable estimates of the net fiscal impact of immigration, i.e. of the difference between the amount of taxes paid by immigrants and the value of public transfers they receive, is not straightforward. Not only does it require the availability of detailed data on individuals’ income, welfare receipts and personal circumstances, but it also requires making several crucial modelling choices and solving a number of important conceptual issues (see Preston 2014 for a thorough discussion). For this reason, many studies have analyzed only the receipt of welfare state provisions by migrants, without also considering their fiscal contributions. We next review the main conceptual issues involved in the estimation of the net fiscal cost of immigration. We then summarize the most important empirical results, focusing especially on studies involving refugee migrants.

3.1 Static vs dynamic analyses

One important distinction between studies of the overall fiscal impact of immigration is whether they conduct a static or a dynamic analysis. A static analysis amounts to calculating the annual net fiscal contribution of particular groups of immigrants to the tax and welfare
system for a particular year. This net contribution is computed typically as the difference between taxes paid and the value of government transfers received. Analysis of this type is relatively straightforward, and does not rely on many modelling assumptions. It allows answering questions like: “What is the fiscal net benefit of all immigrants who arrived after year 2000 in, say, year 2017?” Such analysis is “static”, in the sense that it does not attempt to estimate hypothetical life-cycle contributions of individuals which necessarily should include the fiscal contribution immigrants will make in the future, and “backward looking” as it assesses the fiscal contributions of immigrants and natives in the past. However, by considering jointly different fiscal years, it also allows assessing how fiscal contributions of immigrants have dynamically evolved over time. These analyses are most meaningfully undertaken by considering immigrant cohorts from their first year of arrival onwards, as this allows assessing their entire contributions, whereas analyses that consider cohorts of immigrants who have been in the country for some time miss out the net contributions those immigrants have made in their first years in the host country. Static analyses typically combine micro-data such as Labor Force Surveys or the CPS, available on a yearly level, with yearly government accounts on tax revenue and public spending. They then compute the net fiscal contributions of immigrants and natives by assigning to each group their estimated contribution to the different sources of public revenues and their respective share of cost for each item of public expenditure. In doing so they produce, for each fiscal year, estimates of total government revenues produced and government expenditure received by natives and immigrants.

Dynamic analyses instead compute the net present value of the net fiscal contribution of immigrants over their lifetime, and possibly of their descendants, discounted to a particular point in time. They are therefore forward looking. They require strong modelling assumptions, as the future evolution of many variables that determine the net present value are unknown, and have to be predicted. For instance, they require assumptions about the length of immigrants’ stay in the host country, their fertility and labor market behavior, GDP growth, and predictions about fiscal policies that will be implemented in the future. Such assumptions can substantially influence the final result, and predictions of such models tend therefore to be highly sensitive to the assumptions that are made about the future. Assumptions required are likely even more complex when considering refugee migrations, as they entail predictions of additional unknowns, such as the development in countries where refugees are coming from. In our view, dynamic analyses have academic value, but are not reliable as a policy tool (see also Preston 2014 for a review of the relative advantages of each approach and Dustmann and Frattini 2014 for details).

3.2 Public goods
Immigration expands the population base, therefore expanding also the tax base, since immigrants will contribute to the host country’s fiscal system through their payments of direct (e.g. income tax) and indirect (e.g. VAT) taxes. At the same time, immigrants pose new demands on the social security systems of host countries, thus also potentially increasing public expenditure. For instance, immigrants who work in low-pay occupations may receive
income tax credits, or housing benefits, which represent an additional cost for the receiving country’s public finances. To the extent that appropriate data are available, the amount of taxes paid and of benefits received may be directly estimated. However, there are many goods and services in host countries that would be provided in the same quantity regardless of the presence or not of immigrant populations. One typical example is national defense: the cost of maintaining an army is largely independent of the size of a country’s population. In economic terms, this means that the marginal cost of provision of national defense (i.e. the cost of providing defense to one additional person) is zero. How, then, should researchers allocate the cost of national defense when assessing the fiscal consequences of immigration? One possibility is to assume that immigrants bear no cost for it. This choice is equivalent to estimating the marginal fiscal contribution of immigrants. Alternatively, each immigrant can be imputed the average cost of public defense (i.e. the total cost of defense divided by the total population). Since the overall cost of public defense is unaffected by immigration, but immigration has expanded the population, its post-migration average cost is now lower. In other words, immigration allows sharing the cost of national defense among a larger number of individuals, which represents a form of implicit savings for natives. Thus, allocating the cost of defense on a per capita basis to immigrants and natives would make the net fiscal position of immigrants worse, and conversely improve that of natives.

More generally, it is often difficult to credibly estimate the marginal cost of provision of many publicly provided services. For instance, assessing the actual marginal cost of road maintenance, street lightning, waste disposal or fire protection services is extremely complicated. For this reason, many studies simply assume that their marginal cost is equal to the average cost. Alternatively, other analyses assume that that their marginal cost is zero, which is equivalent to estimating the net fiscal contribution of immigrants as the difference between taxes paid in and benefits received.

Besides public goods, estimation of the marginal cost of provision of in-kind transfers like education, health care or social housing is also difficult. For small immigrant inflows the marginal cost is likely to be smaller than the average cost. For instance, providing education to one additional child does not require hiring new teachers or building new schools, and the provision of health care to one additional person can be done within existing hospitals and with the current medical staff. On the other hand, sizable immigrant inflows, perhaps geographically concentrated, may increase demand for such services to an extent that requires additional investments in personnel (new teachers, nurses or doctors) or infrastructures (schools and hospitals), thus leading to a situation where the marginal cost of provision is higher than the average cost. Since precise estimation of the marginal cost of provision is rarely feasible, it is standard practice to assume that the marginal cost of these services equals their average cost.

3.3 Absolute or relative net fiscal contributions

For an average individual, the net fiscal contribution will be negative in every fiscal year when their country of residence runs a budget deficit and positive if it runs a surplus, even when the individual’s behavior remains the same in both situations. Therefore, when evaluating the net fiscal effect of immigration, the absolute net contributions of immigrants may not be as meaningful as their relative contribution in comparison to natives. In fact, the latter measure accounts for differences in the fiscal stance of the government, and allows assessing whether
immigrants are contributing more or less than natives to public finances, regardless of whether the government is running a budget deficit or a surplus. On the other hand, the absolute contributions may be of independent interest from a policy perspective, where what counts is not whether immigrants’ contributions are larger than those of natives or not, but simply whether they are a fiscal cost or benefit for the receiving country.

3.4 Empirical evidence

The net fiscal contributions of immigrants will differ across destination countries, and according to where immigrants come from. It depends also on their composition in terms of age and skills, their labor market attachment, and the amount of benefits and transfers that they receive. Consider for instance the UK, a country that has been able to attract many high skilled migrants. Dustmann and Frattini (2014) show that those who arrived between 2001 and 2011 from Central and Eastern Europe made a net fiscal contributions of almost 5 billion GBP, while those who arrived from EU15 countries contributed about 15 billion GBP, and those from non-European countries contributed about 5 billion GBP. To compute the per capita contributions these numbers have to be normalized by the size of the respective subgroup of immigrants. These positive net contributions of immigrants are in stark contrast to natives, who over the same period accumulated a net fiscal cost that amounted to almost 617 billion GBP. The positive net contribution of immigrants is mainly explained by them being younger and better educated than natives, having a higher labor force participation rates, and receiving less transfers and benefits.

Liebig and Mo (2013) confirm these results for the UK in a cross-country study of the fiscal impact of immigration across OECD country. They further conclude that in most countries net contributions of immigrants tend to be positive but small if benchmarked against overall GDP. Likewise, even in countries where migrants’ net contributions are negative, their size as a share of GDP is modest. Their estimates, however, refer to the whole immigrant population in the country in years 2007-2009, not to specific immigrant cohorts. As a result, estimates for countries that received large waves of economic migrants in the past, and then restricted migration, like France and Germany, tend to be negative. In fact, their immigrant population comprises in large part of older immigrant cohorts, most of whom are now retired and whose pension payments more than offset the positive contributions of the smaller more recent cohorts of immigrants that are currently working. Conversely, estimates tend to positive for those countries who have received large waves of economic migrants in recent years. Indeed, their results indicate that employment is the single most important determinant of migrants’ net fiscal contribution. Counterfactual analysis suggests that raising immigrants’ employment to the same level of natives’ would imply large fiscal gains, especially in Belgium, France and Sweden where the effect would be above 0.5% of GDP.

3.4.1 Welfare use by refugees

Most of the existing evidence on immigrant’s welfare use concerns immigrants in general, without differentiating between the reason for immigration. Some insights about refugees’ welfare use, however, can be obtained by looking at the evidence on immigrants from specific countries of origin, which are known to be sources of major refugee flows, or immigrants from poor countries in host countries with historically low rates of economic immigration, such as Scandinavian countries.
The economic literature on immigrants’ participation in social insurance programs focusses on the following questions: i) whether immigrants rely on welfare more or less than natives and ii) how participation in welfare programs changes with time immigrants spend in the host country. The answers to these questions, especially to the second one, seem to depend on the type of welfare program and the way a country’s welfare system is structured (for instance, whether participation in some programs is possible only when an individual exhausts other benefits). Another reason that evidence on refugees’ welfare use is, to some extent, mixed, is the lack of separation between welfare eligibility and usage (Kerr and Kerr, 2011). In particular, most studies on welfare use do not discuss which benefits immigrants are entitled to receive.

Baker and Benjamin (1995) is one of the earliest papers discussing refugees’ welfare use. They show that in Canada refugees rely more on welfare benefits than natives and that the probability of receiving social assistance and unemployment benefits goes up with time spent in the country, whereas reliance on rent subsidies goes down. This study, in particular the part related to unemployment insurance, is revisited by Crossley et al (2001), with a more general empirical approach and data covering a longer period of time. This new study finds that whether receipt of unemployment insurance increases or decreases with years since immigration depend on the immigrant cohort. Furthermore, Crossley et al (2001) point out that welfare use fluctuates with the business cycle, and more so for immigrants than for natives, so the gap between natives and immigrants increases in recessions and decreases in booms.¹⁴

Hansen and Lofstrom (2003) study how immigrants use social assistance in Sweden. They find that immigrant households use social assistance to a greater extent than natives, which cannot be explained by different household characteristics. Immigrants from refugee-sending countries are more likely than non-refugees to claim social assistance, but over time their reliance on it decreases. The gap with natives, however, does not close completely: even after 20 years in Sweden, both refugee and non-refugee immigrants are more likely to receive social assistance than comparable natives. Non-refugee immigrants include all persons born abroad that do not come from refugee-sending countries, so they include immigrants from advanced countries (OECD). Refugees in particular seem to assimilate quickly. Their initial welfare-participation rates are between 40 and 50 percentage points higher than natives. After 10 years in Sweden, the difference drops to about 10 percentage points.

Matthiessen (2009) provides a lot of detailed descriptive statistics on immigrants’ welfare use in Denmark in 2000 and documents that non-Western immigrants are more likely to receive benefits than natives (for instance, 56% of non-Western immigrants received short-term benefits in 2000 compared to 27% of Danes). Immigrants from refugee source countries receive higher amounts than immigrants from non-refugee countries, because entitlement for some of the benefits depends on refugee status (for instance, the number of years of residence in the home country is taken into consideration when calculating pensions and disability benefits for refugees, but not for non-refugees). Some evidence on how immigrants’ welfare participation in Denmark changes with years since immigration can be found in Blume

¹⁴ This results is confirmed in other studies, for instance, Blume and Verner (2007), Matthiese (2009), Bratsberg et al (2014).
and Verner (2007). The authors combine income-replacing transfers (such as unemployment benefits and means-tested social assistance), child benefits and public housing support to construct households’ welfare dependency rate, measured as the share of public transfers in the total household income. The authors find that immigrants from less-developed countries are most dependent on welfare: in 1999, public transfers constituted 49% of their total household income compared to 15% for native Danes. They also estimate that immigrants’ welfare dependency rate decreases with years since migration from 80% in the first year of stay to 43% after 15 years for males and from 60% to 50% for females.

Sarvimaki (2011) documents the use of social benefits by immigrants in Finland between 1993 and 2003. The majority of immigration to Finland had non-economic reasons: In 2003 about a fifth of the immigrant population were refugees or their family members, another fifth were ethnic Finns from the former Soviet Union, and a quarter had a native spouse at the time of arrival. The author does not split the sample by reason for immigration and focusses on long-term immigrants who stay in the country for more than five years. He documents that the amount of income transfers to immigrant households from non-OECD countries during their first year in Finland is twice as large as the amount received by a comparable native household. This gap narrows over the following years and is insignificant for households who have been in Finland for 20 years or more. The probability of receiving income transfers, however, differs between non-OECD immigrant and native households even after 20 years in the country. For instance, about 80% of non-OECD immigrant households receive unemployment benefits, which is a means-tested labor market subsidy that does not require a previous work history, in their first year, and 50% after 20 years, whereas only a third of native households claim some unemployment benefit in any given year. While receipt of unemployment benefits decreases with time in the country, the use of social assistance increases in the first ten years for non-OECD males from 30% to more than 40% and remains stable for non-OECD females at about 35%. Unlike long-term immigrants, short-term immigrants, who stay in Finland for less than five years, receive fewer benefits than natives, implying that short-term immigrants behave differently than long-term immigrants. In view of the recent refugee crisis, Sarvimaki (2017) performs a similar analysis focusing on immigrants from Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia, which were the top three source countries of asylum-seekers in Finland in 2015 (85% of all applications). He finds that the average benefits received by households from these countries remain stable over time lived in Finland, at about twice the level of the benefits of natives.

Bratsberg, et al (2014) examine immigrants’ participation in disability programs, which is the most costly social insurance program in Norway, especially from the long-term perspective. They look at labor migrants from low-income source countries such as Turkey and Pakistan and refugees from major waves of refugee immigration to Norway. They show that the participation rate in disability programs goes up with time spent in the country: immigrants are less likely than natives to claim disability benefits after five years in Norway (by 2-3 percentage points compared to about 15% of natives participating in disability programs), but are more likely to do that after 10-15 years in the country.
3.4.2 Fiscal effects of refugee migration

There is so far little published research on the fiscal impact of refugee migrants or forced migrants more generally, although the recent surge in refugee migration is triggering new studies. One exception is Ruist (2015) who studies the revenues from and spending on refugees in Sweden in 2014. Ruist imputes the refugee status using information on the county of origin and the year of immigration and includes all refugees who ever migrated to Sweden in his calculation. He estimates that 1% of 2007 Swedish GDP is redistributed to refugees through the public sector; in particular, 80% of this is attributed to lower public per capita revenues from refugees and 20% to higher public per capita spending. The author’s estimates are based on the assumption that the cost of pure public goods which are non-rival in consumption (such as public defense, infrastructure, and central administration) increase when the refugee population increases. If keeping such costs constant, the estimated redistribution to refugees is smaller (0.2% of GDP). Alden and Hammarstedt (2016) also estimate costs related to refugees in Sweden but their data allow them to identify and follow refugees over time. They calculate net public costs for all refugees from Africa, the Middle East or other Asian countries who were granted asylum in Sweden between 2005 and 2007 up to seven years from their arrival. The authors estimate that during their first year in Sweden refugees cost between 95,000 SEK and 190,000 SEK per capita, depending on whether the calculation excludes or includes costs of pure public goods. Afterwards, the net public cost per refugee varies with refugees’ skills: After seven years in Sweden, the average public net cost for a low skilled refugee (with nine years of schooling or less) is estimated between 49,000 SEK and 107,000 SEK if pure public goods are excluded or included in the cost respectively. A highly skilled refugee (with a university degree) costs, on average, nothing to the Swedish state after 7 years in the country if the cost of pure public goods is omitted from the calculation and 60,000 SEK if it is included. The authors explain this difference in cost with the difference in labor market performance of low and high skilled refugees: 48% of low skilled refugees and 60% of high skilled refugees are employed after seven years in the country. An earlier Swedish study by Gustafsson and Osterberg (2001), which computes net fiscal contributions of immigrants between 1983-1992, also highlights the importance of immigrants’ skills. With regard to refugees, the authors estimate that a 25-year old male refugee will start making positive contribution to public finances 6 years after arrival if he has a university degree and 16 years after arrival if he completed only compulsory schooling. The respective figures for a 25-year old female refugee are 7 and 25 years.

Matthiessen (2009) summarizes a number of studies on net transfers to the public exchequer in Denmark between 1991 and 2001. According to these papers, non-Western immigrants are net recipients of public funds, even in prime working age. The average net transfer that they receive depends on the length of stay in the country (peaking at 3-5 years after receiving residency) and on economic conditions (peaking at downturns). The total transfers to non-Western immigrants amounted to 0.83% of the Danish GDP in 2001. Differences in net transfers between non-Western immigrants and native Danes, who are net fiscal contributors, are caused by immigrants’ lower employment rates, lower wages, and lower incomes in case of self-employed. Hansen et al. (2017) use a dynamic computable general

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15 The study does not include the costs incurred by Swedish authorities while asylum applications were processed.
equilibrium model with overlapping generations for the entire Danish economy to obtain life cycle estimates of the potential fiscal impact of immigration. They find that refugees have a large negative fiscal impact, as do non-refugee immigrants from non-Western countries. Similar to Ruist (2015), they argue that the reason for this deficit is the weak labor market attachment and high welfare dependence of refugee migrants. The authors conclude that the generosity of the Danish welfare system is one of the factors that led to such high costs of non-Western immigrants, as their employment rates are similar to those of non-EEA immigrants in the UK, who nevertheless make a positive contribution to the public purse (Dustmann and Frattini, 2014).

Bach et al (2017) simulate macroeconomic and fiscal impact of refugees having arrived to Germany in 2015 over the next fifteen years, extrapolating data on educational attainment and labor market performance of earlier cohorts of refugees and their family members. Not taking into consideration the cost of pure public goods, the authors estimate that over the entire simulation period the average annual deficit due to the 2015 refugee arrival cohort will amount to 0.07\% of the 2015 GDP (2.1 billion euros, or 26 euros per inhabitant). The expenditure on refugees will initially exceed the income received from refugees, but as more and more refugees enter the labor market, the net public cost of refugees will decrease. Whether or not the net cost of the 2015 refugee cohort remains negative until 2030 (the end of the simulation period) or becomes positive earlier, depends on whether the expenditure on hypothetical children that would be eventually born in Germany (in the form of child benefits, childcare and education) is included in the analysis or not. Furthermore, the authors estimate that investment in education and language acquisition programs provided to refugees would substantially improve the fiscal balance of the 2015 refugee cohort by improving their employment and earning potential.

3.5 Welfare and Fiscal Effects - Summary

- The net fiscal effects of immigration can be computed as the difference between the amount of taxes paid by immigrants and the value of public transfers they receive.
- Fiscal consequences of immigration can be better assessed over a period of several years. Analyses for one year only are not very informative. Studies of the fiscal impact of immigration can be either static or dynamic. Static analyses are backward looking: they assess the net fiscal balance of immigration in any given year. Dynamic analyses are forward looking: they compute the net present value of the net fiscal contribution of immigrants over their lifetime, and possibly of their descendants. Dynamic analyses are heavily assumptions driven, and possibly less interesting from a policy perspective.
- While economically-motivated migrants tend to be young and have high labor market participation, and therefore are more likely to be net fiscal contributors, forced migrants may be less selected in terms of demographic profiles.
- Cross-country evidence shows that in most countries the net fiscal contributions of immigrants tend to be positive, if small as a share of GDP. Current fiscal contributions of

\[16\] Almost 900,000 newly arrived refugees were registered in Germany in 2015.

\[17\] Future returns from these children (e.g. taxes when they enter the labor market) are not included because of the 15-year simulation horizon. Further, pensions that will be paid to refugees as they retire are also excluded.
immigrants are larger in countries that recently received larger waves of economic migrants, as the average age of immigrant populations is lower.

- There is still little evidence on the fiscal effects of refugee migration. Most of the available evidence comes from Nordic countries that have historically received large waves of refugee migrants, rather than economic migrants.
- Refugee migrants cost more to the public sector than economic migrants, in particular in the first years after arrival.
- Refugees are more welfare dependent than economic migrants and natives, especially in the first years after receiving residency. Although in many countries, the gap in welfare participation rates narrows over time, it often persists until more than ten years in the host country. In some cases, like Norway, welfare participation rates of past refugee waves have increased, rather than decreased, over time.
- The cost of refugees depends on their age and skills: younger and more educated refugees become net fiscal contributors several years earlier than their lower educated counterparts, a result which is due to their faster labor market integration.
- Overall, the evidence shows that the fiscal impact of refugee migration is tightly linked to refugees' labor market integration: the faster the labor market integration of refugees, the lower will be their net fiscal cost.

4. Selection and Destination Choice of Migrants

Selection of immigrants with respect to their skills and abilities is a crucial factor that determines both the impact immigration will have on destination countries’ economies, and the economic assimilation of immigrants and their integration into the new society. Obviously, earnings of migrants who are better educated will be higher than of those with less education. Immigrants from culturally more similar societies may more easily integrate, and younger migrants may have more incentives to invest into their new country (in terms of learning country specific skills such as language) than older migrants.

The migration policy framework of host countries will impact on the composition of the immigrant population, in terms of origin countries, socio-demographic characteristics or educational background. Many destination countries have set up migration schemes that explicitly select immigrants based on their education, professional skills or other individual characteristics. These policies are typically aimed at selecting immigrants who have skills that are deemed to be particularly in demand, or more generally to attract highly educated individuals, who are more productive in the host countries (see Aydemir 2014 for a concise review of the effects of skill-selective immigration policies). Such policies are obviously not feasible in the case of refugee migration for countries that are signatories of the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees, and that are therefore legally bound to offer asylum to “[any person who] owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” Despite the lack of formal selection mechanisms for legitimate refugees, however, countries do have different policies toward refugees and differ, for
instance, in their processing time and acceptance rate of asylum applications, in welfare benefits entitlements and legal labor market access for asylum seekers and refugees, as well as on their residential allocations (see Dustmann et al., 2017, and Hatton 2009, 2016 for detail).

Besides the selection operated by destination countries, the characteristics of immigrants will also depend on their self-selection, both from the country of origin and across destination countries. This is illustrated for instance in Dustmann and Glitz (2011), who show that the level of education of immigrants from the same origin country differs substantially according to the destination country. Another example are Polish migrants to the UK after 2004, who have been younger and better educated than Polish migrants to Germany, as illustrated in Dustmann, Frattini and Rosso (2015). There is considerable heterogeneity even across European countries in the educational levels of their immigrant populations. For instance, according to the 2014 EULFS, the share of immigrants with tertiary education is above 40% in Ireland and the UK, but as low as 12% in Italy.

An often used framework to explain self-selection of immigrants is based on the Roy model (Roy, 1951), and developed in an early paper by Borjas (1987) (see also Dustmann and Glitz (2011) and Dustmann, Fadlon and Weiss (2011) for extended versions of this model). This model suggests that individuals decide to live in that country where their skills have the highest value. In its simplest form, the model assumes a one dimensional skill distribution (such as academic skills). If the price for such skills is higher in country A than in country B, then the improvement in earnings will be higher for those who have a lot of such skills than for those who have very little such skills. Thus countries where skills have a high value will attract immigrants with higher skills. In these countries, the earnings between skilled and unskilled individuals will also be more unequal.

Such variation in skills is observed even among refugees from the same source region. We illustrate that in Figure 3, which reports the share of tertiary educated among North African and Middle Eastern refugees for a number of European countries. The share of North African and Middle eastern refugees with tertiary education exhibits stark cross-country variation, ranging from as high as 48% in France to as low as 20% in the UK.
Note. The table reports the share of tertiary educated among refugees from North Africa and Near and Middle East across host countries. The sample includes individuals aged between 25 and 64, not in education or military service, with information on gender, age, education, and labor market status.
Source: EULFS 2014

In the case of forced migration, self-selection mechanisms are in principle less relevant than among economic migrants, because migration is often not a choice. However, there may be some selection across destination countries, to the extent that refugees are able to choose their country of destination. Such selection may be driven by welfare benefit considerations (i.e. the ease with which individuals can access the welfare system, and the generosity of transfers), possibilities to access the labor market (e.g. whether there exists a low skilled labor market or a large shadow economy), the language spoken, and cultural vicinity.

4.1 Empirical evidence
It is typically assumed that, when migrants self-select and make the choice of the destination region, they are perfectly informed about potential earnings (conditional on their skills) and associated migration costs. These might be reasonable assumptions for economic migrants, but are likely unrealistic in the case of forced migrations. Asylum seekers might not have time or opportunity to prepare their flight, information might be much harder to gather during conflict, cost of travel and risks of travel might be much higher than in peaceful times, and travel options might restrict the choice of third countries that offer protection, and that are reachable. Geographical constraints may be another hindrance for forced migrants. For instance, being an island the UK is far more difficult to reach than other Western European countries in continental Europe. On the contrary, Germany with a long land border is far easier to reach for people travelling from Eastern Europe or the Middle East.

In this section we will review the existing literature on the destination choices of asylum seekers. We start by reviewing quantitative papers, most of which use country-level data on asylum applications and focus on the pull (and push) factors of asylum seekers’ flows, following the same empirical approach as the literature studying push and pull factors of the
overall international migration (see, for example, Grogger and Hanson, 2011). These include works by Havinga and Bocker (1999), Neumayer (2004), Moore and Shellman (2007), Keogh (2013) and Barthel and Neumayer (2015). We will also review papers that conduct qualitative analysis. These works are not providing a representative picture on the subject, but by exploring this topic via in-depth interviews with asylum seekers, they add additional interesting information. Such papers include Day and White (2001), Robinson and Segrott (2002) and Gilbert and Koser (2006). McAuliffe and Jayasuriya (2016) focus instead on refugees whose application for asylum has been approved. Other key informants on asylum such as refugee associations, organizations providing assistance to asylum seekers, lawyers, immigration officers and interpreters are interviewed by Bocker and Havinga (1998) and Havinga and Bocker (1999). Occasionally, research has been conducted directly in source countries among potential asylum seekers (McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016).

4.1.1 Quantitative studies of destination choice

Havinga and Bocker (1999) examine statistics on asylum applications in EU countries in the 1980s and early 1990s to study flows between origin and destination countries. They show that asylum-seekers from different regions and countries of origin are not distributed evenly across EU countries. On the contrary, asylum seekers from a particular country of origin tend to migrate to the same destination country: According to the authors’ calculations, over the years 1985-94, and for the case of 28 of the 44 largest countries of origin, 60 per cent or more of the asylum-seekers applied for asylum in one particular country. For instance, 99% of asylum seekers from Mali went to France, 99% from the Dominican Republic to Spain, 99% from Surinam to the Netherlands, 93% from Uganda to the UK, 87% from Albania to Italy, 85% from Afghanistan to Germany, 77% from Syria to the Netherlands, etc. (see Table 1 in Havinga and Bocker, 1999). Using multiple regression analysis, the authors find that the most important predictor of the country of destination is the presence of colonial ties between the country of origin and the country of destination. Language ties also predict the choice of destination country but have a much smaller effect.

Following Havinga and Bocker (1999), other studies also use data on the number of asylum seekers in origin-destination pairs, extending the period of observation, the list of countries included in the analysis, and the list of covariates, and using more sophisticated econometric models. Neumayer (2004) looks at asylum applications in Western European countries in the time period from 1982 to 1999 (17 destination countries and 125 origin countries). He finds again that countries receive a higher per capita share of asylum seekers from countries of origin that are former colonies, that speak the same language and that are geographically closer. The stock of asylum seekers from the same country of origin is also a strong predictor of the current number of asylum seekers from this country in the host country. Richer (in terms of GDP) destination countries receive a higher per capita share of asylum seekers, but other economic factors such as unemployment rates are not correlated with the number of asylum seekers. Neumayer also finds that asylum seekers tend to go to countries with a higher recognition rate and a lower share of right-wing populist parties.

Moore and Shellman (2007) provide the first global analysis of destinations of forced migrants. Using UNHCR data for 1955-1995, they argue that most forced migrants seek asylum in neighboring countries, and report that the top five destinations for refugees over
the analyzed period are Iran, Pakistan, Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), Somalia and Sudan. Germany and the US are the only developed countries among the top ten destinations. The authors proceed to analyze pull and push factors of forced migrations in origin-destination pairs conditional on whether an origin country has a common border with a destination country. In particular, they look at the impact of average wages in destination countries on destination choice. This investigates the common public perception that refugees are mostly “economic migrants” in search of better living conditions. They find indeed that refugees tend to go to a neighboring country with a higher average wage but when migrating to a non-contiguous country, the level of wages has no effect, with refugees following colonial ties and diaspora networks.

Keogh (2013) takes three key characteristics of destination countries that previous studies found to attract asylum seekers - the country’s GDP, recognition rate and refugee stock – and investigates whether these have the same association with the number of asylum applications that countries receive throughout the period 1989-2011. He shows that GDP and recognition rates have a significant impact on the refugee inflows, whereas the stock of refugees is not correlated with the number of asylum applications. Moreover, he finds that the association between GDP and the number of asylum applications remains the same during the whole period of observation, whereas the association between recognition rate and the number of applications becomes weaker after 2002 in comparison to the 1990s. Results also indicate that the three variables explain less than 30% of the overall variation in asylum applications and most of the remaining 70% is due to country specific factors.

Barthel and Neumayer (2015) explore spatial dependence in international forced migration flows to show that forced migration between a pair of an origin and a destination country depends on characteristics of other destination and origin countries. Spatial dependence between destination countries refers to negative externalities that events in a destination country create for other destination countries, such as more restrictive asylum policies in a country deflecting some asylum-seekers from this country to other destinations. Spatial dependence between source countries refers to positive externalities that forced migrants from a source country create for asylum seekers from other source countries, such as knowledge of destination countries, asylum procedures, etc., thus impacting on outflows and destinations of asylum seekers from these other countries. In other words, the authors expect that refugee outflow from a country will impact on refugee outflows from other countries, in particular from those that are geographically close or share the same language or had the same metropole. The authors thus estimate whether the number of asylum applications from a particular origin country to a particular destination country depends on the number of asylum seekers for other source countries and to other destination countries weighted by countries’ proximity in terms of geography, language and colonial past. The estimation sample includes 19 destination countries, 153 source countries over the period 1998-2007. The authors find a large degree of spatial dependence between geographically close countries, which they attribute to social networks and people smuggling networks operating across the borders of geographically close origin countries; the effect of common language is estimated to be much smaller, and the shared colonial past has no effect on forced migration flows. Spatial dependence between destination countries, though small, is also supported by the data.
4.1.2 Qualitative studies of the destination choice

In-depth interviews with asylum-seekers, refugees, and key informants, though not representative, corroborate the key findings of quantitative studies, such as the primary role of colonial ties, common language and social networks and provide deeper insights into issues such as the impact of asylum policy. Qualitative studies also highlight the distinction between anticipatory refugees who have time to plan their journey and acute refugees who leave in a hurry. The latter are found to have much more limited choices of destination, because they have less time to plan, to weigh alternatives, to wait for the most favorable opportunities and to obtain the necessary permits.

Havinga and Bocker (1999) complement their country-level analysis of the number of asylum applications, summarized above, with interviews with key informants working closely with asylum seekers (refugee associations, organizations providing assistance to asylum seekers, lawyers, immigration officers and interpreters) from Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK. These countries were chosen for in-depth interviews because origin of asylum-seekers cannot be explained easily by colonial ties or geographical proximity. Based on these interviews, the authors conclude that in the majority of cases the choice of country of asylum is not based on a comparison of advantages and disadvantages of different options. At most, asylum seekers choose between Europe and North America, but not the actual country, though they have preferences for English-speaking countries such as the UK, Canada and the US. In Belgium and the Netherlands, some asylum seekers regard their current host country as transit, their stay as temporary, and try to go to another country after their arrival in Western Europe. Moreover, in a substantial number of cases the decision on destination is taken not by the asylum-seeker, but by a travel agent (governmental or charity organization or a trafficker) or by the person the asylum seeker relied on for information and advice. Sometimes, only certain travel connections and documents are available. The choice also depends on whether the asylum seeker has a relative, a friend or acquaintance in the country of destination. Most of the informants think that colonial ties are important because this means a settled community in the country of destination, possible mastery of the relevant language, familiarity with the culture and perhaps an idealized image of the former mother country. Asylum seekers from a former colony may also consider it the duty of the mother country to receive them; Zaireans, for example, claim a right to go to Belgium and feel that Belgium is obliged to receive them. Recognition rates were considered to be important by some, but not all, informants. A general conclusion among the informants is that visa policies have become increasingly restrictive in all asylum countries and that asylum-seekers have been forced as a result to make a detour via countries whose visas are not so difficult to obtain, enter the country on false documents or use other clandestine means. This often requires the help of an agent and a lot of money. Some asylum-seekers may end up in a country which they would not have chosen when given alternatives.

Day and White (2001) conducted in-depth interviews with Bosnian and Somalian refugees in the UK, the two groups among the most prominent arrivals in the UK during the 1990s. The two origin countries are different with regards to the links with the host country: no links between Bosnia and the UK and important historical and social ties between Somalia and the UK (colonial ties and personal and friendship networks, making the UK an “obvious destination”). None of the Somali participants claimed to have any prior knowledge of the UK
asylum policy (some even did not understand the true nature of their status). For Bosnians, family or friendship networks were also a major factor for the decision to come to the UK, as well as the English language spoken in the destination country. For some, the decision on destination was taken by charity convoys; furthermore, freedom of choice was taken away by institutions when refugees first arrive in a transit country (charities or government-sponsored resettlement schemes). Gilbert and Koser (2006) come to the same conclusion doing in-depth interviews with groups of refugees in the UK from four origin countries (Afghanistan, Colombia, Kosovo, and Somalia).

Robinson and Segrott (2002) argue that distinction should be drawn between independent travellers making uninformed choices and those using agents. In the latter case, the agent makes an informed choice but bases his decision on different parameters than an asylum seeker (duration of the asylum procedure, quality of care, application success rate, easiness of transportation). These are: the ease with which an agent thinks s/he can get asylum seekers into a given country; whether there is a demand for that destination; whether taking people there is profitable; and whether the agent is already connected to migration networks which might provide intelligence, facilities and personnel to assist illegal entry. A combination of these factors will determine whether an agent offers particular destination countries or not. Those asylum-seekers who have resources will have more choice.

McAuliffe and Jayasuriya (2016) surveyed refugees in Australia, who had arrived via an illegitimate maritime route. In their sample, 67% of refugees had considered destination countries prior to departure from the country of origin. In particular, a high proportion of refugees took into consideration the Australian asylum policy, which was liberal at the time of their arrival (2011-2012). Later the authors also conducted a survey in origin countries targeting ethnic groups, which were the source of a substantial number of illegal immigrants to Australia (such as Hazaras, Rohingya and Tamils in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka). They asked respondents whether they would like to seek asylum. The vast majority of potential asylum seekers reported that they had a preferred destination country or countries in mind. Interestingly, according to the survey results, approximately 27 per cent of Rohingya households in Bangladesh, 17 per cent of Hazara households in Afghanistan and 8 per cent of Hazara households in Pakistan were approached by people smugglers in 2014, showing the importance of travel agents in migration process.

4.2 Selection and Destination Choice of Migrants—Summary

- In general, immigrants both select destination countries, and are selected by destination countries. This two-sided selection process leads to substantial differences in demographic composition of migrants from the same origin country in different destination countries.
- Host countries that are signatories of the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees cannot in general choose the type of refugees they accommodate. However, asylum seekers can to some extent select their destination countries. Such selection may be driven by economic considerations like generosity of welfare benefits and possibilities to access the labor market, or cultural factors like the language spoken, and cultural proximity.
- Evidence shows that the average education level of refugees from the same area of origin varies substantially across different EU destination countries. For instance, the share of
North African and Middle eastern refugees with tertiary education exhibits stark cross-country variation, ranging from as high as 48% in France to as low as 20% in the UK.

- Empirical studies have shown that among the key factors explaining location choices of asylum seekers are: the presence of colonial ties, a common language, and geographic proximity. Asylum recognition rates are also an important determinant of location choice. Conversely, economic factors like wage level or unemployment rate play a minor role, and have only been shown to matter among countries contiguous to the country of origin. The importance of these factors has also been corroborated by qualitative studies.

5. Earnings and Career Decisions

The smoother and faster the labor market integration of newly arrived refugees, the lower will be their welfare dependence, the larger their economic contribution, and likely faster will be their social integration. This will in turn affect their net fiscal contribution and their overall contribution to the host economy. Upon arrival in the host country, immigrants typically lack skills that are specific to the receiving country, and that help them to transfer their existing skills to the needs of the receiving economy. One example for such a skill is language proficiency, which is not just productive in its own right, but also helps immigrants to make their skills useful in the host country's labor market. It is important that these skills are acquired during the initial period after migration, to ensure the longest possible period over which they are useful. An important policy challenge is thus to incentivize newly arrived immigrants to invest in such skills, so as to enhance their earnings and employment prospects.

Important in this context are the expectations of immigrants about their future duration in the host country. The shorter the expected duration, the lower is the incentive to invest into skills that are productive in the host country, but only partially – or not at all – transferable to the country of origin. Again, language is such a skill – it is on the one hand a critical component of productivity in the host country, but on the other hand often not productive in the source country. This issue is particularly relevant in the case of refugee migration, where even those who receive residency often receive only temporary residence permits. That the economic behavior of temporary migrants can be very different from permanent migrants due to shorter durations in the host country is emphasized in a number of papers; see Dustmann and Gorlach (2016) for a review of this literature.

5.1 Migration temporariness and duration uncertainty

What matters for economic behavior is not the actual migration duration, but the expectation about how long an individual believes he or she is staying in the host country. An example is the experience of guest workers immigrants in Germany, who were recruited to fill the temporary shortages of low-skilled laborers in the booming German economy in the 1950s and 1960s, and whose presence was not planned to be permanent. Many of these workers intended to return back to their home countries after working (and accumulating savings) for a certain period in Germany. As a result, they had little incentive to invest in additional skills that could have been valuable in the German labor market. Yet, when the guest workers programs ended with the 1973 oil crisis, many guest workers ended up staying in Germany for considerably longer periods of time than initially expected. Dustmann (1993) shows that
their initial under-investment in German-specific human capital led to slower labor market integration than immigrants to North America and Australia, where immigration was supposed to be permanent. Adda et al. (2017), using structural estimation techniques, generalize these insights and demonstrate that immigrants make their most important investment decisions in the early years after arrival, Initial beliefs about the migration being temporary may lead to large earnings losses over the lifecycle if such expectations are revised only at a later stage. The authors’ simulations show that if the probability of obtaining permanence is only about 10%, the implied loss in lifetime welfare amounts to around 35%. This loss decreases when the probability of obtaining permanence after five years increases but still amounts to about 5% of lifetime welfare when the probability of obtaining a permanent visa increases to 90%.

These considerations have important implications for policies that aim at integrating refugees. A rapid examination of asylum claims and a clear commitment of the host country regarding the future possibilities of residence of refugees whose applications have been positively decided may facilitate their integration in the host country’s labor market, by incentivizing them to invest into host country specific skills.

Two recent empirical studies emphasize the potentially negative effects of extensively long periods of decision on asylum applications. Conducted for the Netherlands and Switzerland, both link the time it takes to process an application to the subsequent integration of refugees in. Bakker et al. (2014), analyzing a sample of refugees in the Netherlands, show that a long stay in asylum accommodations negatively affects refugees’ mental health and hampers their socio-economic integration. These authors further find that uncertainty about the future and reduced confidence due to a long stay in asylum accommodations affects refugees’ chances of labor market success even in the longer run. Further, their analysis suggests that residence status has a direct effect on socioeconomic integration: having a temporary refugee status hampers socio-economic integration, compared to refugees who have been granted the Dutch nationality. Results should be interpreted as descriptive evidence however, and not causally.

Hainmueller et al. (2016) study asylum seekers in Switzerland, paying more attention to identifying a causal relationship, and reach similar conclusions. They show that the swiftness with which an application is processed matters for the integration of refugees to Switzerland: one additional year of waiting time reduces their subsequent employment rate by 4 to 5 percentage points, a 16% to 23% drop when evaluated at the mean. This may be due to skill atrophy, so the authors speculate, so that asylum seekers who wait longer before receiving refugee status have less opportunities as well as less incentives to put their human capital to productive use, and possibly to undertake further investments. On the other hand, the authors also show that psychological discouragement may explain these findings, whereby long waiting times for a decision on their status exacerbate the trauma already experienced by many refugees and leads to psychological stress, depression and disempowerment, which in turn decreases the likelihood of subsequent successful integration. The finding that the negative effect of a longer waiting time is similar across different demographic and education groups suggests that such psychological discouragement mechanism may be especially relevant in explaining their results. In fact, the authors argue, if the results were mostly driven by depreciation of human capital, then the penalty for waiting time should be stronger for
the most highly skilled individuals. This result has potentially important policy implications, as it suggests that simply providing asylum seekers access to the labor market while they wait for a decision may be useful, but not sufficient to facilitate the economic integration of refugees: even if they were legally allowed to work, the stress due to the uncertainty about the outcome of their asylum application may in fact harm asylum seekers’ employment prospects.

A slightly different view is taken by a number of studies that investigate the effect of obtaining citizenship on economic integration. Granting citizenship, like permanent residence, constitutes a commitment of the host country to accommodate immigrants permanently, and so should create incentives to invest into human and social capital. Gathman and Keller (2014) identify a causal relationship between citizenship and labor market performance of immigrants in Germany using discontinuities in eligibility for naturalization created by age-dependent residency requirements for naturalization. They find no impact of citizenship on employment rates; as for wages, they estimate that immigrant men have no returns to citizenship, whereas annual wages of immigrant women eligible for naturalization are 1.4% higher than for those who are non-eligible. Hainmueller et al. (2015) and Hainmueller et al. (2017) show that granting citizenship boosts political and social integration of immigrants respectively. In particular, both papers compare naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants in Switzerland, and they use outcomes of naturalization referenda that were marginal as a design to identify causal effects.

5.2 Evidence on refugee integration

While there is a large literature on the on the economic integration of immigrants in the host countries’ labor markets (see, for instance, a review by de la Rica et al, 2015), far less evidence exists for refugees or forced migrants. Many existing studies on the economic integration of immigrants do not explicitly distinguish among entry-classes, often because that information is not available in data. Those existing studies that analyse the economic integration of refugees mostly conclude that refugees have worse labor market outcomes than natives and other immigrants groups, such as economic migrants (Bratsberg et al, 2014; Dustmann et al, 2017), but comparable or even better performance than migrants who entered the country for family reunification (Bevelander and Pendakur, 2014; Bratsberg et al, 2014; Luik et al, 2016). There are, nevertheless, positive incidences of refugee integration (Robinson, 1993; Cortes, 2004).

The disappointing economic performance of refugees - in comparison with economically motivated migrants – could have a number of reasons. Forced migrants are often unprepared for their migrations. They have not invested in particular skills that are needed in the destination countries, they often have not even chosen their destination country, and they may – under normal circumstances – not have chosen to migrate, as the economic benefits – given their qualifications- would not have been sufficiently high (see Section 4). Forced migrants have also often experienced traumatic circumstances, and the occurrences surrounding their displacement, their subsequent flight, and the stress and uncertainty to succeed with their asylum application may have detrimental effects on their mental and

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18 Other studies examining the relation between citizenship and labor market outcomes do not have exogenous variation in eligibility for naturalization or in decision to grant citizenship.
physical health and may lead to an attrition of their labor market skills. Evidence also suggests however that this gap in labor market performance between refugees and other types of migrant tends to diminish or even close over time (see Bevelander, 2016, for a review of some of this literature). For instance, Cortes (2004) tracks arrival cohorts of refugees and economic migrants in the US across two censuses in 1980 and 1990, imputing the refugee status based on the country of birth and year of immigration. She finds that refugees close the initial gap in annual earnings and working hours with economic migrants (6% and 14% in 1980 respectively) within 10 years in the country. She even finds some evidence for overtaking: In 1990, refugees from the 1975–1980 arrival cohorts earned 20% more and worked 4% more hours relative to economic immigrants. Both faster growth in working hours and hourly wages contributed to higher annual earnings of refugees compared to economic migrants. The author argues that the better labor market performance of refugees is the result of their higher investment into US specific human capital, which refugees undertake because they are less likely to return to their home countries than economic migrants (see also Dustmann 2003). She estimates that between two censuses refugees improved their English skills by 11% relative to economic migrants, which supports the view of higher investments.

Connor (2010) uses a 2003 US survey which identifies refugees explicitly (first wave of the US New Immigrant Survey, which is a nationally representative sample of immigrants who obtained permanent residency in 2003). He estimates that there is no difference in employment probabilities between refugees and non-refugees, but the former are less likely to hold a skilled job and have much lower average wages, even conditional on years since immigration, educational attainment, knowledge of the English language, family structure, health, and neighborhood characteristics. The author, however, does not examine the evolution of the gap with years since immigration.

In a recent European study, Dustmann et al. (2017) analyze refugees’ labor market integration across EU countries, using data from the 2008 wave of the European Labor Force Survey (EULFS). Their findings show that refugees have larger employment gaps with respect to natives relative to economic migrants, and this is particularly true for refugees from North Africa, the Middle East, or other African and Asian countries. Although the employment probabilities of both refugees and economic immigrants increase with years in the country, the growth is far steeper for refugees, although this gap closes only after more than 15 years spent in the host country.

All these studies use either cross sectional data or repeated cross sections. They are therefore unable to distinguish between changes in economic outcomes of immigrants and refugees over time, and changes in the composition of migrant population, through e.g. return migration. This may not matter from the viewpoint of the receiving country, but of course it changes the interpretation of the findings.

Studies on refugee labor market integration in Scandinavian countries exploit the full richness of administrative longitudinal datasets spanning over several decades. They therefore avoid the issues we pointed out in the previous paragraph, and can control for compositional changes. Bratsberg et al (2014) construct lifecycle profiles of employment, earnings and social insurance use for all major immigrant cohorts who arrived in Norway. These include immigrants from Western Europe and labor migrants from Turkey and Pakistan arriving in the
1970s, migrants from Turkey and Pakistan who arrived through family reunification, multiple wages of refugees, and immigrants from Eastern Europe who arrived in 2004-2007 after EU expansion. When constructing long-term lifecycle profiles for these immigrants’ labor market outcomes, the authors retain immigrants who stayed in Norway for at least five years to reduce bias caused by selective out-migration. They find that conditional on individual characteristics such as age, human capital investments and family situation, refugees experience significant labor market assimilation in comparison to natives during the initial period after arrival. However, after 10–15 years in the country, employment and earnings gaps do not close any further and remain considerable. For instance, male refugees are 15-20 percentage points less likely to be employed and earn about 30 percent less compared to natives after 15 years since immigration. There is also considerable variation in assimilation between different refugee arrival cohorts: those from the last wave fare worse than from the first two. The authors do not explicitly compare performance of refugees to other immigrant groups, but their results imply that male refugees have similar employment and earnings gaps with natives as male labor and chain immigrants from Turkey and Pakistan, whereas female refugees from the first earlier refugee waves perform better than Turkish and Pakistani immigrants, especially than those who arrived through family reunification.

Luik et al. (2016), studying employment outcomes of immigrants in Sweden, obtain a similar result that refugees and family reunification migrants have almost the same employment gap with natives (they are less likely to be employed by 29 and 24 percentage points respectively), whereas the difference in employment rates between labor immigrants and natives is 10 percentage points.

Finally, Bevelander and Pendakur (2014) compare employment and earnings of refugees and family reunions from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia to Canada and Sweden. The employment rate of refugees is slightly higher than that of family reunions, by 2 percentage points for males and by 4-8 points for females depending on the type of asylum. Male refugee earn less than males immigrating for family reasons, whereas the opposite is found for females, with female refugees having significantly higher average earnings than female family reunions. The authors find that differences in employment and earnings between intake categories and countries of origin are smaller in Sweden. They explain this result by the same access to language and labor schooling available in Sweden for all non-economic immigrants, whereas in Canada such assistance is provided for refugees but not to family reunion immigrants. Low skilled immigrants to Sweden earn less than comparable immigrants to Canada. However, immigrants have higher returns to university degree in Sweden than in Canada, which the authors attribute to an easier process of credentials recognition in Sweden compared to Canada. The authors conclude that training offered to refugees has a levelling effect; without such training, immigrants’ labor market outcomes are worse, as in case of family reunion immigrants in Canada.

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19 Out-migration is nevertheless discussed in the final section of the paper, with evidence of both positive and negative selection in the return migration.
Bach et al. (2017) come to similar conclusions: based on a simulation model, and data on previous migrations to Germany, they conclude that training, in particular language training, would have large positive effects on the career paths of refugees who arrived in Germany in 2015.

5.3 Evidence from the 2014 EULFS wave

In this section, we present some evidence on the employment gaps between refugees and natives using the 2014 wave of the EU Labor Force Survey. This wave contains a so-called “ad hoc module” on labor market situation of migrants and their immediate descendants, with questions on the main reasons for the last migration, which allows identifying refugees. The core EU LFS questionnaire does not ask this information, so refugees cannot be identified in other waves of the EU LFS (with exception of 2008, which again contains a similar module).

We include in our sample individuals aged between 25 and 64 who are not in full-time education or military service. Immigration status is constructed based on information about the country of birth: a native is an individual who is born in the same EU member state where he or she currently lives, while an immigrant is an individual born outside the current country of residence. In our analysis, we include only economic immigrants who report that they came to the current country of residence for employment, either with or without job offer, and refugees, who indicate international protection or asylum as the main reason for immigration. We exclude immigrants who came for family reasons or study. We drop observations with missing values in the basic demographic characteristics such as gender, age and education, and missing labor market status according to the ILO definition. We lose 0.2% of the total observations, or 0.7% of the observations on refugees (15 individuals out of 2142).

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of natives and immigrant groups. The figures in the table show that males are overrepresented among migrants. Refugees are, on average, slightly older than natives and older than economic migrants, although they were slightly younger at arrival. They are better educated than economic migrants from non-EU countries and have the same probability of having a tertiary degree as natives.

Table 1: Demographic characteristics of immigrant groups in the EULFS 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigration status</th>
<th>Refugee</th>
<th>Non EU28</th>
<th>EU28</th>
<th>Native</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of males</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean age</td>
<td>45.20</td>
<td>42.77</td>
<td>40.69</td>
<td>44.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean age at arrival</td>
<td>28.22</td>
<td>28.30</td>
<td>28.91</td>
<td>29.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share with lower secondary education</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share with upper secondary education</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share with tertiary education</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>2127</td>
<td>10336</td>
<td>8362</td>
<td>486306</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The table compares socio-economic characteristics of refugee migrants, economic migrants from EU28 and non-EU28 countries, and natives, in the following host countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, and United Kingdom. The sample

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20 The main inflow of refugees in the latest crisis happened in 2015 after the survey was conducted. In our sample, about 10% of refugees reside in the country for less than 5 years.
includes individuals aged between 25 and 64, not in education or military service, with information on gender, age, education, and labor market status. 
Source: EULFS 2014

Figure 5 compares the employment gap between economic migrants from EU-28 and non-EU countries and natives, and between refugees and natives, both unconditional, and conditional on gender, age and education. Refugees are much less likely to be employed compared to natives (by 18% percentage points), which is in stark contrast to economic migrants both from EU-28 and from outside the EU who have about the same probability to be employed as natives.

Note. The figure shows the unconditional and conditional differences in employment probabilities between EU28 and non-EU28 economic immigrants and natives, as well as between refugees and natives obtained using linear probability models. All regressions include host country fixed effects. Conditional employment gaps control for gender, age (dummy variables for 5-year age groups) and education (dummy variables for lower secondary and tertiary education with the reference category being upper secondary education). The sample includes all individuals aged between 25 and 64 not in full-time education or military service, with information on gender, age, education, and labor market status. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EULFS 2014 data.

Figure 6 plots the employment gap between economic migrants and natives and between refugees and natives, conditional on gender, age and education, by region of origin. Employment gaps between refugees and natives vary substantially across different source regions, from 13.8 percentage points for refugees coming from East and South Asia, 30.0 percentage points for refugees from North Africa and Near and Middle East and 20.8 percentage points for refugees from the rest of Africa.

21 Unconditional employment gap is calculated as the difference in the shares of employed among natives and among immigrants, without taking into consideration that natives and immigrants might have different characteristics impacting the probability of employment (such as gender or age). Employment gap conditional on gender, age and education is the estimated difference in the probability of employment between an immigrant and a comparable native, who is of the same gender, age and education.
Note. The figure displays the differences in employment probabilities between economic immigrants and natives and between refugees and natives by area of origin obtained using linear probability models estimated separately for each origin area. The regressions control for gender, age (dummy variables for 5-year age groups), education (dummy variables for lower secondary and tertiary education), and host country fixed effects. The sample includes all individuals aged between 25 and 64 not in full-time education or military service, with information on gender, age, education, and labor market status. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EULFS 2014.

In Figure 7, the employment gap is reported as a function of years since arrival. Recent refugees are much less likely to be employed than natives (by almost 40 percentage points), and the gap narrows with the time spent in the country (to 7 percentage points). On the contrary, in the beginning of their stay economic migrants are more likely to be employed than natives, by about 5 percentage points. After 10 years in the country, there is no difference in employment probabilities between natives and economic immigrants.
lower secondary and tertiary education with the reference to upper secondary education), and host country fixed effects. The sample includes individuals aged between 25 and 64 not in full-time education or military service, with information on gender, age, education, and labor market status. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EULFS 2014.

5.4 Policies that favor/deter integration
Host countries can facilitate the integration of refugees through the design of appropriate policies. Not only, as we discussed above, the overall asylum policy framework matters for integration, but policies specifically designed to help immigrants to settle in the destination country have long been common in Nordic countries, where most immigrants have historically been refugees (see e.g. Andersson Joona and Nekby, 2012). Evidence on the effectiveness of such policies, that typically provide a mixture of language courses and labor market specific training, is scant, especially since many studies do not explicitly focus on the identification of causal links (Rinne, 2013, provides a review of the challenges faced in evaluating migrant integration policies.) We review below some of the results of the effectiveness of policies for refugees’ integration.

5.4.1 Settlement policies
In some countries, refugees are not allowed to freely choose their place of residence. Instead, they are allocated across a country’s regions by a government agency. This is primarily done to prevent ethnic enclaves and relieve the burden from particularly popular regions (mainly large cities). Edin et al (2004) evaluate the effect of introduction of a settlement program in Sweden, which required refugees who have received residency to remain in assigned regions for the introductory period of 18 months. As a result, assigned refugees were more likely to be non-employed, had lower earnings and claimed more welfare benefits than refugees who arrived before implementation of the random allocation policy and who could choose where to settle. The authors explain this finding by poor employment prospects in the assigned regions and by increased reliance on income support under the settlement policy. When assigned refugees relocated to urban areas, they improved their labor market performance.

5.4.2 Introduction programs/Language courses
Some countries, like Sweden, have offered newly arrived immigrants and refugees introduction programs since the late 1960s. Introduction programs typically aim to provide immigrants with skills helping both their economic and social integration. To this end, such programs provide a mixture of language training, job-search courses, subsidized employment and validation of pre-immigration education and work experience, but often also information about the norms, values, history and cultural traditions of the host country. Given the heterogeneity of integration programs in terms of organization, length, enrolment criteria, etc., it is difficult to draw generalizable inference from the evaluation of specific case studies.

Few studies estimate the impact of offering language courses per se. Hayfron (2001) aims at estimating the impact of language training on language proficiency and earnings of immigrants from Morocco, Pakistan and Chile in Norway. He finds that participation in language training programs increases the likelihood that an immigrant will acquire proficient speaking and reading skills in the Norwegian language, but has no effect on earnings. This study has, however, several serious flaws in design such as low response rates to the survey
administered to immigrants, so that its results should be evaluated with caution. Clausen et al. (2009) show that for participants in language courses, improvement in language proficiency has substantial positive effects on the probability of finding a job. Again, one should be cautious to interpret the results of this study causally. Nevertheless, proficiency in host country language is shown to be importantly associated with labor market performance. Hangartner and Schmidt (2016) use a quasi-random refugee allocation policy across Swiss cantons coupled with the existence of a sharp language border dividing German and French-speaking to estimate the causal impact of proficiency in the language of the host region. They find that French-speaking African asylum seekers have an 80 percent higher probability of finding a job in the first year after arrival compared to otherwise similar English-speaking asylum seekers when allocated to a French-speaking canton; moreover, this effect is persistent for at least the first five years upon arrival.

5.4.3 Active labor market programs
For Sweden, Andersson Joona and Nekby (2012) show that the provision of more intensive counselling and coaching (in terms of time that caseworkers could devote to each immigrant) to newly arrived refugees coupled with part-time language training successfully increased employment probabilities by 43% (or 6 percentage points relative to the mean employment probability). Further, the authors establish an increased probability of being enrolled in other intermediary labor-market training programs one year after the end of the introductory program, an effect that still persisted 22–30 months after registration to the program. Åslund and Johansson (2011) evaluate another Swedish labor market policy targeting disadvantaged immigrants who are deemed “ready to work” (having sufficient Swedish language skills, not being in need of any type of rehabilitation and being willing to commute or relocate if necessary) but are likely to have difficulties of finding a job and, as a consequence, become long-term unemployed. The main benefit of the program in practice was again that caseworkers had considerably more time with program participants. The results show increased transitions from unemployment to work experience schemes and improved future employment probabilities for those who entered these schemes. Sarvimäki and Hämäläinen (2016) evaluate a similar policy intervention for Finland: nonworking recent immigrants to Finland were given more personalized attention from caseworkers, without changing the type of ALMPs offered to program participants. In particular, caseworkers, supported by interpreters, had to ensure that immigrants had fully understood their personalized plans of actions adapted to their background and circumstances. According to these personalized plans, program participants increased time spent in language courses and other training specifically designed to immigrants and reduced time spent in general job-seeking courses. The overall number of days in training stayed the same as before. As a result, cumulative earnings of compliers increased by 47% over the ten years following participation in the program, whereas social benefits paid to them decreased by 13%. These three studies demonstrate therefore that support programs that help immigrants to navigate the system can have large positive effects on their labor market performance.

Clausen et al. (2009) evaluate the impact of a number of labor market policies proposed by Danish municipalities to newly arrived refugees and their families on transitions to employment. Their results indicate that new immigrants are less likely to work while participating in most active labor market programs; only subsidized employment was effective in increasing the likelihood of employment. However, non-western immigrants who have been living in Denmark for several years and who receive social assistance have more chances to find employment both while participating in, and after completing labor market programs, compared to comparable immigrants who received no training (Heinesen et al, 2013).

Thomsen et al (2013) evaluate the effects of four types of short-term training on the probability of finding employment for welfare benefits recipients in Germany. They find that participation in tests of aptitude for specific occupations and skill provision early on during unemployment spells facilitates transition to employment.

Cohen-Goldner and Eckstein (2010) use a dynamic discrete choice model of training and employment to evaluate the impact of training offered to newly arrived immigrants to Israel for a sample of highly-skilled female immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Estimation of a structural model allow the authors to estimate whether participation in a training program increases the number of job offers the immigrant receives or whether they increase immigrants’ productivity. The authors find that both phenomena take place: The probability of an unemployed immigrant with no work experience receiving a job offer in a white-collar occupation in the quarter subsequent to training is 5.6 times higher than the probability of an immigrant who did not attend training, and 3.4 times higher in a blue-collar occupation. The effect persists in later quarters. Training also increases the mean offer wage in white-collar occupations, which increases by 19%, but not in blue-collar occupations. The authors note that the training offered is relatively more intensive than training offered in Western countries.

5.5 Ability of country labor markets to absorb refugees

A common assumption about labor market participation of immigrants and refugees is that their labor market activity is a matter of choice, and that low participation rates are due to disincentives. This has led to labor market reforms in many countries that are aimed at incentivizing the labor force participation of refugees. One such reform for Denmark is analyzed in detail by Andersen, Dustmann and Landerso (2017). These authors suggest an interesting hypothesis: They show that demand constraints are likely to inhibit labor force participation of refugees in Denmark. They argue that the Danish labor market, with high minimum wages, and production technologies that have basically eliminated the need for workers at very low levels of productivity, is not able to absorb very unskilled workers, who – in the case of refugees – are also not able to speak the Danish language, as their productivity is likely to be below the minimum wage.

This observation raises an important question in the context of refugee migration. While economic migrants are selecting themselves into labor markets where their skills are employable, this may often not be the case for refugees. They may therefore end up in a country where they are simply unemployable, given the lack of skills. Thus, different countries may be in a different position to absorb refugees or very unskilled immigrants, dependent on
the structure of their labor markets. Following this hypothesis, one would expect refugees to be more likely to be employed in countries with a large shadow economy, where work is available for low productivity individuals at low wages.

We investigate this further in Figure 8, which plots employment gaps between natives and refugees who have stayed in the host countries for more than five years against the size of the shadow economy in these countries. Employment gaps are estimated conditional on gender, age and education by linear probability models run separately for each country with sufficient number of observations on refugees. Information on the size of the shadow economy is taken from Hassan and Schneider (2016). The figure plots the fitted line from a regression of estimated employment gaps on the size of shadow economy (dashed line). The figure indicates that the larger is the shadow economy in the host country, the smaller is the employment gap between natives and refugees. The figure also plots the fitted line from a regression of employment gaps between natives and all refugees regardless of their length of stay on the size of shadow economy (solid line).

Figure 8: Employment gap between refugees and natives and the size of the shadow economy

Note: Dashed line is the fitted line obtained from the regression of the employment gaps between natives and refugees residing in the country for more than 5 years on the size of the shadow economy; Solid line is the fitted line obtained from the regression of the employment gaps between natives and all refugees regardless of the length of stay on the size of the shadow economy

23 Which is very low (30-100sh)
5.6 Earnings and Career Decisions – Summary

- A fast and smooth labor market integration of immigrants reduces their welfare dependency, maximizes their economic contribution and likely facilitates social integration.
- The acquisition of key host-country specific skills, like language, are important in determining the speed and extent of refugees’ labor market integration. These skills should be acquired as soon as possible after receiving residency, to ensure the longest possible period over which they are useful.
- Expectations about the duration of residence in the host country are a crucial determinant of immigrants’ incentives to invest in country-specific skills, like language. The shorter is the expected duration of the migration spell, the lower is the incentive to invest into this type of skills, whose productivity is lower abroad. Uncertainty about migration durations may lead to sub-optimal investments in such skills, resulting in less economic integration.
- Empirical studies show that a longer waiting time for a decision on the outcome of asylum applications reduces refugees’ employment prospects, and may also adversely affect their mental health. Consistently with the theory, refugees who are given permanent permits have better labor market outcomes than those who obtain only temporary visas.
- Refugees have in general worse labor market outcomes than economically motivated migrants. This happens because they may have not chosen their destination country, and thus not have invested in country-specific skills before migration. Additionally, they have often experienced traumatic circumstances that harm their labor market skills and employability. The empirical evidence suggests that gaps in labor market performance between refugees and other types of migrant tend to narrow over time.
- Considering data for European countries in 2014, refugees are far less likely to be employed compared to natives (by about 18% percentage points) and to economic migrants. This is the case also when refugees are compared to natives with a similar gender, age and education profile. The employment gap between refugees and natives varies substantially across different source regions, with refugees from North Africa and the Near and Middle East exhibiting the largest disadvantage.
- The available evidence indicates that introduction programs that provide language training and help refugees to become acquainted with the new institutional setting can have large positive effects on their labor market performance.
- The ability of the host country to absorb an inflow of unskilled refugees depends also on the characteristics of its labor markets. Countries with highly institutionalized labor markets and high minimum wages that require high levels of productivity may have more difficulties in absorbing refugees with very low productivity. Conversely, countries with less institutionalized labor markets and larger shadow economies can more easily absorb low productivity individuals.

6. Conclusions

This report provides a review of the impact forced or refugee migrations have on the economies of receiving countries. Four main areas are investigated: the labor market effects, the fiscal consequences, the selection of migrants and their destination choices, and the
career profiles of migrants. Emphasis is on studies that investigate each of these areas for refugee migrants.

Obviously, all these four areas interact. For instance, the better educated migrants are upon arrival, the likely larger are their economic contributions, and therefore their next fiscal contributions. Also, what type of immigrants arrive (e.g. skilled or unskilled) determines the economic effects immigration will have on the labor market. Further, the higher investments of immigrants are into their skills at the start of their migration history, the higher will be their net fiscal contribution. Finally, the changes in economic position of migrants over time spent in the host country may lead to differential labor market effects across the migration history.

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Forced Displacement and Livelihoods: Rebuilding Lives and Livelihoods

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June 2019

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Introduction

The concept and modalities of refugee integration occupy a central space in forced migration research and policy engagement.\(^{24}\) Understanding the pathways to effective and successful integration is highly relevant to policy-makers and receiving communities, and research can provide valuable insights into such understanding. Increasing numbers of refugees and other forced migrants and their protracted displacement, combined with rising security anxieties attached to migration, reinforce the relevance and significance of such knowledge. Although recognised as a multi-faceted process, neither the concept nor the modalities of integration are clear-cut or agreed, despite the attention it has received from researchers and policy-makers alike.

1.1 Research and policy context

For social science researchers interested in the way social structures and processes evolve and adapt, refugee integration has been an enduring analytical concern. Located within the wider context of migrant integration, the scope of this work has been remarkably wide-ranging. Among the principal themes, academic research has investigated: how social and economic factors mediate the processes of integration; the role of social networks and social capital; gender and inter-generational dimensions; the temporal dimensions of integration; the spatialities of integration – community, neighbourhood or national scales; social exclusion and marginality as the antithesis of integration; representations, perceptions and constructions of the ‘other’; the metrics of integration; and of course the role of public and welfare policy in facilitating (or limiting) integration.

From a policy perspective, integration is usually regarded as the desired outcome for refugees themselves, especially for resettled refugees and for spontaneous arrivals who receive refugee status in the global North. For these populations, integration is also seen as the fulfilment of policy objectives. Accordingly, guidelines, resources and proactive instruments seek to promote integration. Although diverse but context-specific, they tend to focus on the acquisition of skills and competences, for example in language and employment, and the removal of social and welfare inequalities, for example in access to housing, education and welfare entitlements.

For refugees who remain in the major host countries, the policy of local integration has been advocated, over many decades, as one of the three durable solutions to displacement, although the modalities by which this might be promoted are diffuse and imprecise. Moreover, under conditions of protracted displacement integration tends to take place incrementally irrespective of the policy environment. In reality, many countries hosting large numbers of refugees have prevented or resisted the process of refugee integration. For these low- and middle-income countries, large-scale refugee populations place substantial additional pressure on already stressed public services, as well as housing and labour markets. Under contemporary conditions of escalating numbers of refugees and their protracted displacement, host countries are increasingly resistant to local integration.

\(^{24}\) Note that this paper only deals with integration in the context of refugee-receiving countries/host communities. It does not deal with the re-integration of refugees on their return to their countries of origin, for which there is an overlapping and parallel research and policy discourse.
As this introduction makes clear, integration is a widely used term but, given the lack of conceptual and operational clarity around it, it is poorly defined. Ironically, as Ager and Strang point out (2004), much successful integration is invisible rather than the outcome of proactive policies; by definition, this makes it difficult for researchers and policy-makers to determine causality. Conversely, it is the non-integration of immigrants such as refugees, and understanding why this occurs, that tends to attract the attention of both researchers and policy-makers. Moreover, which indicators one uses inevitably influences how one defines integration and vice-versa (e.g. Castles et al., 2015): the issue of metrics is discussed in a subsequent section. In short, much of our understanding of what integration is and how it might be facilitated by policy interventions lacks a clear and agreed evidence base.

Box 1: Refugees, forcibly displaced people and voluntary migrants
Since the concept of refugee integration and policies to facilitate it are often cast within the wider context of migrant integration as a whole, it is important to emphasise three distinctive characteristics at the outset (Sigona, 2005: 118–19). First, voluntary migrants tend to plan their migration, enter the country by regular means and may have resources to support them: by contrast, refugees and other forced migrants, except those who are resettled, generally flee without a planned destination, and have few or no resources, although they may have skills. Second, the legal and institutional regimes that determine the boundaries of integration, rights and entitlements to key resources that determine the scope of integration (such as the right to work and access to social housing) demarcate refugees from voluntary migrants more generally, but also demarcate the wider category of forcibly displaced people from both refugees and voluntary migrants. These factors determine how integration takes place. Third, and more specifically, distinctive immigration and asylum procedures, the process of refugee status determination and the uncertainty of the outcomes vis-à-vis the right to remain differ between refugees, forcibly displaced people and voluntary migrants. These conditions further mediate the different scope and process of integration between these categories.

1.2 Overview of the paper
The paper proceeds as follows. Following this introduction, Part 2 scopes out the policy-making challenges in conceptualising refugee inclusion and integration, followed by a discussion of the historical and political embeddedness of the problematic. Part 3 offers a more systematic and structured approach to defining integration by exploring four critical domains which underpin the process: legal, governance, functional and social. Economic inclusion in the context of employment and livelihoods is discussed (Part 4) because of the overriding policy attention currently being given to refugees’ access to employment by international actors and donors. The final section (Part 5) reviews some of the ways refugee integration might be measured, and some of the methodological and analytical challenges involved.

There are two important riders to this paper. First, while integration is the most widely used of many similar terms to describe the process of refugee settlement, and is used
as a short-hand term in this paper, the paper proposes the terms inclusion and rebuilding lives and livelihoods (after forced displacement) as a less politically charged definition of integration. Second, while the paper focuses on refugees, in the context of the World Commission’s aim to expand the scope of rights and protection of other groups of forcibly displaced people, many of the processes, pathways and modalities of inclusion and integration apply to diverse groups of forcibly displaced people, not just refugees in the Convention definition.

2 Conceptualising refugee integration: the ‘state of the art’

As Ager and Strang (2004; 2008) point out, in a seminal contribution, a central problem for academics, policy-makers and practitioners has been the differing definitions of integration between academic, technical and policy contexts, and also in public debate. Inevitably, the meaning varies from country to country since, as noted above, integration reflects the interests and values of the receiving country, and not least the aspirations of refugees themselves. Symptomatic of this definitional problem is the different vocabulary used to describe and define the phenomenon: alongside integration, words such as social cohesion, inclusion, incorporation and assimilation have been used both as synonyms but also to provide a more, or differently, nuanced account of the process. Not only do sociologists, anthropologists and economists use these terms differently, policy-makers too use different terms and metrics to define their objectives and assess outcomes. In this regard there are important distinctions between countries that accept resettled refugees or deal with limited numbers of spontaneous arrivals – essentially in the global north – compared with countries experiencing large-scale refugee arrivals, where the concept of integration and the policy environment for integration, as we have seen, is much more muted.

2.1 Integration: historical and political embeddedness

However, refugee integration is defined, it is not value-free but the outcome of structural factors: refugee integration is a historically embedded process and inextricably bound up with the political discourse on immigration. It is the product of contrasting ways in which individual states have come to define and individualise their understanding of membership, modes of inclusion, how the ‘other’ is perceived, welcomed or rejected, and how these processes come to legitimise national identity (Hansen and Koehler, 2005). This has critical implications for refugees themselves and the agency they use to integrate. Integration is, therefore, always contextual and frequently contested.

Castles (2003; 2015) reinforces these arguments, differentiating the varying characteristics of migrant incorporation with respect to historical processes of state formation and how these affect different forms of citizenship and perceptions of national identity and belonging. Castles highlights the distinction between ‘assimilationist’ states (France, Sweden, Australia and the United States, for example); ‘partial inclusion’ based on differential rights (Germany might fit this typology); and a ‘pluralistic’ model (exemplified by the ‘multiculturalism’ of the UK and the Netherlands), where refugees can become functioning citizens while maintaining distinctive aspects of their cultural identity. But this is not a one-way process because
the dynamics imparted by earlier and contemporary experiences of immigration, including refugees, also influence how states conceive their identity.

The political context further embeds our understanding of integration. In the past, much of the political discourse on refugee integration in countries in the global North reflected wider debates about migrant communities as a whole, including refugees: multiculturalism and community relations, socio-economic exclusion and marginalisation and integration were dominant themes (Zetter, 2000; 2003; 2005a, b, c; 2006). The issue of integration is now located in a highly politicised discourse on national identities, sovereignty and securitisation, at least in Europe and the global North (Zetter, 2014). In this new conjuncture, refugees and asylum-seekers may be perceived as potential threats to ‘national identities’, and their integration is less actively or overtly promoted. Irrespective of the political discourse, public resources to facilitate integration have been progressively reduced. As Geddes summarises, ‘the vocabulary of integration becomes heavily imprinted with historical, political and social processes associated with the nation state and national self-understanding’ (2003: 23).

In the global South, where the vast majority of refugees are, integration is no less ‘imprinted’ with the same processes of nation-state identity and national self-understanding, although for many countries state formation is a relatively recent, largely post-colonial process. However, the context within which refugee settlement and integration take place – large-scale not small numbers, spontaneous not managed resettlement, sometimes in co-ethnic and co-religious not contrasting cultures, assumed temporariness not permanency, legal and normative rights that are often restricted rather than fully recognised – imparts different modalities and dynamics to the process, which this paper elaborates below.

That local integration in these countries occurs largely spontaneously, without the proactive policy direction typical of rich resettlement countries, results in varied models of integration. Rather than one dominant tendency, these countries may simultaneously display all three of Castles’ models – ‘assimilationist’, ‘partial inclusion’ and ‘pluralistic’ – as refugee populations gradually settle and interact with local populations.

2.2 Integration norms: summarising the state of the art
That the word integration is often laden with politically negative connotations suggests that more neutral terms to capture the processes being described might have more traction. For the purposes of this paper, a starting point is to use the UN Development Programme (UNDP)’s definition of social cohesion as: ‘A general condition of stable coexistence within communities, when IDPs, refugees, and host community members accept socio-ethnic differences, have equitable access to livelihoods and other community resources, and feel safe and secure in their homes’. In essence, what this definition describes is a process of rebuilding lives and livelihoods by inclusion in new settings after forced displacement.
Building on this definition, we can elaborate a wider understanding by summarising the ‘state of the art’ of refugee integration along the lines of the following norms. First, an overarching, and non-judgemental, view of integration recognises it as an interactive process where host and refugee communities are able to co-exist and share the same resources, and where refugees become accepted into society with no greater mutual conflict than that which might already exist between different constituencies within the receiving community (Kuhlman, 1991: 3). This conclusion is valuable not least because it is not context-specific (global North or South) and makes no presumptions about policy instruments, the requirements of the receiving society and identities of the ‘other’.

Second, and reinforcing this norm, integration is often posited as a two-way process of host society/community and refugee interactions. While this is a plausible and seemingly benign interpretation implying that there are two homogeneous equal actors, self-evidently the process involves an unequal partnership since many institutions, agencies, policies, laws and local initiatives are responsible for mobilising integration from the point of view of the receiving country, and the receiving society has embedded historical and political structures and identities which condition perspectives on refugees. These imbalances all influence reactions to newcomers and, inevitably, the outcome of a process in which there is a tendency to take the ‘majority’ culture as the norm and define refugee identity as the ‘other’. One could conclude that integration is something that is ‘done’ to refugees through the apparatus of the receiving state and community, rather than a mutually interactive process.

Third, an assimilationist tendency characterises many definitions of integration. An enduring challenge is to understand the extent to which refugees retain a measure of their original cultural identity and social norms, while also becoming part of the host society (Kuhlman, 1991: 4). Some accounts imply that integration is a process by which refugees (and immigrants) become a working part of the receiving society, including adopting the attitudes and behaviour patterns of the receiving country and participating in socio-economic activities without any differentiation. This seems unrealistic.

Fourth, sociological literature predicates the concept of integration as a negotiated process between migrants and hosts, thereby offering a more nuanced and informed definition. This emphasises integration as a more balanced two-way process than that outlined above, involving refugees, with their characteristics, efforts and adaptations, and the receiving society, with its interactions with these newcomers and their institutions. It is the interaction between the two, and how differences and similarities are ‘negotiated’, rather than simply transferred, that determines the direction and ultimate outcome of the integration process.

Fifth, and related, most definitions recognise that integration is a multi-faceted process that occurs at many levels. Again, the sociological literature underpins this more complex and nuanced interpretation of the meaning and modalities of integration as a ‘holistic’ process, which includes functional and instrumental markers such as legal, institutional and citizenship rights, as well as language and skills,
alongside markers such as social and cultural participation, expressions of social and cultural identity and interactions with the receiving society.

Sixth, refugee integration is a heterogeneous process. It is important to recognise it as both an individual and a collective process, and also a process that differs between different refugee populations. Often, the metrics of integration, such as housing, employment, education and social and cultural adaptation to the new society, tend to aggregate the distinctions between these analytical conditions. But there are obvious individual variations, conditioned by variables such as demography, gender, mode and time of arrival and duration of residence. Moreover, integration as an individual experience mirrors the social and class differentiations and socio-economic subcultures of the receiving society. Likewise, integration at the individual level differs from the collective level, where refugee organisations may provide a different perspective on the ambitions and mechanisms of integration, and the resources mobilised to that end. There is substantial evidence that the propensity to integrate may differ substantially between different ethnic groups from the same country of origin, and certainly that it varies enormously between refugee populations from different countries of origin. This points to the contingency of factors such as reception mechanisms, social capital, size of the population and levels of dispersal and secondary migration.

Seventh, these perspectives point to the fundamental importance of the agency of refugees (their different characteristics and capacities for adaptation to the receiving society), their social capital and their community organisations and structures in mediating both the meaning and the process of integration. Refugee agency has many facets and presents in many ways – sometimes buttressing and underpinning the identity, values and markers of the receiving society, sometimes in tension, by seeking to express or assert cultural or social norms that appear to challenge the receiving state. Research shows how the agency of refugees in relation to the process and extent of integration is mediated, inter alia, by their mode of exile and then entry and reception in a host country, and their psychological attitudes to acculturation within the receiving community (Berry, 1997; Richmond, 1994).

Eighth, integration is a process not an end state, which the terminology of ‘durable solutions’ implies. The end state has an obvious rationality for policy-makers. It is often demarcated by legal metrics such as permanent residence, or obtaining full legal rights or citizenship in the receiving country. More complex measures suggest that integration is reached when refugees are judged to have achieved the prevailing levels of socio-economic wellbeing in the receiving society: but of course social wellbeing is a very malleable phenomenon. Setting aside the methodological challenges in providing this evidence, an end-state view denies the reality that, just as receiving societies undergo continuous change, this is even more the case for individual refugees and their communities, where adaptation of socio-economic characteristics and values, and integration with the norms and cultural markers of the receiving society, is a constant process. For example, inter-generational identity as a refugee (and indeed a migrant) with a distinct heritage is a well-documented research finding in relation to the extent of integration. A more nuanced understanding of integration
problematises the notion of a clear end state, recognizing that it will differ for each refugee, and that even settled refugees (individuals, households and communities) are not static but under a constant process of change and adaptation (da Costa, 2006).

3 Promoting refugee integration: delineating the components of refugee integration

There is agreement that integration can be conceptualised as a multi-dimensional process. However, defining the process does not account for the structural framework, in other words the policy environment and role of the policy apparatus within which integration takes place. Building on the findings of the previous section, this part of the paper expands this conceptualisation by developing a systematic and comprehensive typology of factors – termed ‘structural domains’ – which mediate the process of integration. This approach constitutes the basis for establishing the indicators and metrics by which refugee integration can be demarcated (discussed in a later part of the paper), while more generally offering further insights into the process of integration.

Research by Zetter et al. (2002) and Ager and Strang (2004; 2008) has attempted to provide such a framework. Zetter et al. (2002) identify four main clusters or structural domains, built around key policy variables, which constrain and facilitate (often simultaneously) the process of integration. These are the legal, governance, functional and social domains. Broadly speaking, the first two domains (legal and governance) define the contours of integration from the perspective of the receiving country – what are sometimes described as the corporatist modes of inclusion (e.g. Soysal, 1994; Penninx, 1999; 2000; 2003) – while the latter two are more characteristically ‘soft policy’ domains (functional and social), and give more emphasis to what refugees themselves bring to the process and the experience. However, the clusters are not rigid demarcations, and the interaction between them is often key. Clearly, these domains differ significantly in terms of their impact on refugees and wider categories of forcibly displaced people, and between rich countries and mass-impacted countries.

3.1 The legal domain

The legal domain refers to different models of membership conditioned by legal entitlements such as refugee status, the right to work, residency, civil and political rights and ultimately the processes and instruments of nationality and citizenship. Relevant indicators might include the different stages of the reception process, from asylum-seeker to refugee and ultimately citizen, and thus the differential access to social, economic and welfare rights and the time period involved in this legal process of integration. A key element here is the accessibility and transparency of these legal processes. For forced migrants who do not have an obvious legal pathway to the entitlements of asylum-seekers or refugees, the legal domain constitutes a major barrier to integration.

Integration is defined in terms of juridical instruments which demarcate entitlements and rights that embody national policies of membership and belonging. Different regimes emphasise different ‘channels of mobilisation’, and in particular the
acquisition of rights (legal and political, socio-economic and cultural and religious). They have significant impacts on promoting integration and the extent to which integration is achieved. For example, different paradigms of rights (and ultimately citizenship) are deeply rooted in the particular histories of individual states and norms of belonging. The assimilationist stance of France contrasts, as we have seen, with what is perceived to be a multicultural mode of citizenship in countries like the UK and the Netherlands. Equally, the malleability of these instruments, for example in relation to deterrent and restrictive policies through the withdrawal of rights, impacts the process of integration. While legal conferment of rights is not, per se, a definitive pillar for the integration process, it is invariably a necessary if not sufficient condition.

In the legal domain the ‘politics of integration’ are writ large. In this context, of great significance is the distinction between the legal domains of countries in the global North resettling refugees or receiving spontaneously arriving refugees, and countries of mass refugee entry in regions of conflict and large-scale forced displacement. In the former case, the legal domain (entitlements, residency, civil and political rights and ultimately citizenship) is recognised and promoted (although increasingly circumscribed) as a key element in the process of refugee integration. Conversely, countries hosting large refugee populations generally resist promoting the legal domain, particularly under conditions of protracted displacement: they deny or withhold rights such as the right to work or own property, or more fundamental legal provisions such as refugee status and nationality. In this way, although integration may progressively and informally take place in terms of the social and functional domains (see below), the security and stability of integration underpinned by formal rights-based entitlements for the refugee is denied.

3.2 The governance domain
The governance domain comprises the administrative and organisational structures and platforms that define the policy environment, and which facilitate the implementation of integration strategies. Many public administration and civil society stakeholders play a crucial role in promoting and mediating integration. This emphasises the need to understand how different strategies are developed and coordinated, and how these impact on the integration of refugees. It is important here to understand the role of the different stakeholders involved in the process, the distribution and articulation of power at different administrative levels and the resources and responsibilities between them and how this is coordinated. Opposing traditions of institutional and political organisation are also relevant: the degree of centralisation, federalism and municipal autonomy, and the presence of the voluntary networks, associations and civil society organisations (CSOs) that are instrumental in influencing how integration is mobilised and how refugees can access the apparatus of integration. Settlement and dispersal strategies and support structures – community relations strategies, integration support for refugees such as signposting, familiarisation – are all part of the governance domain.

In refugee resettlement countries and for spontaneously arriving refugees in the global North, the governance domain is generally well-developed. Even so, austerity policies have reduced the resources available to both public and civil society actors,
and the securitisation of migration places a more marked emphasis on how refugee integration is mobilised. Conversely, in countries hosting large refugee populations and other categories of forcibly displaced people, the ‘politics of integration’ mitigate against well-developed governance structures. These countries have neither the political will nor the public resources to support the governance of integration. In some refugee-hosting countries civil society organisations, particularly those developed within refugee communities themselves, may provide informal support, albeit pragmatic and ‘low-intensity’, for integration.

3.3 The functional domain

The functional domain describes the levels of social and economic participation of refugees in their host country. This is a dominant theme in the literature on refugee (and migrant) integration, and is especially attractive to policy-makers. The contention here is that successful integration depends on the acquisition of key competencies, such as language (functional literacy) and skills, and access to essential resources such as housing and employment. Politically less contentious and operationally more prescribed than issues of citizenship, governance and social identity (accessing civil society, political representation, cultural identity, social networks and social capital), functional integration has dominated policies for migrant, and by extension refugee, integration in resettlement and post-industrial countries.

All countries that promote integration place heavy emphasis on functional integration: that is, the extent to which refugees (and other migrants) achieve access to, or parity with, hosts in terms of labour market participation and uptake (including unemployment) and mobility – these factors are often cited as key variables in refugee integration or marginality; skills levels, training and development; levels of language proficiency and training; access to welfare benefits; levels of educational participation; and access to housing provision, including social and public housing. The objective here is to ascertain if refugees are represented in a range of key baseline socio-economic indicators proportional to the host population. Indicators such as these are very much in line with UNHCR’s approach to the measurement of integration, and they underpin many definitions of integration in terms of social and economic cohesion between hosts and migrants. An issue here is that these indicators tend to measure outcomes, but are less effective in assessing inputs and the barriers refugees confront in accessing the socio-economic fabric of the host country.

Again, there are significantly contrasting characteristics of the functional domain between resettlement countries and countries heavily impacted by large refugee and other forcibly displaced populations. The functional domain reflects the political positioning of host countries vis-à-vis integration. On the one hand, most host countries seek to limit rather than promote the functional domain, notably in terms of the development of skills that might lead to labour market access, concerned that this will underpin long-term settlement and thus the de facto integration of refugees. On the other hand, heavily impacted countries lack the resources to support functional provisions such as housing, healthcare and skills development. Notwithstanding these governments’ resistance to functional integration, international humanitarian (and increasingly development) actors, NGOs and donors
largely take on this role by, for example, promoting sustainable livelihood and social development programmes. These activities occupy a central space in the humanitarian regime. Increasingly, however, these countries insist that ‘functional’ assistance to refugees must go hand in hand with equal support for their own heavily impacted communities. These requirements take on added meaning in the context of the increasing attention paid to development-led responses to large-scale protracted refugee crisis.

The functional domain is further conditioned by the economic structure of mass-impacted countries. Given the limited capacity of their formal sectors, the highly developed informal sector – labour markets, land and shelter provision and so on – carry the main weight of refugee demand. Limiting functional integration inevitably encourages the expansion of the informal sector and sustains the marginalisation of refugees. Conversely, strategies and policies that support the economic and social integration of refugees are likely to underpin their long-term integration, which these countries usually wish to resist.

3.4 The social domain

The social domain – ethnicity, cultural identity, social networks and social capital – focuses on the extent to which refugees participate and connect with the majority community, and thus their level of social inclusion. It shifts the emphasis from public policy indicators and the role and impact of state organisation and specific social and economic interventions for the integration of refugees, to social processes and the participation of refugees in their host societies. Unlike the other three domains, refocusing the process and dynamics of integration on the agency of refugees themselves reveals this to be the domain where refugees have most ‘control’, and the mediating role of the host community and state apparatus has less traction. Even so, social participation is determined by the expectations and experiences, both of refugees, recognising that host society reaction also mediates these characteristics, and the host society.

In this domain, integration is reflected in the extent to which refugees are proactive participants in receiving societies, and the processes of membership, social participation and empowerment in the host society. Other elements might disclose how refugee groups perceive and exert their rights as members of the host community, or which appraise how refugees balance the retention of cultural identity with processes of social inclusion in the mainstream. At the same time, social networks and the social capital within refugee communities provide critical foundations for integration. The characteristics of the social domain of integration tend to be more flexible and adaptable, and thus less likely to display the sharp contrasts between host countries in the global North and mass-impact countries that have been described in the other domains. In summary, social compatibility and adaptability, alongside the retention of social and cultural markers within the refugee community, are significant features of inclusion and integration. In this sense, social inclusion cannot be explicitly ‘made’ by policy interventions, or indeed prevented, as is the case in the other domains.
The implications of the social domain of integration for policy-makers are significant. Much research reveals the informal, incremental and progressive nature of integration through the social domain and, to an extent, the selective ways in which refugees may integrate through social processes. Moreover, these social processes are least exposed to mediation by the host country. To this extent, host countries that seek to resist or limit integration may nevertheless find that it happens almost irrespective of, or despite, their attitudes and policies. But the outcomes will likely be fractional and incomplete. Equally, for countries seeking to promote integration, social processes may impart their own dynamic, which may or may not follow the trajectory and expectations that states set out in the other three domains.

4 Economic inclusion

The contemporary conditions of large-scale and protracted displacement of refugees and other forcibly displaced people constitute a significant developmental challenge for host countries, as well as for donors and international actors responding to refugee crises. This renders the economic inclusion of forcibly displaced people a pressing priority in order to reduce the negative impacts of economic exclusion, but also to capitalise on the potential development opportunities that they might provide. Moreover, the strong policy bias in many developed countries towards functional integration discussed above further propels policies for the economic integration of refugees through employment.

This section of the paper explores the specific challenges surrounding economic integration, while recognising that the interplay between the four structural domains noted above is critical to the overall success of refugee inclusion. For example, availability for employment and the ability to sustain employment is likely to be enhanced where refugees enjoy good health and housing conditions and their rights are clearly demarcated and protected. The analysis focuses on formal labour markets and employment. A recent KNOMAD study on the right to work for refugees (Zetter and Ruaudel, 2016) provides much background analysis on the way in which employment conditions mediate the potential for integration.

4.1 Economic inclusion: generic principles and policies

First, research and policy evidence, and the experience of refugees themselves, overwhelmingly points to the conclusion that employment is the key plank for the economic inclusion of refugees and, more generally, a critical factor in securing integration. Employment is pivotal to the process of settlement and integration (Phillimore and Goodson, 2007; Ager and Strang, 2004). Second, employment is central, not only as a ‘stand-alone’ instrument of integration – ensuring self-sufficiency, economic well-being and independence – but also the means to wider psychosocial aspirations, such as reclaiming dignity and identity, independence and agency. Third, employment underpins or reinforces other integrative objectives, such as stronger interaction with hosts, increasing opportunities for learning the host language, enhanced social inclusion and mobility. Encouraging refugee participation and advancement in the labour market also chimes with the objective of host
governments in advanced industrial countries to manage migration (including refugees) for the economic benefits it brings and the scope to fill skills gaps.

4.2 Dimensions of economic inclusion: facilitating, constraining and mediating variables

While refugee access to labour markets is most likely to be spontaneous and self-motivated, particularly in the informal labour markets of developing countries hosting large numbers of refugees, their participation is usually enhanced by a number of facilitating factors which are sometimes incorporated into national policy frameworks and models for refugee and migrant integration. Special Economic Zones in Jordan and Ethiopia and the Compacts for those countries, in which employment generation is seen as the turnkey, exemplify the importance of national and indeed international policy frameworks. Equally, there are structural and situational factors which may act as constraining variables or barriers to access. And finally there are wider mediating variables which delineate the contextual conditions within which employment and labour market access is determined. All three variables are subject to policy and operational interventions at different times and in different ways, particularly in more advanced economies where the economic (and social) inclusion of refugees tends to be more engaged. Nevertheless, the policy apparatus is rarely comprehensive, coordinated or sustained. Rather, it tends to be pragmatically conceived in response to specific political agendas, funding regimes or social pressures. The three-fold typology of facilitating, constraining and mediating variables is used here to elaborate the most significant factors determining access to employment as noted in the research literature.

4.2.1 Facilitating variables

Reception. In general, countries with well-developed and comprehensive reception policies and programmes for refugees can point to greater success in inclusion, including economic inclusion. These policies and programmes may include factors such as developing knowledge of host country culture, language proficiency, education and training and local work experience. Although not inevitably the case, this is more likely in countries that resettle quota refugees and in advanced economies than for spontaneously arriving refugees, where the reception process tends to be more fragmented.

Labour market access. Accessing formal labour markets can be a complex process, especially for refugees with skills and professional qualifications. Obtaining work permits and/or the right to work can be complex, time-consuming and often not transparent. Employers also may lack detailed knowledge of legal requirements. Refugees’ job search techniques may not be attuned to local conditions, and ‘acculturation’ into labour markets may facilitate access. Thus, signposting, counselling, mentoring and brokerage to help refugees access labour markets can support refugees’ economic inclusion.

The importance of work placement and work experience for refugees is widely acknowledged. However, where access programmes have developed, for example through local projects and schemes, these initiatives are often localised and
piecemeal. Refugees need assistance in identifying pathways and navigating the system, plus an awareness of the scope of initiatives designed to aid their integration into labour markets.

*Social capital.* Intermediaries and informal networks among kinship groups/co-ethnic/co-national refugees play a critical role in access to employment. Clustering around ethnic ‘enclaves’ in formal and informal economy activity is a characteristic phenomenon of refugee employment. These networks and information fields also play an important, but often under-recognised, role in expanding access to the wider labour market.

*Inclusion policies.* Evidence shows that tailored policies and programmes for refugee inclusion (including economic inclusion) are essential and can generate positive outcomes. These may form part of broader inclusion policies that may also extend to host communities, for example to foster community cohesion through host and refugee community and social development projects and activities. Usually, they comprise part of comprehensive resettlement programmes for quota refugees, but they may also be geared towards the economic inclusion of spontaneously arriving refugees, for example through language or skills development and work to overcome employer prejudice.

*Language proficiency.* A basic knowledge of the host country language and a willingness to improve language skills beyond functional literacy is crucial. Lack of language proficiency, as many research studies confirm, is most detrimental to labour market participation. Making language teaching available (usually on a part-time basis to avoid loss of earnings) with courses that are appropriate and relevant to the needs of refugees and employers can be highly supportive.

*Qualifications and skills.* The role of employers and regulatory bodies in skills mapping and the assessment and accreditation of professional qualifications and skills (including transferable skills) acquired by refugees in their countries of origin, and a willingness among refugees to develop and broaden their skills and competencies, all play a significant role in accessing employment. Qualification recognition services are essential (possibly including identification of further training needs) to support refugees in accessing labour markets and to prevent downward social mobility and under-employment in relation to refugees’ and qualifications. The skills and competencies refugees bring with them, and the mechanisms they use to strengthen these competencies through education and training and local work experience, are also critical.

*Training.* Training programmes to fill skills or professional gaps can play a vital role in facilitating access to the labour market. However, participation rates of refugees in training are generally low because of a lack of language skills, lack of knowledge of what is available and/or entitlements and childcare and other family commitments.
4.2.2 Constraining variables

The political economy of displacement. The vast majority of refugees and forcibly displaced people are in low-income and some middle-income countries. Unsurprisingly, these countries are reluctant to encourage the economic inclusion of large numbers of refugees, first because this places further stress on economies which already have to cope with enduring structural weaknesses, and more specifically because of the potential and actual negative effects on their labour markets. Beyond many of the technical and operational conditions reviewed in this section of the paper which facilitate or constrain the economic inclusion of refugees and other forcibly displaced people, the political economy of these countries constitutes a fundamental structural constraint.

Rights and status determination. Strict adherence to national legal provisions means that refugee employment is usually contingent on attaining full refugee status and often in addition a work permit/visa. Many countries, nevertheless, derogate the right to work under Articles 17–19 of the Refugee Convention. Moreover, institutional and administrative complexity often make it very difficult to obtain work permits (where these might be required in addition to refugee status), bank loans for business start-up, licences and so on. The involvement of many actors and agencies across central government, city councils, the private sector and voluntary bodies, and the lack of coordination between them, is a significant problem for refugees and others trying to find employment.

There is some evidence that the protracted process of full refugee status determination (RSD), during which most countries prevent asylum-seekers from working, can have a negative effect on refugees’ eventual access and integration into labour markets, for instance through the loss of skills and motivation or a reluctance among employers to take on long-term unemployed staff. Conversely, allowing asylum-seekers to work could produce fiscal savings by reducing the financial and material support needed during the application period. However, many governments believe that allowing asylum-seekers to work acts as an additional ‘pull’ factor attracting more asylum-seekers and economic migrants posing as refugees.

Dispersal. Most advanced economies that receive asylum-seekers and refugees now compulsorily disperse them as a condition of receiving public welfare assistance. Much of the research literature shows that dispersal has negative impacts on inclusion, when and if refugee status is achieved, because it fractures kinship and ethnic support networks and depletes social capital – undermining an important facilitator discussed above – and because economic conditions and employment opportunities are frequently more limited.

Recruitment and employer resistance. There is evidence that employers discriminate against refugees, although this may be part of a wider pattern of discrimination against ethnic minorities. Employers may also be reluctant to employ refugees because of confusion over their legal status, permission to work documentation and a fear of prosecution and heavy penalties for employing migrants without a legal entitlement to work. Employers’ lack of familiarity with refugees’ qualifications and
work experience are also significant deterrents to employment. Non-discriminatory recruitment practices are necessary to assist entry into employment.

**Exploitation and marginalisation.** There is substantial, although not easily quantifiable, evidence that refugees, like many migrants, are susceptible to exploitation in labour-intensive, low-wage sectors of the economy, and the non-observance of legal obligations relating to employment conditions. These constraints further marginalise refugees and thus inhibit integration. Language deficiency may limit migrants’ knowledge of their workplace rights and prevent them from seeking legal advice.

**Gender.** The differences in employment experiences between male and female refugees, and thus the scope for economic integration, tend to be considerable. Refugee women suffer greater work exclusion, in part because they may be dependent on their husband’s asylum claim and may have less contact with statutory agencies than men. Women tend to experience greater under-utilisation of their skills, and face greater challenges in accessing labour markets in host countries. While these outcomes are often a function of socio-cultural factors, such as the loss of informal family support or conventionally lower participation in waged employment, they are also determined by many of the structural factors outlined above. Conversely, for refugee women who are more settled or looking for less skilled work, ‘female’ skills may be more in demand in economies dominated by the service sector.

**Employment agencies.** State-run employment centres and advice services tend not to be attuned to refugees’ needs because they undervalue professional qualifications and push refugees into semi- and unskilled work. Consequently, the take-up and knowledge of these services tends to be low. Mainstream employment services are more likely to be used by refugees who have been in the country for longer, and who have a better command of the majority language.

### 4.2.3 Mediating variables

There are contextual variables which, while not directly facilitating access to employment, determine wider labour market conditions and thus potentially enhance (or constrain) the economic inclusion of refugees.

**Economic conditions and fiscal policy.** There is extensive evidence that economic conditions (economic performance, the investment climate, levels of taxation, wage rates, labour market elasticity, levels of productivity) influence the trajectory of international migrants, and may be more or less conducive to their subsequent absorption into the host economy (Castles et al., 2013; Collier, 2013). Irrespective of a country’s economic conditions, early payment of taxes by refugees will help with their acceptance in the community, while reducing the risk of downward pressure on wages. Development actors are increasingly interested in supporting the inclusion of refugees in macro-economic strategies, but there is as yet limited research on the effect of such initiatives on economic integration.
**Urban economy.** The majority of refugees in protracted displacement now settle in urban areas and access urban rather than rural labour markets. Urban areas offer better and more diverse livelihood opportunities than rural or camp settings (see e.g. Buscher, 2011; Campbell, 2006; Jacobson, 2005, 2006; IFRC, 2012, 112–43; Zetter, 2014). Despite the obvious advantages and opportunities for refugees, research on their integration in urban areas emphasises the significant challenge they, and often their host communities, face. Beyond the general conditions discussed above, these broader challenges include oversupply of labour in unskilled and semi-skilled sectors, irregular work and incomes and depressed wages. While these constraints also apply in advanced economies, they are far less acute given the small number of refugees in these countries.

**Access to finance.** Research indicates that refugees are often self-employed or work as small business entrepreneurs or social enterprise actors – at least in the first generation – because entry to these labour markets is relatively easy. Access to start-up finance, micro-credit and micro-savings can be critical for small businesses. This may be mobilised through co-ethnic or co-national networks or diaspora/transnational communities, though there is limited research literature on how this happens. In situations of large-scale and protracted displacement, humanitarian agencies and actors have extensive and significant programming experience in micro-credit interventions to reduce poverty and support refugee enterprise (Jacobsen, 2005).

**Demand-side conditions.** While employment policies in host countries usually emphasise supply-side factors – i.e. the skills and qualifications refugees have – there is growing emphasis, in the context of managed migration policies, on demand-side conditions – i.e. the needs of employers. This can accentuate the challenges of labour market access for refugees whose skills may not be in demand.

**Rights and duties.** Rights protection, for example overcoming discrimination and exploitation, supports access to labour markets and thus more positive integration experiences. In employment, respect for refugees’ religious or cultural practices affects employment conditions and obligations and helps refugees access and sustain their presence in local labour markets.

### 4.3 Conclusion

Significant caveats surround any discussion of economic inclusion and how it is measured. First, while economic and employment policies are a vital instrument of refugee inclusion, they are not, of themselves, full and sufficient measures of settlement and integration. Second, it is important to guard against the homogenisation of refugees’ experiences of labour market access and economic inclusion. As with the social inclusion of refugees, needs and experiences differ according to ethnicity and nationality, gender, duration of residence and stage of settlement, quota or spontaneously arriving refugees and, of course, variations in policy, practice and public attitudes towards refugees between different countries of asylum. Overall, the research evidence consistently confirms that refugees, as with many ethnic minorities, occupy a disadvantaged position in the formal labour market,
although informal labour market participation may be stronger. In general, they experience higher levels of unemployment or under-employment, lower wages than native-born employees, greater job insecurity and fewer entitlements in the workplace.

Third, it is important to note the challenges in measuring the success of economic inclusion policies and programmes. On the one hand, information, data and statistics on refugee employment and economic activity are generally patchy, non-uniform and lack longitudinal time series and large-scale data sets. On the other, there are methodological challenges – attributing refugees’ economic activity and employment to policy interventions as opposed to exogenous factors in the host economy and the resources and attributes of refugees themselves. For the most part, analysis and evaluation of refugee economic inclusion relies on qualitative methods; quantitative analysis is conspicuous by its absence or patchiness. Fourth, inclusion is often assessed in terms of outputs such as uptake of vocational training programmes and employment and income levels of refugees, rather than outcomes, for example removing employment inequalities between refugees and hosts, or between male and female refugees, or the use to which relevant competences is put.

5 Indicators and metrics of integration: some methodological issues

Recognising that integration is a multi-faceted and dynamic process, measuring integration poses a number of methodological challenges.

Demographic characteristics. Few countries keep detailed data on the numbers, ethnic and national identities of refugees, let alone factors such as age, gender, social status prior to exile and pre-existing language competence and skills. All these variables will have an impact on who is integrating and how the process is experienced.

The scale of analysis. Is integration measured at the group and community level, or as an aggregate for the country of origin for the refugee population as a whole? Equally, the dynamics of integration may well be conditioned by where the refugees have settled or been resettled, with different localities offering different economic and social opportunities, such as access to housing, education and employment and the capacity of existing social networks to support the process of integration.

Time period. What is the relevant time period over which to measure integration given that it is an incremental process? Substantial variations are to be expected between individuals, households and groups even within the same ethnic/national community. Moreover, the variables to measure integration impact over different time scales: employment invariably occurs at an early stage of integration, language competency as an indicator of integration may develop over a longer period, while membership of social and civil structures of the host society may take much longer.

Choice of variables. Any assessment of integration is conditioned by the choice of variables. As we have seen, the different domains of integration expose an extensive
portfolio of potential indicators, and so prioritising the variables that best reveal the extent of integration is a major challenge. In any case, these may vary from one refugee community to another. In addition, it is important to separate out the factors which differentially impact refugee integration as opposed to other migrants or the social wellbeing of the host community as a whole.

*Basis of comparison.* For the extent and effectiveness of integration to be verified, and comparisons made between different refugee groups, panel data, control groups or benchmarks need to be established.

*Host society response.* As the models of integration reveal, refugee integration is a two-way process. While the metrics discussed above largely focus on how refugees are ‘performing’ vis-à-vis a range of criteria, the host society also plays an instrumental role.

*Appropriate methods.* The choice of methods also presents a challenge. Quantitative measurement is essential for policy-makers and governments in determining trends and impacts. But the complex and interconnected variables which condition the modalities of integration also demand qualitative methods of data collection and analysis which facilitate a more interpretative understanding of the process.

**Bibliography**


Refugee policy and integration in Canada: an exemplar?

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1. Context

Canada has long been seen as an exemplar of humane, successful and generous refugee policy. Primarily a resettlement destination, since 1960 it has accepted around 890,000 refugees, over three-quarters of whom were resettled. Canada is particularly renowned for its Private Sponsorship Program (PSP), through which more than 200,000 refugees and individuals in ‘refugee-like situations’ have found a new home in the country (Hyndman et al., 2016). Although resettlement to Canada has spanned a number of major waves, this case study draws particularly on the experiences of Indochinese and Syrian refugees, Canada’s two largest resettlement movements.

2. Legal and policy frameworks

2.1 Canadian immigration and asylum policy

Canada’s refugee policy is best understood within the context of the country’s broader immigration policy, which is characterised by an unusually high level of control and selectivity. To a large extent this is the product of the country’s geographic position, surrounded on three sides by cold sea and sharing its only land border with its high-income neighbour, the United States (Hyndman et al., 2016). As a result, Canada is largely insulated from spontaneous refugee and broader migration flows, enabling the development of policies in both areas that prioritise control, selection and strategic planning.

Canada’s long history of immigration has primarily been framed by successive governments as ‘an economic strategy for nation-building’ (Hyndman et al., 2016: 10). Throughout the twentieth century, Canada operated an immigration policy designed to meet the needs of its growing economy, addressing labour shortages and responding to the interests of a powerful business lobby (Troper, 1993). While this resulted in a relatively liberal set of policies, there is nonetheless a history of ethnic selectivity in Canada’s approach. Until the early 1960s, immigration policy was notably discriminatory in favour of migrants from northern and western Europe, though in the post-war period the range of ‘acceptable’ migrants gradually expanded to include Jews, Slavs, Italians, Greeks and Portuguese (Troper, 1993; Vineberg 2011).

Canadian immigration policy lost its ethnic bias with the introduction of a points system in 1967 which officially eliminated ethnic discrimination and instead privileged migrants’ ability to contribute to Canada’s economy and society. Since 1971, Canada has followed an official policy of multiculturalism (discussed further below), encouraging migrants from different cultural backgrounds to maintain their identity while consolidating Canada’s increasingly ethnically diverse immigrant population into a unified political community (Dewing, 2013; Harles, 1997).

25 Once the ‘longest undefended border in the world’, the US–Canada frontier has seen increased enforcement post-9/11, under pressure from the United States (Andreas, 2005).
Box 1: Timeline of Canadian refugee and immigration policy

1945: Canada takes part in post-war international resettlement from displacement camps in Europe.
1947: Prime Minister Mackenzie King establishes an immigration policy consisting of economic migration, family sponsorship and refugee resettlement. For the first time Canada acknowledges a moral responsibility to assist refugees.
1956–57: Over 37,000 Hungarian refugees arrive in Canada following the Hungarian uprising.
1962: Ethnic discrimination is officially removed from Canadian immigration policy and a points system introduced.
1968: Canada resettles 12,000 refugees following the Prague Spring.
1969: Canada signs the 1951 Refugee Convention.
1971: Official government policy of multiculturalism established.
1972–73: Canada resettles approximately 7,000 Ugandan Asians. A similar number of Chilenes are admitted around the same time, but logistical issues delayed their resettlement (Kelley and Trebilcok, 2010: 368).
1976: A new Immigration Act formalises Canada’s asylum and resettlement policy, including the introduction of a new private sponsorship scheme.
1978–80: Canada resettles 60,000 Indochinese refugees, with a total of 136,951 resettled by the early 1990s.
1985: The Supreme Court’s ‘Singh Decision’ strikes down the refugee determination system.
1986–87: Two ships carrying Tamil and Sikh asylum-seekers are stranded off Canada’s east coast, prompting public concern over boat arrivals.
1987–89: The government introduces legislation to create an independent Immigrant and Refugee Board to determine refugee status.
1996: Major amendments to the Immigration Act restrict access to asylum.
2002: An updated Immigration and Refugee Protection Act establishes the resettlement framework in use today, including a new focus on vulnerability in resettlement policy.
2004: Canada signs a Safe Third Country agreement with the United States, aiming to reduce movements of asylum-seekers across the Canada–US border.
2009–10: High-profile cases of boats carrying Tamil asylum-seekers prompt a public outcry.
2010–12: Two new pieces of legislation, the Balanced Reform Act and the Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, introduce more restrictive policies towards boat arrivals and asylum-seekers.
2015: Operation Syrian Refugee commences, following Justin Trudeau’s election pledge to resettle 25,000 Syrians by early 2016.

Although this case study primarily focuses on Canada as a resettlement destination, it is worth noting the marked contrast between its relatively open resettlement policies and its restrictive policies regarding people claiming asylum in the country. Canada signed the Refugee Convention in 1969, almost two decades after it was first adopted in Geneva. Previously, Canada had no domestic legal framework for processing asylum claims. In 1976, the Immigration Act established a formal asylum application process through the Refugee Status Advisory Committee, which replaced the raft of ad hoc committees that had previously assessed asylum claims (Basok, 1996; Dirks, 1984). In 1985, the Supreme Court’s ‘Singh Decision’ established refugees’ right to an oral hearing in the event that refugee status is refused. While spontaneous arrivals in Canada have consistently made up a relatively small proportion of refugees in the
country, Canada has nonetheless seen moments of public hysteria over high-profile arrivals, alongside concerns around unfounded asylum claims. Given slow and demanding procedures, the system has suffered at various points from an asylum backlog (Basok, 1996; Hathaway, 1987).

Broadly speaking, the development of Canada’s position on asylum mirrors that across the global North, with a marked securitisation of policy and increasing efforts to deter asylum-seekers and otherwise prevent their arrival. Restrictive measures have included widening the use of deportation powers, the interdiction of boats, visa restrictions and pre-departure admissibility screening (Basok, 1996; Toper, 1993; Mountz, 2010; Reynolds and Hyndman, 2015). In 2004, in a bid to stem the flow of asylum applicants travelling to Canada via the US border – which in 2003 made up over one-third of all asylum claims in the country – Canada signed a Safe Third Country Agreement with the United States preventing people who had transited through the US from lodging a claim in Canada (Hyndman and McLean, 2006). Meanwhile, reforms from 2010 onwards have included expedited processing for asylum-seekers from ‘designated countries of origin’ (DCOs) considered unlikely to produce bona fide refugees, mandatory detention of ‘designated foreign nationals’ (DFNs) who arrive with the help of people-smugglers, restricted access to work permits for both DCOs and DFNs, and the increasing revocation of permanent residence status from recognised refugees (Reynolds and Hyndman, 2015; Atak et al., 2017).

2.2 Resettlement

Although Canadian policy was gradually brought into line with the country’s international obligations after the adoption of the Refugee Convention in 1969, resettlement in Canada retains a number of unique features rooted in the programme’s distinctive origins and history.

2.2.1 Ad hoc origins: Canadian resettlement 1945–76

Between the end of the Second World War and the mid-1970s Canada strategically resettled numerous groups, including people from displacement camps in Europe in the immediate aftermath of the war, refugees from the 1956 Hungarian Uprising and 1968 Prague Spring, and in the 1970s Asians expelled from Uganda and Chileans fleeing persecution (Hathaway, 1987). As with Canada’s broader immigration policy, this emerging resettlement programme was highly selective. Four key areas informed early resettlement policy, and continue to leave their mark on the scheme today: humanitarian concerns; foreign policy considerations; sensitivity to public opinion; and the privileging of groups and individuals considered likely to contribute to Canada’s economy and society.

Although the importance of humanitarian concerns in the early days of resettlement should not be understated, they were often overshadowed by foreign policy considerations. Resettlement from post-war displacement camps in Europe, for example, was part of an effort to position Canada as a key player in the emerging Western alliance in the aftermath of the Second World War (Hathaway, 1987), just as Cold War politics informed the country’s decision to resettle refugees from communist regimes in Hungary and Czechoslovakia (Reynolds and Hyndman, 2015; Basok, 1996). The contrast between Canada’s generous response to Ugandan Asians in 1972, at the
behest of its UK ally, and the delays and challenges that beset the response the following year to Chileans fleeing the military regime the following year underscored the dominant role of foreign policy in guiding resettlement choices, over and above humanitarian needs (Troper, 1993; Hathaway, 1987; Reynolds and Hyndman, 2015. For a different perspective, see Kelley and Trebilcok, 2010).

Resettlement decisions were also sensitive to public opinion and business lobbying. Canada’s decision to resettle refugees from the Hungarian Uprising, for example, was in no small part due to a media campaign calling for greater assistance to Hungarian refugees (Lanphier, 1981). Media pressure also played a role in the decision to admit Indochinese refugees (Dirks, 1984), and in the more recent response to the Syrian refugee crisis. As with broader immigration policy, the business lobby also exerted pressure on the Canadian government to resettle individuals from displacement camps in Europe, judging this to be a useful response to labour shortages in the country’s growing economy (Troper, 1993). While this may not have been the most important factor, resettled Hungarian refugees, Czechoslovaks and Ugandan Asians all had a high socioeconomic profile, and individuals were chosen for resettlement using the same selection criteria that were applied to economic migrants (Lanphier, 1981; Dirks, 1984).

2.2.2 Formalisation of the programme: the 1976 Immigration Act

In 1976, following a comprehensive review of the country’s immigration policy, a new Immigration Act formalised Canada’s ad hoc resettlement efforts in line with the country’s new obligations under the Refugee Convention. The Act established a system whereby the Canadian government would set an overall annual refugee quota, within which quotas would be fixed for refugees from different regions (Lanphier, 1981). Hathaway (1987) has argued that, historically, there has been little connection between quotas and global needs, maintaining the geographic selectivity that has marked Canada’s resettlement history. While quotas are in theory set annually by the relevant government ministry, following a planning process that considers global needs, they can be adjusted to reflect the tenor and needs of overall immigration policy (UNHCR, 2016; Lanphier, 1981). The Act also introduced the ‘ability to successfully establish in Canada’ as a marker for selection within resettlement schemes (Lanphier, 1981). In the following decades this stipulation earned Canada a reputation for picking the ‘best and the brightest’ from populations in need of assistance. Although to some extent remedied by a more recent focus on vulnerability (described below), this remains a key tenet of Canadian resettlement policy.

Most importantly, the Act represented Canada’s first attempt to introduce universal selection criteria. Previously, the country’s ad hoc approach to resettlement had included groups that did not meet the refugee definition in the 1951 Convention, in particular people in need of protection who had not left their country of origin (Dirks, 1984). Girard (2005) describes the process through which Canadian policy-makers, in drafting the 1976 Act, initially attempted to fit groups they already assisted – and wished to continue assisting – into the confines of the UN definition. However, when it became apparent that this could not be done, not least because Jewish emigres from Russia ‘considered the term [refugee] to be pejorative and took offence at the idea it should be applied to them’, the government instead opted for a two-pronged
approach. While the Act introduced the class of Convention refugees as eligible for resettlement, it also introduced an additional category of ‘designated classes’, consisting of specific groups from specific regions who, while failing to meet the UN refugee definition, were considered deserving of assistance, often for strategic geopolitical reasons (Reynolds and Hyndman, 2015). A set of regulations introduced in 1979 established three designated classes:

- A class of ‘self-exiled persons’, including people who had left Eastern Europe and were unwilling to return to their home countries.
- A class of ‘political prisoners and oppressed persons’, including nationals of specified countries still in their country of origin, who either met the Refugee Convention’s persecution requirements or had been detained, imprisoned or repeatedly penalised for acts that in Canada would be considered a legitimate expression of freedom of thought or civil rights.
- A class of Indochinese refugees, including citizens or former habitual residents of Kampuchea, Laos or Vietnam, who left their country after 30 April 1975 and were unwilling to return (Hathaway, 1987).

From 1979 to 1992 the majority of individuals resettled to Canada came under one of these three designations (Casasola, 2016). Notably, of 136,951 Indochinese individuals resettled to Canada between 1978 and 1994, 129,105 (94%) were selected under the Indochinese Designated Class, as opposed to just 7,846 who met the more stringent requirements of the Refugee Convention (ibid.)

This wider ‘designated class’ allowed for the rapid processing of Indochinese refugees, with an average eight- to ten-week wait between first contact with the Canadian authorities and arrival in Canada (Employment and Immigration Canada, 1982). Some 60,000 Indochinese refugees to Canada were resettled by 1980 alone. The significant task of managing this rapid, large-scale resettlement programme was delegated to a newly established Refugee Task Force, which was responsible for coordinating the work of Canada’s Employment and Immigration Commission in Canada and overseas, other government departments, voluntary agencies and private groups (ibid.). As remains the case today, refugees were given interest-free loans to cover the costs of travel to Canada and granted permanent residence status upon arrival. Subsequent support included orientation sessions, language training, job counselling and financial assistance (ibid.). Over half of Indochinese refugees were resettled to Canada under a new Private Sponsorship Program, another key feature of the 1976 Immigration Act (see Box 1).

**Box 1: Private sponsorship**

Private sponsorship operates on the basis of a commitment by Canadian citizens or permanent residents to provide financial assistance or in-kind support for the first year of a refugee’s stay in Canada, including assistance with housing, food and other essentials (Hyndman et al., 2016), as well as helping the resettled individual become self-supporting after the one-year commitment has expired. The government provides access to public healthcare and education. Sponsorship may take place with a ‘Group of Five’ (a temporary group of five or more Canadians who sponsor one or a small number of cases), a Sponsorship Agreement Holder (SAH – an
incorporated organisation with a sponsorship agreement with the Canadian government allowing them to regularly submit sponsorship applications), or a Community Sponsor (an incorporated organisation with no formal agreement, and which will only sponsor once or twice) (IRCC, 2016a). Since 1978, over 200,000 privately sponsored refugees have been resettled in Canada.

Private sponsorship has strong links to religious communities. According to Hyndman et al. (2016), around three-quarters of all SAHs are faith-based organisations. Since sponsors are able to personally select the individual they wish to sponsor for resettlement, Private sponsorship has also become a de facto pathway to family reunification, a feature over which the Canadian government has expressed some concern (UNHCR, 2016; Hyndman et al., 2016). Researchers have also noted an ‘echo effect’, whereby resettled refugees have themselves sponsored people seeking resettlement from their home country (Hyndman et al., 2016).

The Canadian government maintains that private sponsorship operates on a principle of additionality, whereby any refugees resettled through this route are in addition to and do not replace government-assisted resettlement. In the case of Indochinese refugees, for example, the Canadian government committed to sponsoring one refugee for each refugee sponsored privately (Casasola, 2016). However, Hyndman et al. (2016) have expressed concern that the Canadian government may increasingly be using private sponsorship as a way of privatising its existing commitments. There are also concerns about new regulations asserting greater government control of the programme, including limits on places (Hyndman et al., 2016). Recent evaluations have highlighted long processing times, high refusal rates and lack consultation by the government on policy changes (IRCC, 2016a; Beiser, 2003; Hyndman et al., 2016). Even so, the scheme is a remarkable and innovative piece of refugee policy. In recent years, many have held the programme up as a model with potential to be replicated on a global scale. In December 2016, the Canadian government, in partnership with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Open Society Foundation, launched an initiative to promote private sponsorship globally (Hyndman et al., 2016).

2.2.3 Contemporary resettlement procedures

In many respects, resettlement in Canada today follows the framework advanced by the 1976 Immigration Act and put into practice through the Indochinese resettlement programme. These provisions have been applied to various refugee caseloads over the past two decades, including refugees from Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Syria (Reynolds and Hyndman, 2015).

Resettlement in Canada is subject to the provisions of the 2002 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), which is notable for refocusing Canadian resettlement efforts away from their historic focus on highly skilled individuals towards more vulnerable groups. While in most cases applicants must still provide evidence of their ability to successfully establish themselves in Canada within three to five years, the
IRPA created additional categories of those considered ‘vulnerable’ and in ‘urgent need of protection’, to whom the ‘successful establishment’ criteria are not applicable (UNHCR, 2016; Ekaterina, 2012; Presse and Thomson, 2008). Under current legislation, individuals must be referred for resettlement by UNHCR, a designated referral organisation or a private sponsor. Those eligible for resettlement must fall under one of two categories: a ‘Convention refugee abroad class’, covering people fitting the UN refugee definition, or a ‘Country of asylum class’, covering people outside their home country or country of habitual residence, and who have been seriously affected by civil war or armed conflict, or have been denied basic human rights (Government of Canada, 2017). Under the IRPA, the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship has the authority to apply their discretion to cases that do not meet these requirements, justifying exceptions on the grounds of humanitarian, compassionate and public policy considerations (UNHCR, 2016).

Resettlement takes places through three streams:

- Government Assisted Refugees (GARs), who are usually referred by UNHCR and receive a federal government stipend for their first year in Canada, or until they become self-supporting (whichever comes first). Support can be extended for up to three years in exceptional cases (IRCC, 2016a). This assistance comes from Canada’s provinces.
- Privately Sponsored Refugees (PSRs), who receive financial and in-kind assistance from private sponsors for the same one-year period (see Box 1).
- Blended Visa Office Referred (BVOR) refugees, a new scheme introduced in 2013 whereby refugees are referred by UNHCR or designated referral agencies, and receive a combination of public and private assistance. Refugees receive six months of income support from the Canadian government, in addition to six months of financial support from their sponsor (IRCC, 2016a).

A wide range of actors are involved in resettlement, including Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) and the Department of National Defence, provincial and municipal governments, UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), NGOs, sponsors and volunteers (Hansen and Huston, 2016). Although IRCC recently centralised its processing office, evaluations still report slow processing times, inefficient information-sharing and poor monitoring (IRCC, 2016a).

Resettled refugees are subject to security, criminal and medical screening prior to arrival in Canada and – except in very unusual cases – receive permanent residence status immediately upon arrival (UNHCR, 2016). Refugees typically take government loans to cover the cost of their travel to Canada, although this may be waived for refugees with special needs. On arrival, resettled refugees are given access to

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26 The roots of this shift lie in part in the earlier Women at Risk (AWR) Program, which offers resettlement to women ‘who do not have the normal protection of a family unit and who find themselves in precarious situations where the local authorities cannot ensure their safety’ (UNHCR, 2016).

27 Support can be extended for up to three years in exceptional cases (IRCC, 2016a). This assistance comes from Canada’s provinces.

28 As the BVOR programme is relatively new, fewer refugees have been resettled through it, and there is very limited literature exploring or critiquing it; as such, this report focuses primarily on GARs and PSRs. For more information on BVOR, see IRCC (2016a).
provincial education and health services, and are immediately eligible to work (UNHCR, 2016).

The government also provides refugees with a range of additional services, varying with the resettlement scheme under which they arrived. All individuals resettled under GAR receive an initial six weeks of assistance under the Refugee Assistance Program (RAP), including reception at the port of entry, temporary accommodation and orientation (IRCC, 2016a). PSR and BVOR resettlement cases receive the same assistance through their sponsors. Both GAR and BVOR cases receive monthly payments under the RAP – for 12 months in the case of GAR and six months for BVOR – calculated based on provincial social assistance rates (IRCC, 2016a).

Finally, all refugees are given access to the Settlement Program, a longer-term scheme aimed at supporting integration and the successful participation of resettled refugees in Canadian life (IRCC, 2016b). The programme explicitly conceives of integration as a ‘two-way process for immigrants to adapt to life in Canada and for Canada to welcome and adapt to new people and cultures’ (ibid.: 3). Through the programme, the IRCC funds a number of services, including language classes, employment assistance and settlement information and support.

2.2.4 Syrian resettlement

Over 40,000 Syrians have been resettled in Canada following a 2015 election pledge by Justin Trudeau to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees by early 2016. Upon Trudeau’s election to office, this pledge was swiftly operationalised through ‘Operation Syrian Refugee’ (Hansen and Huston, 2016; IRCC, 2016b).

Syrian resettlement has deviated from the framework outlined above in several key respects. First, despite the considerable government discretion over eligibility for resettlement, in 2015 all Syrians were formally awarded prima facie refugee status by the government. Second, from November 2015 to February 2016 travel loans were waived for all Syrians. Although in March 2016 travel costs were reinstated for privately sponsored Syrian refugees, the government continued covering costs for Syrians entering through the GAR and BVOR routes, either until the end of 2016 or until a further 10,000 were taken in (Hyndman et al., 2016). Third, the Syrian case has been notable for the rapidity with which large-scale resettlement has been achieved. Syrian refugees have been given priority for expedited resettlement, which in practice has meant faster processing and shorter application forms (Hyndman et al., 2016). However, the rapidity of the process has also resulted in inconsistent and in some cases inadequate support, varying standards in delivery, poor reporting and lack of sufficient planning for assistance beyond the first few weeks after arrival (IRCC, 2016b). The priority given to Syrians has prompted accusations of favouritism against the IRCC, and has had the unintended consequence of increasing backlogs for non-Syrian caseloads (IRCC, 2016b; Hyndman et al., 2017).

Finally, the Syrian resettlement

29 For example, Hyndman et al. (2016) note that, in 2016, official online IRCC guidance showed that privately sponsored refugees processed in Nairobi could expect a waiting time of approximately 70
scheme has explicitly prioritised vulnerable women and refugee families, with very few single men admitted, sidestepping a demographic issue that has been a bone of contention in Europe (Hyndman et al., 2016).

3. The impact of forced displacement

Since 1960, Canada has accepted just under 900,000 refugees, around 80% of whom have been resettled (as opposed to being granted asylum). As Figure 1 shows, allowing for sharp peaks in the late 1970s, between roughly the mid-1980s and early 1990s and 2015–16, the number of newly arrived refugees in recent years has been fairly constant at around 11,000. In the same period, the overall population of the country has doubled, from 18 million to 36m. Given the relatively small volume of arrivals relative to total population, impacts are difficult to detect at national level, and there do not appear to be any studies quantifying this in terms of costs or benefits.

Figure 1: Number of new refugees in Canada by year and entry type


There are demographic differences between refugees and the overall Canadian population, particularly in age distribution, level of education and knowledge of Canada’s official languages. The proportion of children in the population is much lower for Canadians overall than for new refugee arrivals (World Bank, 2017; UNHCR 2017).
Boxes 2 and 3 contain information on the population composition of the two largest groups of refugees resettled to Canada, Indochinese and Syrians.

**Box 2: Indochinese refugees in the 1970s**
Sixty thousand Indochinese so-called ‘Boat People’ were resettled in Canada under the provisions of the 1976 Immigration Act. At the peak of resettlement, in 1980, Indochinese accounted for nearly 30% of all immigrants (Troper, 1986). Prior to 1975, there was no Indo-Chinese population to speak of in Canada, so the arrival of thousands of refugees changed the ethnic profile of host communities. Their arrival also altered the religious complexion of host communities, as reflected in the establishment of new places of worship reflecting refugees’ religious traditions (Dorais, 2007).

Data on Vietnamese refugees from 1978 onwards indicates that they were younger on average than the Canadian population, with higher numbers of children per household in the initial wave of arrivals (Lanphier, 1981). According to one study, approximately three-quarters of refugee arrivals between 1979 and 1981 were under the age of 35 (Beiser, 2003). The same study estimates a higher percentage of men than women (58% male), whereas Canada’s population at the time was split more or less evenly female to male. Rates of English or French language fluency were very low, and one study estimates that, after ten years, 7% still spoke no English (ibid.). Many arrivals had experienced disruption to their education (Wilson et al., 2010). Early arrivals were also poorly prepared for the Canadian labour market (Lanphier, 1981). However, a decade later unemployment was lower among refugees than the rest of the Canadian population (Beiser, 2009, referencing Beiser, 1999).

**Box 3: Syrian refugees from 2015 to the present**
By January 2017, 40,000 Syrians had been resettled through direct government assistance (22,000), a combination of government and private sponsorship (4,000) and private sponsorship (14,000). Since 2005, 60% of refugees have arrived through the government track (GAR), as opposed to private sponsorship (PSR). While GARs are dispersed, PSRs are resettled with their sponsor, meaning that different provinces experienced different intake levels. For example, Manitoba, with only 3.6% of Canada’s population, resettled 15% of all PSR arrivals in 2015 through a well-established and active private sponsorship community.

Half of Syrian refugees are below the age of 16 (Wilkinson and Garcea, 2017). This is in contrast to the equivalent figure of just over 16% in the Canadian population as a whole. Refugees arriving via PSR are on average slightly older (IRCC, 2016b). Resettled Syrian families were on average larger than the Canadian average (around 2.5 members). The GAR system deprioritises single men on the basis that they are less vulnerable than other groups, although there are no restrictions on men entering through the PSR or BVOR categories (Hyndman et al., 2017). Official data on Syrian arrivals shows a higher percentage of male to female refugees overall (51% and 49%). This is fairly consistent across visa categories (IRCC, 2016b).
4. Public attitudes

Canada is well known for being relatively positive and welcoming towards refugees. Indeed, Canadians tend to see themselves as welcoming and generous (Tyyskä et al., 2017; LeFranchi, 2016), and regard their refugee resettlement programmes as a success. While a number of studies question these generalisations, and the extent to which they accurately reflect reality (e.g. Tyyskä et al., 2017), it is undeniable that Canada has responded to refugees differently than other developed states. For example, unlike the United States or Europe, surveys show that two-thirds of Canadians feel positively about immigration in general (Bloemraad 2012). Canadians are also more likely to favour policies that are more generous to refugee resettlement than the US or Europe, as evidenced most recently in the election of Trudeau, whose campaign vocally advocated for refugee resettlement. Many Canadians are proud of the fact that their country has resettled such a large number of Syrians so quickly, and that the UN is presenting it as a model for other resettlement states to follow (Woods, 2016). While the refugee resettlement programme in Canada is not without either flaws or opponents, it is important to consider why Canada presents such a different outlook, and why public perceptions of refugee resettlement are so different than their American and European counterparts. This section considers Canada’s public perceptions through its history and geography, policy and media approaches to refugees.

Canada’s history and geography partly explain why Canadian public opinion tends to be more favourable toward refugees. As noted, Canada’s geographic isolation has meant that it can be selective about who it chooses to take in, and has not had to struggle with large numbers of people moving irregularly across its borders without formal authorisation. The orderly process of arrival means that many Canadians may not have the fear or anger perceived ‘chaos’ or ‘illegal crossings’ at a border can provoke. However, there have been points of tension over refugee policies in the 1980s and 1990s (Abu-Laban 2013), and public opinion leaned towards a more securitised refugee policy in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the United States, and to some extent after the 2014 shooting on Parliament Hill in Ottawa (though the individual involved was not a refugee) (Adelman, 2002).

In policy terms, the fact that Canada is selective regarding the refugees it resettles has meant that it has historically been able to receive refugees and immigrants who will benefit the Canadian economy, thereby minimising common concerns about strains on the welfare state (Bloemraad, 2012). The government also maintains diverse flows, which helps to avoid a single conception of ‘the immigrant’. Narratives around immigration have been kept largely neutral, avoiding the highly charged, securitised discourse that tends to surround the issue in American and European politics (Hiebert, 2016). Refugees and immigrants are also well-presented in voting, which serves as a check on political parties and means that politicians actively court immigrant votes, and unlike other parts of the world there are no anti-immigrant parties on the fringes of Canadian politics (Bloemraad 2012). Policies that encourage the involvement of the private sector and the public as a whole give Canadians more direct involvement in refugee resettlement, and Canada’s focus on permanent resettlement gives refugees and their receiving society a stake in promoting favourable long-term outcomes.
Public–private partnerships, anti-discrimination laws and government policies of multiculturalism also help to generate positive public perceptions of refugees.

The Canadian media has played a key role in fostering positive views of refugees, including through sharing high-profile refugee success stories. Examples include coverage of Ahmed Hussen, a resettled Somali refugee who is now Minister of Immigration (Murphy 2017); and coverage of a Syrian family who founded a successful chocolate store, Peace by Chocolate. Canadian television airs stories that emphasise the generosity of individuals like Jim Estill of Danby Appliances, who spent $1.5m to help resettle 58 Syrian refugee families, offering all of them employment, English classes, and other programmes to help them support themselves. Others highlight examples of Vietnamese refugees resettled decades ago sponsoring Syrian families, demonstrating their patriotic Canadian sense of generosity and duty. Studies show that Canadians who identified themselves as most patriotic were also the most supportive of immigration and multiculturalism – something that is not true in the United States or Europe (Bloemraad, 2012). Canadian attitudes toward refugees have also been affected by social media and coverage of humanitarian need. For example, the 2015 photo of Aylan Kurdi, a Syrian refugee child who drowned on his way from Turkey to Greece, prompted an outpouring of sympathy toward refugees (LeFranchi, 2016). Other literature is more critical of media dramatization of refugee situations, arguing that it ‘others’ refugees and portrays them as vulnerable and lacking agency. Female Syrian refugees, for example, are often portrayed as silent and needy, while men might be viewed as a source of threat (Tyyskä et al., 2017). While liberal newspapers in Canada have tended to portray refugees as victims, other outlets might focus on false refugee claims, or portray refugees as terrorists or criminals (Medianu, Sutter and Esses, 2015).

5. Integration

There is a large body of academic and policy-oriented research on the legal, governance, functional and social elements of refugee integration in Canada. Topics most commonly explored in the literature include health (primarily mental health, but also physical health and health access); social integration (social support, participation and networks); economic integration (primarily labour market integration and employment experiences); and resettlement. Other themes include language, discrimination, gender, children and youth and education. Older literature is included in this review because it provides insights into the historical integration of refugees in Canada, much of which is still relevant today (Casasola, 2016).

A large amount of the research in this area has focused on Indochinese refugees. A seminal study from the Refugee Resettlement Project (RRP) conducted over ten years explored the psychological, economic and social adaptation of refugees from Southeast Asia resettled in Vancouver between 1979 and 1981. The substantive findings from (discussed below) – particularly how measures based on health, linguistic and economic indicators significantly changed over the decade of research – exemplify the long-term nature of integration, and make a strong case for the value of longitudinal research when studying it. As Beiser (2009: 570) writes: ‘Cross-sectional studies provide snap-shots of adaptation to a new environment. Static images cannot,
however, do justice to resettlement, a moving sequence of challenges and adaptive responses whose importance is conditioned by time’. As Syrian refugees only started to be resettled to Canada in large numbers at the end of 2015, this case study includes the small number of early evaluations and reports on Syrian refugees, though a large literature is expected to develop in the future.\(^{30}\) While it is possible to reflect on initial aspects of the settlement and integration of Syrian refugees in Canada, experience studying Indochinese refugees suggests that an understanding of how Syrians have settled and integrated will only emerge in the years and decades to come.

### 5.1 Limitations of the evidence base

The literature in this area also has limitations. First, apart from the RRP, the multifaceted and holistic nature of integration is poorly represented in most of the literature; rather, a case study approach predominates, with a disproportionate focus on isolated or arbitrarily paired markers of integration at a given point in time, disconnected from broader contextual factors. There is a paucity of national-scale research on refugee integration (Yu et al., 2007) (even the RRP focused on one geographic location, Vancouver), and the geographic and temporal limitations of most studies limit the extent to which findings can be generalised. Much of the existing national data on refugees is not broken down by group (PSR, GAR, etc.) (Hyndman, 2011); while comparisons between GARS and PSRs can provide valuable insights into the factors that support refugee resettlement and integration, existing comparisons often fail to control for factors such as country of origin, the vulnerability criteria on which many GARS are selected for resettlement, pre-resettlement experiences, socioeconomic status and resettlement location (and resultant access to integration and other services) (Hyndman et al., 2016).

Above all, it must be recognised that integration is a heterogeneous process, and one which operates at individual and collective levels. Aggregate-level inferences can mask inequalities (and often inequities) – such as those related to age or gender – and there is also a risk of essentialising the diverse lives of refugees into a flat, collective experience. For example, while Valtonen (1999), Koh (2016) and Ngo (2016) all reflect on the diverse experiences and perspectives of Vietnamese refugees, Ngo (2016: 21) points to a narrative around ‘exceptionally legitimate and successful refugees, thus allowing lived experiences that fall outside of this identity to remain hidden’, and calls for further investigation into the ‘presumed homogeneity of the Vietnamese refugee group and their apparently successful settlement’ (ibid.: 27). The risk of a singular construction of a group or subgroup of refugees is that it fails to recognise the diverse needs, assets and agency of different refugees.

Lastly, Hyndman (2011) (drawing on Brunner et al. (2010)) highlights the risk of ‘refugee-centrism’: the presumption that certain challenges or experiences are exclusive to refugees. Refugees may well face challenges commonly associated with integration that are in fact more widespread among immigrants and Canadian nationals, such as barriers to healthcare or education. At the same time, while challenges experienced by resettled refugees may not be unique to them, they may

\(^{30}\) Significant funding for dozens of studies has been allocated by the Canadian government for research on the resettlement and integration of Syrian refugees.
be compounded by interconnected factors related to language, poverty or employment (McKeary and Newbold, 2011). These issues are discussed further below.

5.2 Multiculturalism: a framework for refugee integration in Canada

Multiculturalism has been described as ‘the mosaic model of cultural pluralism’ and ‘Canada’s national ideology of ethnic integration’ (Valtonen, 1999: 475). In his paper on Canadian multiculturalism, Dewing (2009: 1) sets out three ways in which multiculturalism can be interpreted in Canada: descriptively (a sociological fact); prescriptively (ideology); and politically (policy):

As a sociological fact, multiculturalism refers to the presence of people from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds. Ideologically, multiculturalism consists of a relatively coherent set of ideas and ideals pertaining to the celebration of Canada’s cultural diversity. At the policy level, multiculturalism refers to the management of diversity through formal initiatives in the federal, provincial, territorial and municipal domains.

Multiculturalism thus serves as an overarching framework, in both ideological and practical terms, for the integration of refugees and immigrants in Canada. While critics assert that it promotes diversity over unity, emphasises difference rather than shared values, and decentres Canadian culture to accommodate others, proponents assert that ‘it encourages integration by telling immigrants they do not have to choose between preserving their cultural heritage and participating in Canadian society. Rather, they can do both’ (Dewing, 2013: 9). More complex are issues surrounding how refugees themselves perceive and respond to multiculturalism. Drawing on research with Lao refugees in Ontario, Harles (1997) notes that, while the Lao generally regard multiculturalism as ‘[easing] the cultural transition of immigrants to Canada and [encouraging] appreciation for ethnic diversity’ their assessment of multiculturalism is ultimately mixed, with concerns relating to maintaining cultural traditions in a new and completely different country, to concerns that the policy may ‘isolate them socially and undermine the unity of their adopted country’ (ibid.: 38).

Derwing and Mulder (2003) describe the surprise sponsors of Kosovar refugees felt at their prejudice towards other ethnic groups in Canada, and make the obvious but important point that the very notion of multiculturalism can be surprising for refugees who come from less diverse countries.

5.3 Drivers of integration

Integration is an explicit objective of refugee resettlement in Canada, and is openly discussed and debated in government, civil society, literature, the media and public fora. Drawing on the paper on the concept of integration produced as part of this

31 A full analysis of multiculturalism is beyond the scope of this paper. See Dewing (2013) for a helpful review of multiculturalism in Canada, including discussion on its historical evolution, legal and policy implications, Canadian attitudes towards multiculturalism, and critique.

32 As the focus of this case study is refugee resettlement and integration in Canada, this section does not consider landed asylum-seekers or refugees. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that they may face additional challenges to resettled refugees, in part due to restricted entitlements during – and the legacy of – the claimant period.
study, this section considers the legal, governance, social and functional domains of refugee integration in Canada. It considers the policies and factors that contribute to or detract from ‘successful’ integration. It does not provide a systematic review of the literature on integration, but rather discusses processes and policies that have shaped integration outcomes, highlighting examples and statistics to build a better understanding of what can be learned from how different groups of refugees have rebuilt their lives in Canada over the past 40 years.

5.3.1 The legal domain
The legal domain of integration refers to different models of membership conditioned by legal entitlements, rights and ultimately the processes and instruments of citizenship. Refugees resettling to Canada benefit from an array of state-funded formal integration services, exemplifying some of the tangible (and relatively generous, on a global scale) ways Canada invests in and supports the integration of refugees. Most resettled refugees are given permanent residency – and all the legal and social benefits this entails – upon arrival.

Syrian refugees entering under GAR33 have access to various programmes. GARS benefit from the Resettlement Assistance Program (RAP), which funds immediate essential services related to reception, accommodation and orientation, and links refugees to other federal and provincial programmes. Monthly income support pays for food and accommodation for up to a year. The Settlement Program aims to support the integration of refugees (and other ‘newcomers’) through IRCC-funded organisations providing language, community and employment services, assistance with obtaining official recognition of foreign credentials and more general information and support.

The Standing Committee on Human Rights (2016: 29) notes ‘general agreement that the level of financial support, which is tied to provincial social assistance rates, is inadequate to meet refugees’ essential needs’. This assertion is supported by indicators included in a recent IRCC (2016b: 23) evaluation, which found that 53% of GARS agreed that RAP income support was sufficient for basic necessities (compared to the 87% of PSRs who felt that income and in-kind support from their sponsors was sufficient), and 65% of GARS reported using food banks, compared to 29% of PSRs. A second, related concern is what happens when federal and private sponsorship officially ends. While GARS and PSRs who are not yet self-sufficient can apply for continued social assistance from their provincial governments, and while many sponsors may continue to provide financial or in-kind help, for some PSRs the shift to social assistance will represent a significant loss of support at a time when they are still finding their feet (Standing Committee on Human Rights: 2016).

The services and assistance resettled refugees receive specifically to facilitate integration must also be considered in the broader socio-political context of Canada’s welfare state. Writing on Lao refugees in Canada, Harles (1997: 729–30) draws on what Edward Shils has termed allocative integration, ‘the idea that provision of a

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33 For a more detailed breakdown of services available to Syrian refugees under different resettlement programs see IRCC, 2016b: 2–3.
certain standard of living can be a vehicle for political incorporation’, and notes the extent to which the Lao valued Canada’s provision of services such as healthcare, education and social assistance. The fact that Canada provides refugees (and citizens) with social services does not diminish the need for additional, tailored integration services for refugees, but it does provide a longer-term safety net should they need one.

Lastly, most resettled refugees are given permanent residency on arrival – and all the legal and social benefits this entails – and most go on to apply for citizenship. While this is highly important for integration, it is not a panacea to the challenges involved; as Hyndman and McLean (2006: 358) write, ‘Legal status and permission to work – highly sought after and often elusive goals for many urban refugees in other parts of the world – are not in themselves a sufficient basis for securing livelihoods in the Canadian context’. More holistic support is also required.

5.3.2 The governance domain
Governance refers to the administrative and organisational structures and platforms on which integration policies are implemented. Two aspects of governance are discussed here: policies regarding the geographic distribution of refugees (referred to as ‘destining’ in some of the literature), and the Private Sponsorship Program.

Resettlement policies can either disperse refugees across a country, based on considerations such as population size, the availability of services and funding, or concentrate them in one area, to form a ‘critical mass’. GARs tend to be dispersed to provinces across Canada, with relocation decisions informed by a range of factors, including existing family ties and care needs (such as medical treatment). PSRs are sent to the city where their sponsors reside. Recent data on the matching and allocation of Syrian refugees suggests most are satisfied: according to the IRCC (2016b), 68% of GARs and 75% of PSRs were happy or very happy with the city they were sent to.

Intentionally resettling refugees of the same ethnic group to one geographic area has proved a positive experience for Kosovar refugees in Alberta. An effort was made to keep extended Kosovar families intact, and to reunite refugees with family members who had already been resettled, which meant that many were settled in the small city of Grand Prairie (Derwing and Mulder, 2003, citing Abu-Laban et al., 1999). Derwing and Mulder (2003: 14) conclude that ‘In the case of the Kosovars, there appeared to have been a critical mass to provide the support they needed. In future, the federal government should attempt to keep extended families together, particularly if smaller centres are to retain refugees’.

In discussing the conditions under which Acehnese refugees were resettled to Vancouver, Hyndman and McLean (2006: 358) write:

*It seems clear then that the seeds of a transnational community have been sown as part of this particular resettlement plan, in that locating all the refugees in the Vancouver area has helped to maintain existing social ties and communications as well as provide the space for fostering new relationships within the broader South Asian diaspora that makes up one part of the Vancouver ethnoscape.*
Furthermore, the ongoing interaction this particular group has with state and service providing actors contributes to a sense of cohesiveness among the Acehnese.

Policies of dispersal – particularly when refugees are separated not only from their families, but also from friends and members of their community – can be difficult for refugees, inhibit integration and prompt secondary movement. Although rates vary widely over time and between resettlement categories and geographic destination, a recent evaluation indicates that 11% of GARs moved in the first year. Of those who specified why, 40% cited finding employment, 22% being closer to friends and 19% being closer to family (IRCC, 2016b: 25). In their analysis of the underlying reasons for secondary migration among refugees, Simich et al. (2003: 886–87) report that refugees experienced social isolation, stress and health problems associated with a lack of meaningful and supported relationships, and framed secondary migration as support-seeking behaviour:

*This study contributes to the argument that resettlement policies that promote geographic dispersal can impede social integration and contribute to isolation (Carballo, Divino, & Zeric, 1998), particularly for newly arrived refugees, and illustrates deleterious health outcomes when refugees' needs for social support are not appropriately met.*

As Beiser (2009) notes, it is not always possible for resettled refugees to join pre-existing co-ethnic communities – not only because of policies of dispersal, but also because such communities may not yet exist in the resettlement country. The RRP therefore explored the idea that private sponsors could provide support akin to that which refugees seek in co-ethnic communities. As discussed above, the private sponsorship model, which enjoys high levels of public support within Canada, places individuals and communities at the forefront of the host society response to resettled refugees. In doing so, it redistributes a degree of power away from the state to private sponsors (the majority of PSRs are named or family-linked cases), and enables refugees to access the apparatus of integration more informally. Sponsors commit to providing financial support for up to a year, as well as other necessities (such as initial accommodation, utilities, food and clothing), reducing some elements of government expenditure. Sponsors also help refugees integrate into Canadian society. Although what this entails may vary, it can amount to a significant level of support to help refugees deal with formal (e.g. bureaucratic systems) and informal (customs and

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34 A report by Hyndman, Payne and Jimenez (2016: 6) contains an illustrative example of the high levels of demand for the PSR programme; it notes: ‘In an attempt to quantify PSR demand, in October 2016, Hospitality House Refugee Ministry of Winnipeg opened its waiting list and began to accept new applications for sponsorship from Winnipeg residents. In the first week of this experiment, they received over 7000 applications, all with family links to the refugees to be sponsored. They anticipated that this number could double within weeks.’

35 For a breakdown on processing programme costs for GAR, PSR and BVOR see IRCC (2016a: 36).
The fact that sponsors are not a single individual but rather part of a group or organisation expands the networks and support that can be offered to refugees.

Challenges surrounding the programme include the financial and time costs for sponsors; ambiguities in the relationship between sponsors and refugees (including issues around intrusiveness and privacy); administrative and bureaucratic backlogs; the travel loan, which refugees need to repay; a potential power imbalance between sponsors (providers) and refugees (recipients); lack of oversight; and issues around equity in the levels of assistance different refugees receive, the number of refugees admitted from particular regions and the speed with which applications are processed. There are also concerns around refugees paying for resettlement-related processes.

While GARs tend to be selected based on vulnerability criteria, PSRs generally receive more comprehensive support (Yu et al., 2007).

Lanphier (2003) and Beiser (2009) highlight issues around religion in resettlement, particularly with regard to private sponsors. Many refugee sponsorship groups are organised through religious organisations, and the religion of refugees may not match that of sponsors. Beiser (2009:565) notes " overt attempts to proselytize the refugees ...

5.3.3 The social domain
The social domain – ethnicity, cultural identity, social networks and social capital – focuses on the extent to which refugees participate and connect with the majority community and thus the level of social inclusion. This section considers various themes related to the social integration of refugees in Canada, including social networks and support, discrimination, faith and religion and family reunification.

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36 The government of Canada website states that sponsors normally support refugees by: ‘providing the cost of food, rent and household utilities and other day-to-day living expenses; providing clothing, furniture and other household goods; locating interpreters; selecting a family physician and dentist; assisting with applying for provincial health-care coverage; enrolling children in school and adults in language training; introducing newcomers to people with similar personal interests; providing orientation with regard to banking services, transportation, etc.; and helping in the search for employment’ (CIC, 2016).

37 The Rapid Evaluation of Syrian resettlement (IRCC, 2016b: 28) reports that ‘4.1% of surveyed PSRs indicated that before coming to Canada, they paid someone to complete their sponsorship application or to provide for their own support while in Canada. Of those people who indicated that they were asked to pay, 50.0% said they paid their sponsor, 25.0% paid an immigration consultant and 7.1% paid family or friends in Canada.’

38 There has been some effort to capitalise on the benefits of the PSR programme without requiring volunteers to make a financial commitment; Lamba and Krahn (2003) note that GARs have access to host-matching programmes, coordinated by refugee service-providing agencies, that link GARs to volunteers who provide similar (but non-financial) support as private sponsors.
5.3.4 Social networks and support

Social networks of family, friends, sponsors, neighbours, co-workers and employers play a critical role in refugees’ settlement and integration. As Lamba and Krahn (2003: 337) write:

39 refugees tend to handle money and personal problems by turning to familial networks, whereas health and job problems are typically addressed with the assistance of members of extra-familial networks in the host community. Equally important, all four types of problems are generally addressed by relying on extensive social networks. These consistent patterns of reliance on familial and extra-familial networks when faced with a variety of different problems clearly demonstrate the functional value of social capital for refugees resettling in Canada (ibid.: 355).

Like all communities, the communities of which refugees are a part are unlikely to be wholly supportive or united, and policy-makers and practitioners cannot assume that all refugees will find social support from co-ethnic communities in Canada; Koh (2016), for example, describes how political views on Vietnam divided and estranged members of the resettled community in Canada. Social support from shared ethnic communities can also constrain integration: as Beiser (2009) describes: ‘unless balanced by integrative efforts, the strands of what was initially a safety net can knit together into a cocoon’, and that, ‘over time, an overly exclusive involvement with the like-ethnic community may militate against acquiring the tools necessary to fully participate in the larger society’ (ibid.: 562). Thus, while social support from co-ethnic communities is beneficial, broader networks and activities are also necessary in order to capitalise on the benefits and encourage integration.

While at the time of the research Syrian refugees were still in the early stages of resettlement, the IRCC evaluation in 2016 offered several specific policy-relevant findings related to the social integration of Syrians, including the role of religious and community organisations as a main source of social connections; the importance of shared resettlement experiences (e.g. the plane ride, staying in Welcome Centre hotels) in facilitating connections between Syrian refugees; and children as facilitators of social integration. The size of the Syrian refugee population has also contributed to social links and networks.

Social networks can facilitate employment and access to services. In discussing social support for immigrants and refugees in Canada, Simich, Beiser and Mwakarimba (2005: 259) note that ‘most desirable for immigrants and refugees may be social support that functions as a “springboard,” not just a “safety net”, working directly in

39 The research included 525 adult refugee participants resettled to Alberta in the mid-1990s. Participants were from a diverse range of countries and regions, including Africa, Central/South America, East Asia, former Yugoslavia, the Middle East and Poland. Most (72%) were government-assisted refugees, while 25% were privately sponsored; a structured interviewing method was used, incorporating both fixed-response and open-ended questions.
terms of social relations and indirectly by facilitating access to employment, education and other basic needs’. Lamba and Krahn (2003, citing Lamba, 2001) note that refugees with larger family networks had significantly better jobs. One study of the societal participation of Vietnamese refugees in Finland and Canada (Valtonen, 1999) argues that ‘employment serves to make concrete the two-way character of integration. In welfare states such as Finland and Canada, employment allows the citizen who is otherwise endowed with rights to social security to contribute to the new home society, with important potential implications for refugees’ social and economic integration. Beyond providing economic independence to an individual refugee and their household, employment also allowed refugees from the ‘collectively-oriented’ Vietnamese community to meet their perceived obligations to a broader network of family and kin. Conversely, a lack of employment can result in social marginalisation and restrict refugees’ ability to participate in social spheres (ibid.: 487).

The collective or community orientation of some refugees also has clear implications for social support interventions. Makwarimba et al. (2013) identified major support needs among Somali and Sudanese refugees in Canada, including depleted social networks and barriers to accessing services and support. Refugees expressed a preference for peer and group-level support, and identified numerous facilitators to improve the accessibility of support programmes, such as transportation, childcare and meals. Findings from an intervention to meet the support needs and preferences of Sudanese and Somali refugees (Stewart et al. 2011) indicate a statistically significant increase in perceived social integration following the intervention, pointing to the value of the support provided by ethnic peers, and their potential role in interpreting and supplementing professional health and social service providers.

Finally, refugees, researchers and policy-makers alike recognise the importance of family during resettlement (Lamba and Krahn, 2003; IRCC, 2016b; Simich et al., 2003). Lamba and Krahn note that more than half of the refugees in their study planned to sponsor other family members to come to Canada, and sponsors of Syrian refugees identified family reunification as the question they are most often asked by refugees (IRCC, 2016b). A report on Syrian resettlement in Canada (Standing Committee on Human Rights, 2016: 40–41) likewise stresses the importance of family reunification for integration and mental health:

*Family reunification is an area in which the federal government can make an immediate and long-lasting impact both in the resettlement process and integration. As noted by witnesses, family reunification for refugees is good for the integration of those that are already here, but also for new arrivals. The first to arrive are able to fully focus on their integration into Canada once reunited with family, and the new arrivals’ integration is accelerated through assistance from those that arrived before them.*

5.3.5 **Faith and religion**

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40 The intervention involved peer and professional support delivered via group and one-to-one.
Religion provides an interesting point of reference when considering refugees’ resettlement and integration experiences. Regarding Indochinese refugees, Dorais (2007) highlights that, while economic, linguistic and social integration initially took priority, revitalising their religious beliefs and practices and establishing Vietnamese congregations brought a sense of continuity to refugees’ pre- and post-migration lives and identity. She notes that, even after 30 years, many Vietnamese prefer to attend their own religious institutions, as ‘most former refugees are eager to preserve some of their original values, cultural practices and mental representations – refusing total assimilation to North American culture – even if they have now generally become well integrated into mainstream society’ (Dorais, 2007: 66). On a more practical level, places of worship could potentially ‘accommodate widely-used programs (health, labour market orientation) to bridge wider community services with newcomer idioms and customs’ (Lanphier, 2003: 238).

5.3.6 The functional domain
The functional domain describes the levels of social and economic participation of refugees in their host country. The contention here is that successful integration depends on the acquisition of key competencies such as language, and access to essential resources such as housing and employment. This can be a challenge for many refugees.41

5.3.7 Language
The importance of language acquisition for refugee integration is widely acknowledged; indeed, refugees’ access to language training has been recognised as ‘a cornerstone for successful integration into Canadian society’ (Standing Committee on Human Rights, 2016: 33), and free English and French classes are available to refugees in Canada. Among resettled Syrian refugees, language was a particular issue: 83% reported not knowing English or French (the official languages of Canada) (IRCC, 2016b), and 95% of GARs and over 75% of PSRs in the Syrian resettlement programme were enrolled in some form of language training (ibid.).42

The importance of language, and the sometimes surprising ways in which it intersects with other aspects of integration, are evident in research on South-East Asian refugees in Canada. Findings from the RRP demonstrate that most refugees invested in learning English and achieved some fluency: in the initial survey, 17% of respondents spoke English well, while 16% spoke none; ten years later, the figures were 32% and 8% (Hou

41 While the sections below consider facets of integration related to health, education etc., cross-cutting elements such as information and coordination are also critical. For example, although Canada has an established system for integrating refugees into public services, it is worth noting that the provincial authorities responsible for managing Syrian resettlement were given information in advance of the arrivals which matched a previous cohort of Syrian refugees, but which was not reflective of the 2015–16 cohort. As such, one report claims that provinces were unprepared for the greater need for childminding, language classes and larger houses, and that related public services were overburdened as a result (IRCC, 2016b).
42 Uptake among Syrians (particularly PSRs) is slightly higher than among non-Syrian refugees, with 32% of non-Syrian PSRs and 6% of GARs reporting that they had not taken classes (IRCC, 2016b).
and Beiser, 2006). The authors note that, while linguistic competence increases with duration of residence, important progress is made in the initial years of resettlement. The authors also challenge the assumption that language fluency predicts employability, and instead suggest that it is better framed as a reciprocal relationship, noting that ‘steady employment, particularly in non-ethnic settings, was a powerful predictor of language acquisition’ (ibid.: 157). It is also a relationship that changes over time. In an earlier article (Beiser and Hou, 2001: 1,321), the authors report that, while English language fluency had no effect on depression or employment in the initial phase of resettlement, after ten years in Canada it was a significant predictor of both, especially among female refugees who did not enter the labour market in the early years of resettlement.43 The relationship between language and employment (and occupational mobility) among resettled refugees in Canada is complex, and the question of whether refugees should invest in learning and gaining fluency in an official language (in the hope of entering a training programme or the labour market at a higher level) or get work quickly (often in menial jobs, the only type they can attain with existing levels of language and skills) has been a long-standing dilemma, particularly for PSRs (Neuwirth and Clark, 1981).

There is some evidence of notable gender and age differences in language acquisition. Women and elderly refugees tend to have lower levels of education and knowledge on arrival, disadvantages that are compounded by lack of opportunity in Canada (as those deemed most likely to enter the workforce, mainly men, are prioritised for language classes) (Beiser and Hou, 2001). Thus, while language fluency is important to successful refugee integration, those most in need of training are often the least likely to be able to access it.

5.3.8 Economic participation and employment
This section explores the position and placement of refugees in the Canadian labour market. The literature looks primarily at earnings. In the early 2000s, studies analysed how the wages of different cohorts of refugees behaved across time. However, these studies gave little weight to the diversity of the cohorts being studied; analysis was limited to the relationship between arrival years and the time it took for refugees to find employment, and lacked a more granulated perspective. Subsequent work has taken into account not only the variables articulated in the earlier studies, but also internal differences in the composition of refugee cohorts. In this new context, discrepancies in earnings within a certain cohort, determined by sex and age for instance, became integral to the research, leading to a more detailed understanding of how refugees fare in the labour market.

We know that it takes an average of 15 years for refugees to become fully integrated in Canada’s jobs market. We also know that incomes vary across subgroups and over

43 In a subsequent article, Beiser (2009: 571) further expands on this relationship, writing that the reason language did not affect employability initially is because refugees tended to do menial jobs. He further notes that ‘The way in which the symbolism of work changed over the years provides yet another example of temporal contingency. Early on, unemployment jeopardized refugees’ mental health only because of economic deprivation and not, as it did among resident Canadians, because it threatened self-esteem. However, by the end of the first decade in Canada, unemployment was both an economic and psychological threat to the refugees’.
time. Ten years after arrival, refugees earn on average CAD 27,000, which is about CAD 14,000 below the average for Canadian-born workers; refugees who arrived prior to 1990 rely most heavily on unemployment benefits, and scholars tend to agree that refugees frequently live under or at the poverty line (evident through indicators such as their use of food banks). According to IMDB, the number of refugees who filed tax returns for the first time since their arrival year fell from 20,795 in 2004 to 14,400 in 2009. However, starting in 2010 the number has grown to 15,210 (an annual average rate of 6.1%). If tax filing is taken as an indicator of refugees’ participation in the labour market, the increase since 2010 would suggest that the number of refugees joining the labour force is also increasing. Young refugees are more likely to be unemployed than immigrant or Canadian-born youths. Female refugees too appear at a disadvantage. According to Wilkinson and Garcea, only 46% of female refugees are employed, compared to 88% of other female immigrants and 76% of Canadian-born females. Employment is at 67% for male refugees, 80% for other male immigrants and 74% for Canadian-born males (Beiser, Morton and Feng Hou, 2000). Language proficiency, education and age are the most important predictors of successful integration into the Canadian labour market (Bonikowska, Feng Hou and Picot, 2015).

Figures 1–4 show the trajectory of refugees’ income by sex, category and type of employment between 2010 and 2014, the last year available at IMDB. The median income of government-assisted female refugees was 58% of the median income of their male counterparts in 2010, rising to 60% by 2014. Among privately sponsored refugees, the female cohort saw an increase of 48% in its median income, and male refugees 70%. For self-employed, government-assisted male refugees, median incomes rose by 14% between 2010 and 2014, while for women in this category median incomes declined by 21%. The equivalent figures for privately sponsored self-employed refugees were a 6% increase for men, and a drop of 5% for women. These figures are consistent with the more general finding in the literature that female refugees face more pronounced obstacles to entering, staying in and reaping the benefits of labour market participation.

![Figure 3. Source: IMDB, 2017](image-url)
5.3.9 Housing
Numerous studies from the 1980s onwards have identified access to affordable housing as a central challenge for refugees in Canada (Neuwirth and Clark, 1981; Yu
et al., 2007; Preston et al., 2011; IRCC, 2016b). Specific issues relate to size, affordability and tenure. One study on refugees and immigrants in Toronto found that PSRs with large families ‘often live in overcrowded housing that puts them at risk of homelessness’ (Preston et al., 2011: vii). Far from being resolved in the early years of settlement, housing difficulties can persist for up to a decade after a refugee’s arrival. At the heart of the issue is money: the RAP monthly budget (for housing and other basic expenses) for a single adult in Vancouver was $610 in 2014, a city where the cost of an average bachelor apartment was $902, and a one-bedroom apartment $1,038 (or 148% of a refugee’s income; the figure was 144% in Calgary, 126% in Halifax and 106% in Winnipeg (IRCC, 2016a: 31)). Several provinces developed programmes for Syrian refugees to mitigate the challenges surrounding housing: Manitoba, for example, provided GARs with a rent supplement to cover the difference between market rates and income, and New Brunswick subsidised up to 70% of refugees’ rent for the first year (IRCC, 2016a). However, initiatives such as these are ad hoc and short-term.

5.3.10 Health

While research on refugee health in Canada includes case studies on certain groups of refugees; problems with service access and provision of care (Fowler, 1998; McKeary and Newbold, 2010); and general health considerations in the resettlement process (Hansen and Huston, 2016), most of this work pertains to mental health. One key finding is that, perhaps contrary to expectations, the great majority of refugees appear not to experience mental health problems such as depression. For South-East Asian refugees involved in the RRP, rates of depression went from 7.5% within a few years of arrival to 4.4% a few years after that, and 2.3% after a decade: ‘people with both an intimate relationship and a presumably supportive community were particularly resistant to the development of disorder’ (Beiser, 2009: 560). Based on what is known about other refugees, a minority (10–20%) of Syrian refugees resettled in Canada will have significant mental health needs over the coming years (Standing Committee on Human Rights, 2016: 38). Discrimination is known to have an impact on refugees’ mental health (Noh et al., 1999), and is strongly associated with depression. Twenty-six percent of the Indochinese refugees who took part in an RRP survey (Beiser et al., 2001) reported at least one racist experience, more often subtle (e.g. rudeness) than overt (threats or vandalism).

The central question regarding refugee health relates to utilisation and access. Among Syrian refugees, the level of demand for specific healthcare services differs by visa category, with GARs being more than twice as likely as PSRs to require referral to a specialised health service (38% to 16%) (IRCC, 2016a); this is not surprising given that many GARs are selected based on vulnerability criteria, which includes serious medical conditions. One study reports that refugees were more likely than Canadians to attempt to access healthcare in the first six months after arrival, but that after four years this proportion had declined to below the Canadian average (McKeary and Newbold, 2010). Under-utilisation of healthcare services has been reported, though no data could be found on the overall scale of the problem. One study reports that, after referral, 60% of GARs and 79% of PSRs (IRCC, 2016a) actually receive mental

44 E.g. the health needs of Kosovar women: Redwood-Campbell et al., 2007.
5.3.11 Education

Refugees are the least educated category of migrants on arrival in Canada. While numerous studies provide insight into the educational experiences of select refugees, there is little comparative or systematic information on how refugee children fare in – or the impact they have on – the Canadian education system. One report on Syrian refugees describes the Settlement Worker in Schools programme, through which the federal government supports the integration of immigrant and/or refugee children in about 3,000 schools, providing services and counselling related to settlement, education and mental health, as well as orientation at the start of the school year to prepare children for entry into the Canadian education system (Standing Committee on Human Rights, 2016). Given that 48% of Syrian refugees were below the age of 16 (Wilkinson and Garcea, 2017) and 57% below the age of 18 (IRCC, 2016b), this implies a notable increase in demand, yet the report notes that schools have managed to accommodate this, and feedback has been generally positive. One long-standing and highly successful programme, the World University Service Canada (WUSC), seeks to address challenges around resettlement and higher education by directly linking the two. Since 1978, over 1,400 refugee students have been privately sponsored to come to Canada to attend university (Hyndman et al., 2016). Hyndman et al. (2016) note that the ‘small but remarkable’ programme combines protection with social and economic development, and suggests that the government could double the number of students by making them eligible as BVORs, or adding them to the roster of GARs.

There is limited understanding of the unique experiences and integration of refugee children and young people in Canada (Pressé and Thomson, 2008). Of the research that exists, Hyman, Vu and Beiser (2000) identify post-migration stresses among young South-East Asian refugees youth related to school adjustment (marginalisation and cultural conflict), parent–child relationships (communication difficulties and high parental expectations), and intra-personal conflict (related to inter-generational

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45 Wilkinson (2002), for example, found that about half were doing well, about a third were experiencing some difficulty finishing secondary school and about a fifth were not expecting to complete it. He identified three individual variables affecting educational status (ethnicity, number of months in Canada and grade placement on arrival) and two family variables (positive impact of living in an urban setting, likely linked to availability of services for newcomers, and parental health).

46 For further analysis of the origins, development and significance of the WUSC programme, see Peterson (2012).
differences in acculturation, values and ethnic identity). In a Rapid Impact Evaluation of Syrian resettlement, young Syrians expressed concerns related to education and labour market integration, while partners and stakeholders expressed concern that, given integration challenges, young refugees could ‘become disenfranchised and have a harder time developing a sense of belonging to their communities’ (IRCC, 2016b: 28). Reports on both South-East Asian and Syrian refugees note that children appear to be a socialising force, particularly in helping their parents improve their language skills and communicate with members of their community (teachers, doctors, neighbours) (Beiser and Hou, 2000; IRCC, 2016b).

5.3.12 Integration: final thoughts

Canada has long recognised the importance of investing financial and human resources to support the integration of resettled refugees, whether through the Private Sponsorship Program or programmes to address needs related to language, training and health. Refugees’ own efforts to establish themselves in the country, together with this investment, has resulted in some success, if success is measured by indicators related to socio-economic integration and the satisfaction of refugees themselves. According to IRCC (2016: 23) ‘the majority of Syrian GARs and PSRs (77% for both groups) indicated that they were happy or very happy with their lives in Canada … In addition, 90% of Syrian GARs and PSRs reported having a somewhat strong or very strong sense of belonging to Canada’. With reference to the Indochinese, after a decade in Canada:

86% of the SEA refugees were working, feeling healthy, and speaking English with moderate proficiency; in other words, they could be classified as successful … In response to questions about daily life and well-being, the successful group, on average, felt that their life chances were better than they would have been at home, that their family relationships were better, and that their children would benefit from a superior education in Canada.

Inevitably, not every refugee integrates well and happily: of the studies cited above, 6% of Syrian refugees were not at all happy/a little bit happy with their lives in Canada, while 17% were somewhat happy, and 14% of refugees in the RRP did not integrate well (based on language, health and employment indicators); more broadly, many refugees in Canada live in poverty, with unstable or inadequate employment and housing, and more limited life chances than those born in Canada. Their stories and experiences are part of the narrative of refugee resettlement in Canada, and need to be better understood to ensure that individuals and groups of resettled refugees receive the support they need to rebuild their lives.

6. Conclusion

Canada is often held up as a model resettlement country, and a global leader in the policy and practice of refugee resettlement. It has adopted a broader understanding of refugeehood and the situations from which refugees can be resettled than outlined in the 1951 Convention; it has capitalised on pivotal windows of opportunity (such as the strong international push for countries to resettle Syrian refugees, and receptivity among Canadians to receive them); and it has developed a renowned private
resettlement programme. The basis of its reputation rests in the unique programmes and policies the country has created to resettle and integrate refugees (in particular private sponsorship), as well as its willingness to resettle large numbers of refugees quickly (including tens of thousands of Indochinese and Syrian refugees).

Yet the ‘success’ of the Canadian model is also amplified by comparison with countries that explicitly restrict the entry or integration of refugees, with insufficient recognition (particularly in international fora) of Canada’s unique situation and complex record in refugee response. As a result of geography and the Safe Third Country Agreement, Canada receives few asylum-seekers, giving it significant control over the number and profile of refugees it selects for resettlement. Canada is ethnically diverse, with a relatively generous welfare state, positive public attitudes towards refugees and a strong history of resettling them. These factors are shared by few other countries, which means that it cannot be assumed that policies that work well in Canada will also work well elsewhere.47

In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to Canada’s private sponsorship model, and the potential to implement it in other countries.48 Yet, as Hyndman et al. (2016: 16) note, there is no standard private sponsorship ‘recipe’, and there are ways in which private resettlement in Canada itself can be improved, including:

- greater involvement of refugees in shaping their own resettlement,
- the reconceptualization of sponsorship as a partnership between newcomers and their sponsors, recognition of the importance of transnational linkages for newcomers, and the expanded use of places of worship for hosting widely used programs such as health and employment services so as to bridge community services with the languages and customs of newcomers.

Extensive efforts are made – on individual, collective and policy levels – to integrate resettled refugees in Canada, and research conducted over the last 40 years provides a valuable source of evidence on integration experiences, from the perspective of refugees, individual hosts (sponsors) and institutions (e.g. healthcare providers). While the disparate nature of the evidence makes it hard to draw generalisable conclusions, key findings nevertheless emerge. First, the factors underpinning integration are deeply interconnected, with clear links between language, employment and mental health (Beiser, 2009). Learning an official language to some degree of fluency is challenging (particularly when doing so is privileged over getting a job), but is a particularly worthwhile investment in the early years of resettlement. Offering and encouraging uptake of language classes for all refugees (not just those deemed most likely to enter the workforce) is one way to improve the prospects of successful integration.

Second, integration is a long process. While critics and supporters of refugee resettlement are understandably keen to know how resettled refugees are faring,

47 Indeed, if one looks beyond resettlement to refugee response more broadly (including treatment of landed asylum-seekers and boat arrivals), Canada’s ‘welcome’ wanes, as it adopts practices (such as the detention of some asylum-seekers) in line with more restrictive states.
48 See, for example, Kumin (2015).
caution is called for in drawing conclusions in the early years of resettlement, and there is a need for more longitudinal research across refugee groups. For example, the RRP tracks significant changes (including increased language acquisition and employment and changes in mental health) over the first decade rather than first few years of resettlement of Indochinese refugees. More research is also needed on the integration of refugees across multiple generations. Lastly, while Canada is often held up as a gold standard for how to resettle refugees, the evidence surrounding integration is more nuanced and, in some regards, mixed. Particularly in the early years, many refugees live in poverty and struggle to find their feet. While commending Canada’s welcoming culture for refugees in Canada, and the investment the country makes in resettling and integrating refugees, there is a need to contextualise good practice and avoid holding up any one example as a panacea for the challenges of rebuilding the lives of refugees in resettlement.

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Germany as an Immigration Country: From Denial to Integration

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1. Context
One of the most significant trends in post-war Europe has been the way migration has changed nation-states across the continent (Green, 2013). Germany’s transformation has perhaps been the most striking (ibid.). Today, more than 15% of Germany’s population are foreign-born (Rietig and Müller, 2016), and one-fifth of Germany’s 82 million inhabitants have a migration background, including one-third of children under the age of six (Foroutan, 2013). From a country that did not historically see itself as a ‘country of immigration’, Germany is more actively embracing its status as one of the most attractive immigration destinations in Europe.

Germany has gone through many waves of inward and outward migration since 1945, including post-war refugees; a surge in outward and internal migration with the division of East and West Germany (Kurthen, 1995); the arrival into West Germany of over 4 million ethnic Germans (Aussiedler oder Spätaussiedler), primarily from Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union; refugees from Iran during the 1980s and from the Balkans/former Yugoslavia in the 1990s; Iraqi refugees; and refugees from the current Syrian conflict. The country’s longstanding demand for foreign workers has also made it an attractive destination, and between 1955 and the end of the ‘guest worker’ (Gastarbeiter) scheme in 1973 millions of unskilled and low-skilled workers entered the country (Green, 2013). While most (around 11 million) returned home, around 3 million remained in Germany, and their efforts to reunify families resulted in a sustained stream of immigration throughout the 1970s (Rietig and Müller, 2016).

Figure 1: Migration to and from Germany, 1950–2014

Source: Migration Policy Institute, 2016

Between the end of the Second World War and the early 1970s, the number of asylum applications was relatively low (between 4,300 and 5,600). After 1973, there was a significant change in both the volume and origin of asylum-seekers – with many more coming from outside Europe (Kreienbrink, 2013). By 1979, forced displacement had emerged as a significant source of immigration, with close to 2.6 million asylum applications lodged in Germany over the following two decades (Green, 2013). The number of asylum-seekers reached its first peak between 1979 and 1981, with a total
of 200,000 applying for asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany (Schneider and Engler, 2015). Between 1989 and 1994, Germany witnessed another peak in forcibly displaced people seeking asylum (see Figure 2), particularly from the Balkans. From Yugoslavia alone, about 350,000 refugees fled to Germany; while some claimed asylum, the majority were granted temporary leave to remain (so-called ‘tolerated stay’) (ibid.). As can be seen in Figure 2, the number of asylum-seekers increased once more by the middle of the 1980s, as Tamils from Sri Lanka and Kurds from Turkey, Iraq and Iran sought refuge in Germany. Between 1980 and 1999, West Germany was by far the largest destination for asylum-seekers in Western Europe.

**Figure 2: Asylum applications in the Federal Republic of Germany (1973–2014)**

![Graph showing asylum applications from 1973 to 2014](image)

Source: BAMF (2015); Federal Agency for Civic Education (2014)

The increase in arrivals of asylum-seekers throughout the 1980s, coupled with another peak in arrivals of ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) and the perceived increasing expenditure on these groups – largely due to the lack of a coherent integration policy which did not allow asylum-seekers to work and enforced their stay in communal housing – led to an increasingly tense and politicised debate around asylum-seekers and immigration more generally (Kreienbrink, 2013), including the extent to which asylum law was being abused by ‘economic migrants’ (Schneider and Engler, 2015). As the asylum debate became increasingly heated during the 1980s, federal and provincial governments sought to curb asylum claims, making it more difficult to appeal against negative decisions, imposing a visa requirement for countries of origin, preventing asylum-seekers from working during the first 12 months of the asylum procedure, cutting social benefits and imposing residency restrictions (Residenzpflicht) (Schneider and Engler, 2015). Despite these restrictions, as can be seen in Figure 2 the number of asylum applications continued to rise, with an exponential increase between 1988 and 1992. Rather than curbing forced migration, restrictions instead encouraged rejected asylum-seekers to remain in the country without pursuing an appeal and pushed a significant number to decide against applying for asylum at all.
Germany’s obligations under international human rights law, especially in cases of lost identity documents, made deportation virtually impossible, and eventually 60–70% of those rejected as de jure refugees were allowed to stay and work indefinitely as ‘tolerated migrants’. Others stayed on as undocumented illegals (Kurthen, 1995). In 1992, a cross-party compromise called the ‘Asylkompromiss’ restricted the constitutional right to asylum, including the introduction of ‘safe third country’ and ‘safe country of origin’ principles (Green, 2013). The result was a sharp decrease in asylum claims, which reached their lowest level between 2006 and 2009 (ibid.).

Throughout these ups and downs, policy-makers continued to assert that Germany was ‘not an immigration country’, despite the existence of immigration since the 1950s, and the large number of foreign workers in the country. This changed in the early 2000s when the new social democrat/green coalition introduced a number of key legislative changes and reforms. These effectively accepted that immigration (both by migrants and by asylum-seekers) was an inevitable fact that could not be undone. The coalition also started looking into how integration processes could be enhanced and made more sustainable (Kreienbrink, 2013). With the large inflows in recent years integration efforts have been accelerated and more holistic and expansive integration policies have been developed. At the same time, however, public unease and anti-immigrant sentiment has grown, leading to a tightening of asylum policies since 2015–16 (Rietig and Müller, 2016).

This study explores the economic, demographic, social and political impacts of forced displacement to Germany. We focus in particular on three main waves: Afghans (from the end of the 1980s); Iranians (from the end of the 1970s); and the most recent wave of arrivals (from 2015–16), mainly Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis. The study will also consider integration policies towards these groups, and how successful (or not) they have been at integrating both economically and socio-politically, and how public opinion towards forced displacement has evolved. While the study focuses on forced displacement (not just refugees in the narrow sense of the definition), it also draws on studies and data on migration more broadly (including economic migrants), to illustrate commonalities or distinctions between these groups. No data is available specifically on the economic impacts of forced displacement. Detailed data on refugees is only available from the 1990s on, as refugees have mainly been treated as part of the larger group of migrants.

2. Legal and policy frameworks

2.1 National legislation and legal framework

Germany is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, which is enshrined in the constitution of the Federal Republic and integrated into German law. The right to asylum is codified in Article 16a of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Asylum Act (Asyl Gesetz).\(^49\) Germany offers subsidiary protection based on the European Convention on Human Rights on Subsidiary Protection, which has been transposed into national legislation through Section 4 of the Asylum Act.

\(^{49}\) Until 2011 there was a legal difference between the entitlement to asylum according to the German Basic Law and acceptance as a refugee according to the Convention.
Through this, and as per Section 4(3) of the Asylum Act, a foreign national ‘shall be eligible for subsidiary protection if he has shown substantial grounds for believing that he would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in his country of origin’ (Asylum Act, 2008). Serious harm includes ‘serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict’ (ibid.). According to Section 60 of the Residence Act, ‘a foreigner may not be deported to a state in which his or her life or liberty is under threat on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a certain social group or political convictions’ (paragraph 1), or ‘to a state where they face serious harm as referred to in Section 4 (1) of the Asylum Act’ (paragraph 2), and as per paragraph 7 ‘to another state in which this foreigner faces a substantial concrete danger to his or her life and limb or liberty’ (Residence Act, 2008) – following the international customary norm of non-refoulement. The Asylum Act and the Residence Act also provide rules for the admission of refugees and the handling of refugee claims. The Asylum Act codifies the process for and consequences of granting and denying asylum, whereas the Residence Act covers the entry, stay, exit and employment of foreigners in general.

Until the early 2000s, Germany did not have specific policies geared towards the integration of immigrants, let alone an immigration law (Green, 2015). Labour migrants from outside the European Economic Area (EEA) had no legal avenue for coming to and working in Germany. This changed in 2000, when German citizenship law was liberalised to make it easier for immigrants and their children to become German citizens, and for natives and immigrants to hold dual citizenship. The following year, a highly influential government-appointed commission, the Süssmuth Commission, set out comprehensive reform plans for immigration policy and integration. This was followed by the 2005 immigration law, which included the Residence Act governing immigration of third-country nationals and the EU Freedom of Movement Act governing immigration of EU citizens. The Residence Act significantly reduced the administrative complexities of residence procedures and highlighted the importance of integration, making it for the first time a responsibility of the federal government, rather than of immigrants themselves (Rietig and Müller, 2016). New integration courses funded by the federal government were introduced, focusing on language training and legal and cultural orientation (ibid.).

Coincident with these changes to Germany’s overall immigration law, there were also important amendments to its asylum law, which meant that many of the restrictions under the 1992 asylum compromise were gradually abolished, and an increasingly generous interpretation of humanitarian protection was established (ibid.). In particular the 2004 EU Qualifications Directive and 2011 EU Asylum Procedures Directive requested that those granted refugee status under the Geneva Convention be guaranteed the same rights as those granted asylum under the German Basic law. The principle of ‘subsidiary protection’ was also introduced (ibid.).

Most refugees are accepted through an in-country asylum claim, although there are additional routes to refugee protection such as the humanitarian admissions programme and resettlement and relocation programmes at the national and European level (Korntheuer, 2017). Germany participates in the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)’s resettlement programme and the EU-wide resettlement programme, though the numbers resettled through these schemes are
low (300 a year in 2013–14, increasing to 500 in 2015 and 1,600 in 2016–17 through the EU resettlement scheme). Under Germany’s lesser-known humanitarian assistance programme for Syria, a total of 20,000 Syrian refugees from Syria and neighbouring countries are allowed entry, while an additional 21,500 were admitted by the end of 2015 under a private sponsorship scheme that began in 2013. Germany also grants temporary protection to local Afghan staff whose work with German troops or officials in Afghanistan may have exposed them to danger.

The number of asylum-seekers increased dramatically from 2015, prompting an outpouring of support by civil society activists and volunteers. What was widely referred to as ‘Willkommenskultur’ or ‘welcome culture’ seemed to demonstrate widespread acceptance of these new arrivals. However, over time discontent has grown, alongside a rise in anti-immigrant political parties, and Germany has adopted a series of new, tighter immigration and asylum laws and policies. Legislative changes in 2015 and 2016 (part of the so-called Asylum Package II) envision an accelerated asylum procedure for a large number of asylum-seekers, with a target of one week to complete applications. The Asylum Procedure Acceleration Act of 2015 designated Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro as ‘safe’ countries of origin, meaning that applicants from these countries are not allowed to work and will have their applications rejected more quickly than previously. Other claimants with a good prospect of being allowed to stay are to be integrated into the labour market more quickly, and benefit from early integration measures such as occupational language training. Tougher measures were also introduced for those who refuse to participate in integration schemes, including cuts to benefits, and the ability to stay in Germany permanently has been linked to successful participation in these schemes (Rietig and Müller, 2016). In addition to access to training and language courses, as well as benefits, a refugee’s status determines their rights to family reunion. Recognised refugees are given an immediate right to family reunion, whereas family reunion is currently on hold for those who obtained subsidiary protection after March 2016.

2.2 Freedom of movement and accommodation

The responsibility for and allocation of asylum-seekers is shared between the federal government, the provinces (Länder) and municipalities. A quota, the ‘Königstein Key’, is used to allocate asylum-seekers based on the population and tax revenues of each German state, giving no say to asylum-seekers about their preferred location. The asylum procedure is handled by the BAMF, while the provinces and municipalities are responsible for providing accommodation and social benefits. During the first three months of the asylum process, asylum-seekers are housed in specialised reception centres (Residenzpflicht), are not allowed to move freely or work, and are required to remain in the district where they registered (Eurofound, 2016). People who have been granted refugee status or subsidiary protection receive a residence permit. Municipalities and provinces decide on a case-by-case basis whether to house asylum-seekers in accommodation centres (Gemeinschaftsunterkünfte) or state-provided apartments, decentralised housing (see

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51 According to the BAMF the Königstein Key is calculated on an annual basis by the bureau of the Federation-Länder Commission (http://www.bamf.de/EN/Service/Left/Glossary/_function/glossar.html?lv3=1504234&lv2=1450778).
Informationsverbund Asyl und Migration, 2017), or allow them to seek accommodation in the private housing market, where they may find themselves competing with other migrants and German nationals. Local implementation of federal guidelines is not uniform and differs between provinces (Scholz, 2016).

2.3 Right to work: from the European to the national

With the exception of Ireland and Lithuania, every member of the European Economic Area (EEA) grants asylum-seekers the right to work at some point during their application process and before a decision is made on their application. However, under the 1951 Refugee Convention there is no obligation on states to grant asylum-seekers the right to work, and states do not commonly grant asylum-seekers the immediate right to access the labour market for fear that this would encourage more asylum-seekers, as well as economic migrants, and for political and public opinion reasons. Aside from Greece and Sweden, which grant an almost immediate right to work, waiting periods vary from two months (in the case of Italy) to 12 months (in the case of the UK) (Migration Watch UK, 2013; OECD, 2016a).

Figure 3: Waiting period until a work permit is granted across EEA countries (in months)

Source: OECD, 2016a. Certain employment conditions apply in some countries, e.g. labour market tests.

Once an asylum-seeker receives a positive decision on their application in the EEA, they are granted the right to work (OECD, 2016a). The key problem in Europe is the period between an asylum application and becoming a recognised refugee. During this time, asylum-seekers are dependent on social assistance from the state and are in many cases unable to access language classes or other educational or training courses. Although research shows that granting the right to work facilitates integration, many countries believe that, before an asylum-seeker is recognised, there is little incentive to invest resources in their integration. Yet without initiating the integration process prior to approving an application, recognised refugees will not be immediately able to work due to language and other educational barriers (Chope, 2012)
2.3.1 Access to the local labour market
Prior to 2014, refugees in Germany were expected to pass a proof of precedence test (Vorrangigkeitsprüfung) before receiving the right to work. This meant that German nationals and those holding permanent residency had priority access to any open job positions, and employers were required to demonstrate that they had been unsuccessful in attracting a German national to the vacancy. Similar rules applied to apprenticeships, with the additional stipulation that the candidate had to demonstrate a good likelihood of keeping their refugee status and becoming self-sufficient. Refugees had access to the same level of social support (in the form of financial assistance, rent coverage, health insurance etc.) as a long-term unemployed German (Barslund et al., 2016).

Starting in 2014, the hurdles to employment for refugees and those with subsidiary protection have been progressively reduced. Initially, the right to work could be given to asylum-seekers (but not to tolerated persons, i.e. rejected individuals who are not deported) after three months of their formal application, but required a proof of precedence and that the individual was not a national of a so-called secure third country. The proof of precedence was subsequently reduced to a period of 15 months, before being abandoned altogether in most provinces. While refugees staying at reception centres are not given the right to work, the waiting time to access the labour market for asylum-seekers with a good prospect of being granted asylum is now officially three months (Eurofound, 2016). Recognised asylum-seekers and those with tolerated status are allowed to engage in self-employment, though the latter are required to ask for permission from the immigration authorities. Employers can offer an unpaid three-month internship for career guidance purposes, including a six-week assessment (ibid.).

3. Impacts of forced displacement on Germany and prospects for integration
Germany has experienced a significant increase in asylum applications since 2013, and since 2014 has received the largest number of asylum applications in Europe. Previously, France and the UK processed the largest number of asylum-seekers.
**Figure 4: Final decisions on applications by refugees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>First application</th>
<th>Subsequent applications after withdrawal or denial of first application</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>30,303</td>
<td>19,164</td>
<td>11,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>28,018</td>
<td>22,085</td>
<td>5,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>33,033</td>
<td>27,649</td>
<td>5,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>48,589</td>
<td>41,332</td>
<td>7,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>53,347</td>
<td>45,741</td>
<td>7,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>77,651</td>
<td>64,539</td>
<td>13,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>127,023</td>
<td>10,958</td>
<td>17,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>202,834</td>
<td>173,072</td>
<td>29,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>476,649</td>
<td>441,899</td>
<td>34,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>745,545</td>
<td>722,370</td>
<td>23,175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Developed by the authors based on Eurostat, data set as of July 2017, extracted in August 2017.
Figure 5: Applications for asylum, 1953–2016

The ten largest groups comprise more than two-thirds of all refugees in 2013 and 2014, and more than 80% for the years 2015 and 2016, with Syrians making up by far the largest group of forcibly displaced people. Afghans and Syrians represent the largest groups of forcibly displaced people in Germany for at least the last five years.

Figure 6: The ten largest countries of origin, 2013–2016

Source: Developed by the authors based on data from the Federal Office for Migration
3.1 Demographic impacts

3.1.1 Demographic profile of the forcibly displaced population

There are three main sources on recent asylum applicants to Germany. The first key source is published by the BAMF, based on a 2014 representative survey of people entitled to asylum and recognised refugees (Worbs et al., 2016). The second is based on analysis of a database of all first-time asylum applicants in 2015 who agreed to respond to additional questions, also published by the BAMF (Rich, 2016). This is therefore not a representative sample. The third is a representative survey of 4,800 refugees who applied for asylum in Germany between 2013 and 2016 (IAB/BAMF/SOEP, 2016). These three sources thus differ in the time period they cover (with some overlaps) and the types of forced displacement they are concerned with. All three, however, show that the forcibly displaced population has a different demographic composition than the German population.

Gender profile

Compared to the German population, there is a greater share of men than women, around two-thirds male to one-third female (Worbs et al., 2016). The Rich (2016) study based on 2015 data suggests that up to 75% of asylum-seekers are male (Rich, 2016). This male–female breakdown is found among Syrian, Afghan and Iraqi asylum-seekers. However, this is a recent phenomenon; over the past 50 years, immigration has seen only a small gender imbalance.

Age profile

Like most industrialised countries, German society is aging, increasing dependency ratios between the non-working and the actively working population. The inflow of young migrants and refugees may alleviate the imminent pension crisis. The forcibly displaced population has a much younger demographic profile than those with German ancestry (see Figure 7). Young people aged between 18 and 34 constitute the largest share by far in all nationality groups and in the total refugee population. Crucially, the over-50s do not account for a tenth share in any group. The share of the youngest group is largest for Afghan refugees, with more than 70% in that category, giving an overall average age of 32.5 years (Worbs et al., 2016). This means that the forcibly displaced population is generally of working age, but it also implies that they could be more likely to need state services (there is more discussion on this below).

52 This survey was based on responses from 2,800 people entitled to asylum and recognised refugees from Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq, Iran, Sri Lanka and Syria, aged between 18 and 69, and whose asylum application was approved between 2008 and 2012.
53 This is the so-called ‘Soziale Komponente’ questionnaire, which includes questions on education, language skills and employment.
54 This includes people entitled to asylum, failed asylum-seekers and recognised refugees. The first part of the results of this survey have recently been published under Forschungsbericht 29. The analysis of the second part of the survey was published after this report was produced.
The average number of children per woman is significantly higher than in the German population. With the exception of Iranians and Sri Lankans, with an average of 1.7 and 2.1 children respectively, the range is from 2.7 for Afghan refugees and 3.1 for Iraqis, according to the 2014 study by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees.

### 3.1.2 Education levels

Levels of education among the forcibly displaced are, as to be expected, lower than in the German population. The Worbs et al. (2014) study shows that around 16% had no education (25% for Iraqis, 18% for Afghans, 16% for Syrians). Roughly 70% of all respondents in the survey attended school for between five and 14 years (Worbs and Bund, 2016, based on Worbs et al., 2014). Approximately 13% can be categorised as ‘unskilled’ with regard to schooling and formal vocational training taken together, while just over 10% can be regarded as ‘higher-skilled’ (13% for Afghans, 8% for Syrians) (ibid.).

The 2016 study based on the database of asylum-seekers finds that 7% had no educational attainments (27% for Afghans, 18% for Iraqis, around 5% for Syrians), 22% some primary schooling, around 50% some form of secondary education and 18% higher education (27% for Syrians) (Rich, 2016). The most recent study (IAB/BAMF/SOEP, 2016) shows that 55% of asylum-seekers have completed ten years of schooling, and 58% have spent ten years or more in school, higher education or professional education, compared to 88% in the German population. At the upper end of the spectrum, around 37% of those aged 18 and above have attended secondary/high school, and 32% have completed their high school education; those at this end of the spectrum have comparable or even slightly higher levels of education than the German population – for comparison, around 29% of the German population have completed high school or similar. In the middle, 31% have attended middle school (comparable to German Hauptschule or Realschule, i.e. secondary school) (22% completed), and at the lower end 10% of asylum-seekers only attended primary school and 9% attended no school at all. In other words, at the higher end of the spectrum the qualifications of asylum-seekers are not very different from the overall German
population but are significantly different in the middle and at the lower end. There are also significant differences between asylum-seekers from countries that have experienced prolonged wars (such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan), where the education sector has been decimated, leaving large numbers of people without formal education, and countries like Syria, where education levels are comparatively high (ibid.).

Figure 8: Education level of refugees based on full database of asylum applicants in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia Federation</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Developed by the authors based on data from the BAMF Soko Database, 2016.

Recent data on asylum-seekers shows a varied and diverse picture of educational attainment, and one that is highly dependent on the country of origin. Comparing the more recent survey described in Rich (2016) to the earlier study of Worbs et al. (2014), we can see somewhat higher education levels in the Rich (2016) study, in particular
regarding Syrians (8% against 27% with higher education), though it is unclear if this is a trend that will continue in the long run.\textsuperscript{55} Many have high ambitions for future education: 40% of asylum seekers surveyed aim to attain a high school certificate in Germany, and two-thirds a university or professional leaving certificate (IAB/BAMF/SOEP, 2016). This could have important consequences for the German education system, as well as highlighting the importance of integration measures such as language training and professional integration. However, it remains to be seen whether refugees will be prepared to invest substantially in education or professional training, potentially at the expense of starting a job and earning an income more quickly (ibid.).

\subsection*{3.1.3 Women and girls}
More than 500,000 women and girls came to Germany between 2012 and 2016, mainly from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq (Worbs and Bauralina, 2016). Most are young and live with their families (ibid.). They tend to have lower educational qualifications than men, and often lack any form of schooling or vocational training (Worbs and Bund, 2016). In the 25–65 age group, unskilled women account for 17%, compared to 10.8% for men. The share is particularly high among Iraqi women, at 27.2%. Women are also most represented in the group with no vocational qualifications (the highest is again Iraqi women, at 82%). On average, women also tend to have significantly less experience of paid work in their countries of origin (Worbs and Baraulina, 2017). As women account for only one-third of refugees, this is unlikely to have a major impact on the labour market, but it does have implications for their integration because women are less likely to work and more likely to be ‘stuck’ at home. See below for a more detailed discussion.

\subsection*{3.1.4 Place of residence}
Data from 2014 shows that most refugees live in large cities (Worbs et al., 2016). This means that impacts on public services will be felt particularly strongly in cities and large agglomerations, though schools and service providers in these areas should also have more experience with migrants and refugee children. This was also one of the reasons behind the additional obligations on asylum seekers introduced in 2016: only those able and willing to find a job are allowed to settle wherever they want in Germany (after the three-month waiting period); others have to accept their place of residence as determined by the official distribution system (the ‘\textit{Königsteiner Schlüssel}’) (Rietig and Mueller, 2016).

\subsection*{3.2 Education}
Like German children, the children of refugees and asylum seekers (including those who have a ‘tolerated’ status (temporary leave to remain)) are required by law to attend full-time education for nine or ten years – with few exceptions\textsuperscript{56} – and are given the opportunity to obtain an official school certificate (Müller et al., 2014). Given the

\textsuperscript{55} We also need to keep in mind that they are sampling somewhat different populations.

\textsuperscript{56} Education is the responsibility of the provinces, so there are regional variations. For example, in Berlin schooling is not compulsory for asylum seekers who have not yet been granted asylum.
educational differentials discussed above, refugee children frequently require additional years of preparatory classes before switching from primary to secondary school or follow regular classes while receiving additional language tuition (Schroeder and Seukwa, 2007). Insufficient resources mean that schools are often unprepared to accommodate young immigrants (Eurofound, 2016).

The state actively supports extra-curricular activities, such as school trips. Figure 9 provides an overview of the support provided by the state to parents of school-age children. Additional funding is available for children with learning difficulties and physical disabilities, but this is dependent on their leave to remain status (Weiser, 2016).

**Figure 9: School support for asylum-seekers in 2016 and first quartile of 2017**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School excursions</td>
<td>50000</td>
<td>50000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School trips (lasting several days)</td>
<td>100000</td>
<td>150000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School supplies</td>
<td>150000</td>
<td>200000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>250000</td>
<td>300000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning support</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>500000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board</td>
<td>100000</td>
<td>150000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in social and cultural life as part of the community</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The categories are: 1) School excursions, 2) School trips (lasting several days), 3) School supplies, 4) Transportation, 5) Learning support, 6) Board, 7) Participation in social and cultural life as part of the community.

Source: Developed by the authors based on data from the Federal Statistical Office 2017 – Benefits for asylum-seekers.

On condition of having obtained a minimum language proficiency at level C1 and providing proof of the necessary formal qualification, refugees are allowed to attend university in Germany. In addition, the ‘3 plus 2’ rule is intended to guarantee greater legal security for those employing an asylum-seeker as an apprentice, as requested by employers. Since February 2016, asylum-seekers (including those granted leave to remain) can start an apprenticeship under certain circumstances, and are protected
from deportation during their training, and for two additional years if they succeed in finding work after completing their training (OECD, 2017). Asylum-seekers are also entitled to the same level of pay as German apprentices pay according to the Federal Employment Office (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, see 2017).

In response to recent refugee inflows, the German government has provided additional funding of €130m (Bundestag, 2016). The Education Ministry (BMBF) has developed an app to teach German, trained teaching assistants, developed special reading kits for refugees, and put in place funding for educational coordinators at municipal level (ibid.). Many schools have introduced ‘welcome classes’ and integration courses (Judith Kohlenberger, Wittgenstein Centre, draft).

There is as yet no systematic empirical evidence on the impact of refugee children on the German education system, but in terms of numbers it is unlikely to be substantial (Robert Bosch foundation, 2015). However, it is also important to consider the needs and additional requirements of refugee children, which are likely to be higher than for German children (ibid.). Thus, while the actual number of Syrian children attending primary school in 2014–15 (5,440) led to only a very small increase in enrolment rates, and as such did not have any measurable impact on the characteristics of the primary school population (Blossfeld et al., 2016), Wößmann (2016) argues that pupils do not have a standard of education equivalent to their German counterparts. There is some evidence that individual institutions are overburdened, with teachers unable to cope or who do not know how to deal with the specific challenges involved (Blossfeld et al., 2016; Karakayali et al., 2017). Many teachers feel that they do not have the right training or knowledge (ibid.), making integration more difficult. It is not yet clear to what extent the new initiatives rolled out by the German government will overcome some of the challenges identified by teachers. More broadly, 26.5% of asylum applications in 2015 were made by minors under the age of 16, mostly from Eritrea, Syria and Serbia, for a total of 117,000 applications. These numbers are growing (Blossfeld et al., 2016). These children fall under compulsory education but are particularly difficult to integrate. They have highly heterogeneous educational backgrounds, most do not speak German and many also need psychological support (ibid.). Refugee children and youth in their late teens are no longer obliged to go to school and have no right to education. Lack of education makes it difficult for them to access work easily. To our knowledge this issue has not been explored.

3.3 Healthcare

Asylum-seekers are initially screened for infectious diseases (Bozorgmehr et al., 2016), but not systematically for chronic diseases or mental health disorders (including trauma). Asylum-seekers whose application has been formally granted and who have a long-term residence permit are eligible for full public healthcare, as are asylum-seekers who have been subject to the Asylum Seekers’ Benefit Act for longer than 48 months, regardless of status (Bozorgmehr and Razum, 2015). According to the Asylum Seekers’ Benefit Act, all other groups receive only emergency medical care, necessary vaccinations, dental care for painful conditions and support during pregnancy and childbirth. Aftercare is subject to individual application and assessment. Psychotherapy is rarely granted, and only if the need for it is judged to be acute (Klein, 2016).
Perinatal and neonatal mortality rates are consistently higher in foreign-born groups, especially Turkish immigrants, than in the population as a whole (Carballo and Nerukar, 2001). The rate of perinatal mortality for babies born to German mothers is approximately 5.2%, and among non-nationals approximately 7%, and the incidence of congenital abnormalities and maternal mortality is also higher among immigrants (ibid.). A study on migrants from the former Soviet Union showed that male immigrants had a significantly higher risk of dying from external causes and suicide than Germans, and this increases with the frequency of residential changes (Ott et al., 2008). There is little data on the health status of refugees, but isolated studies suggest that refugees are more likely to have mental health issues and PTSD and are at greater risk of suicide (Razum et al., 2008). Children in particular need specialised support (ibid.). The IAB/BAMF/SOEP (2016) also shows that individuals with a background of forced displacement are more satisfied with their general health status but are more likely to suffer from depression.

There is little evidence as to the impact of asylum-seekers and refugees on the health system. Several studies show that migrants and refugees make less use of preventive healthcare services (Kohls, 2011; Razum et al., 2008); for refugees, this effect is especially strong for vaccinations (Razum et al., 2008). This is of course linked to the fact that they are on the whole not eligible for these services (see above). Initial restrictions on access to health services can lead to higher follow-up costs if mental health and other health issues go untreated (Bozorgmehr and Razum, 2015; Norredam et al., 2005). The current system shifts care from the less expensive primary sector to costly treatments for acute conditions in the secondary and tertiary sectors, increasing the direct costs of treatment and administrative costs (Bozorgmehr and Razum, 2015). Other barriers to healthcare include language and the availability of interpreters. One study (Bischoff and Denhaerynck, 2010) shows that language barriers can affect usage of health services and hence the costs to the health system in the short and longer term.

There is also a general question as to whether refugees need health services more, though this has not been explored. For labour migrants, analysis has shown that there is a so-called ‘healthy migrant effect’. This means that migrants tend to be healthier than the native population in the beginning due to self-selection, and so will not use health services as much. There is no analysis on whether this effect also holds for refugees, though studies by Razum and colleagues suggest this may not be the case (Razum et al., 2008; Bozorgmehr and Razum, 2015; Razum and Wenner, 2016). Refugees are also more likely to have mental health issues, disabilities and injuries from war or sustained on the journey (see Lindert et al., 2009 for a cross-European systematic review which shows this). The health of refugees in Germany is better than the population back home, and there is likely to have been positive selection of refugees: journeys to Europe are physically challenging, and younger and healthier refugees are more likely to have attempted the journey. Evidence in this area is still lacking, but it is clear that whether there is a ‘healthy refugee effect’ depends on the comparison group.
3.4 Economic impacts and integration prospects

3.4.1. Key features of Germany’s integration policy

German policy-makers have focused on developing a more holistic set of integration policies since 2015, which has also resulted in a number of legal changes, notably through the Integration Act of 2016. Integration focuses on three key areas: language, employment and societal interaction/integration (Blickpunkt Integration, 2017). Integration measures are linked, so for example while the earliest possible integration into the labour market is clearly a primary goal, this can only be achieved with focused language training that aims, not only at learning the language itself, but also connecting language training with employment and labour market integration, such as how to write job applications (ibid.). Another important element has been the targeting of integration measures more specifically to the needs and characteristics of new arrivals. Thus, specific integration courses help familiarise new arrivals with societal norms and values. A key feature here has been an on average nine-month-long integration course. Although established in 2005, long before the recent refugee influx, access to the course has been widened to cover, not only asylum seekers, but also those with ‘tolerated’ status prior to obtaining official asylum status. The course includes a 60-hour ‘cultural orientation’ with an introduction to German culture and society, as well as 600 contact hours (Unterrichtseinheiten) of German-language teaching (Trines, 2017). The new integration measures allow for more rapid integration for some asylum seekers, but also place more responsibility on newcomers to accept course offers and actively participate in integration schemes, with those refusing to participate facing benefit cuts.

Hundreds of new integration projects have also been created (and are supported by federal budgets) that aim to support interaction between new arrivals and the German population – these range from sports to cooking and various projects run by local associations. Many rely heavily on the involvement of local volunteers and civil society (Blickpunkt Integration, 2017). Between 2015 and 2016, some 15,000 projects aiming to increase refugees’ language acquisition were launched, ranging from volunteer teaching to mentoring and more casual meetings and interactions with refugees (Spiegel, 2017). There has been significant public sector investment in these new integration measures, with social welfare payments for asylum-seekers alone accounting for €5.3bn in 2015 – 169% more than in 2014 (Trines, 2017). In 2016, the government spent €21.7bn on refugee-related expenditure, including €5.3bn on integration measures and €4.4bn in social welfare payments (ibid.).

3.4.2 Labour market integration

Studies suggest that, in the past, there were significant differences in integration outcomes between refugees and other migrants. Refugees generally had lower levels of educational attainment and professional qualifications than other migrants and found it more difficult to get their existing certificates recognised (Liebau and Salikutluk, 2016). Refugees also had less knowledge of German than other migrants at the time of their arrival, though they managed to rapidly increase their language

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proficiency (Liebau and Schacht, 2016). Labour market integration also took longer compared to other migrants – in particular for refugee women – although differences seemed to fade over a number of years (Salikutluk et al., 2016). Dustmann et al (2016), drawing on the 2008 wave of the EU Labour Force Survey, finds that, at the European level, migrants who arrived for humanitarian reasons were less likely to be employed than economic migrants from the same areas of origin. However, given that in the past there were no explicit policies in place to facilitate refugee integration into the labour market, and there were a number of additional institutional hurdles placed on refugees with regard to labour market and other integration, it is difficult to know whether these results would still hold true under different circumstances. In particular, changes to Germany’s integration policy since 2015–16 aimed at opening up labour market access to asylum-seekers much earlier and investing more in skills/educational training may prove significant.

Enduring and successful integration of asylum-seekers and refugees requires access to the labour market and effective participation in the labour force (OECD, 2016b). Aiyar et al. (2016) identify integration of refugees as a key element in alleviating the potential negative fiscal impact of the recent refugee influx, and as a counter-measure to the aging society in Germany. Integration of refugees into the labour market is however a slow process. Employment reaches its full potential only after 10–15 years, and still remains below the level of native-born Germans (OECD, 2017). According to Dustmann et al. (2016), the gap between refugees and native Germans reaches insignificant levels only after 15–19 years. Nevertheless, almost all male and 85% of female asylum-seekers demonstrated interest in seeking employment. Thus, propensity to seek employment is high, while labour participation remains low, especially among women (Neske and Rich, 2016, Brücker et al, 2016). In addition, asylum-seekers and refugees are frequently employed in the informal sector (Aumüller and Bretl, 2008) and in jobs below their level of qualification (UNHCR, 2013).

Around 14% of refugees in Germany are employed (IAB/BAMF/SOEP 2016), though evidence suggests that labour market integration progressively increases over time: while only 9% of those who arrived in 2015 were working, 22% of those who arrived in 2014 and 31% of those arrived in 2013 or earlier were employed (ibid.). Refugees who have been granted asylum tend to work in positions for which they are overqualified, i.e. that are not equivalent to their degree, as roughly two-thirds of the offered positions require only low qualifications (OECD, 2017). According to the Worbs et al. (2014) study, refugees with an academic degree frequently work as medical or non-medical healthcare professionals (i.e. as physicians, masseurs, medical assistants or carers). They also frequently work as drivers.

Language skills

At least half of employers consider a good mastery of German essential, even for low-skilled jobs. For the position of a skilled worker, 90% require a good level of German and 40% prefer an excellent level of language proficiency. Based on a recent study (Brücker et al., 2016), at entry approximately 90% of refugees had no prior knowledge of German and only 30% declared themselves proficient in English. However, within two years around a fifth considered their knowledge of German to be good or excellent, and a third as average, while roughly half considered their proficiency as
poor or non-existent. Of those who remained in Germany for more than two years, approximately 70% consider their language proficiency as average or better. Acquiring good language proficiency is not just a first-generation problem but applies equally to the children of migrants. Parents often believe that teaching their children their mother tongue is part of conserving their national identity, and so can neglect the German-language skills of their children (see Al-Ali et al., 2001 for the case of Eritreans and Bosnians). However, the children of migrants and refugees have a better chance of acquiring German language skills through schooling than their parents, and often act as translators for their parents.

**Education, experience and current work**

An estimated 35% of arrivals in Germany in 2015 did not have work experience (Trines, 2017). By comparison, 73% of those surveyed in the recent IAB/BAMF/SOEP study (2016) (81% of men, 50% of women) in the 18–65 age group had some work experience prior to arriving in Germany, on average 6.4 years. A third had been blue-collar workers, 25% were employed but not in management positions and 27% were self-employed. However, 69% lacked formal vocational training or the professional qualifications the German labour market requires (ibid.).

The low rate of acceptance of training qualifications acquired in their country of origin imposes an additional obstacle for refugees trying to access the labour market, especially since refugees need to provide official documentation and proof of their qualifications and certificates (OECD, 2017). A formal evaluation and recognition procedure known as the ‘Anerkennungsgesetz’ allows those who do not have supporting documents for their qualifications – including refugees – to take part in a ‘skills analysis’ that might help identify the level of skills attained or, if the foreign credentials are found not to be comparable to German standards, can recommend programmes to convey the missing skills (Trines, 2017).

Other factors, such as waiting times for asylum decisions and uncertainty about long-term ability to stay, can also greatly influence whether an individual chooses to invest in acquiring new skills – such as language, apprenticeship or education – that are useful in their new country (Dustmann et al., 2016). Germany’s system of 2–3-year trade apprenticeships, after which students obtain their skills certificate, is both expensive for refugees (because they earn less than they would in an unskilled job) and the certificate might not be worth much in their country of origin. Hence, a refugee might be reluctant to engage in prolonged training unless assured of permanent residency in Germany (ibid.; see also Dustmann and Schöberg, 2012).

The recent IAB/BAMF/SOEP (2016) study finds that, according to preliminary estimates, there is a statistically significant positive correlation between finishing one of the BAMF integration courses, the ESF/BAMF language courses or the BA language course and the start of employment. The effects of the ESF/BAMF language courses were particularly strong. This shows the potential that investment in integration measures may be able to show in the future.

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58 These are correlations, rather than causal inferences.
Several new government initiatives have focused explicitly on the skills needed for employment in Germany – such as the job-related language training courses funded by the federal government in 2016, or a project to subsidise 100,000 so-called ‘one euro jobs’ for refugees, which provide employers with cheap, subsidised labour while at the same time helping refugees gain work experience, improve their language skills and develop local contacts (Trines, 2017). However, this programme had reached only 4,392 refugees as of November 2016 and has been criticised for potentially ‘parking’ refugees in low-skilled, low-income jobs, without leading to real integration (ibid.).

Apart from initiatives formally supported by the German state, the private sector has also launched a number of initiatives aimed at supporting refugees’ integration into the workforce. One such initiative, a ‘network of businesses integrating refugees’, included 300 companies employing 2,500 refugees in October 2016 (ibid.). Here again, the key concern is that these often included temporary hiring contracts, internships and training programmes, rarely leading to full-time employment – at least as yet (ibid.). Individual companies have also launched their own programmes. DHL, for example, has committed €1m in funding in the first year of an initiative to support refugee integration programmes through local partners, in particular language acquisition and vocational support. The company also plans to offer up to 1,000 internships, and supports employee volunteers involved with local projects, drawing on its global Corporate Volunteering programme (DHL Press Release, 2015).

Success rates of these private sector initiatives are not yet clear. Key issues cited by German businesses include the difficult bureaucracy they need to navigate in order to hire refugees, lengthy asylum processes and long waiting lists for language courses (Spiegel, 2017). There are also concerns that investments in young migrants might be wasted should they ultimately be deported – as has been the case for those from Afghanistan and Eritrea (ibid.). Another key concern for German business remains how to fill Germany’s skills gap, with 78% of German companies complaining that they are having trouble finding qualified personnel (Ernst & Young, cited in Spiegel, 2017). There were hopes that Syrian refugees might be able to fill this gap given their better qualifications, though comprehensive data is not yet available on their skills and doubts have recently emerged as to how quickly even qualified Syrians might integrate into the labour market, given the bureaucratic hurdles and the difficulties around recognition of skills and certificates outlined above (see also Spiegel, 2017).

As analysis by Deutsche Bank’s research unit highlights that, if well managed, the recent influx of refugees presents a significant opportunity to address Germany’s demographic challenges and the skills gap in the German labour market (Folkerst-Landau, 2015). Success hinges on the successful integration of the new arrivals, in particular integration into the school system for younger refugees, and for older ones integration into the labour market. Substantial government spending on facilitating integration measures is warranted (ibid.).

3.5 Fiscal effects
This section looks at the fiscal effects on Germany of immigration as a whole, drawing on available economic literature on the net impact of both migrants and refugees. The literature is ambivalent. Most German researchers are positive, and project beneficial
returns for the German economy from the increase in refugees, while the estimates and projections of Austrian researchers are more negative. Berger et al. (2017) projects that increases in employment are outstripped by the increase in labour supply. This will lead to higher unemployment rates and lower wages for those entering the labour market with lower qualifications. In turn, this will lead to a GDP increase, but a decrease in per capita income. An OECD study in 2015 calculated that the increase in refugee numbers will require an additional 0.5% of GDP per year in public spending but will have little impact on the labour market. Similarly, Riphahn (1998) illustrated that foreigners are more likely to claim welfare benefits, while Ulrich (1994) estimated that welfare benefits received are lower than taxes paid. In the latter study, immigrants generated a positive net contribution of DM25–35bn. Although an average foreign household paid fewer taxes in total than a German household, their total contributions to social security (mainly to the pension system) were higher (see the population structure outlined above). Immigrants were also responsible for the creation of 85,000 new jobs between 1988 and 1994, raising GDP growth rate by 1.3% (Ulrich, 1994). However, immigrants rely more on unemployment payments, child benefits and social security than Germans. They also benefit from the consumption of public goods and will rely more heavily on retirement payments in the future.

Findings regarding the net impact on the German health system are likewise mixed. Sinn et al. (2001) found that the net impact was negative, while a similar study by Bonin (2002) found positive impacts. The difference in results between the two studies is partially explained by their different treatment of costs; Bonin (2002) uses marginal costs, whereas Sinn et al. (2001) use average costs as a means of accounting, implying that all beneficiaries share costs identically, whereas using marginal costs looks at the cost that an additional migrant would entail. Stähler (2017) projects that, as long as the qualification gap can be closed, the increase in refugee numbers will not translate into GDP and consumption losses but will lead to a higher level of employment. Failure to integrate refugees will reduce per capita output and consumption by 0.43% and 0.48%, respectively, whereas adequate integration measures will result in an increase in per capita output and consumption of 0.34% and 0.38%, respectively. Raffelhüschen et al. (2016) predict an increase in the sustainability gap, from 30.1% to 53.6%. One study by Fratzscher and Juncker (2015) anticipates a positive aggregated fiscal impact, whereas another by the European Commission (2016) projects a negative fiscal impact of 3% of GDP.
Figure 10: Beneficiaries of standard benefits for asylum-seekers according to nationality for 2015

Note: MKS stands for Montenegro, Kosovo, Serbia (incl. predecessor states).

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the data of the Federal Statistical Office, 2017. Note: Due to the high level of new asylum seekers during the last quarter of 2015, not all asylum seekers could be technically registered in Bremen. The real numbers might be higher.

Figure 11: Gross expenditures for asylum-seekers

Source: Based on data by the Federal Statistical Office, 2017. Note: The results do not contain the accommodation cost data of a reporting unit in Schleswig-Holstein. They were not available at the time of publication.
The rate of welfare claims is higher for asylum-seekers than for other immigrants. This can partially be explained by the fact that asylum-seekers were until recently not allowed to work. While subsistence payments accounted for the majority of these payments until the late 1990s, basic benefits now represent the largest part. Approximately 82% of asylum-seekers receive basic benefits for less than a year on average, while for those above the age of 65 the share decreases to 30%. In absolute terms, the most populous states pay the majority of gross expenditures. However, if expenditures are taken per resident, the city states and the state of Saxony shoulder the largest burden. Benefits are roughly equivalent to German welfare payments, including housing, medical care and minimum living expenses of €390 (or equivalent consumer goods).

**Figure 12: Gross expenditures for asylum-seekers in 2015**

![Gross Expenditures](image1.png)  ![Foreign Population](image2.png)

Source: The authors, based on data from the Federal Statistical Office (2017) and foreign population in the same year (based on data from the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2017))

**Box: Migration histories and experience**

Given the lack of long-term historic data that distinguishes between refugees and migrants, this section provides some broad indications of the wider social and economic conditions of people in Germany with a migration background. This is based on migrant data drawn from the latest micro-census of the Federal Statistical Office in 2016, to provide some overall indications that are also relevant to refugee integration in the long term, in particular around the lack of social mobility in Germany. This section uses the German concepts of migration background (*Migrationshintergrund*) and migration experience (*Migrationserfahrung*). People with a migration background include both those who were born abroad and those who were born in Germany but have foreign ancestry (at least one parent who immigrated or who was born in Germany as a foreign citizen). A distinction is also made between those with migration
experience and those without – likely second- or third-generation migrants who did not migrate themselves.

According to the Federal Statistical Office’s 2016 micro-census, approximately three-quarters of German citizens (77.5%) have no migration background. The remaining 22.5% with a migration background translate into 18.57m citizens (a decrease of roughly half a million over the previous year). The three largest groups with a migration background are from Turkey (15.06%), Poland (10.06%) and Russia (6.58%). Almost 80% of all households have no members with a migration background. Three-quarters of households with a migration background comprise only members with a migration background.

For both groups, participation in the labour market is similar. The most significant difference is that those without a migration background are more likely to work as civil servants (approximately 5.4 times more likely), whereas those with a migration background are twice as likely to be blue-collar workers. Those with a migration experience are more likely to be employed than those without. For example, more than 82% of German nationals with a migration background but without a migration experience are not part of the working population, and over 20% serve an apprenticeship. Those with a migration experience are more likely to rely on welfare benefits and pensions. Most of the difference can be explained by the age difference between groups, where those without a migration experience are second- and third-generation migrants.

Those with a migration experience face a significantly higher risk of poverty. This broadly holds both for German nationals and foreigners. Those with migration experience are also more likely to find themselves in a higher income group than those without migration experience.

The educational background of parents largely defines the level of education children obtain (see also DIPF, 2016). Data from the Federal Statistical Office shows, for example, that independent of ethnic background 43.8% of the children of those who graduated from the lowest type of secondary modern school (Hauptschule, from year 5 to 9) end up with a degree from the same school, while 62.5% of parents who obtained an A-Level degree send their children to grammar school (Gymnasium, the highest type of secondary school). A similar correlation exists between the vocational and professional qualifications of parents and the choice of school for their children.

Looking at the data on education and degrees attained, there are some differences between those with and without a migration background, but these are not persistent and thus an explicit disadvantage for those with a migration background cannot be established. For example, those without a migration background are 5% more likely to go to a secondary school (Gymnasium), but also 7% more likely to attend a secondary modern school (Hauptschule). Both groups are similar when it comes to university degrees. Those with a migration background are more likely to attain a bachelor’s or master’s degree.
3.6 Political and social impacts of selected refugee populations

3.6.1 Afghan refugees

Afghan refugees have been arriving in Germany since the late 1970s. They have seen significant changes in social perceptions and subsequent shifts in policies affecting their legal status – the most recent of which is Germany’s latest and heavily criticised deportation policy of Afghans (see for example Marsh 2017; Grunau 2018). Afghans make up the second-largest nationality of asylum seekers across the EU – nearly 200,000 applied for asylum in 2015, and of those, according to the BAMF, the German government expects 48% to eventually qualify (Kasinof, 2016; European Asylum Support Office, 2015). In 2016, over 127,000 Afghans applied for asylum in Germany (ibid.). Germany is considered to have one of the largest Afghan immigrant populations in Europe (Haasen et al., 2008).

The literature on Afghan refugees and their political and social impact is limited to a handful of studies. A number describe how the image of Afghan refugees has changed over time, especially with growing fears of terrorism, which have heavily impacted their political and social integration in host countries, including Germany (Safri, 2011). Others focus on questions of identity, nationalism and Islam, looking at immigration from predominantly Muslim countries, and the impact of Turkish immigrants on German society and politics in particular. Götz (2011) argues that the demographic impact of immigration since the 1970s by populations from diverse religious and ethnic backgrounds has had a considerable impact on German society’s self-perception and the definition of the boundaries between insiders and outsiders. With the more recent drastic increase in the number of Syrian and other asylum-seekers from the Middle East, immigration and Islam have dominated policy debates (see Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2016).

According to Fischer (2017), unlike the UK, where Afghan immigration is a much more recent phenomenon, Afghan immigration to Germany has been longstanding throughout the twentieth century. By the end of the 1970s, Germany had become a key destination for Afghans fleeing persecution, war and conflict. As a result, the population of Afghan refugees in Germany, particularly those arriving before the early to mid-1990s, belong to the well-educated elite, compared to Afghans arriving in the UK. As a general tendency, the socioeconomic background and education levels of Afghans in the UK are lower than in Germany, as the large majority of Afghans in the UK were previously refugees in either Iran or Pakistan (ibid.).

While there is not much focus in the literature on Afghans’ political or social impact in Germany, there is more research on the way Afghans themselves have been affected by changes in asylum and refugee policies. This impact is reflected in the temporal and generational differences separating the different waves of Afghan refugees arriving in Germany. Afghans who arrived before the restrictions in asylum law were introduced seem to be better integrated than those arriving after the 1993 ‘asylum compromise’ (Safri, 2011).

The literature tends to divide Afghan refugees in Germany into two different waves. The first wave arrived in the 1970s and 1980s and was composed of well-educated Afghans; these are mostly professionally active, remain within their community and form close-knit networks. Some formed associations and communities, with members
meeting regularly. These communities tend to be based on deep-rooted family, ethnic and political affiliation and background and are closed to outsiders. Family background is key to shaping self- and mutual perceptions within the Afghan community and networks of family, relatives and friends. It also affects the level of social integration within Germany. As put by one Afghan refugee, who has been in Germany since the 1970s, ‘we always move to places where we have relatives, where our children live, where we have friends and where our clan is’ (Fischer, 2017). Intermarriage with Afghans outside this network is uncommon, let alone with citizens of the host country.

The second wave of Afghan refugees arrived in Germany after 1993, with a large majority coming to Germany or other EU Member States after transiting through or spending time as refugees in either Pakistan or Iran. As one Afghan refugee put it: ‘[w]hen I came to Germany in 1992, I was part of the second wave, those who came after the demise of the pro-Soviet government ... everyone reacted strangely, because they thought “he is probably some sort of communist, socialist or leftist”’ (Fischer, 2017). Despite both waves coming from the same country, they perceived each other differently, with political, familial and clan affiliation at the centre of this relationship. Second-generation Afghans of both waves, who were born or have lived for the majority of their lives in Germany, lean more towards abandoning these considerations and reaching out within the wider network of Afghans. They also tend to be more socially integrated than their parents.

Unlike the first wave of Afghan refugees, the second wave was particularly impacted by restrictive asylum policies in place by the time of their arrival. This affected their ability to participate on social, political and economic levels to the same extent as the first wave did, especially as the image of Afghan refugees changed post-9/11. The second wave of Afghan refugees extends to those still arriving in Germany and claiming asylum today. As Germany struggles to process and integrate hundreds of thousands of refugees, newly arrived Afghans are faced with social stigma and are often deported. Of the thousands of Afghan refugees who have made it to Germany in recent years, very few have been able to find work (ToloNews, 2016).

3.6.2 Iranian refugees

Irans arrived in Germany in the early 1980s in the wake of the Islamic Revolution – though a community of considerable size had existed in Germany before that, and particularly since the 1950s and 1960s. Between 1966 and 1967, 5,545 Iranians studied in West Germany – a figure exceeded only by Americans (6,941) (Bafekr and Leman, 1999). In 1982, 32,246 Iranians were living in Germany, and by 1995 this had risen to 106,997 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1995). Currently, there are an estimated 120,000 people of Iranian heritage in Germany. This constitutes the third-largest Iranian diaspora community in the world, after the United States and Canada (Ajam Media Collective, 2016).

Like Afghan refugees, Iranians came to Germany in different waves. Iranians who arrived between the 1950s and 1960s were mainly intellectuals who came to Germany to study or complete their university training as doctors, engineers, scientists or literary scholars, and then ended up staying (Bafekr and Leman, 1999). As in the case of Afghans, existing literature on Iranian refugees is very limited. Studies on Iranians tend to focus on intellectuals, and generally suggests that Iranians tend to be well-
educated and successful socially and economically, especially those who have been in Germany for a significant period of time. Most of the literature on the Iranian community in Germany focuses on highly skilled Iranian refugees and their means of integrating within German society, particularly through their integration in the German labour force and engaging in professions such as medicine and law or literature, music, the arts/entertainment and politics. Iranians have the lowest percentage of intermarriages within their community and the highest with Germans, as well as other nationalities, compared to other refugee communities in Germany. There are many notable Iranian-German figures in public and professional life, including Yasmin Fahimi, the general secretary of the Social Democratic Party; Iranian-born and naturalised German Omid Nouripour, an active politician of the Alliance ‘90/The Greens, Bundestag member for the state of Hesse, vice-chair of the German-US parliamentary friendship group and a board member of the Atlantik-Brücke and German Atlantic Association; Sahra Wagenknecht, an Iranian-German left-wing politician and member of the Bundestag; and Ramin Djawadi, an Iranian-German composer who gained worldwide recognition for his score for the Game of Thrones television series.

Iranians tend to be more closely connected as a community than Afghans, and the literature suggests that this connection surpasses political or religious differences between different waves. Iranians who came to Germany prior to the Revolution in 1979 chose not to take any public stance on the subject, and their interest in Iran both then and now focuses on their families, whom they still regularly visit. It is this absence of interest, debate and publicly expressed opinions on religion, politics and society that differentiates them and their children from the political refugees who came to Germany after the Revolution (Bafekr and Leman, 1999). Regardless of their background, the reasons for their immigration, whether or not they have been naturalised or the years they have spent in Germany, many Iranians share a common attachment to their culture, which among pre-1979 Iranians is idealised and often related to Iranian heritage and society prior to the Revolution. The literature suggests that, while Iranians and largely doing well socially and economically, many feel uprooted and lack a sense of belonging (Ajam Media Collective, 2016). As one Iranian put it, ‘I am no longer an Iranian and I will never become a European. I feel uprooted’ (ibid.).

The Iranian community has a large number of associations and community-based networks in Germany and Europe, such as the Iranian Academics and Specialists Association in Germany (IRASA), the Association of Iranian Faculty Members and Academics in Germany (Verband Iranischer Hochschullehrer und Akademiker – VIHA), the Academy of Iranian Physicians and Dentists in Germany, www.InterNations.org and the German-Iranian Alumni Network (GIAN). There is also a strong online presence aiming to connect these local networks both regionally and globally, such as www.farsinet.com/ipco. The predominant feature of these networks is that they are largely educational and professional, reflecting the socioeconomic and educational background of the Iranian community. Köck et al. (2004) also refer to a significant number of traditional Iranian religious institutions in Hamburg (and London) representing a section within the Iranian migrant community, particularly those who arrived after the Iranian revolution.
Sadeghi (2014) suggests that, compared to Iranians in the United States, where the state does not provide any formal or uniform support to immigrants, Iranians in Germany rarely rely on family networks or other forms of informal support given that Germany provides all refugees with equal support. This makes them more reliant on the state, but also allows them to be more socially and economically engaged and active. While Iranians in both the United States and Germany reported experiencing discrimination, in Germany this seemed to be part of a general anti-foreigner sentiment rather than one particularly targeting Iranians (ibid.). Such sentiments can also be related to wider questions around the place of Islam within German society. Islam has been at the heart of debates around migration and integration and has particularly impacted the integration of newly arrived asylum-seekers and refugees from predominantly Muslim countries. Yet, according to Foroutan (2013), the integration of Muslims in Germany has on average been better than often assumed: more than 50% of Muslims are members of a German association, and just 4% are members of associations affiliated with their country/culture of origin. At the same time, Sadeghi (2014) suggests that, despite their success, Iranians from both first and second generations interviewed described feeling perpetually ‘foreign’, with the best they can expect being seen as a ‘good foreigner’.

3.6.3 Recent waves of refugees (predominantly Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan refugees)

Syrians accounted for the largest number of asylum applications in 13 out of the 28 EU Member States, including over 266,000 applicants in Germany (the highest number of applicants from a single country to one EU country in 2016). At the end of 2015, 366,566 Syrians and 136,000 Iraqis were registered in Germany. Between 1991 and 2014, 140,000 asylum applications were made by Iraqis, and in 2015 the number increased sharply to about 30,000 a year, 50% of which were applications from the Yazidi community (Hunger and Candan, 2016).

It is still too early to say what the social and political impacts will be of these more recent waves of forced displacement. However, some initial studies focusing on the social and political engagement and integration of some of these groups show how they build on the activities and engagement of previous arrivals from the same areas of origin. For Iraqi refugees, the most recent arrivals are often integrated in established structures and voluntary associations that previous immigrants had set up in Germany in the second half of the twentieth century. Recent arrivals have also set up voluntary associations of their own. A key characteristic of Iraqis in Germany has been their high level of engagement with their community in both Germany and Iraq (ibid.). There are a large number of studies on the enormous influence that the Iraqi diaspora has had on reconstruction in their home country, including the diaspora in Germany (ibid.). Apart from this engagement there is no overall association that represents all Iraqis, but community groups tend to be established according to ethnic, religious and political affiliations, and work is often focused on building support for that particular community in Germany and back in Iraq (ibid.).

Like Iraqis, Syrian immigration to Germany predates the current crisis. At various times over the past 50 years there have been overlapping movements of voluntary migrants and forcibly displaced people arriving in Germany. The literature distinguishes in particular between two waves of Syrian immigration: those arriving since the 1980s,
who were frequently very well qualified, including many students, and the large number of forcibly displaced who arrived roughly since 2011, with a much more mixed background (Hunger et al., 2017). Many of those who arrived in the 1980s founded community associations to strengthen links among the Syrian diaspora in Germany, as well as to support integration and connections in Germany (ibid.). After 2011, politicisation among Syrians in Germany has increased, and much effort has been put into highlighting the plight of those struggling for freedom and democracy back in Syria (ibid.). Of particular importance is the Association of German and Syrian aid organisations (Dachverband), which explicitly aims to support connections and interactions among Syrians in Germany, regardless of their religious or political affiliations. The Association also forms part of wider inter-cultural initiatives, notably among the Turkish community in Germany (ibid.). A recent study by the University of Maastricht (Ragab et al., 2017; cited in Hunger et al., 2017) highlights that most diaspora organisations focus their activities either on humanitarian projects or on integration in Germany, with 60% of the organisations surveyed mentioning these areas as their primary focus. The literature highlights how self-organisation and voluntary associations play a very important part in different immigrant groups’ integration in Germany. However, in the case of Syrians there do not yet seem to be many connections between initiatives taken by the Syrian diaspora and the wider integration efforts of the German state (ibid.).

Given the very recent arrival of most of the forcibly displaced, it is still too early to assess integration outcomes for these groups. There are, however, a number of representative studies currently under way that have started to shed light on some of the factors that may determine the success or failure of integration of these groups, and which highlight very initial findings gleaned from the experience of the past two years.

The IAB/BAMF/SOEP (2016) survey shows that 95% of recent arrivals would like to stay in Germany indefinitely. Those who felt more welcome were more likely to want to remain in the country. Encouragingly, the survey finds a high level of conformity (96%) with German attitudes towards democratic values, including democracy as the best form of government and the protection of citizens’ rights. Similarly, 92% of asylum-seekers state that equality between men and women is a key part of democracy. This data, though reliant on refugees’ self-characterisation, seems to indicate that cultural and value differences may be less stark than often portrayed in the media and in public discourse around the current refugee influx. Such attitudes are corroborated by studies in Austria of the same refugee cohort (Buber-Ennser et al., 2016).

Another key aspect of integration is the extent to which new arrivals have been able to interact with the local population. Even though those surveyed in the recent IAB/BAMF/SOEP (2016) survey have only arrived recently in Germany, they seem to, on average, have relatively frequent interactions with the local population. The amount and frequency of interactions seem to be positively correlated with levels of educational attainment and are important not only in terms of social integration, but also crucially for integration into the labour market.
4. Public attitudes and politics

Since the early 1990s, and in response to the increasingly polarised political debate around migration, Germany has witnessed what Green (2013) refers to as a ‘tectonic shift’ in definitional terms, as well as in the political discourse. Foroutan (2013) notes that, from 2006, German politicians began to perceive hostility towards Muslims as a growing threat to social cohesion. As already mentioned, on the policy level Germany has long struggled with questions around its own national identity and reconciling this identity with its changing demographics. This played out most often in the public domain with the oft-repeated slogan ‘Germany is not an immigration country’. In response to the changing social and political mood towards immigrants, changes in terminology could be observed. First, from 1998 the term used to refer to immigration changed from ‘Einwanderung’ to ‘Zuwanderung’ (Green, 2013). Although seemingly technical, this change has resulted in a change in the perception of immigration, as ‘Einwanderung’ refers to formally recruited migrants (i.e. Gastarbeiter or migrant workers), whereas ‘Zuwanderung’ refers to any form of immigration (ibid.). The effect has been to move public and political perceptions away from the history of the Turkish ‘guest workers’ scheme to a perception of Germany as a country open to different kinds of immigration.

In 2000, the Statistisches Bundesamt began to develop a new category of ‘persons with a migration background’ (Personen mit Migrationshintergrund), which referred to anyone who either has personal experience of migration, or who has one parent or grandparent who is a migrant. Previously, official statistics had only differentiated between ‘Germans’ and ‘foreigners’. Thus, this change facilitated much more nuanced data collection, but also a change in perception by de-linking the concepts of ‘migration’ and ‘nationality’. Statistical data released subsequently showed that there were more German citizens with a migration background than there were non-nationals in total (Green, 2003).

Despite this revealing data, which aimed to reflect the change in Germany’s demographic and social makeup to show that Germany had indeed become a country of immigration, public discourse often represents German society as homogenous, in which those with a migration background cannot fully belong (Foroutan, 2013). Migrants in general, and in recent years migrants with a Muslim background, have often been perceived negatively by the wider public (ibid.). Green (2013) confirms that, over the years, despite the ‘welcome culture’ (Willkommenskultur) portrayed in the media in response to the recent refugee influx, Germans have not found it easy to accept growing ethnic, religious and cultural diversity. One-third of Germans reportedly believe that ‘people who have always lived here should have more rights than those who have moved here later’, while 47% agree with the statement that ‘[t]here are too many foreigners living in Germany’ (Foroutan, 2013).

The tensions around integration, national identity and culture in many ways remain unresolved, on both the policy level and within general public debate. Historically, integration was seen as an active choice by the non-national to embrace German culture – a perspective which underpinned dual citizenship and Germany’s ‘guiding culture’ (Leitkultur) debate (Green, 2013). An essential element of this debate has been the question of how much diversity German society can accommodate, and in
particular whether Islam and Christianity can coexist in the country (ibid.; Foroutan, 2013). Both Green (2013) and Foroutan (2013) refer to examples that confirm this contention: in 2010, Angel Merkel herself declared that multiculturalism has ‘failed utterly’, while declaring in 2015 that ‘Islam belongs to Germany’ (Islam gehört zu Deutschland); in 2010, Bundesbank executive board member and former Berlin state finance minister Thilo Sarrazin published a critique of immigration in his book Germany Does Away with Itself (Deutschland schafft sich ab), where he referred to genetic and racially-based differences that inhibit Muslims from integrating into German society and culture. The book sold over one million copies and created the most polarised and intense debate in recent years around the issue of migration in Germany; while then Federal President Christian Wulff confirmed, in a speech in 2010 marking the twentieth anniversary of German unification, that Islam was part of Germany in response to Sarrazin, the newly appointed Federal Interior Minister, Hans-Peter Friedrich, asserted precisely the opposite at the annual meeting of the German Islamic Conference in 2012.

It is clear that German politicians as well as the general public are still wrestling with issues around migration, with Islam being at the heart of this question today. While for some an open refugee and asylum policy offered an instrumental renunciation of the country’s past, for others it signalled the renunciation of the German people’s cultural and ethnic identity (Poutrus, 2014). The diverse responses and effects of the most recent refugee crisis epitomise this dichotomy: on the one hand, there was an outpouring of public support and solidarity at the beginning of the refugee crisis, with large donations and support for refugees, as well as significant civic and volunteer engagement, ranging from free German lessons to offers to shelter refugees, as well as many other volunteer projects (Trines, 2017). On the other hand, attitudes towards refugees and the governments’ policies have turned increasingly negative. Key events that precipitated this change in public opinion include the sexual assaults during New Year’s Eve 2015 (wrongly blamed on asylum-seekers), as well as an increase in terror attacks during 2016, some of which were carried out by asylum-seekers (ibid.). Polls conducted in January 2017 showed that some 42% of those surveyed considered refugees a threat to German culture, up from 33% in October 2016; 70% believed that growing refugee numbers were related to increased crime, up from 62%. Disapproval of Merkel’s handling of the refugee crisis increased from 49% to 56% (ibid.). In particular, perceptions that the crisis was out of hand and not under control, with the government and local authorities barely able to handle the pressure on housing and services created by new arrivals, seem to have exacerbated these negative perceptions. However, recent studies in Germany also show that two-thirds of those polled agreed that accepting refugees was a national obligation (Purpose, 2017). Recent research employing methods of ‘attitudinal segmentation’ also finds more nuanced perceptions, where the German public can be roughly divided into ‘liberal cosmopolitans’, ‘radical opponents’, ‘economic pragmatists’, ‘humanitarian sceptics’ and ‘moderate opponents’ (Purpose, 2017). This segmentation reveals some

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59 ‘Attitudinal segmentation’ divides the public into different segments based not only on their attitudes towards migration, but also their attitudes towards a number of related issues, including multiculturalism, diversity, social change and optimism about the future. It is therefore able to map out segments of the population based on interlinked attitudes, rather than purely demographics (Purpose, 2017).
characteristically ‘German’ features, such as the ‘humanitarian sceptics’ group consisting mainly of older Germans who, although worried about refugees’ ability to integrate, see accepting refugees as a national obligation (ibid.).

Arguably the most important impact so far has been political: the rise of anti-immigrant movements and parties across Europe more widely, and in Germany a reconfiguration of the political landscape with the rise of the anti-immigrant right-wing party Alternative for Germany (AFD). The recent rise of anti-immigrant parties is often intertwined, as is the case with the AFD, with anti-European activism (ibid.). Germany’s refugee policy was at the heart of the debates and outcomes of the recent German elections, with the AFD winning, for the first time since the Second World War, popular representation for a right-wing party in the Bundestag, with 13% of the vote.

5. Conclusion

Over the past decades Germany has gone through major changes in its attitude towards both forcibly displaced people and migrants. For a long period, the assumption was that arrivals were only a temporary phenomenon, and that people would in time return home. Hence, little was done to facilitate their integration into the labour market, or into German society more widely – in fact, obstacles to integration were often deliberately deployed so that integration did not act as a ‘pull factor’ encouraging people to stay. This attitude changed from the early 2000s, when policy-makers finally accepted that immigration was part of German society and a phenomenon that was here to stay; as a result, a number of key policy and legal changes were gradually introduced aimed at actively facilitating multi-dimensional integration through early access to the labour market, language skills, vocational training and cultural orientation. A key realisation has also been that successful integration hinges not only on labour market and skills integration, but integration into society as a whole.

What the long-term effects will be for both the forcibly displaced and German society as a whole remains to be seen. Whereas data from the past shows that refugees were poorly integrated into the labour market, acquired poor language skills and often pushed up social expenditures, future prognoses are still unclear. Many studies to date highlight the substantial opportunity that new arrivals present for Germany in terms of addressing the country’s demographic challenges as an aging society and closing the skills gap in the German labour market. However, success hinges on the integration of the new arrivals – in particular, integration into the school system for younger refugees, and into the labour market for older ones. Significant government spending will also be needed in the short to medium term to sustain integration measures and social security for new arrivals. Most studies are clear that missing the opportunity to invest in and integrate newcomers would result in increasing distributional conflict and long-term raised governmental expenditure.

Initial results from surveys conducted among the recently arrived cohort show a mixed picture as to how likely it is that these hopes will be fulfilled. While it has become clear that many are not as well educated as was initially thought – or have education and professional skills that may not be comparable or – in their current form – useful in
the highly formalised German labour market, this has also triggered a number of reforms in the German labour market that will make it easier for those skills to be converted/updated to the requirements of the German labour market. Similarly, while initial figures of labour market integration of those recently arrived seem low, data from surveys covering the last few years paints a more positive picture and shows progressive integration into the labour market among recent arrivals.

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# Jordan: Between the Making of a Nation and the Politics of Living

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1. Context
For most of its existence, Jordan has been an island of relative stability and peace in a region beset by conflict. For this reason it has been a major refugee-hosting country since its creation as a state. Migrants and refugees have entered the country fleeing war, seeking employment and medical care and for religious pilgrimage. The large-scale refugee presence has fundamentally altered Jordan’s demographic composition, and its relations with Western as well as regional states. While its early history includes policies of remarkable openness and assimilation towards Arab migrants, over time Jordan has moved towards a more restrictive stance towards its refugee residents (De Bel-Air, 2007).

Forcibly displaced people have arrived in distinct waves:

- Palestinian refugees (1948) fleeing violence in the aftermath of the creation of the State of Israel. Around 100,000 Palestinians fled to Jordan.
- Palestinian refugees (1967) fleeing violence during the Six Day War between Israel and Syria, Egypt and Jordan. Around 140,000 fled the Gaza Strip, then under Egyptian administration, and around 240,000 left the West Bank, then under Jordanian administration.
- Lebanese refugees (1975–90) displaced by the civil war there. About a million Lebanese fled their country, many of whom crossed the border into Jordan.
- Iraqi refugees (1990s) fled persecution and violence and to escape the effects of economic sanctions. Around 200,000–300,000 mostly middle-class Iraqis fled to Jordan.
- Refugees (mid-2000s–) from the Iraqi elite fled to Amman in the aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. This wave was small but ostentatious. When Baghdad and other cities descended into sectarian violence, thousands of middle class and poor Iraqis followed.
- Syrian refugees (2013–) displaced by conflict. The UN has registered 661,114 Syrian refugees in Jordan.

A further demographic shock was the expulsion of 300,000 Jordanians of Palestinian descent from Kuwait during the Gulf War in 1991, forcing them to return to Jordan (Chatelard, 2011). In addition, an unknown number of Palestinians have migrated to Jordan in search of employment and investment opportunities, as have many labour migrants from other Middle Eastern and North African countries, and from Asia. Many of these waves of migration have been large in themselves, and in proportion to the total population of Jordan at the time. Between 1948 and 1950, Jordan’s population tripled, with a third of that increase caused by the reception of Palestinian refugees (Chatelard, 2011). Today, UNHCR-registered Syrian refugees (a lower figure than the government’s estimate of Syrians in Jordan) are equivalent to almost 10% of the Jordanian population of 6.6 million (Jordan Times, 2016; UNHCR, 2017).

The situation of Palestinian refugees in Jordan is unique in the region. In 1948, most Palestinian refugees were granted full Jordanian citizenship rights, and they and their descendants (who retain refugee status) are regarded as Jordanians for all legal purposes. Today, Jordan is host to the largest population of registered Palestinian
refugees in the world, estimated at more than two million; perhaps half of the population is of Palestinian origin (El-Abed, 2006; Ryan, 2010).

Our focus in this case study is on Palestinian refugees and their experience from 1948 onwards, and on Syrian refugees arriving in Jordan in 2013–14. We also shed light on the experience of Iraqi refugees, namely those arriving in Jordan after the US-led invasion in 2003. Each of these refugee populations has been subject to varying policies on integration, naturalisation and employment, and each has received varying levels of international support, making Jordan an instructive case study of the effects of different approaches.

1.1 Camps, cities and settlement patterns

Most refugee movements to Jordan have been in massive waves over a few months or a few years, altering the demographic composition of major cities or the country as a whole. Inevitably, these influxes played a role in Jordan’s urban development. Western aid to support refugees has been used to build infrastructure that refugees and citizens share, and wealthy Palestinian refugees invested in housing and the private sector in the first decades of the state, helping to grow nascent urban centres (El-Abed, 2004).

Refugee camps also play an important role in this story. When Palestinians first fled to Jordan in 1948, the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the Jordanian government established camps to house them. This first wave of refugees largely comprised families from poor rural backgrounds, who settled in camps with relatives from the same village in Palestine. Over time, Jordanian cities expanded and absorbed the camps, and refugees moved into the streets around them. Today, the boundary between camp and city is not obvious to the untrained eye. In recent decades, the upward socio-economic mobility of many Palestinian families has meant that they can afford better-quality housing, and they have moved to other neighbourhoods. According to UNRWA, only around 18% of Palestinian refugees living in Jordan are currently residing in the country’s ten recognised camps (UNRWA, 2017). Meanwhile, other population groups have moved in, and camps also serve as reception areas for new migrants. In the mid-2000s, many middle class and poor urban displaced Iraqis took up residence in the capital, Amman, in middle-income neighbourhoods, informal areas and Palestinian refugee camps (Chatelard, 2008).

As the number of Syrians fleeing into Jordan picked up pace camps were built, and their management soon became securitised and restrictive. At times refugees have been subject to strict limitations on their movements in and out of camps. Approximately 21% of Syrian refugees are in six camps in the north: Zaatari, Azraq, the Emirati Jordanian Camp, King Hussein Park and Cyber City (UNHCR, 2017). However, most Syrian refugees, like Iraqis before them, settled in urban areas, following family members, tribal links or employment opportunities in particular towns or cities, primarily in the northern governorates and in Amman and Zarqa (Bellamy et al., 2017). As of July 2017, Amman, Irbid, Mafraq and Zarqa governorates were hosting – outside of the camps in these provinces – 76% of registered refugees (UNHCR, 2017). Syrians in urban areas are able to access government-subsidised medical care and schooling, and benefit from government subsidies on cooking fuel, bread and water and electricity. Inside the camps, UNHCR provides humanitarian assistance, shelter, legal...
aid and access to the legal system.

The Jordanian government maintains that Syrians will not be allowed to naturalise and must return to Syria or be resettled elsewhere. The continued existence of closed camps serves to underscore this message. Camps have variously come to function as reception areas for newly arrived refugees, as visual shorthands for the country’s refugee burden, and even as prisons or punishment zones for refugees found working in the informal economy (Bellamy et al., 2017). Jordanian towns and cities remain the real zones of refugee integration.

1.2 Increasingly restrictive policies and durable solutions

While Jordan’s early history is marked by its remarkable mass naturalisation of Palestinian refugees, this was the high-water mark of refugee integration. Even Palestinian refugees from Gaza in 1967 were received under a different regime and given temporary Jordanian passports, rather than being granted Jordanian nationality (El-Abed, 2004). Today, more than 40 years after their displacement, ex-Gazans and their descendants remain temporary residents. Each subsequent refugee wave has enjoyed fewer rights to residency and employment, and the memories attached to previous refugee movements condition how the state reacts to subsequent arrivals (Lenner, 2016). While Jordan remains a relatively generous, tolerant and consistent host, its attitude to both labour migrants and refugees has become more restrictive.

A number of factors have pushed for the reform of policies concerning refugees. Over several decades the discourse around naturalisation has been permeated by fears that Jordan would be made the homeland of all displaced Palestinians, as part of a political ‘solution’ to the Arab–Israeli conflict that has at times been mooted by Israelis, and fears that Jordan would be destabilised by repeated outbreaks of conflict in neighbouring states. The deepening of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the Iraq war, growing instability in Lebanon and, lastly, the Syrian civil war have all contributed to a trend that increasingly sees refugees in light of the threat they pose to domestic security.

In this respect Jordan is hardly alone. Western countries in particular have also backtracked on their commitment to providing asylum, and so too do Jordan’s neighbours. The Syrian crisis has demonstrated the limits of regional refugee hosting as Syria’s neighbours have progressively closed their borders to new arrivals. Jordan is no exception. Its western border was sealed in mid-2013, followed by the northeastern border in June 2016, trapping tens of thousands of refugees in a no-man’s land (Hargrave and Pantuliano, 2016). Partly as a result, there has been a huge decrease in the number of arrivals from Syria following spikes in 2012 and 2013. Jordan’s entry policies have also kept out young men travelling on their own, as well as Palestinian Syrian refugees.

An increasingly restrictive attitude, enduring violence and instability in Syria, the Arab–Israeli conflict and continued violence in Iraq all bode poorly for refugees achieving any of the traditional durable solutions. The great majority of Palestinians living in Jordan are naturalised and therefore long ago attained de jure local integration, though ‘Gazan’ Palestinians have no immediate prospects of local integration. The government likewise maintains that naturalisation is not an option
for Iraqis or Syrians. Resettlement opportunities in the (primarily) Western countries that have historically resettled refugees are in decline, and governments face increasingly hardline domestic attitudes to immigration of all kinds.

2. Legal and policy frameworks

Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and UNHCR operates in the country under a 1998 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the government. According to the UNHCR website, ‘[i]n the absence of any international or national legal refugee instruments in force in the country, the MoU establishes the parameters for cooperation between UNHCR and the Government’. Such parameters include that asylum, once granted, is not bound by time or by a refugee’s geographical origin, and the principle of non-refoulement should be respected. UNHCR undertakes status determination.

Arab labour migrants and refugees have in the past been admitted to the country on terms that emphasise pan-Arab solidarity and cultural values of hospitality. In practice, the state does not use the term ‘refugee’ in its own discourse and prefers to label displaced people and labour migrants alike as ‘guests’. Although Article 21 of the Jordanian Constitution prohibits the extradition of ‘political refugees’, Jordan itself does not have a highly developed domestic legal framework for dealing with refugees. Law No. 24 of 1973 on Residence and Foreigners’ Affairs requires that those entering the country as asylum-seekers present themselves to a police station within 48 hours of their arrival, and Article 31 of the same law allows the Minister of the Interior to determine on a case-by-case basis whether people entering the country illegally will be deported. The law does not explain the conditions under which individuals seeking political asylum will be recognised and acquire such a status, as with the 1951 UN Refugee Convention.

The Jordanian state is highly centralised, and the discourse around refugee issues is led through the Office of the Prime Minister. The government frames its current responsibilities in terms of its historic role as a refugee host, emphasising that Syrian refugees are received on the basis of solidarity, hospitality and indigenous norms, while also making clear that the refugee crisis poses huge challenges for the government’s ability to deliver services to its own citizens. UN agencies involved in the refugee response liaise with line ministries (such as Health or Education) and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC). MOPIC acts as the gatekeeper for governmental approval for aid projects. In addition, international NGOs deal with the Hashemite Foundation, a quasi-government organisation with strong links to the royal establishment, and which acts as intermediary between civil society and the state. Within the international aid system, UNHCR leads the coordination of the response for Syrians, Iraqis and all other refugees bar Palestinians.

Both the state and the international aid system are important providers of services to refugees. While UNHCR and its NGO partners provide a range of services inside the camps, the majority of refugees outside the camps rely on access to government health and education services, as well as UNHCR cash assistance (if they qualify for it). Refugees must have both an Asylum Seeker Certificate, issued upon registration, and a Ministry of Interior service card, for which they must register at a police station, in
order to access these services. Both Palestinian refugee waves were highly reliant on UNRWA upon their arrival, and UNRWA has remained the main provider of international assistance to Palestinian refugees in Jordan.

UNRWA concentrates most of its budget on education, alongside relief, infrastructure and health services. It supports almost 100,000 students a year (see Figure 4) and 172 schools for basic education, and trains more than 600 teachers per year (UNRWA, 2017c), as well as providing vocational training to almost 4,000 young people. Students’ literacy and educational attainment are among the highest in the region (UNRWA, 2017) and student results, especially in maths and science, are significantly above-average compared to public schools in Jordan and in international assessments (World Bank, 2014). Registered refugees also benefit from primary health care and, under certain conditions, hospital care. In 2016, UNRWA’s 25 primary health care centres dealt with over 1.55 million visits (UNRWA, 2017c). Almost 60,000 refugees received cash transfers in 2016, and almost 7,000 participated in micro-credit initiatives. Even so, when compared with their non-camp counterparts Palestinians living in the camps are still significantly poorer, live in larger households, achieve lower educational levels, suffer from poorer health and rely more heavily on UNRWA’s support and other relief services. Those without a Jordanian passport suffer the most, with non-citizens three times more likely to live below the poverty line.

**Figure 1: Number of Palestinian refugees registered by UNRWA, 2005–2015**

![Number of Palestinian refugees registered by UNRWA, 2005–2015](image-url)

*Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Palestinian Affairs, Yearbook 2015*
Figure 2: UNRWA budget, 2005–2015

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Palestinian Affairs, Yearbook 2015

Figure 3: UNRWA expenditure by area of operation and programme, 2016 (US$ thousands)

Source: UNRWA, annual operational report 2016.
2.1 Right to work

According to the 1998 MoU between UNHCR and the Jordanian government, UNHCR is obliged to find durable resettlement solutions for recognised asylum-seekers after six months of recognising their status – although the Jordanian government does not enforce this provision in practice. In finding ‘durable solutions’, UNHCR treats Jordan as a transit country, not a final destination. As noted, the Jordanian Constitution prohibits the extradition of ‘political refugees’, and Article 2(1) of the MoU between UNHCR and Jordan obliges Jordan to uphold the principle of non-refoulement.

Once their status is recognised by UNHCR, refugees are not automatically granted specific rights that take account of their vulnerability, such as the right to residency, employment, public education and healthcare. They are instead treated as foreigners and are not granted the right to work. The Jordanian Labour Law of 1996 makes no mention of refugees or asylum-seekers (Kelberer, 2017). Law No. 24 of 1973 stipulates that Jordanian nationals and companies must not employ foreigners without a valid work permit.

The legislation around labour migrants has also often been constructed around bilateral treaties with neighbouring states, such as the treaty signed with Egypt in 2007, which has allowed hundreds of thousands of Egyptians to come to the country as temporary labour migrants, but with their labour restricted to certain industries and with labourers expected to meet other requirements, such as medical and criminal record tests. In practice, many Egyptians work in the informal sector too, where they compete with other forced and voluntary migrants. With the strict and expensive regulatory environment around work permits, many are forced to work informally. Here, refugees and labour migrants alike face protection threats associated with informal work: exploitation, harassment and abuse by employers.

The legal and policy regime, and its fluctuations, highlight how different displaced groups have been afforded markedly different rights, with consequences for the
ability to integrate. The laws around employment and economic activity demonstrate this. Palestinian refugees from 1948 and their descendants are full citizens and have full rights to employment, though a policy of ‘Jordanisation’ of the public sector restricts their access to public sector jobs. ‘Gazan’ Palestinian refugees have more limited rights and must apply for work permits on the same basis as other foreigners. Their rights to own property are also curtailed, and they are only issued ‘temporary’ passports, which restricts their ability to travel and so to become migrant labourers themselves (El-Abed, 2006). Iraqis fleeing in the mid-2000s were received as foreign ‘guests’ but given their wealthier and more educated profile and smaller numbers they were in practice granted more stable residency rights, and their informal employment was more-or-less tolerated (Chatelard, 2011). Wealthy Iraqi refugees were able to buy residence rights and find highly skilled employment. Iraqi refugees who are not rich are mostly without a secure legal right to be in the country and risk deportation for working illegally. They accordingly have little or no sustainable income and are struggling to support themselves and their families.

Syrians were initially received according to a bilateral treaty between the two countries that permitted reciprocal freedom of entry and movement and allowed Syrians to work in Jordan (and vice versa). Although Syrians still required work permits under the treaty this was weakly enforced, especially as migrant Syrian agricultural workers filled important seasonal labour gaps (Aljuni and Kawar, 2014). When Syrian refugee flows became more intense, this provision began to be more strictly monitored and additional policies about registration were implemented. While in the first few months of the Syrian influx this situation continued, in 2013 the government began to crack down on informal workers and insist, through threat of deportation to camps and fines for employers, that Syrians be subject to the same legal requirements as other foreign workers. In mid-2016 and again in early 2017, there were reports of deportations and forced expulsions of registered Syrian refugees by the Jordanian authorities (see for example HRW, 2017).

Prior to the Jordan Compact (see below), the requirements for a work permit were: 1. valid identity documents – a requirement that many refugees could not meet as they lost their identity documents en route (there are no special laws/regulations for refugees); 2. passing a background security check by the Ministry of Interior (MOI) – a deterrent to vulnerable refugees who feared that this might jeopardise their safety and status; and 3. a sponsor/employer willing to pay between $240 and $522 for the permit. There is also a list of professions and industries that are by law only open to Jordanian citizens. These include medical, engineering, administrative, accounting and clerical professions; telephone and warehouse employment; sales; education; hairdressing; decorating; fuel sales; electrical and mechanical occupations; guards; drivers; and construction workers (Library of Congress, 2016). Recently, an additional 11 other job sectors have reportedly been closed to foreign workers (El-Hindy, 2016). Permits tie workers to the specific employer who applied for the permit: they are not transferable to other industries or even other businesses. Work permits also require employers to make payments into Jordan’s social welfare system, which refugees and employers alike resent.
The Jordan Compact, agreed in 2016, is intended to ease these regulations and encourage the Jordanian government to issue more permits. Research shows mixed views on the impact of the Compact. The number of permits issued has not increased at the expected rate, due to a range of factors. Critical among these is that, while the government provides the permits without charge, it has not removed the requirement that refugees present Syrian identification documents (Mellinger and Van Berlo, 2016). There were reports in 2016 that Syrians without identity documents or valid passports continued to face difficulties in relation to the right to work (see for example NRC, 2016). A large number of refugees only have the skills to do jobs that are by law reserved for Jordanians, and hence work permits will not allow these refugees to pursue work according to their skills. Concerns persist over the security and low pay of jobs even with a permit, meaning that refugees remain reliant on assistance provided by UNHCR. Some refugees have expressed concerns about losing their right to resettlement by applying for a permit, and thereby demonstrating economic integration.

The regulatory environment around starting businesses and registering them with the government is sometimes unclear and often complex (UNHCR, 2016). The wealthiest Syrian refugees have been able to gain a residence permit through the 1973 Residence Law, which allows foreign entrepreneurs with commercial or industrial ventures (ILO, 2015a) to apply for ‘investor status’ through a large investment (currently 250,000JD ($351,000)). This is the same route that some displaced members of the Iraqi elite took in 2005–2006. Owing to the large capital investment required, this has only been an option for a small number of rich and successful refugees. Jordan has benefited not only from the capital investment, but also through the relocation of manufacturing and other Syrian and Iraqi businesses to the Jordanian economy (ILO, 2015b).

For foreigners wanting to start businesses without residency rights, Jordanian law requires that, in some sectors, a Jordanian citizen should own 50% or 49% of a business’s capital and made a minimum investment. This minimum investment has fluctuated between 10,000JD ($14,000) and 50,000JD ($70,000). When a non-Jordanian without a Jordanian partner tries to register a business, the matter is referred to the Foreign Investors Affairs Department in the Ministry of the Interior, which gives final approval on these applications. In practice, many applications are refused (Bellamy et al., 2017). Refugees with more social and economic capital have been able to enter into business partnerships. The legal framework for registering small and home-based businesses is unclear and many, if not most, small businesses, whether run by locals or migrants, are not registered and operate in the informal economy.

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60 In February 2016, as part of the London conference on ‘Supporting Syria and the Region’, the Jordanian government, development partners and international and non-governmental organisations came together to explore ways to create jobs and investment opportunities for countries most affected by the Syrian refugee crisis. The resulting agreement, the Jordan Compact, is a potential blueprint for other host countries looking for ways to facilitate the socioeconomic integration of refugees.
3. The impact of forced displacement on Jordan

Jordan hosts the second-highest number of refugees as a proportion of its inhabitants and is considered to be the sixth-largest refugee-hosting country in the world (UNHCR Factsheet, 2017). Refugees account for a large share of the population, and in some municipalities, they outnumber residents (European Parliament, 2017). Historically, forced displacement has been an integral part of the formation of the Jordanian nation, and it continues to shape Jordanian culture and politics today.

Figure 5: Population breakdown, 2015

![Population breakdown, 2015](image)

Source: European Parliament, based on data from the Jordanian Department of Statistics.

3.1 Palestinian refugees

Jordanian citizens of Palestinian refugee origin are cultural and political figures and form the backbone of the private sector: while hard data about their impact is lacking, it is impossible to imagine Jordanian society without them – the country would be half the size it is. The development of their community is inextricable from the development of the Jordanian state, and the growth of Jordan’s cities
Significant historical moments in Jordanian–Palestinian relations

- **In 1946 Jordan gained its independence**, and in 1948 the country saw a mass influx of Palestinian refugees as a result of the Arab–Israeli conflict.
- **The annexation of the West Bank** and the emergence of a rhetoric stressing unity between Palestinians and Jordanians prompted a general attitude of openness by Jordanians towards Palestinians.
- The **mass naturalisation of Palestinians** allowed them to participate in political and social life and become part of Jordanian culture and society. This also resulted in the rise of a more inclusive rhetoric describing Jordan as part of a larger, regional Arab and Muslim identity, rather than an identity focused on tribalism and kinship.
- **The 1967 defeat** led to the rise of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Palestinian nationalist movement, which forced a change of perceptions and attitudes on both the Palestinian and Jordanian side as the PLO gained a stronger hold in Jordan’s refugee camps. This was perceived by King Hussein as a threat to his authority and a general threat to security. A major confrontation occurred as the government attempted to disarm the camps.
- **The 1970–71 conflict** between the Jordanian army and the Palestinian resistance movement, which broke out in September 1970 (‘Black September’), saw months of fighting and heavy casualties on both sides. A large number of Palestinians fled to Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and the Occupied Territories. Relations between Palestinians and Jordanians deteriorated further (Al-Abed, 2004). A Transjordanian nationalist movement emerged that stressed a national identity that excluded Palestinians and Palestinian-Jordanians.
- **In 1988 Jordan severed legal and administrative ties with the West Bank**, resulting in the complete separation of the East and West Banks and the revocation of citizenship rights of those residing in the West Bank at the time (Al-Abed, 2004; Ramahi, 2015), marking the start of a process creating ‘tiers’ of citizenship rights and documentation determined by origin and residence.

3.1.1 Demographic effects

Estimates of the number of registered Palestinian refugees in Jordan range between 634,000 (as per the figures of the Jordanian government) and 2.1 million (as per UNRWA). An estimated 43%–60% of the Jordanian population is either Palestinian or of Palestinian origin (Abdullah, King of Jordan, 2009; Al-Abed, 2004), while stateless Palestinians in Jordan comprise 18% of the total population. The variations in these figures reflect the complexity of the Jordanian–Palestinian relationship, and the various categories of rights and statuses among Palestinian refugees (Ramahi, 2015). Beyond these headline figures, data and analysis on the impact of Palestinians on Jordan’s demographic profile is sparse. One study looking at fertility rates among Palestinian and Jordanian women finds that fertility is slightly higher for Jordanians (Khawaja, 2002). Another study (van Hear, 1995) argues that Palestinians returning to Jordan en masse in the early 1990s resulted in greater demand for education and health services: 57,000 new school places had to be found (*ibid.*).
3.1.2 Political and social effects
Of all refugee nationalities, Palestinians have had by far the most significant impact on Jordan’s history, culture, society and politics. The literature, particularly in Arabic, is expansive when it comes to assessing and reflecting on the impact of Palestinians in Jordan from 1948 onwards. Their presence in Jordan’s modern history since 1948 – just two years after the declaration of independence – placed them at the heart of debates on identity and nationalism from the 1940s through to the 1970s. The Israeli annexation of the West Bank and the emergence of a discourse around the unity of the ‘two banks’ further contributed to an assimilation process that created a common culture and a shared history between Palestinians and Jordanians. Beyond this, Palestinian displacement (referred to in Arabic as al-taghriba al-falastinia) is also part of a wider narrative around the Arab–Israeli conflict, pan-Arabism, statelessness, state-building and the right of return (Tamari, 1997; Knudsen and Hanafi (eds), 2011).

Since the beginning of the Palestinian crisis, the Jordanian government has adopted a policy aimed at integration, first through naturalisation and then through granting equal political and civil rights and allowing Palestinians to positively engage in political and social life. By the 1950s, naturalised Palestinians were allowed to vote in parliamentary elections, and naturalised Palestinians assumed important government positions. One, Mohammed Al-Abbasi, became Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1970, during the events of Black September. Following the end of the conflict between Jordanian forces and the Palestinian resistance movement, the political impact of Palestinians was severely restricted; legal and administrative ties with the West Bank were severed and citizenship rights curtailed, pushing a significant number of Palestinians out of political life.

Despite their political marginalisation, Palestinians continued to have a significant impact on Jordanian society and culture. The Palestinian plight became part of Jordanian social history and represents an integral part of Jordanian culture and arts. Intermarriage between Jordanians and Palestinians is common; Queen Rania al-Yassin, the wife of Jordan’s ruling monarch, is of Palestinian origin.

3.1.3 Urban and spatial impacts
A good deal of the literature on the Palestinian experience in Jordan focuses on the urban and spatial impact of Palestinian refugees, and the visible physical changes they have brought to urban spaces, particularly in the appearance and architecture of Amman. Haninia (2014) identifies both positive and negative effects. The 1948 displacements were followed by a ‘formative period’, where streets were paved, modern buildings and government offices were built, pavements constructed, and trees planted throughout the city. Architects and engineers, many of them of non-Jordanian origin, were contracted to help reshape and modernise the capital. A number of notable architects, such as Nasri Muqhar and Jabra Khamis, were Palestinian. However, the large and rapid influx of Palestinians – Amman’s population increased from 65,500 in 1946 to 175,000 by 1959 (Hanania, 2014) – also meant that the city’s development was rapid and disorganised. From a quiet urban space characterised by Arab and Ottoman architecture, Amman was rapidly turned into a vibrant and busy city. Ottoman and Arab urban architecture was replaced with Western styles based on a vision of building a ‘modern city’; green space was lost as
the city grew, and social demarcations became more pronounced as the wealthy moved to the hills, leaving the centre of the city to the urban poor (Hanania, 2014).

### 3.1.4 Economic impacts

Although a large majority of Palestinians both outside and inside the camps hold Jordanian citizenship (96% and 85%), a significant number of those displaced from Gaza as a result of the 1967 war do not hold a Jordanian passport, but predominantly a two-year temporary passport without a national number. The high degree of naturalisation makes it difficult to obtain distinct data for Jordanians of Palestinian ancestry, since the Bureau of Statistics does not report information on ethnic origin (Reiter, 2004).

The strongest insight about the current situation of Palestinian refugees and their development over the past decades can be obtained from two Fafo reports (Arneberg, 1997 and Tiltnes and Zahng, 2013). It is essential to distinguish between refugees who are living in the ten recognised refugee camps and those outside them. According to Tiltnes and Zahng (2013), there is little statistical difference between out-of-camp refugees and those who have obtained Jordanian nationality. These refugees have been and are significantly better off compared to those who still reside in camps but are still subject to various forms of discrimination. Palestinians have been under-represented in parliament\(^{61}\) and face discrimination, above all in the state administration (Centre for Strategic Studies, 1995; Al-Monitor, 2013). The situation is aggravated by the higher fertility rate of 3.3 births, the highest of Palestinian refugees in the region according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). Although a disenfranchised majority, Palestinians are still in a better economic and political situation than in any other country in the region (MAR, 2006).

Palestinians have historically economically outperformed native Jordanians, and they dominate the private sector (Reiter, 2004). Around 300 Palestinian companies accounted for 40% of Jordanian GDP in the 2000s, with the largest share taken by the Arab Bank. Palestinians’ economic stronghold is in commerce and real estate, while Jordanians control the public sector and agriculture. This means that they are more exposed than Palestinians to international market price fluctuations and economic and political crises (ibid.). The majority of Palestinian wealth is concentrated within a small elite of Palestinian businessmen.

Comparing the two Fafo reports (Arneberg, 1997 and Tiltnes and Huafeng, 2013) indicates that, over the past 20 years, child mortality and acute malnutrition have been very rare in Jordan, in the case of the former particularly among refugees and displaced children. Both reports also describe significant differences between those refugees living in camps and those outside of camps with respect to other determinants, with little change over recent years. In 1997, those living inside the camps generally had a lower level of education and fewer opportunities to attend school. University education was more common among non-refugees, except for those returning from the Gulf. Consequently, refugees outside the camps were often skilled workers and drivers, working in sales, trade, commercial services,

\(^{61}\) Only nine out of 55 senators are Palestinian and Palestinians obtained only 18 of the 110 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. None of 12 governorates is led by a Palestinian (Minority Rights Group, 2017).
manufacturing, education and health services, while those living in the camps frequently relied on transfers, had lower incomes and thus lower wealth levels and less access to income-generating resources such as land. In addition, those not living in camps were more frequently self-employed. Wage was the main income for both groups, but those living inside the camps earned less income due to lower labour market participation and employment levels and lower pay. While labour force participation for males stood at 71%, only 15% of women were looking for or working in a job and reported themselves to be housewives more frequently than any other group.

Figure 6: Labour market participation rates (%)

Source: Fafo 2012: Insights into the Socio-economic Conditions of Palestinian Refugees in Jordan

Non-refugees tended to work in occupations at both ends of the spectrum, frequently working as professionals and managers, but also as cleaners and messengers.

The differences between those outside and inside the camps are historically determined. Those who settled in the camps were largely peasants with little or no educational background, whereas those outside the camps frequently belonged to the educated urban middle class (Baraka, 1973). In relative terms little has changed since then, though overall Palestinians have seen a gradual improvement, mainly in terms of educational attainment, especially among female students. Tiltines and Zhang highlight the persistent disparity between camp and non-camp populations 16 years after the previous Fafo report. Those living in camps are still significantly poorer, live in larger households, achieve lower educational levels, suffer from poorer health and rely more heavily on UNRWA support and other relief services. Those without a Jordanian passport suffer the most. Non-citizens are three times as likely to live below the poverty line of $1.25. In recent years, the government has tried to address some of the problems refugees face by supporting projects offering free health insurance to children under six and subsidising health care.

Education remains a key issue. The educational gap between those living inside the camps and non-camp refugees is increasing, allowing twice as many men under the age of 35 living outside of camps to complete post-secondary education than those
living in camps. However, younger cohorts tend to be more likely to complete basic schooling and achieve higher educational attainment than older cohorts. Although the education gap between both groups remains, women inside the camps tend to do worse than men in older cohorts, but better in younger cohorts. This difference is not evident between the sexes with respect to those under 35 living outside of camps. Since literacy is strongly correlated with education, literacy is higher outside than inside the camps. In addition, the educational attainment of the household head reflects strongly on the reading and writing proficiency of other household members.

Due to the high fertility rate, the share of the working age-population is lower inside the camps than outside. Age is one of the principal reasons for economic inactivity, with health and lack of suitable jobs being of lesser importance. Those living outside the camps are on average educated for longer. Youth inside the camps more frequently entered the labour market at an earlier age yet were also more likely to be unemployed. The overall labour market participation rate is similar for both groups, while men inside the camps enter the labour market sooner and retire earlier than men outside the camps. Figure 6 shows that labour market participation fell significantly among those living outside the camp, as well as women living inside the camps. This is explained by a significant drop in the share of adults who want to work but are currently not employed (from 20% to 10% for men, and 5% to 2% for women). For men, this is primarily explained by the large share of men with a post-secondary degree pursuing further education and no longer actively seeking work. Men who completed their studies and are married are significantly more likely to work as part of their responsibilities as a wage-earner. For women, marriage entails family responsibilities such as motherhood and domestic labour, preventing them from finding employment.

Although Palestinian refugees are well-integrated into the labour market, they less frequently work in the public sector compared to native Jordanians, for the reasons previously outlined. Women who are employed are more frequently highly educated and work as professionals or managers, mostly in the services, education and health sectors. Women living in the camps more frequently work in trade, are agricultural workers or are employed in elementary occupations, whereas those outside the camps are employed as office workers, professionals, managers and technicians. The occupational landscape for men has not seen meaningful change over recent years, and differences in occupation between men inside and outside the camps follow a pattern similar to that for women. Outside the camps, women are three times as likely to work as professionals or in managerial positions and twice as likely to work in technical or administrative professions than men. Men, on the other hand, are five times more likely to work in trade and agriculture and are more frequently employed in the manufacturing sector. In general, unemployment is negatively correlated with education for men, but positively correlated for women. Unemployment rates are higher inside the camps than outside.

Palestinians outside the camps are paid higher hourly wages and are entitled to a wider range of benefits (especially sick leave, paid vacation and holidays) than those living in camps, even working in the same profession. The latter group report worse working conditions and lower job security. Those outside the camps enjoy significantly higher annual household incomes, possess a larger amount of durable goods (such as
air conditioning units and vacuum cleaners) and have higher wealth and economic status than those residing inside the camps. This group is comparable to non-refugees.

Wage income constitutes the principal source of revenue, while transfers and income from self-employment are becoming increasingly rare. Poverty support from the National Aid Fund and UNRWA is more frequently given to those living in the camps. They also rely more heavily on remittances. A higher share of those inside the camps falls below the absolute poverty line, while growing income disparity means that a higher share of those outside the camps fall below the relative poverty line.

**Figure 7: Remittances to Jordan**

![Remittances to Jordan](image)

*Source: DataBank, World Development Indicators, The World Bank*

### 3.2 Syrian refugees

The conflict in Syria has triggered what the European Commission has labelled ‘the world’s largest humanitarian crisis since World War II’ (European Commission, 2016).

**Figure 8: Syrian refugees in the MENA Region**

![Syrian refugees in the MENA Region](image)

*Source: UNHCR Syria Regional Response (as of 31 July 2017)*
The vast majority of Syrian refugees (over 3m) are in Turkey and Lebanon (1m), with some 660,000 in Jordan and substantial populations in Iraq and Egypt. While the Syrian influx into Jordan has been depicted as a drain on the country’s resources, putting pressure on its infrastructure and increasing competition for jobs in the informal economy in a context of national youth unemployment rates that reached 16% at the end of 2016 (Department of Statistics, 2016), some commentators have disputed this, arguing that refugees have been scapegoated for pre-existing service delivery problems and the behaviour of a rentier private sector (Mansur, in Al-Khatib and Lenner (eds), 2015). Such concerns also ignore the benefits that both the crisis and the conflict have created, with the relocation of major factories and businesses from Syria to Jordan, increased consumption as a result of the population boom (many refugees receive cash vouchers) and significant inflows of international aid (The Economist, 2013; Mansur, in Al-Khatib and Lenner (eds), 2016). Even so, the costs involved in providing assistance to Syrian refugees are substantial, amounting to about 1% of GDP in 2013 and 2014 (USAID, 2014). Foreign direct investment has plummeted, tourism and trade have declined, public debt has increased, and the economy overall has contracted.

There is limited literature assessing the social or political impact of Syrian refugees in Jordan. Negative public attitudes and policy concerns over their economic impacts, fears over the permanence of their stay and the implications of welcoming refugees amid increasing regional security and political challenges are all major themes (e.g. Francis, 2015). As such, particular focus will be given to assessing their economic and demographic impacts on Jordan, while also shedding some light on Jordan’s policy stance and public attitudes in relation to the crisis.

3.2.1 Demographic impacts

Syrians comprise the second-largest refugee group in Jordan today. Although some 660,000 are officially registered, many more are in the country unofficially, and the actual figure is likely closer to double that. Overall, Syrian refugees account for about one in ten inhabitants in Jordan, most of whom live in urban areas (UNHCR, 2016). While displaced Syrians are provided with shelter in camps in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, in reality 80% of displaced Syrians in the region live outside refugee camps (Miliband, 2015). Zaatar camp, which opened in July 2012, and has since grown to become one of the most densely populated centres in the region, the world’s second-largest refugee camp and Jordan’s fourth largest ‘city’ (Francis, 2015), hosts just 20% of Syrian refugees in the country.

Indeed, the influx of Syrian refugees has been felt by Jordan in terms of the cost of delivery of services, and the quality of services provided. The inflow in fact exacerbated existing problems in service provision – Jordan was already suffering from structural challenges in service provision before the Syrian refugee crisis (Francis, 2015; European Parliament, 2017). A number of studies document the effect of Syrian refugees on the education and health sector, as well as the costs of providing services to refugees. It is estimated that the fiscal costs of providing humanitarian services to the Syrian population (including health and education) amount to about 1% of GDP. In terms of demographics, Syrian refugees in Jordan are much younger than the Jordanian average, have marginally lower education levels and there is a higher
portion of children and female household heads (Verme et al., 2015). These differences in population structure are important: the younger age, on average, and particular family structure mean that the Syrian refugee population has particular needs for education (particularly at the primary school level) and health services (for instance for maternal health and vaccinations).

There is no consistent evidence to demonstrate whether Syrians have a different health profile than Jordanians. Some studies suggest no differences in morbidity rates (Hidalgo et al., 2015), while others point to differences in terms of disease profile and increased levels of morbidity (MOPIC, 2013). Syrians may have injuries as a result of the war, and mental health issues may be more prevalent, which could affect demand for health services, though more research is needed. There is some evidence that the influx of refugees has led to the re-emergence of some communicable diseases, including measles and tuberculosis, which the Jordanian government had previously successfully controlled. A total of 34,314 communicable disease cases were reported among the Syrian population between 2013 and 2014 (World Bank, 2017, based on government statistics). This affects the health system financially, but also has symbolic importance as the eradication of communicable diseases was one of the most important public health missions of the Jordanian government.

Between 2012 and 2014, public health services were provided at virtually no cost to Syrians, but this led to steep increases in demand and was fiscally unsustainable. Now, Syrians are required to make a 20% co-payment, while they still receive some basic services for free. Health facilities still deal with about 1.5 million registered Syrians annually (World Bank, 2017); primary health centres are becoming overburdened (Francis, 2015), drugs and vaccines are being depleted at a rapid rate (IEG, 2016), waiting times are longer and there is a shortage of health workers (World Bank, 2017, based on government statistics). Pressures on public facilities may also displace some Jordanians towards other public sector or private facilities (USAID, 2014). As one study by MOPIC explains, the strains on public health facilities affect the quality of service provision. More specifically, the capacity of local hospitals has been exceeded by 23%, with 86% of this attributable to the Syrian crisis (MOPIC, 2016). MOPIC estimates that Jordan needs more than 1,000 new physicians, nearly 900 nurses and around 170 dentists (MOPIC, 2016).

There is also some evidence that the influx of Syrians has affected education. Over half of the Syrian refugee population in Jordan is under the age of eighteen, placing large demands on a public school system that was already under strain (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Overcrowding is the main threat to education quality (MOPIC, 2013). To alleviate the pressure on class sizes, the government has increased the number of double shifts, throwing off previous efforts to reduce the practice, and opened 98 additional double-shifted schools. The proportion of students attending double-shifted schools increased from 7.6% in 2009 to 13.4% in 2014 (Francis, 2015). In Amman and Irbid, almost half of schools have experienced overcrowding and have had to turn students away (ibid.). Plans were announced for another 100 primary schools to introduce double shifts in 2016–17 (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Double shifts can affect the quality of teaching and learning outcomes as the number of hours of teaching per child is reduced and teachers are overworked. Double shifts produce worse outcomes in Jordan than elsewhere (including UNRWA schools in Jordan), and
have been linked to increased tensions between host and refugee communities because shifts tend to be segregated (see Culbertson et al., 2016). It is estimated than an additional 5,707 classes would be needed to compensate for this overcrowding, or about 300 schools with 19 classes (MOPIC, 2016).

3.2.2 Economic and social impacts
Confinement in camps, poverty or cultural mores exclude or distance Syrian refugees from Jordanian society, and without political rights Syrians do not take part in policy debates or participate in political processes. In parts of the country already hosting Syrian refugees from the 1980s, business partnerships have been struck between new arrivals and this more established community. Over time these connections may grow into tighter bonds and de facto integration, and the socio-cultural impact of Syrian refugees may become more visible.

Without work permits, Syrian refugees are not integrated into the formal economy, but rather work (when they do work) alongside other migrants in the informal sector. Syrians are considered adept at trades such as masonry, carpentry and electronics, and produce specialities in the food and beverage industry, notably pastries. Unemployment is high: according to one study in 2013, half of Syrian refugees were economically inactive – i.e. not in employment or working – and only roughly a third was employed (Host Community Support Platform, 2013). This situation has been aggravated by significant reductions in public sector employment and the disproportionate growth in the working age population between 2010 and 2013 (Jordan, 2015). According to UNHCR data, two-thirds of Syrian refugees are living below the poverty line (Immenkamp, 2017).

Jordan’s economy has been heavily impacted by the mass influx of Syrian refugees, with reduced investment and a fall in tourism and trade leading to high unemployment rates, from 13.8% to 15.8% in 2016. GDP growth was estimated at 2%. As a consequence – and due to a lack of competitiveness, insufficiently diversified energy supplies and inadequate growth-supporting policies, as well as being a resource-poor country, Jordan has experienced a drastic increase in gross domestic debt. In response, the Jordanian government was planning a sales tax increase and additional taxes. The economy has operated below its potential since 2013.

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62 According to the Jordanian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, informal employment represents 44% of total employment in Jordan, while the IMF estimates the figure at 26% of the Jordanian economy – broadly comparable with other countries in the region (MPIC, 2010; Rawashdeh, 2017). Figures do not provide an accurate picture of the number of Jordanians versus migrant workers, but they do suggest that informal work is the most common form of employment for migrant workers, especially Egyptians (ETF, 2017).
3.3 Iraqi refugees

At the start of the war in Iraq in 2003, Jordan was already hosting an estimated 250,000–300,000 Iraqi refugees (Seeley, 2016). Many were from the Baghdad middle and upper classes, who acquired temporary residence permits at the border and settled in Amman and other Jordanian cities (ibid.). The bulk of the Iraqi refugee influx between 2004 and 2008 did not remain in Jordan permanently, but was resettled in the West or established transnational patterns of mobility within the region. There is therefore no definitive comment in the literature about the impact of Iraqi refugees in Jordan, beyond noting that the refugee crisis unfolded within long-standing economic and cultural connections between the two countries. The Jordanian state received high levels of foreign aid, much of which went into local services, in exchange for providing Iraqis with temporary asylum (Seeley, 2010).

In the aftermath of 2003, Iraqis were regarded as temporary visitors or ‘tolerated guests’ (De Bel-Air, 2007; Fagen, 2009; Seeley, 2016), and their entry and settlement was largely facilitated. Wealthy Iraqi refugees were able to acquire legal residence rights by making substantial deposits in Jordanian banks or investing in purchasing property and other assets (ibid.), triggering a property boom. The Iraqi refugee population today is estimated at 140,000, with 62,445 registered with UNHCR (UNHCR Jordan, 2017; Gavlak, 2017). The significant reduction in Iraqi refugees in Jordan is in part the result of policy changes following terrorist attacks on hotels in Amman in November 2005, in which at least three Iraqis were involved (De Bel-Air, 2007). The rights enjoyed by Iraqis in terms of border crossing and settlement were limited or

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It should be noted that the number of Iraqis in Jordan is not consistent in the literature, let alone confirmed. While the government inflates the numbers at times, UN statistics only recognise registered Iraqis. Hence there are significant discrepancies in the literature regarding the exact number of Iraqi refugees.
withdrawn (Mahdi, 2007); acquiring and renewing residence permits was restricted, and overstayers were deported. Although UNHCR declared a ‘temporary protection regime’, Jordan continued to make visa renewals so difficult that most Iraqis lost their legal status, and a substantial, though unconfirmed, number of Iraqis have been deported since 2006.

4. Public attitudes and perceptions of the ‘other’

Like the policies that the government has followed over the past decades in relation to the many waves of refugees that have sought safety in Jordan, public attitudes have also drastically shifted, both towards Palestinians and towards forced migrants more generally. Changing attitudes towards Palestinian refugees are reflected in schoolbooks, which stress Jordanian culture, identity, geography, history and heritage, and rarely mention Palestine. The media often portrays a sense of patriotism and pride in the country’s army, monarchy and natural resources (Farah, 1999). Public frustration is increasing over the impact of Syrian refugees on resources, services and infrastructure (Seeberg, 2016), alongside security fears in the context of the challenges posed regionally by Islamic State (IS). Many Jordanians feel neglected by donors, who have focused their attention on Syrians, and by their government, for failing to take care of communities heavily impacted by the crisis. One example of a citizen-led effort to manage tensions and increase mutual understanding is the community-based radio show AmmanNet/Radio Al-Balad, co-produced by Jordanians and Syrians, which seeks to shed light on the situation of Syrians in Jordan (Kuttab, in Al-Khatib and Lenner (eds), 2015).

When discussing public perceptions it should be noted that Jordan does not have a free press, and space for criticism of the ruling elite or contestation of public policy is limited. Civil society is often linked to bodies aligned to the state or the royal family and is not outspoken. According to Freedom House (2016): ‘The government tolerates modest criticism of state officials and policies. However, journalists risk arrest under a variety of restrictive laws, and much of the media sector is state-run. A number of journalists were arrested during 2015 in connection with reporting on foreign affairs and their impact on Jordan, including the conflicts in Syria and Yemen. Journalists routinely self-censor and are aware of certain “red lines” that may not be crossed in reporting, including critical coverage of the royal family’. These restrictions on the Jordanian press are reflected in the difficulties around undertaking large-scale independent academic research. Neither was this review able to draw on large public polls. As such, there is little literature that captures public perceptions, public debate or politically sensitive interactions between host and refugee populations.

5. Integration: between policy and politics

This project uses UNDP’s definition of social cohesion as the basis for its understanding of integration: ‘A general condition of stable coexistence within communities, when IDPs, refugees, and host community members accept socio-ethnic differences, have equitable access to livelihoods and other community resources, and feel safe and secure in their homes’. Legal, governance, functional and social ‘domains’ form the main elements of the multi-faceted process of integration (Zetter, 2017), with the first
two domains central to the interests of the receiving country, and the second two giving more emphasis to the refugee experience. The legal domain refers to the different models of membership enabled by legal entitlements, ultimately leading to citizenship. The governance domain comprises the institutional structure and processes which facilitate integration. The functional domain describes the levels of social and economic participation of refugees in their host country. The social domain focuses on the degree of social inclusion of the refugee within the majority receiving community, and relates to ethnicity, cultural identity, social networks and social capital (ibid.).

5.1 Legal and governance domains
This report has dealt in detail with the legal and governmental approach to the integration of the majority of Palestinian refugees who hold Jordanian citizenship. During the 1940s and 1950s, government policy aimed at political assimilation and forging a common history, identity and society ‘uniting two branches of the same family’ (Brand, 1995). From the late 1960s, however, Jordan’s stance started to shift towards a more restrictive approach. With the rise of nationalism on both sides, Jordan began limiting the political and civil rights of naturalised Palestinians, as well as suspending further measures towards naturalisation.

With regard to Syrian refugees, the government’s official position remains that it will make no moves towards de jure integration. Its management of the crisis does, however, show that it will both implement and retract policies towards the Syrian refugee population that provide them with civic entitlements, like access to education and healthcare, when it deems it necessary. This is based in no small part on the degree and type of support that the international community has provided. For example, when international funding declined in 2014, Syrians’ access to government healthcare facilities was restricted, but when donors pledged greater support for developing Jordan’s economy in 2015, the Jordanian government relaxed fees and other restrictions on work permits for Syrian refugees.

5.2 Social and functional domains
The vast majority of refugee flows into Jordan have involved the mass movement of Arabic-speaking, predominantly Sunni, Muslims, often with tribal or other kinship links within Jordan. While differences of dialect, culture and ethnicity have still been present, this has meant that some of the cruder barriers refugees often face in other parts of the world – incongruous religious practices or belief systems, racial or ethnic discrimination, and the inability to communicate in the host language(s) – have not been present or significant. In a sense, this makes both the presence and absence of social and functional integration harder to observe and brings to the fore more subtle questions of political expression and economic integration.

Most Palestinian refugees are Jordanian citizens, and in most respects take part in social and functional domains as robustly as non-Palestinian Jordanians. Intermarriage is also, anecdotally, widespread, though no figures were available to quantify this. Palestinian refugee identity and participation in social and political life – and the state response to it – is, however, complex. The literature demonstrates that, throughout its history, Jordanian national identity has emphasised the (more inclusive) larger regional and universal collective of Arabs and Muslims, as opposed to an emphasis on
the smaller family on the basis of kinship and tribalism, which is part of the Transjordanian nationalist discourse (Al-Abed, 2004; Nasser, 2013). However, the national identity discourse inclusive of Palestinians started to crumble (Achilli 2014), exacerbated by the emergence of the PLO and the development of a separate Palestinian identity and nationalist discourse crystallised around the plight of the iconic figure of the ‘camp dweller’ (al-mukhayyami). The to-and-fro of integration and separation can be seen in events in the Palestinian refugee camps over the decades – from the camps becoming a hotbed of anti-monarchical organising in the 1970s to their gradual physical merging with surrounding Jordanian suburbs, to the resistance in the 1980s to World Bank-sponsored ‘urban upgrading’ projects in the camps, which a vocal minority objected to as they felt, simply put, that if the camps no longer looked marginalised, a potent symbol of Palestinians’ continued exile would be lost, and their stay in Jordan would be considered permanent (Ababsa, 2010).

Today, Palestinian elites comprise a large proportion of Jordan’s private sector (Ryan, 2002), with their own businesses and philanthropic foundations, usually social enterprises set up as family foundations (Ibrahim and Sherif, 2008). These family foundations offer assistance and grants to other institutions and manage a large number of charitable programmes. Examples include the regionally renowned Shoman Foundation and the Eljah Nuqul foundation, both of which aim to promote social change (Associated Press, 2005).

For Syrian refugees, family, tribal and employment links to Jordan have facilitated interaction, and in some cases integration, particularly through intermarriage between Jordanian and Syrian members of the same kinship group (Bellamy et al., 2017). Even where there is no kinship connection, Syrians live alongside (usually) poor Jordanians in the cities, and there are many reports of small-scale informal assistance from Jordanians to their Syrian neighbours. Bellamy et al. (2017) quote an elderly Syrian woman who put their relations in the context of Jordan’s history with displaced people: ‘We live amongst [Jordanian] Palestinians so they know what it’s like to be a refugee’. Over time, Syrians are becoming less distinguishable from their Jordanian neighbours. Staff from the Jordanian Women’s Union, who have worked in several poor neighbourhoods all over the country, note this shift: ‘Being all Arabs, we have similarities, but we are also able to distinguish each other. At the beginning of the crisis we were able to identify Syrian women walking on the street or Syrian children playing outside. Now, everybody looks the same. We cannot distinguish anymore’ (Al-Khatib and Lenner, 2015). Cultural values, such as the greater acceptance of childhood marriage amongst Syrians, will take longer to shift (ibid.).

Younger generations are integrating socially through their participation in the Jordanian education system. Bellamy et al. (2017) note that Syrian children in Zarqa are more likely to complain about differences between their circumstances and those of their Jordanian counterparts, rather than harking back to life in Syria. However, Syrian children face significant disadvantages within Jordan’s school system (including through their disrupted education, their greater poverty and their ineligibility for university places or work permits upon graduation).

The Economic Policy Council (EPC), established in June 2016, is responsible for developing short- and long-term policies to enhance the economic situation of Syrian
refugees by improving the business environment, supporting start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises, improving laws and regulations and reforming the tax system. In September 2016, the government approved the EPC’s first recommendations (World Bank, 2016a), announcing an eight-point plan to reduce unemployment, as well as regional development packages to foster job creation, infrastructure support and funds for small and medium-sized enterprises. Fiscal measures as part of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) include an increase in cigarette prices, taxes on alcohol and fees on car sales, and the removal or reduction of goods and sales tax exemptions.

In 2014, the European Union (EU) and Jordan signed a mobility partnership to foster mobility and integration. In total, the EU has provided Jordan with €950 million for the support of refugees and vulnerable communities via the Macro Financial Assistance Instrument, the European Neighbourhood Instrument, the Instrument contributing to Peace and Stability, the EU Trust Fund and the EU’s humanitarian budget (Immenkamp, 2017). In addition, Jordan secured grants at a donor conference in London in early 2016 as part of the Jordan Compact. In return for improving employment conditions for Syrian refugees previously barred from legally working in Jordan, the international community agreed a $2.1 billion aid package. Multilateral development banks offered to double concessional financing, from $800 million to $1.9 billion, while the EU agreed to waive taxes and quotas for products created by Syrians (Reliefweb, 2016), and to revise its preferential rules of origin. In return, Jordan promised legal employment to a large number of Syrians outside the SEZs by creating up to 200,000 jobs for Syrian refugees in the next five years (Crawley, 2017). In addition to quotas for involvement in municipal works via private sector employment, Syrians would be allowed to formalise existing businesses and to establish new businesses. A crucial focal point in the Jordan Compact is a commitment to the education of every child in Jordan to avoid a ‘lost generation’ of refugee children (Immenkamp, 2017). A year on, Jordan has secured $923.6 million, partly via World Bank loans and a large cash transfer from the United States. The IMF has also approved a three-year extension under the Extended Fund Facility granting $723 million to support economic reforms. In June 2017, the IMF disbursed $71 million, bringing a total of $141.9 million (IMF, 2017).

As a result of the Jordan Compact, Jordan has introduced a number of positive policy measures aimed at facilitating the integration of Syrians into the country’s labour market. However, the Compact has not returned the expected results, and research by Bellamy et al. (2017) suggests that many Syrians will remain in the informal sector. Only 38,516 permits were issued between April 2016 and February 2017, substantially fewer than expected based on the political and financial effort expended. This is partly explained by the potential costs of formalised employment, including losing access to aid and the chance of resettlement to a third country, as well as becoming visible to a possibly unsympathetic government (Staton, 2016). Higher-skilled labour, such as engineers, physicians, accountants, lawyers and teachers, are excluded from the work permit scheme, and some industries are effectively closed to Syrians (Crawley, 2017). Conservative Syrian women are reluctant to enter a factory without male company and are restricted by household chores (for another example, see Reznick, 2016).
In order to attract new investment and improve access to the EU market, the Jordanian government intended to increase incentives and demand for jobs for Jordanians and Syrian refugees by creating Special Economic Zones (SEZs), estimated to provide 200,000 jobs. This is currently financed by $300 million from the World Bank (World Bank, 2016b). In simple terms, tax incentives and trade opportunities should encourage firms to invest and provide job opportunities for refugees. The prospects are unclear. SEZs in Asia have eroded labour rights, reflected in low wages, longer working hours and abuse, leading to what have been called ‘special exploitation zones’ (Crawley, 2017). Cultural idiosyncrasies and the risk of losing benefits and being exposed to exploitation have reduced demand for regular labour, while employment opportunities are limited to a restricted set of professions at potentially low salaries. The creation of employment opportunities for Syrian refugees has also led to restrictions on foreign migrant workers, mostly Egyptians, in order to mitigate negative impacts on the employment of Jordanian workers (Abaza, 2016). Thus, instead of providing additional jobs, Syrian refugees have effectively substituted for migrant workers, especially since the SEZs provide cheaper labour for investors, thereby increasing the vulnerability and precarious living conditions of Egyptian workers, who account for 65% of migrant labour.

Similarly, in the Better Work programme, initiated by the ILO and the International Finance Corporation to increase employment for Syrian refugees in the garment sector, low wages and monotonous work, as well as the long distances between towns and factories, rendered work unattractive to Syrians, especially women. According to the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, migrant workers are exposed to violations of their labour rights, such as withholding of an employee’s passport, non-payment, movement restrictions, unpaid and long overtime, an absence of holidays and even threats of imprisonment and physical and sexual abuse (SDC, 2014).

The Jordan Response Plan 2017–2019 provides $7.6 billion for refugee-related interventions and $2.5 billion for resilience strengthening on the basis of a three-year rolling plan to respond to the effects of the Syrian crisis. The plan focuses on the resilience both of refugees and host communities, promoting sustained access to education and energy, the mitigation of environmental consequences and pressures on natural resources, especially water, food security, the provision of health services and social protection to Syrian refugees, and justice services. It is also intended to create job opportunities and provide training for Jordanians and Syrian refugees, as well as local governance and municipal services. In addition, it is meant to create additional affordable housing, thereby easing the strain on Jordan’s housing market, while reducing transportation costs and improving sanitation. The plan is complemented by the UN’s regional refugees and resilience plan (3RP), which supports multi-year funding and policy implementation through national systems and local actors (Immenkamp, 2017). Finally, IKEA together with the Jordan River Foundation is financing a project that is expected to provide labour for 200,000 refugees and the same number of local workers within two years (Fairs, 2017).

6. Conclusion

For most of its existence as an independent state, Jordan has been a major refugee-hosting country. This has significantly altered its demographic composition as a nation
and heavily influenced its political history, culture and identity. Today, over half of the population are of Palestinian origin. Jordan is also hosting over 650,000 Syrian refugees and an estimated 140,000 Iraqis. Jordan has historically been one of the most open countries towards Arab forced migrants and has acted as a regional crossroads for migrants seeking work opportunities, healthcare or religious pilgrimage.

Despite this rich history of welcome, in recent years policies towards refugees have become increasingly restrictive and securitised, and the policies of active integration that met the initial influx of Palestinians have been rolled back. This has created different ‘tiers’ of Palestinians with different rights and statuses, and an encampment policy aimed at segregation. Jordan has also adopted more restrictive border controls and residence regulations towards Arab migrants in general and forced migrants in particular. Meanwhile, the mass arrival of Syrian refugees has led to a number of international initiatives aimed at encouraging investment and trade in Jordan, in the hope of turning the crisis into an economic opportunity, both for Jordanians and Syrians.

Ultimately, Jordan’s record as a refugee-hosting state must be assessed in the context of its geographical position and political history at the heart of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Its success in integrating millions of Palestinians should be viewed as a positive model for integration in the region, despite Jordan’s subsequent turn away from an open-door policy towards Arab migrants and the integration policy adopted in relation to Palestinians.

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Against the Odds: Refugee Integration in Kenya

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Kenya’s relative stability, economic resilience and porous borders in a region dominated by protracted crises means that the country has been hosting refugees since the 1960s (Abuya, 2007). Until the 1990s, refugee policy favoured local integration. Refugees – many of whom were African and Asian Ugandans fleeing political turmoil in the 1970s – were able to work, move and settle across Kenya; and to access education (Abuya, 2007; Campbell, 2005). As many Ugandan refugees were relatively well-off professionals, intellectuals and business people, this policy supported Kenya’s interest in attracting skilled workers and investment to the country (Kawanja, 2000). The Kenyan government provided limited support, and responsibility for the integration of refugees largely lay with churches and aid organisations (Abuya, 2007). No large-scale camps were in operation, although the government’s Thika Reception Centre outside Nairobi provided reception and accommodation for a few hundred refugees and asylum-seekers. It also housed the government’s registration and refugee status determination activities (Campbell et al., 2011). Kenyan experts suggest that camps were also used at other points in Kenya’s past.

This integration policy was reversed in the early 1990s, when hundreds of thousands of refugees arrived in Kenya fleeing conflict and insecurity in Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC. By the end of 1992 Kenya was hosting almost 300,000 Somali refugees, the first mass influx of refugees in the country’s history (Abuya, 2007). Somalis have dominated ever since, both in terms of refugee numbers and refugee policies. Conflict in Ethiopia resulted in a parallel influx of Ethiopian refugees, who numbered almost 70,000 in 1992, alongside 22,000 Sudanese, half of whom were thought to be unaccompanied minors. Refugees from DRC also started arriving in large numbers in the 1990s. Overall, refugee numbers, estimated at between 12,000 and 15,000 before 1990, rose to 120,000 in 1991, and over 400,000 in 1992 (Abuya, 2007).

The scale and profile of the new arrivals prompted a major shift in Kenyan refugee policy away from integration and towards encampment. While much of the literature chronicling this change in policy points to the escalation in numbers overwhelming Kenya’s refugee management system (Campbell et al., 2011; Lindley, 2011; Omata, 2016), there were also important political and ethnic dimensions. The large numbers of Somali refugee arrivals in the 1990s lacked the socio-economic credentials of their Ugandan predecessors and arrived in a context of long-standing discrimination against Kenyan Somalis following a secessionist conflict in Kenya’s North-Eastern Province between 1963 and 1967, when Somali and Muslim populations fought to join a greater Somalia. The province was under emergency rule until 1991, and Kenyan Somalis there were subject to collective punishment, security screenings and forced repatriation (Lind et al., 2015). Other factors reinforcing the policy change included a downturn in the Kenyan economy; broader concerns that regional conflicts would spill over into Kenya; increases in small arms and more general social unrest; and a chronic shortage of arable land (Kagwanja, 1999; Abuya, 2007).

The new strategy was predicated on the offer of temporary protection; the delegation of responsibility for refugee affairs to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); and the containment of refugees in camps in remote areas of the country.
close to the borders of Somalia and southern Sudan. The camp option was deemed the most appropriate by both the Kenyan government and UNHCR because it allowed for the provision of assistance to the large numbers of arriving refugees, while also protecting Kenya’s national security interests and facilitating the eventual repatriation of refugees. Individual refugee status determination was replaced by the granting of *prima facie* refugee status (Campbell et al., 2011). Somali refugees were transferred from areas where they had initially settled in Mombasa and along the coast to the Dadaab camps of Ifo, Hagadera and Dhagahaley in the north of North Eastern Province, close to the border with Somalia. Meanwhile, refugees from Ethiopia, Sudan and the Great Lakes were hosted primarily in Kakuma camp, in the north-west of the country close to the border with southern Sudan.

By early 1999 the number of refugees had fallen to under 200,000 as a result of the repatriation of many Somali refugees and resettlement (Kagwanja, 2000). Between 2006 and 2012, however, numbers rose sharply again in response to fighting between internationally-backed Ethiopian troops and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the emergence of Al-Shabaab and the effects of Somalia’s worst famine for 25 years. By September 2011, more than 500,000 Somali refugees were in Kenya, mostly in Dadaab camp. Numbers of South Sudanese fleeing to Kenya have also risen again, although flows to Kenya have been lower than to Ethiopia and Uganda. Today, Kenya is home to the tenth-largest refugee population in the world and hosts the highest number of Somali refugees globally (UNHCR, 2016). Its refugee and asylum-seeker population of 490,656 is third only to Uganda and Ethiopia in Africa.

There were an estimated 138,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kenya at the end of 2016, the majority of them the result of evictions, communal violence, terrorism and development-induced displacement.64 These figures do not include the estimated 300,000 people who fled post-election violence in 2007–2008 and ‘integrated’ into host communities (World Bank and UNHCR, 2015). Kenya is reportedly a transit hub for migrants smuggled and trafficked on the so-called ‘Southern route’ to South Africa. In 2009, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated that up to 20,000 Somali and Ethiopian male migrants were being smuggled to South Africa annually, although numbers are thought to be much higher today (Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, 2013).

### 1.1 Opportunities for durable solutions

Despite an early emphasis on the temporary nature of the camps established along Kenya’s borders, once the emergency phase had stabilised refugee management shifted to care and maintenance of the large refugee population, with few options for a durable solution to their long-term exile. Only 29,000 refugees were resettled to a third country over the five years between 2011 and 2016, and resettlement is mainly provided as a protection intervention for refugees who arrived in Kenya in 1991–92 (UNHCR, 2017). Formal local integration through citizenship is virtually impossible through legal means, although arguably some refugees outside of camps have obtained a form of de facto integration as many are self-reliant thanks to employment in Nairobi’s thriving informal sector and are able to access some health and educational services (Jacobsen, 2001; Crisp, 2004; Campbell et al., 2011). Official

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figures estimate Nairobi’s urban refugee population at 67,267 (UNHCR, 2017), although unofficial numbers put the figure as high as 100,000. Abdulsamed (2011) and Carrier (2017) highlight that large numbers of Somali refugees were granted Kenyan citizenship, including in return for political favours, while many others have acquired Kenyan identification cards and citizenship through illicit means.

Repatriation remains the main durable solution for Somali refugees, despite the absence of conditions conducive for return. Over 66,000 Somali refugees returned between 2015 and the first half of 2017 under a voluntary repatriation agreement signed between the governments of Kenya and Somalia and UNHCR in 2013 (UNHCR, 2017). In 2016, the Kenyan government announced the closure of Dadaab camp, although delays and legal challenges have meant that the likelihood and timing of its closure, and the possible forcible repatriation of its residents, remain unclear. Overall, official numbers of Somali refugees in Kenya have fallen from an estimated 475,000 in 2013, to just over 300,000 in 2017 (UNHCR, 2017). Today, Somalis account for approximately 62% of Kenya’s refugee population, down from 81% in 2013, as a result of repatriation, reverification exercises and, to a lesser extent, resettlement.

2. Legal and policy frameworks

2.1 Kenyan refugee law, institutions and protection

Kenya became a party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter the 1951 Convention) in 1966, and the 1967 Protocol in 1981. It has also ratified the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problem in Africa (hereafter the 1969 OAU Convention), which expands upon the 1951 Convention definition of refugee to include people compelled to leave their country owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order (as discussed in related policy research for the World Commission). The 1969 OAU Convention also does not require a refugee to demonstrate a direct and personal link to future danger. Kenya did not enter any reservations in regard to these Conventions. However, it was not until 2007, when the Refugees Act 2006 came into force, that Kenya had national legislation that affirmed its commitment to international refugee conventions, and set out the rights and treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers in Kenya (Abuya, 2007).

The Act established the Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA), whose responsibilities include receiving and processing applications for refugee status, which had been delegated to UNHCR since the early 1990s. The DRA took on responsibility for registering refugees in 2011, but only assumed some refugee status determination (RSD) functions in 2014. Due to resource and capacity limitations, the transfer of RSD functions has not been completed (Garlick, 2015). The RSD process takes approximately two years rather than an intended maximum of six months, and it currently lacks an appeal system (UNHCR and DRC, 2012). In November 2016, the DRA was disbanded abruptly and subsequently replaced by a Refugee Affairs Secretariat, largely tasked with the same functions. Reports indicate that the staff of the new Secretariat are largely drawn from government security and intelligence departments.

The Refugees Act recognises two classes of refugees: statutory and *prima facie* refugees. *Prima facie* refugees are defined in accordance with the expanded OAU
Convention (Refugee Consortium of Kenya, 2012). The Minister of Interior and Coordination of National Government is empowered to declare a class of persons prima facie refugees and to amend or revoke such declarations. The most recent examples are the designation in 2014 of South Sudanese as prima facie refugees, and the revocation of this status for Somali refugees in 2016.

The Act stipulates that refugees are protected from arbitrary arrest, detention or expulsion, and that refugees should be provided with a ‘refugee identity card’. These take the form of either a UNHCR Mandated Refugee Certificate (MRC) that is valid for two years, or the DRA-issued Alien Refugee Certificate (ARC), valid for five years. One of the important implications of the documentation is that it affords refugees some small measure of protection from harassment, extortion and violence at the hands of security officials in urban centres. Avenues to transition from refugee status to citizenship are limited. The 2010 Kenyan Constitution provides that a person who has resided lawfully in Kenya for a continuous period of at least seven years may be naturalised if they meet additional conditions. These conditions include legal entry into Kenya, the ability to speak Kiswahili or a local language and the capacity to make a substantive contribution to Kenya’s development. In practice these conditions mean that refugees rarely meet the criteria and are seldom granted citizenship (Lindley, 2011), although as mentioned above, an unknown number have been granted or have acquired this illicitly.

A new Refugee Bill passed through parliament in 2017. Its development was supported by a taskforce co-chaired by the government and civil society representatives. Accounts indicate that there may be greater provision for refugee self-reliance, including the potential for refugees to access land and work permits. During debates in parliament, it was, however, agreed to remove reference to integration as a possible durable solution for refugees, linked to concerns that Somali refugees in particular might gain Kenyan citizenship. While the Bill passed through all stages of parliamentary approval during early 2017, at the time of writing it is not yet clear if it will be signed into law, and even if it is, the degree to which some of its more progressive elements will be implemented in practice is uncertain.

2.2 Freedom of movement

Although Kenya’s 2010 Constitution guarantees freedom to all refugees to enter, remain and reside anywhere in the country, Kenya’s policy of encampment effectively prohibits refugees from leaving the camps. Refugees’ lack of freedom of movement fundamentally curtails their ability to access employment and higher education. Access to justice is also affected, as refugees have to wait for the monthly mobile court

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sittings in the camp (Refugee Consortium Kenya, 2012). Kenya’s policy of encampment was recognised legally in March 2014. A High Court ruling in January 2015 upheld as constitutional the provisions on encampment, arguing that the policy did not violate freedom of movement as envisaged under the Constitution (World Bank and UNHCR, 2015).

Only camp residents in possession of a movement pass can travel to other parts of Kenya. Passes are issued for a limited set of reasons, such as medical or higher educational requirements or due to protection concerns in camps. The limited opportunities for legal travel have resulted in many refugees travelling either without permits, or gaining permits through false documentation or bribery (Refugee Consortium Kenya, 2012). Despite the policy of encampment, many urban refugees remain outside camps, with their presence implicitly endorsed by the Kenyan authorities, which have registered some of them in urban areas. In early 2012, the Refugee Consortium of Kenya reported more welcoming procedures for refugees in urban centres than in camps (Refugee Consortium Kenya, 2012).

The freedom of movement enjoyed by refugees in urban centres was significantly restricted by a relocation directive in December 2012, as well as a subsequent encampment directive issued in March 2014, both of which resulted in urban refugees being relocated to camps. In July 2013 the High Court ruled that the directive was unconstitutional. In April 2014, following a number of serious security incidents, the government launched ‘Operation Usalama Watch’. Originally targeted at Somalis, the operation led to arrests, detentions and the relocation of refugees living in urban areas to camps, as well as deportations to Somalia (IRC and ReDSS, 2016).

2.3 Right to work
The 2006 Refugee Act provides refugees the same rights to employment as other non-nationals. Employment of non-nationals is governed by the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act 2011, under which work permits, called ‘Class M’ permits, are granted, usually for two years. Applications for permits also need a recommendation from a prospective employer, and must be accompanied by a letter from the DRA confirming refugee status (Zetter and Rudel, 2017). While refugees may therefore theoretically work, the practice is reportedly much different, perhaps due in part to Kenya’s high unemployment rate of over 39%, and high dependence on the informal economy. The Refugee Consortium of Kenya stated in 2012 that the government only issues work permits to asylum-seekers or refugees in a few isolated cases (RCK, 2012). For those who manage to obtain them, work permits last for five years (Zetter and Rudel, 2017). As a result, refugees, both skilled and unskilled, seek employment in the informal sector. A thriving informal economy has emerged in camps, and the majority of refugees in urban centres rely on Kenya’s extensive informal economy.

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69 Refugees Act § 16.
3. The impact of forced displacement on Kenya

Perceived negative impacts of refugees on Kenya’s security bear heavily on decision-making. In terms of their economic impact, refugees are, on the one hand, perceived as a burden, and on the other as competitors for Kenyan jobs. However, despite strong political and public perceptions and concerns, no studies have been undertaken to quantify the impacts of refugees on the Kenyan economy at a national level. Urban refugees are more integrated, and are likely to have greater impacts, but as many are unregistered, under the radar and operating in the informal sector, the extent of their impact is difficult to discern.

This section draws on the available evidence to document the impact of Kenya’s camp-based refugees, before reviewing the impact of refugees in Nairobi. As the available literature seldom distinguishes between the different countries of origin of camp-based refugees, it has not been possible to provide a detailed assessment of the impact of different population flows, although Somali refugees form the majority of refugees in Dadaab, and South Sudanese the majority in the more ethnically diverse Kakuma camp, analysis of the impact of each of these camps corresponds, to a certain degree, to the impact of these populations. The sub-section on Nairobi profiles refugees from Somalia and the DRC, offering interesting comparisons because of their numbers, different settlement patterns and very different impacts.

3.1 The impact of Kenya’s camps

Much of the literature on Kenya’s camps focuses on the experience of refugees and the impact of encampment on their rights and freedoms, livelihoods and access to services. Indeed, refugees’ experiences in Kenya’s camps have been the inspiration for a body of literature critical of camps for depriving refugees of their civil and political rights, rendering them dependent on relief, robbing them of access to socio-economic networks and problematizing refugees and depicting them in dehumanizing ways (Harrell-Bond et al., 1992; Crisp, 2002; Verdirame et al., 2005). This literature has in turn been criticized for downplaying the agency and productivity of refugees (Jacobsen, 2001; Horst, 2004).

The literature on refugees’ impact on host populations is mostly qualitative, but a recent World Bank impact assessment of Kakuma camp (Sanghi et al., 2016; Alix-García et al., 2017) uses quantitative methods to assess the economic and social impacts on local populations. Two earlier studies of Dadaab, although less comprehensive and robust in terms of methodology, analyze its socio-economic, cultural and environmental impacts. These studies form the basis of the findings provided below, supplemented by analysis from the qualitative work. The evidence is therefore limited, and in some instances dated. What it does show is that the picture is much more nuanced than narratives about the negative impact of refugees in Kenya would suggest. The evidence shows significant, although localized, economic benefits of camps for host populations, negative, but geographically limited, environmental impacts and mixed social impacts.
3.1.1 Demographic impacts

Of the 17 original refugee camps established by UNHCR in the early 1990s, only four remain: Kakuma camp in the Turkana District of north-western Kenya and the three camps at Dadaab in Garissa District (Ifo, Dagahaley and Hagadera, commonly referred to as the Dadaab complex). Both camp complexes are situated in remote, impoverished, politically marginalized and semi-arid locations, with low population densities, close to the borders of South Sudan and Somalia, respectively (Ikanda, 2008). Although demographic impacts are restricted in scale and scope by the geographic segregation of the refugee population, there are some indications of impact on population size, mobility and access to services and resources.

The prolonged presence of refugees, their high concentration as well as the cultural and economic characteristics of the camps have led a number of academics to conclude that they resemble cities or ‘refugee camp towns’ (de Montclos and Kagwanja, 2000; Okra, 2011; Agier, 2011). Certainly, their scale and the concentration of refugees relative to host populations is clear. Kakuma camp is currently home to 176,872 refugees and asylum-seekers (UNHCR, 2017). At its opening in 1991, the camp held 35,000 Sudanese refugees, some 10km from Kakuma town, an ‘inconsequential village’ at the time with a population variously estimated at 2,000 (Ohta, n.d.), 8,000 (de Montclos and Kagwanja, 2000) and 15,000 (UNHCR, 2004). The camp appears to be having some effect on Kakuma’s local population, at least in terms of size and density, as by 2004 the population had risen to 50,000, with some evidence of high levels of in-migration (Alix-Garcia et al., 2017). While the exact causal relationship between this population growth and the camp is not set out in the literature, aside from the camp there are few other explanations.

The impact on Dadaab’s demography appears to be more clearly demonstrated. Unlike Kakuma, the predominantly Somali Kenyan host population in Dadaaab shared a common ethnic ancestry, language, culture and religion, and in some cases clan affiliation, with the Somalis who arrived in 1991. Although the Dadaab complex was designed to accommodate a maximum of 90,000 people, by 2009 its population had exceeded its initial capacity by 270% (Sanghi et al., 2016). Today, it is home to 246,517 people (UNHCR, 2017). Two studies describe the difficulty of distinguishing between refugee and local populations due to locals’ easy access to refugee ration cards (one study estimates that 27% of non-refugee households within a 50km radius has one), the recent arrival of host populations to the area and the ethnic and clan ties between the two groups (Enghoff et al., 2010; Ikanda, 2008). To our knowledge, there has been no impact analysis of population growth around Dadaab as a result of the camp, although the area’s population growth rate of 11.7% since 1999 is much higher than the overall rate in North-Eastern province of 3.7%, which has resulted in a population increase from 15,000 in 1989 to 148,000 in 2010. However, it is unclear whether these rises suggest increased urbanisation of the local population. Agier (2011) highlights how the transient nature of camps means that urbanisation is ‘incomplete and unfinished’. This appears to be the case with Dadaab, given its uncertain future.

Although no quantitative assessment of the availability of services in areas surrounding the camps has been undertaken, there is no evidence of a drain on social
services and some indication that services have improved for local people. A simple comparison between levels of service provision in the Dadaab area and other arid areas of Kenya shows above-average access to potable water, education and health facilities among the local population, and surveys find that 83% of respondents in a host community sample reported improved access to water and 85% improved access to education (Enghoff et al., 2010).\footnote{This data is from a recall question; the period of recall is not specified in the study.} In Kakuma, the local population report that entitlement to free medical facilities at the camp’s main hospital has been beneficial, and in 2000 it was reported that around 10% of schoolchildren in Kakuma camp was Kenyan (Verumu et al., 2016).

Services may have improved, but negative environmental impacts have been recorded, which is significant given the semi-arid locations of the camps. According to two qualitative studies, Kakuma camp has contributed to a shortage of resources, particularly firewood, and the extra demand for water has, at times, caused insufficient supply, and over the long term lowered the ground water level (RMMS, 2013; Aukot, 2003). A study by Braun et al. (2015) indicates a decrease in natural resources, such as water and foliage, of 11.8% in the five kilometres around the Dadaab complex. Enghoff et al. (2010) report depletion of firewood and building materials, as well as grazing competition in the immediate environment. The report also provided more nuanced arguments in relation to the environmental impact than the accepted, more alarmist narratives of the Kenyan government and international actors. It suggested that environmental degradation is largely restricted to the immediate vicinity of the camp and is an inevitable consequence of concentrating large numbers of refugees in large camps at a level much above the 20,000 refugees advised by UNHCR. Numerous programmes have been implemented in recent years to reduce dependence on firewood, introduce solar energy and address the detrimental environmental impact of the camps.

### 3.1.2 Economic impacts

Confounding assumed narratives that refugee camps are a burden, the evidence from Kenya shows that they are in fact considerable economic assets for local economies, especially given that they are largely financed externally. However, the benefits are not felt equally, and the limited strategic engagement with camp economies means that there are no efforts to redistribute the benefits more equally amongst host populations. The informality of camp economies also means that potential revenue benefits for the Kenyan authorities are not realised.

The economies of camp-based refugees hinge on the transfers they receive, which in turn determine their purchasing power. The main sources of transfers are foreign aid and remittances. We found no studies quantifying the amount of investment, but the total budget received for refugees in Kenya by international agencies for 2011–13 was $940 million, amounting to $1.42 per refugee per day, including food. Similarly, no study was found quantifying the amount of remittances received by refugees in camps. Alix-Garcia et al. (2017) found that, in Kakuma, 61% of those surveyed had received a remittance payment in the past year. Horst (2004) estimates that 10–15%
of refugees in Dadaab receive remittances, with some receiving regular payments of $150–200 per month. These resources have contributed to improved living conditions at the household level, as well as services in the camps, especially housing, water provision and telephone services. Montclos and Kagwanja (2000) showed that telecommunications in both Kakuma and Dadaab were upgraded in order to support the high number of international calls being made to relay international remittances.

A recent study of the economic impact of Kakuma camp on the host Turkana population shows that it is both significant and localised. The camp has boosted Gross Regional Product by an estimated 3.4%; employment has increased by 2.9%, and there has been a small increase in individual incomes of some 0.5% per person. The macroeconomic impact on Kenya is, however, negligible (Sanghi et al., 2016). A study of Dadaab also indicates economic benefits for the host population, although these are not quantified in percentage terms (Enghoff et al., 2010). The study estimated the total economic benefits of the camps and related operations for the host community at $14 million in 2010, with a further $4.9 million in food aid if it was traded. Relevant impacts include sales of livestock and milk to the camps and a 20% reduction in the price of basic commodities, resulting in savings on food purchases for the local population.

Other studies highlight the range of economic interactions between hosts and camp residents, including the sale of livestock, firewood and charcoal to refugees in Kakuma; the supply of goods and services by merchants in Kakuma; and the importance of refugees from the camps as customers for local shops in Kakuma. In Dadaab, a study by Enghoff (2010) found that its approximately 5,000 businesses had an estimated turnover of some $25 million and supported 1,000 local jobs. Wages in 2010 were 50–75% higher for unskilled labour than in other comparable areas of Kenya, although the situation may have changed since.

Alix-Garcia et al. (2017) show that the economic benefits of Kakuma camp are not felt equally, and hosts who face direct competition from refugees are worse off. Lack of sufficient competition in markets in the vicinity of the camp, such as retail, land, housing and livestock (due in part to the areas’ relative poverty, political and economic marginalisation, low population density and limited economic investment) means that benefits are felt disproportionately by those who control these businesses. Garcia et al. (2017) indicate that the camps do not affect the housing market directly as refugees and aid workers are not housed outside them, but they may influence the market indirectly through increased in-migration of other Kenyans to Kakuma, and through increasing titling and commercialisation of land.

Few locals benefit from have formal employment with aid organisations, with jobs instead taken up either by refugee incentive workers (refugees paid a stipend for their work) or non-local Kenyans. This is an issue that local populations have protested publicly about (Monclos and Kajwanja, 2000). Major markets in Dadaab town were transferred into the camps, causing tensions with the local community (Ikanda, 2008). One study in 2008 indicated perceptions of considerable wealth disparities between refugees and host populations in Dadaab (Ikanda, 2008), and wealthy refugees in
Kakuma camp in the early 2000s employed indigenous Turkana as casual labour, including children as domestic servants (Aukot, 2003; Montclos and Kagwanja, 2000). Although local populations protested against the proposed closure of Kakuma camp (Alix Garcia et al., 2017), a survey of host populations in Dadaab indicated support for the repatriation of Dadaab’s refugees, whom they blamed for the area’s economic hardships (Ikanda, 2008).

The informality of refugee economies results in lost revenue for the Kenyan government, although the amounts are unknown. Montclos and Kagwanja (2000) refer to past efforts by the government to collect tax in Dadaab following demands by the host community. At that time, the authorities estimated that taxation in the camp would yield up to KES 8 million (approximately $75,000) per annum. Omata (2016) notes that, since 2014, the district municipality of Turkana has requested that refugee enterprises inside Kakuma camp pay for a business licence and register their shops. The cost is approximately KES 3,500 (approximately $33) per year per business.

### 3.1.3 Social and political impacts

Numerous studies show the implications of the segregation and containment of refugees in terms of security, community tensions and relations between refugees and host communities. However, most do not quantify these impacts, and it is difficult to discern the degree to which negative perceptions are accurate. Where refugees and hosts have been able to interact – mostly in relation to trade and other economic activities – this reduces concerns and tensions.

Ethnographic studies by Ohta (n.d.; 2005) indicate that over-riding narratives of conflict and violence between refugees and host populations in Kakuma in the early days of the camp conceal more complex and nuanced relations, especially as the economic impact of the camp has brought benefits for the Turkana. This has been more recently evidenced by a 2016 World Bank social impact study in four locations near Kakuma camp that showed mostly positive attitudes among host populations, which increased with proximity and regularity of interaction. Distrust and violence are reduced by cooperation, collaboration and the exchange of labour, goods and services between the two groups, but compounded by external factors such as the marginalization of the Turkana from the Kenyan political system and perceptions of bias by aid actors against local populations and towards refugees (Verumu et al., 2016).

Studies of similar depth have not been undertaken in Dadaab, but the available evidence points to tense relations between host and camp populations due to conflict over the availability and utilization of resources, as well as perceived disparities in wealth between the two communities (World Bank, 2017; Kamau and Fox, 2013). Ikanda highlights how the privileging of refugees for humanitarian assistance by aid organizations gives rise to tensions, rather than a dislike of the refugees themselves (Ikanda, 2008).

No comprehensive study was found quantifying the impact of refugees on insecurity. As in Kakuma, Enghoff (2010) notes a tendency among hosts to emphasize problems
with the camp in a quest for compensation, though overall the study found that residents rate the security situation as good, and that refugees did not have a major effect on crime. However, a number of other studies highlight insecurity within camps, including high levels of domestic and community violence; recruitment of camp residents into armed forces in the country of origin; high levels of sexual and gender-based violence; arbitrary and violent administration of customary justice; and violence between national refugee groups. This tends to focus more on Dadaab, rather than Kakuma, though this may be a reflection of under-reporting of violence in Kakuma (Crisp, 2003; Karanja, 2000). The perceived violence in Dadaab has led the Kenyan authorities to claim that the camp has lost its humanitarian character. The degree to which violence is affecting host communities is unclear, but Ikanda’s survey of 150 local residents indicates that 92% attributed insecurity in the region to the increase in trafficking of small arms across the border from Somalia that coincided with the arrival of the refugees. Key issues including rape, cattle theft, conflict and violence were highlighted (Ikanda, 2008).

Qualitative studies point to friendship and social interaction between refugees and host populations in Kakuma, drawing on customary practices of the Turkana (Ohta, 2005; Verumu et al., 2016). Verumu points to host–refugee relations being strengthened through inter-marriage, usually involving Turkana women marrying male refugees (Verumu et al., 2016), although previous qualitative work also indicated tensions associated with refugees undermining customary marital practices (Aukot, 2003). Ikanda (2008) also points to a significant level of interaction between hosts and refugees in Dadaab, including social relations, inter-marriage and sharing of cultural practices. Aukot (2003) indicates political implications in Turkana resulting from the presence of refugees. The perceived privileging of refugee populations over their local hosts has been a factor in the host Turkana population becoming more attuned to their marginalization. Some consequences have included increased requests to central government for recognition of their rights and investment in local development. In 1997, an MP from the ruling party was ousted due to perceptions of insufficient support.

3.2 The impact of Kenya’s urban refugees

This section documents the impact of refugees living in Nairobi, focusing in particular on refugees from Somalia and the DRC. Much less is known about the situation of these refugees than their counterparts in camps: they are less visible, do not rely on assistance and the encampment policy encouraged politicians to downplay their existence (Lindley, 2007; Campbell, 2006). A number of factors drive people to leave or avoid Kenya’s camps: insecurity; the urban background of refugees; limited livelihood opportunities in camps; and lack of adequate education and medical services (Pavanello, 2010). Campbell & Crisp (2012) also highlight opportunities for onward migration to other countries. Banki (2004) highlights that only those refugees with resources live outside camps as, in effect, most who do so lose access to assistance. Many refugees retain links with the camps and travel there during

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verification exercises, or return there if urban life becomes too difficult (Cambell, 2006).

Urban refugees in Nairobi live in an expanding city of some 3.5 million people. Around 40% of the city’s Kenyan population is unemployed, 50% live below the poverty line and 60% live in slums (Campbell et al., 2011). As of 2006, nearly 70% of Nairobi’s population was estimated to be working in the informal sector (UNHCR and Danish Refugee Council, 2012).

Officially, 14% of Kenya’s registered refugees – just over 47,000 – reside in Nairobi (UNHCR, 2017), but unofficial estimates put the figure at between 80,000 and 100,000 in 2011 (Campbell et al., 2011). The government conducted a census in 2009, but it has not published a breakdown of Nairobi’s suburbs by citizenship or ethnicity. This lack of accurate data on numbers poses a major problem for those attempting to measure the impact of the presence of refugees in Nairobi.

3.2.1 Population composition
The largest urban refugee group by citizenship is Somali, and has been for many years. Officially there are approximately 30,000 Somali refugees in Nairobi (UNHCR, 2017), though the actual number is almost certainly substantially higher (estimates put the figure at 60,000 in 2005) (Lindley, 2007). Other major refugee groups include Ethiopians, who currently make up around 15% of Nairobi’s registered refugees. The proportion of registered refugees from the DRC has grown substantially, from 18% in 2009 to over 25% in 2017 (UNHCR, 2017). Unofficial numbers suggest this group has grown from 6,500 in 2012 to approximately 18,000 in 2016 (Omata, 2016), although, again, official figures are much lower. Other nationalities include South Sudanese and small numbers from the Great Lakes region, notably Burundi and Rwanda (UNHCR, 2017). As with other demographic indicators, these figures should be taken as part of the picture, as it cannot be assumed that the unregistered refugee population has the same composition as registered refugees.

A third of registered refugees are children (below 18 years of age), 65% are of working age and 3% are aged 60 or over (UNHCR, 2014). This contrasts with overall refugee figures in Kenya from 2017, which show that 56% of refugees are children, 42% working age and 2% over 60 (UNHCR, 2017). This would suggest that the urban refugee population is older on average than those in camps, with fewer children. Furthermore, while 56% of refugees in Kenya are under 18, the figure is only 48% for the Kenyan population as a whole (UNICEF, 2017),73 which implies that the presence of refugees has increased the proportion of children in Kenya’s population.

As is often the case with migrants to cities in general, different refugee groups are clustered by citizenship and ethnicity in different parts of the city. The suburb of Eastleigh, once known for having a comparatively high concentration of ethnic Asians, is now predominantly populated by Somalis and Ethiopian Oromo, many of whom are refugees with ties of religion and kinship to the Kenyan population residing there (UNHCR and DRC, 2012). In the 1999 census, Eastleigh had a population of 100,000,

73 https://data.unicef.org/resources/state-worlds-children-2016-statistical-tables/
which by 2005 had grown to an estimated 500,000 (Lindley, 2007): a surge in numbers in which refugees have no doubt played a part. Refugees in the suburb of Kayole are almost all from the DRC and the Great Lakes region, and settled there through social networks (ibid.). Security and social networks are two important reasons for the dispersal patterns of different ethnic groups.

**Gender**

In terms of gender, a study by Aseyo and Ochieng (2013), which sampled refugees in Nairobi, found that their respondents were 36 years old on average, majority male and unmarried, which they take as confirming other reports that ‘younger and more productive refugees are attracted to the cities’.

**Language**

Few refugees arrive proficient in one of Kenya’s official languages, Swahili and English. One study of a school in Nairobi suggests that the presence of refugees has increased the range of languages being spoken, with one anecdote reporting seven languages spoken by children in one class (Mendenhall, 2015).

**Public services**

As in the case of Kenya’s refugee camps, to our knowledge no quantitative study has been conducted to assess the impact of refugees on public services. Several studies, however, do describe changes in service provision, which can be attributed to the presence of refugees and differences between refugees and host populations’ use of services, which provide some information about changing patterns over time.

In the education sector, the presence of refugees in Nairobi has been linked to the opening of new private or community-led schools by refugees themselves, and the initiation of efforts by international NGOs (and UNHCR) to improve the capacity of government-run schools (Kronick, 2013; Campbell et al., 2011). UNHCR also funds a small number of scholarships to tertiary-level institutions for refugees (Campbell et al., 2011). The literature also provides some evidence of changing patterns of school-going among the Kenyan population as a whole, albeit small and context-specific. One study reports a case of Kenyan parents withdrawing their children from government schools in response to overcrowding and deteriorating quality, which the parents attributed to the arrival of refugees (Campbell et al., 2011). There is reported to be a high rate of absenteeism among urban refugee children (Campbell et al., 2011), and although government schools are statutorily free of charge, various studies report that the extra costs and fees for school attendance drive some refugees to instead enrol their children in low-cost private or religious schools (Mendenhall, 2015; Kronick, 2013; UNHCR and DRC, 2012; Campbell et al., 2011). Other studies indicate that religious schools are chosen out of preference (Carrier, 2016). The establishment of religious schools by refugees also has implications for teaching quality, since such schools are unregulated.

In the health sector, available studies report a low rate of usage of primary facilities among urban refugees, both for palliative and preventative care (Mohamed et al., 2016; UNCHR and DRC, 2012), due to the costs associated with health provision, and
different cultural and health practices. One study found that refugees in Nairobi were much less likely to have used health services associated with pregnancy and birth than Kenyan citizens (Carter, 2011).

Another study touching on urban transport reported several instances of refugees relying heavily on taxis because of concerns about security and harassment on public transport (Anderson, 2012). Another study noted that the supply of piped water to certain parts of Nairobi with a large refugee population is particularly inadequate, with water being sold in jerry cans as a result (UNHCR and DRC, 2012).

A number of studies reported a deterioration in the quality and availability of services as a result of population growth in Nairobi and the introduction in 2003 of free education for all children. In a context where refugees and migrants are sometimes identified as the cause of overburdened public services, it is important to recognise that no data is publicly available on the number of refugees (or migrants) in Nairobi, or the extent to which migration has contributed to population growth.

### 3.2.2 Economic impacts

We found no studies assessing the impact of refugees on Nairobi’s formal or informal economy. Indeed, much of the economic literature focuses on the impact of Somalis, and does not disaggregate between Kenyan nationals of Somali ethnicity (Somali Kenyans) and refugees from Somalia. The development of Eastleigh district has resulted in increased investment and growth, but accurate figures are not available. One estimate suggests that Somali investment in Kenya and the remittances Somalis receive amount to $780 million a year (Carrier, 2016: 217), but it is not clear the degree to which this can be attributed to refugees. Carrier’s research also indicates that, in the early 1990s and from 2006 onwards – periods of high numbers of Somali refugee arrivals to Kenya – were also periods of intense economic growth and transformation in Eastleigh, but the exact relationship is not explored further.

Carrier’s ethnographic study of Eastleigh presents it as a ‘dramatic example of a displacement economy’: that is, an economy made possible because of displacement. Somalis in Kenya have taken advantage of a transnational diaspora; the absence of state regulation in Somalia as well as Kenya which has facilitated cheap international trade; the availability and transfer of financing through the **hawala** system; and the absence of price controls in Kenya to generate what he terms ‘low end globalisation’ – the importation and sale of consumer products at low cost, which has resulted in an economic boom in Eastleigh.

In the 1990s, Somalis were instrumental in the development of a thriving retail industry in Eastleigh, as well as the trade and export of **khat**, although no studies were found quantifying the scale. Carrier describes how cheap consumer goods sourced through diaspora links in the Middle East were routed through Somalia and smuggled into Kenya, while **khat** – which had been made illegal in Somalia in 1983 – was smuggled the other way, back into Somalia. Goods were sold from small retail units in Eastleigh frequently operated by refugees who relied on Kenyan Somalis to obtain permits from the city council (Carrier, 2016). The scale of the retail trade is indicated
by the development of shopping malls in Eastleigh: Carrier highlights that seven large malls were built in the early 1990s containing a total of 660 shops and 463 stalls. Abdulsamed (2011) reports that the success of Somali businesses has resulted in property prices tripling in areas of Nairobi where Somalis predominate, and Carrier (2016) indicates that property prices in Eastleigh are now among the highest in Nairobi.

Construction and real estate are also important sectors of Eastleigh’s economy, alongside industries revolving around the mobility of people and goods. Kagwanja (1998) shows that Somali refugees with strong transnational links were able to mobilise funds to purchase and operate matatus (private buses) during the 1990s. The constant flow of refugees between Nairobi and the camps means that Somalis have also operated permanent transport routes to these peripheral areas (Campbell, 2005). Abdulsamed’s research shows how Somalis now own at least ten trucking companies, each with annual profits of about $20m in 2011, although the level of refugee involvement is not detailed (Abdulsamed, 2011). Freight companies and travel agencies are also key sectors. Little (2003) described how Somalis adapted the mobility patterns of nomadic pastoralism to transnational trade, with 16% of all cattle consumed in Nairobi coming from Somalia (Little, 2003).

The influx of refugees into Eastleigh in the 1990s is reported to have also affected housing and property prices. Reports suggest that the price of accommodation in Eastleigh rocketed to five or more times previous levels, pushing Kenyan tenants out into other areas, whilst Somali refugees often lived in over-crowded conditions, sharing and sub-letting (Campbell 2005). Abdulsamed (2011) reports that the success of Somali businesses has resulted in property prices tripling in areas of Nairobi where Somalis predominate, and Carrier (2016) indicates that property prices in Eastleigh are now amongst the highest in Nairobi.

Although many non-Somali refugees, and in particular Ethiopian Oromo, depend on Eastleigh for their livelihoods, Campbell’s research on Congolese refugees shows that many established their businesses in Nairobi’s city centre in order to take advantage of wealthier Kenyan customers. Congolese refugees are active in the service and entertainment sectors as musicians, tailors, barbers or hairstylists. Like their Somali counterparts, Congolese rely on Kenyan spouses, friends and business partners to obtain the necessary business permits, although Campbell reported that only 50% of those operating in the city centre, and none of those in Eastleigh, had the required licences (Campbell, 2006).

**Competition and employment**

The economic success of some of Kenya’s urban refugees has both positive and negative implications. Abdulsamed (2011) highlights how informal trading in Eastleigh has been detrimental to mid-sized formal businesses, particularly Kenyan-Asian ones. It is understood that Kenya’s long-term Asian business community was influential in the government’s decision in 1995 to close the coastal refugee camps and move refugees inland to Kakuma and Dadaab. Asian business owners argued that the activities of Somali traders were harming the profits of long-established Asian
businesses in Mombasa (Abdulsamed, 2011: 13). Congolese hairstylists have had to relocate their businesses to people’s homes as Kenyan competitors drove them out of the market by repeatedly calling the police (Campbell, 2006). Meru elders, concerned about Somali refugees’ takeover of the khat industry, lobbied the government in 2003 for greater regulation. Campbell also notes negative reports in the media about the impact of refugees on competition in Kenya’s labour market (Campbell, 2006).

Numerous reports describe Kenyan workers being employed by refugee businesses, but again the scale and overall impact on Nairobi’s labour market is unknown. Many refugee businesses are either established in partnership with Kenyan nationals, or Kenyans enable them by obtaining permits and licences. Congolese refugees deliberately employ Kenyan staff as they understand the local market better, can facilitate business with Kenyan customers and can represent the business with officials (Campbell, 2006). Carrier (2016) shows how Somali-owned businesses have created jobs for Kenyans and frequently pay higher rates for casual labour. Kenyans have adapted their business practices to Somali practices, including changing their opening hours. In Pavanello’s research in 2010, every business and shop owner interviewed employed at least one Kenyan, in part to deal with the police; research by the Refugee Consortium of Kenya shows that 49% of those working in refugee-owned enterprises are Kenyan nationals (RCK, 2015).

**Fiscal effects, informality and illegality**

While the non-registration of businesses means that the government is collecting less revenue than it potentially could, it is also likely that these businesses are paying other indirect taxes, such as VAT and import duties. Given that informal workers and informal migrants are also not likely to be receiving any kind of social protection, i.e. state pensions, they could very well be net tax contributors overall. Carrier and others also note that Somali businesses in particular have become increasingly formalised as they have grown in scale. There is no separate tax band for Eastleigh, so accurate accounts of tax revenues are not available, but estimates include a figure of $22.8m annually. It has also been claimed in parliament that, of Nairobi’s districts, Eastleigh is the third-largest contributor of tax revenue. Again, the degree to which this is revenue from Kenyan Somalis or Somali refugees is not clear (Carrier, 2016).

Eastleigh is on the one hand praised for its development and entrepreneurship, and on the other condemned as an economy built on dubious goods and illegal activities (Carrier, 2016). It is partly through corruption that Somalis in Kenya have managed to convert Eastleigh into a commercial area, despite the fact that it was legally zoned as residential (Abdulsamed, 2011). Despite these perceptions – which are reinforced by the government, which has linked Eastleigh with piracy and terrorism – investigations by the World Bank, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Interpol show that the main drivers of Eastleigh’s property transformation are bank credit, diaspora remittances and a strong market (Lind, 2015). Refugees claim that 60% of refugee businesses in Nairobi were established with capital from remittances (RCK, 2015). However, there appears to be no doubt that tax and duty evasion occurs on a grand scale, involving property development and shipping contracts, as well as in everyday business life. There are also numerous reports of Eastleigh operating as a market for
contraband goods, drugs, illegal documents and weapons (Lind et al., 2015; Carrier, 2016).

3.2.3 Social and cultural impacts
The presence of a relatively large population of Somali Kenyans mean that many Somali refugees adapt and integrate into this community, rather than Kenyan society more broadly. The lack of integration policies facilitating integration means that there is little opportunity or incentive to do others. Carrier’s ethnographic study of Eastleigh highlights how many Somali refugees confine much of their social, economic and religious life to the suburb. He indicates that there are examples of inter-ethnic marriage, but that these are rare, and non-marital relationships are frowned upon. Some Somali refugees learn Kiswahili, both in order to facilitate business relations, as well as to navigate difficulties faced at the hands of Kenyan police and bureaucracy (Pavanello et al., 2010). Carrier highlights how there are numerous Kiswahili language schools in Eastleigh. Carrier (2016) also highlights how Kenyans also adapt in order to support their business relations with Somalis, including some learning the Somali language and others adopting the trust- or credit-based system of Somali trade.

Congolese refugees take a very different approach. They disperse across different suburbs of Nairobi, learn Kiswahili and try to blend in as much as they can as part of a deliberate strategy aimed at minimizing the intolerance they face from their Kenyan hosts, as well as the persistent harassment meted out by the police. Although the literature points mainly to the challenges faced by Congolese refugees in terms of their acceptance into Kenyan society, there is also some evidence of positive relations, including friendship with some Kenyans and assistance in accessing legal documents (Pavanello et al., 2010; Campbell, 2006). Aseyo and Ochieng (2013) highlight how belonging to different social, religious and ethnic groups is a key factor in refugee livelihoods, indicating that a majority of refugees they interviewed belonged to a religious group, and that this was one of the few places where refugees felt accepted.

4. Public attitudes, politics and security

Despite a thread of African hospitality running through Kenyan public and political discourse on refugees (Lindley, 2011; Campbell, 2005), attitudes towards refugees have been largely negative. Abuya (2007) recalls parliamentary debates in the 1970s demanding the repatriation of Ugandan refugees, and in 1993, when Kenya faced its first large-scale influx of refugees, the government asked the UN to repatriate all refugees due to concerns about banditry and pressure on resources (the call was not acted on at the time).

If anything, these attitudes have hardened with time. A global survey of public attitudes undertaken by Amnesty International ranked Kenya 23 out of 27 countries polled in terms of people’s willingness to host refugees. Interestingly, and in line with the encampment policy, there was majority support (55%) for accepting refugees in the country, but the number of people prepared to accept people into their homes, neighbourhoods or villages was, at 22%, dramatically lower than the global average of 47% (Amnesty, 2016). An IPSOS public attitudes poll conducted in Kenya in 2016 found
very high public awareness of refugee issues, and overwhelming support (69%) for the closure of Dadaab camp.

4.1 Attitudes towards refugees

Perceptions of refugees in Kenya are linked to crime, illegality and insecurity. In 2004, then Kenyan Vice-President Moody Awori blamed the increased proliferation of light arms and small weapons on refugees (Campbell et al., 2006). Such attitudes have persisted and are reinforced by the media. An article in Kenya’s Daily Nation in 2006 claimed that ‘it is conceivable that if the Government continues to pursue its open-door policy, rival Somali gangs will soon be settling their differences on Kenyatta Avenue’ (quoted in Jaji, 2013), while more recent articles highlight how Somali gangs have pushed the police out of Eastleigh.74

More recently, concerns about general insecurity and criminality have been overtaken by the stereotyping of Somalis as terrorists (Kagwanja, 2009; Jaji, 2013). Jaji highlights how the regional and global discourse on terrorism has allowed for the depiction of Somalis in Kenya as threatening, aggressive and violent. She points to media stories blaming Somali refugees for a measles outbreak, environmental degradation and illegal weaponry, as well as interviews with Kenyans saying that they fear Somalis in their neighborhoods due to their ‘extremism’ (Jaji, 2013). Somalis caught up in the wave of police violence that followed the encampment directive in 2014 have said that police officials accused many of them of being terrorists (HRW, 2013).

Prevailing attitudes are both represented and reinforced by politicians. The Kenyan Ministry of State for Immigration and Registration of Persons, for instance, claimed that the influx of Somali refugees into Kenya created ‘a major terrorism threat and [put] tremendous pressure on social services and amenities’; ‘extremist groups’ and ‘Islamic radicals may use refugee flow to smuggle weapons and people into Kenya to engage in terrorist attacks’ (MIRP, 2009: 15). The Assistant Minister of Internal Security described Al-Shabaab as ‘like a big animal with the tail in Somalia and the head of the animal is here in Eastleigh’ (Mureithi, 2011). This government-sanctioned discourse against Somali refugees has created an atmosphere in which abuse is normalized and possibly even perceived as merited (HRW, 2013). While there appears to be little doubt that Al-Shabaab is active in Dadaab camp in particular, a number of commentators have raised questions regarding the level of refugee involvement in terrorism and criminality more broadly. They point to a scapegoating of a vulnerable group by a government keen to demonstrate strength in the face of major terrorist attacks such as the one by Al-Shabaab at the Westgate shopping mall, continuing insecurity and accusations of incompetence (Campbell et al., 2011; Carrier, 2016). Lind argues that growing insecurity stems from long-standing ethnic and geographical tensions, and that heavy-handed security responses targeting Somalis and Muslims play directly to Al-Shabaab’s aim to deepen insurgency in Kenya’s peripheral regions (Lind et al., 2015).

The conflation of refugees with insecurity and terrorism has led to a series of measures and legislative changes. This includes a series of efforts on the part of the Kenyan government to stem the flow of Somali refugees into Kenya and reduce their numbers in Kenya, including closing the border with Somalia in 2011 and halting refugee registration. In 2014, parliament passed the Security Amendment Act, which limited the number of refugees and asylum-seekers in Kenya to 150,000. A High Court ruling in January 2015 suspended elements of the Act, including the limitation on refugee numbers. Later that year, the Kenyan government started building a fence along the Somali border. The government has also sought to tighten control of refugees through relocation and encampment. Following a series of security incidents in Eastleigh, in 2012 the DRA issued a directive stating that all urban refugee operations had stopped with immediate effect, and that Somali refugees were to relocate to the Dadaab camps immediately. The directive was stopped by the High Court following civil society intervention, but in 2014 the Kenyan government restated that all refugees should relocate to camps, and launched ‘Operation Usalama Watch’, a campaign aimed at relocating refugees to the camps by force. Human Rights Watch documented a wave of police abuse, violence and extortion (HRW, 2013). Efforts to repatriate refugees have also been stepped up since the announcement in 2016 of the closure of Dadaab camp. The measure has met with civil society and international opposition, and in February 2017 was declared unconstitutional by the Kenyan High Court, which ruled that it amounted to an illegal and discriminatory act of group persecution. The negative security environment and uncertainty about the future has prompted Somalis (the proportion of refugees is unclear) to move to other urban centres (Abdulsamed, 2011), to reduce trading in camps (Omata, 2016) and to move to Uganda (Lind et al., 2015; Carrier, 2017).

Of note here is the important role that Kenyan and international civil society has played in helping to hold the government to account for its obligations towards refugees under national and international law. Through assistance, advocacy, public condemnation and legal action, civil society has been involved in a number of important actions that have halted or delayed some of the most egregious efforts to undermine refugees’ freedoms in Kenya. Different approaches have been successful at different times. Civil society actors point to a willingness on the part of governmental representatives to take account of civil society input on the development of policy and legislation, only for this to be over-ridden by political and security interests. That it has fallen to the Kenyan courts to provide some measure of protection to refugees as a last resort can only be viewed as an indication of the limited opportunities to influence public and political opinion in favour of refugees.

### 4.1.1 Factors driving attitudes in Kenya

It is unclear the extent to which there is a correlation in Kenya between hostile public attitudes towards refugees and current restrictive, securitized policies. It appears that public attitudes are reinforced by political and media narratives, although which constituency is driving which is difficult to discern. With 2017 an election year in Kenya, it is likely that the increasingly politicized debates and high-profile decisions
regarding refugees have a strong domestic political agenda. As in other countries, scapegoating of refugees in a context characterized by popular hostility towards them is likely to be politically popular, and commentators have noted that the closure of Dadaab camp was announced just a week before President Uhuru Kenyatta began campaigning. The Kenyan government’s rationale for closing Dadaab camp was linked to security and financing. In its initial statement, the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government cited ‘a pervasive and persistent terrorist threat’ in the country, while later statements highlighted government concerns that the costs of managing the camps, in terms of environmental impact, the provision of services to refugees and the economic fallout of terrorism allegedly stemming from the camps, had become unmanageable.

International factors also play a role – not just in terms of international funding, but also arguments that diminishing international respect for refugees has meant that Kenya could no longer bear the brunt of hosting such a large population (Kibičho, 2016). Some believe that the deal signed between Turkey and the European Union (EU) – where Turkey was provided with $2bn for stopping refugee flows to Europe – is having a ‘ripple effect’ in refugee-hosting countries such as Kenya, which are demanding increased international funds (Dempster and Hargrave, 2017).

More local issues are also important. Reports suggest widespread lack of knowledge among the public and police about the rights of refugees (RCK, 2015). Studies also indicate that threats against refugees from police declined following efforts to increase their understanding of refugees and refugee documentation. Finally, the policy against integration has an important bearing on public attitudes towards refugees, in that it reduces opportunities for contact that is deemed so integral to positive attitudes (Dempster and Hargrave, 2017). Pavanello et al (2016) highlighted concerns amongst those in Nairobi that Somalis did not want to integrate and were not interested in joining cultural events or learning Kenyan languages. Verumu’s social impact study in Kakuma highlighted more positive attitudes in locations nearer to Kakuma due to the relatively higher opportunities for interaction and engagement.

5. Integration in Kenya

This project has adopted UNDP’s definition of social cohesion as the basis for its understanding of integration: ‘A general condition of stable coexistence within communities, when IDPs, refugees, and host community members accept socio-ethnic differences, have equitable access to livelihoods and other community resources, and feel safe and secure in their homes’. Zetter (2017) describes ‘domains’ or key aspects of integration. Legal, governance, functional and social ‘domains’ form the main elements of the multi-faceted process of integration, with the first two central to the

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interests of the receiving country, and the second two giving more emphasis to the
refugee experience. The legal domain refers to the different models of membership
enabled by legal entitlements, ultimately leading to citizenship. The governance
domain comprises the institutional structures and processes that facilitate integration.
The functional domain describes the levels of social and economic participation of
refugees in their host country. The social domain focuses on the degree of social
inclusion of refugees with the majority receiving community, and relates to ethnicity,
cultural identity, social networks and social capital (ibid.).

5.1 Integration of refugees in Kenya’s camps
It is something of an oxymoron to describe the level of integration amongst refugees
in camps given that they are designed as a temporary measure to limit integration and
facilitate the early return of camp residents. Integration is fundamentally
circumscribed by the remote location of the camps and physical curtailment, and
refugees’ socio-economic opportunities are further constrained by their lack of
mobility and right to work.

5.1.1 The impact of the legal and policy environment on integration in camps
The encampment framework determines the overall level of integration of refugees
in camps; however, the actions and policies of local authorities and aid actors also
affect outcomes for camp-based refugees. No literature was found directly analysing
the interaction of local and regional authorities with camp residents, although as
mentioned there is some indication that the Turkana authorities may impose licences
on refugee businesses. Several analysts suggest that UNHCR, which controls large
tracts of territory, social services and budgets, has taken on a quasi-state role in camps
(Gilbert 1998; Verdirame et al., 2005; Slaughter and Crisp, 2009). In providing critical
assistance to large numbers of refugees in camps, aid actors reinforce the legal, social,
economic and spatial isolation of refugees from surrounding society. This compounds
negative perceptions of refugees among host populations, as the large majority of
assistance is targeted towards refugees rather than to the communities hosting them.
Aid actors have recognized the need to invest more in livelihoods strategies for the
camps (JAM, 2014; UNHCR, 2016), but this is undermined by a consistent reduction in
funding for camp-based refugees. Only 6% of funding is allocated to supporting the
livelihoods of refugees in Kenya (UNHCR, 2016). Efforts also rub up against the barrier
of the encampment policy: due to the limited job market and that fact that even
trained refugees are highly unlikely to obtain a work permit, it is difficult to avoid a
saturatation of skills, and apparently take-up of these opportunities are affected (Kamau
and Fox, 2014; IRC and ReDSS, 2015).

5.1.2 Economic integration – the functional domain
It is a testament to the agency of refugees that only 2% of refugees in Dadaab in 2013
relied entirely on humanitarian assistance (Kamau and Fox, 2013). In 2010 there were
an estimated 5,000 businesses in Dadaab, ranging from petty traders to large concerns
with an annual turnover of millions of dollars. The refugee economy in Kakuma is
similarly dynamic: the majority of refugees engaged in economic activities in the camp
work for humanitarian agencies, in shops or in construction, with activities ranging
from pharmacies to money transfer companies and breweries. Of those reporting a
cash income, the largest source was from employment (36%), followed by remittances
(29%) and business (20%). In 2016, Kakuma camp had more than 2,150 shops, including 14 wholesalers, and businesses produced approximately $350,000–400,000 in monthly sales (Vemuru et al., 2016). Although it is clear that the majority of refugees are economically active, encampment curtails the nature, location and scale of work by refugees. The vast majority of livelihood opportunities are derived from the microcosm of the camp, made possible through external aid and remittance investments – few refugees are employed outside the camp and in both areas agricultural and charcoal production and livestock holding are limited – with the recent exception of Kalobeyei (see below) (Kamau and Fox, 2013; Omata, 2016). On the other hand, Lindley highlights that, while ‘incentive’ work for aid organizations helps in terms of boosting income, skills development and interaction with Kenyan colleagues, the fact that refugee workers receive a benefit, rather than a salary in line with Kenyan pay scales, reinforces the separateness of refugees.

Despite the diversity of livelihood activities, the segregation of refugees and curtailment of their economic activities severely affects their economic independence. It is thought that only 4% of refugees in Kakuma could sustain themselves independently of humanitarian aid (Kimetrica 2016). Despite the protracted nature of the camps, needs remain high. In 2014, 70–80% of people in both camps lacked sufficient food assistance to meet their monthly requirements; rates of malnutrition in Dadaab and Kakuma remained ‘serious’ and ‘poor’ respectively; and educational enrollment – at only 59% and 81% in primary education in Dadaab and Kakuma – faced significant gaps (Joint Assessment Mission, 2014).

5.1.3 Cultural and socio-political integration of camp-based refugees – the social domain

Refugees who achieve a certain level of economic self-sufficiency in such a constrained environment do so as a result of their own agency, identity and capacity. Ethnicity, social capital and social networks – all elements of Zetter’s social domain – are reported to be the primary determinants of success. Somali and Ethiopian refugees are perceived to be doing best; refugees from DRC are thought to be middling and South Sudanese are at the bottom in terms of livelihoods outcomes. This is attributed to access to networks and remittances. The length of stay in the camp is another factor in improved livelihoods. Refugees in the camp for ten years or longer are more involved in small and medium-sized income-generating activities, whereas new arrivals are more dependent on humanitarian assistance (Kamau and Fox, 2013).

In the absence of opportunities to integrate into Kenyan society, refugee networks serve as alternative systems of governance, into which refugees integrate in various ways. Okra (2011) reports that those with greater means and higher socio-economic status tend to do better, using their networks of influence. Refugees use social networks as support mechanisms, including sharing homes and meals; relying on and providing debt and credit; supporting those in need and the newly displaced; paying zakat; and engaging in community-based rotating savings and credit schemes (Lindley, 2011; JAM, 2014). Another set of camp strategies relates to interactions with the humanitarian system: refugees use different methods to maximize the food aid they receive or make efforts to establish good relationships with aid providers to secure
assistance, preference or incentive work. However, such strategies occur largely within the camp microcosm, cut off from interactions with wider Kenyan society (Lindley, 2011).

Horst (2004) describes a third important network for both camp and urban refugees. She estimates that 15% of camp refugees receive remittances of up to $150 a month, which are important for supplementing incomes, dealing with crises and investing in business and education. However, despite common perceptions that remittances are a form of social security for all Somalis, evidence shows that these remittances tend to benefit those with greater socio-economic status and influence, as it is often better-connected and wealthier refugees who have relatives in the diaspora. While the benefits of remittances are often felt beyond the recipient family through increased spending power and the use of remittances to support others, Horst highlights how remittances can result in tensions between those who receive them and those who do not.

5.1.4 A shift in refugee policy towards greater self-reliance?

The World Bank study of Kakuma assessed various policy scenarios on refugee integration and their impact on economic welfare (Alix-Garcia et al., 2017). The three scenarios were: (1) limited integration of skilled refugees only; (2) full integration of all refugees currently in camps; and (3) decampment – closure of camps and repatriation of refugees. The study found that integration reduces the burden of aid, reduces market imperfections and incentivizes skills acquisition. This is true if current transfers (of aid and remittances) are maintained, but also true if aid is gradually phased out after their integration, and that the differences between the two impacts are marginal if aid is phased out in five years. Encampment, the status quo, concentrates both gains and losses in the vicinity of the camp, which reduces potential aggregate gains for the rest of the economy.

A scenario involving partial or full integration of Kenya’s camp-based refugees appears remote, but there are some indications of a shift in refugee management towards greater self-reliance of refugees from South Sudan (UNHCR, 2016). Kalobeyei, a new refugee settlement 10km from Kakuma, is a relatively new, innovative approach to refugee management, which is a significant departure from before. Devolution in Kenya and county-level engagement has paved the way for an agreement with the Turkana county government for the settlement, which will grant plots of land to an estimated 60,000 refugees. Drawn from examples in Uganda, the Kalobeyei Integrated Social and Economic Development Programme (KISEDIP), is a Turkana County, UNHCR, World Bank and multi-agency collaboration which will run from 2016–30, to develop the local economy and service delivery at Kalobeyei. The overall objective of this initiative is to contribute to: (a) improvement of the socio-economic conditions of the refugees and host communities; (b) better prepare the host community to take advantage of emerging economic opportunities in upcoming extraction and potential irrigation-fed agriculture; and (c) reduce over-dependence on humanitarian aid and help refugees achieve durable solutions. The 15-year plan to develop the settlement combines strengthening income-earning opportunities, urban and agricultural and livestock development, integrated service delivery and private sector engagement,
with the intention that the site eventually becomes an urban centre. The plan was, apparently, undertaken with the acquiescence, rather than direct involvement, of the central government, and is facing challenges in terms of retaining its focus on longer-term goals in the context of funding difficulties and high rates of arrivals of South Sudanese in need of emergency assistance.

5.2 Integration of Kenya’s urban refugees

Many commentators argue that urban refugees in Nairobi have achieved a form of de facto integration due to their level of self-sufficiency, access to services and social interaction with the host community (Jacobsen, 2001; Campbell, 2005; Beversluis, 2016). Analysis commonly draws on Jacobsen’s description of de facto integration, which has a number of elements including: refugees are no longer in physical danger or at risk of refoulement; not confined to camps or settlements, and have the right of return to their home country; can sustain a livelihood, are self-sufficient and have similar standards of living to their hosts; and have access to public services and are socially networked into the host community (Jacobsen, 2001).

It is evident that refugees in Nairobi enjoy much higher levels of integration than their camp compatriots due to their ability to draw on their own skills, adaptability and networks to navigate Nairobi’s informal economy and wider socio-political environment. However, much of this analysis is derived from the level of economic integration achieved by Somali refugees in particular, and downplays the significant social, political and cultural barriers that they face in integrating into majority Kenyan society. As their status and security in Nairobi becomes increasingly fragile in the face of growing hostility, encampment and security crackdowns, it will be important not to privilege economic integration at the cost of social, political and cultural achievements. Indeed, despite the obvious economic successes of some within the Somali community, a recent study charting levels of integration of refugees in Nairobi concluded that Congolese refugees were more integrated than Somalis as they had adapted to a greater degree to the fabric of Kenyan society (Beversluis, 2016), highlighting the fact that economic success and interaction does not necessarily equate to broader integration. Indeed, as we will see below, at least some of the economic success Somali refugees have enjoyed can be attributed to their lack of integration – their ability to benefit from a co-ethnic enclave in Nairobi on the one hand, and from their diaspora network on the other.

5.2.1 Economic integration – resilience in the face of significant odds

Nairobi’s refugees – a self-selecting group who have opted to avoid camps for reasons of protection or opportunity – are generally self-reliant and tend to be in a better economic position than those in camps. Their skills, determination and resilience have, as we have seen, resulted in economic benefits for the host community. However, this does not mean that all urban refugees are wealthy and have achieved full integration into Nairobi’s economy; in fact, the majority join the ranks of Nairobi’s urban poor. A very low number, estimated at only 2%, have a Class M permit, which allows them to work in the formal economy (RCK, 2015). The few refugees in this position can own their own businesses and make significant profits (UNHCR and DRC, 2012). The great majority, however, engage in activities below and different to their professional
training and competency (Zetter and Rudel, 2017), and rely on their own means or that of relatives to survive. Educational status is more nuanced. Aseyo and Ochieng (2013) indicate that tertiary education is an impediment to, rather than a facilitator of, economic integration amongst refugees from the Great Lakes, presumably as they find it more difficult to adapt to Nairobi’s informal economy. Refugees tend to be self-employed and engaged in the informal economy, selling a range of consumer goods or khat, or running businesses such as restaurants, taxis, hairdressing shops or tailoring (Pavanello et al., 2010; RCK, 2015). Semi-skilled and unskilled refugees undertake a range of casual labour and petty trade such as shop attendants, mechanics, car washers and herdsmen.

A recent study showed that refugee incomes were almost equally split between business (29%), employment (28%) and remittances (30%), with only 3% relying on NGO assistance (RCK, 2015). Overall, almost 70% of refugees in Nairobi earn below the Kenyan national income average of KES 30,000 per month ($290), and only 12% earn above KES 50,000 ($480) (RCK, 2015). While no study provided a breakdown of wealth status on the basis of countries of origin, a livelihoods study analyzing the livelihoods of refugees in three districts in Nairobi indicated that those who reside in Eastleigh – Somalis and Ethiopians to a greater extent – tend to have higher incomes than those in other areas. Less than 20% of those in Eastleigh were classed as ‘very poor’ and earning less than KES 9,500 per month. However, the rate of ‘very poor’ households in the two other locations in the study – which were dominated by refugees and asylum-seekers from the Great Lakes, and to a lesser degree South Sudan – was between 55% and 65%. Very poor households fall below the ‘survival threshold’ and do not have the means to meet their minimum food and non-food requirements. These households are more prone to negative coping strategies such as prostitution to make up their financial shortfalls (UNHCR and DRC, 2012).

Apart from difficulties in accessing formal employment, refugees face a number of other economic barriers. Refugees face poor access to financial services, for example, to obtain credit to expand their businesses (Beversluis et al., 2015). As a result, and similar to the experience in camps, there is a high level of dependence on transnational networks and remittances, with 60% of refugees indicating that they secured their start-up capital for their businesses from remittances. Perceptions on the part of the local population that refugees are relatively wealthy due to different factors, including Somalis reputation as successful entrepreneurs and the flamboyant dress of some Congolese refugees, results in refugees being charged more, for instance for renting property (Pavanello et al., 2010; Campbell, 2005).

5.2.2 Police harassment and extortion: a major impediment to integration

Numerous reports highlight routine and extreme harassment, extortion and violence against refugees on the part of the police, linked to their precarious legal status as refugees; lack of training of police on refugee rights and documentation; the large number of fake documents in circulation in Nairobi; and the widespread violence that is a characteristic of Kenyan life more generally (RCK, 2015). This affects refugees’ ability to move about, take up employment and start businesses. It also affects refugees’ perceptions of Kenyan authorities; for many, their only interaction with the Kenyan state is negative, extractive or violent. Even though many refugees are registered and have the right to be in Nairobi, Pavanello et al. (2010) highlight how
language barriers, fear of exposure and lack of familiarity with the system mean that refugees are likely to try to resolve police interactions through bribery. The patterns of police targeting of refugees vary, with men approached more during the day as they are perceived to carry money and women after dark, as police believe (rightly) that the woman's family and wider network will pay quickly to avoid possible sexual assault.

Refugees pursue a number of strategies to minimize abuse, including obtaining illegal documents, avoiding leaving their homes, especially after dark, and women pretending to be pregnant, which apparently reduces harassment. Many refugee households pay a monthly protection fee to the authorities to safeguard against abuse; a strategy also employed by some Congolese refugee businesses (Campbell, 2005). A livelihoods assessment of urban refugees in 2012 indicated that refugees spend approximately 1% of their income on bribes, with the amounts paid rising with their level of wealth (DRC and UNHCR, 2012). Beversluis et al. (2015) highlight how the lack of legal protection exacerbates vulnerabilities leading to discrimination, such as unfair rents, exploitative business partnerships or, more seriously, gender-based violence; and how this situation has implications for refugee trust and civic engagement, as intimidation is the only consistent interaction refugees have with the authorities.

5.2.3 Socio-political and cultural adaptation of Somali refugees: ‘segmented assimilation’

The presence of Somali Kenyans is a key determinant of the level of integration of Somali refugees in Kenya. On the one hand, they afford refugees material assistance, social networks and orientation into Kenyan life. On the other, the availability of an ethnic enclave reduces opportunities for trust-building and integration with the wider community beyond Somali Kenyans, and leads to what Lindley (2011) terms ‘segmented assimilation’.

Stigmatization means that Somalis choose physical isolation to protect themselves from it, as well as from threats and extortion at the hands of the police and the security services. Some limit themselves geographically to Eastleigh as much as possible. The seclusion of Somalis in their ethnic enclaves generates hostility from local communities, and highlights Somalis’ reluctance to participate in Kenyan social and customary events and to learn the country’s languages (Pavanello et al., 2010). For their part, Somalis engage in ‘retaliatory criticism’ of Kenyans and self-segregate socially and physically in order to guard against perceived cultural, moral or religious corruption (Jaji, 2013). Other cultural factors also play a role in orienting Somalis away from local integration. Some have highlighted how traditional Somali nomadism and information from transnational networks concerning opportunities in the West have stimulated ‘buufis’ – an extreme desire to relocate to the West – amongst some Somalis, which again reduces interest in local integration.

The government guarantees the right to free primary education for all children in Kenya. Up to 70% of children in some schools in Eastleigh may be refugees (Pavanello et al., 2010). However, the strength of Somali identity is such that children’s
adaptation to Kenyan life is perceived by some as detrimental to Somali cultural and religious values and an obstacle to eventual return. Many Somali refugee children attend faith-based schools (Carrier, 2016). Cultural norms that exclude women from public life mean that Somali women are the least integrated (Beversluis et al., 2016). As in the camps, however, the length of time people are displaced has a bearing on the degree to which they integrate, and there is now a generation of Somalis born and brought up in Kenya who speak the local languages and are very integrated into Kenyan life (2011).

Beversluis (2016) also found that legal status and access to documentation is a key determinant of integration in Nairobi. The blurring of Somali refugees into their co-ethnic group also occurs in official and legal matters. Carrier highlights how the term ‘refugee’ is seen as pejorative, and shunned by Somalis, particularly those who are economically successful, and many refugees instead self-identify as Kenyan Somalis to outsiders. Others seek to establish this more officially, by procuring Kenyan ID papers or passports through the black market (Carrier, 2016). Lindley (2011) highlights how official treatment of Somali Kenyans and Somali refugees is also blurred, with refugees facing an environment where Somali Kenyans are subject to high levels of official suspicion, and where the plight of Somali Kenyans’ is undermined further by the arrival of large numbers of Somali refugees. The Kenyan government has also played a role in assigning Kenyan citizenship in 1997, when thousands of Somalis were granted citizenship in return for electoral support (Carrier, 2016).

5.2.4 Cultural adaptation by Congolese refugees
Congolese refugees adapt to life in Nairobi very differently to Somali refugees. Without a large population of co-nationals, they disperse into different districts across the city and attempt to assimilate socially and physically by adopting Kenyan dress and language. This is easier for Congolese than for other nationalities due to their physical and religious similarities to many Kenyans (Campbell, 2005). Congolese Bantu refugees are more integrated in Nairobi than Somalis because they share the Kinyamulenge language, spoken by ethnic Kenyan Bantus (Beversluis et al., 2016). Many report having positive relations with their Kenyan hosts, but many also hide their refugee status in the belief that it will prejudice their social inclusion. Those refugees whose status is known report facing hostility and abuse from locals, who believe that they benefit unfairly from aid that should be provided to Nairobi’s poor. The fact that many have to hide their identity and status means that they do not feel integrated (Pavanello et al., 2010). Although they downplay their national identity to outsiders in many ways, Congolese refugees still found solidarity, support and assistance through their fellow ethnic refugees (Beversluis et al., 2016).

6. Conclusion
Three decades of mass refugee influxes to Kenya have resulted in policies designed explicitly to reduce opportunities for integration. Focused on containment, camps and repatriation, these policies have allowed the Kenyan government to claim control over a refugee population that is perceived as posing an inherent security threat; reduced opportunities for the refugee population to blend into the local population, thus preserving the possibility of eventual repatriation; and offered visibility, which assists
with external funding. A largely hostile environment, continued spikes in arrivals and a chronic emergency refugee response has left little room for changes in this approach.

1. The over-riding and unsurprising conclusion is that camps are highly effective barriers to integration. Segregating people’s social, political and economic lives from the host population fundamentally undermines opportunities for interaction, cooperation and co-existence. It is largely only those refugees who have managed to circumvent the controls resulting from the encampment policy who have made progress, however limited, towards integration.

2. The vastly different experiences, outcomes and impacts of refugees in Kenya’s camps and urban settings demonstrate the extent to which the policy framework is the principal determinant in outcomes for refugees and the host community. This, more than the timing, numbers and profiles of arrivals, matters most.

3. Kenya’s experience highlights the profound difficulty of transitioning from an encampment policy once this has been established as the preferred option, particularly in a country receiving continuous refugee arrivals. This is an important consideration for policy responses that aim to take account of the protracted nature of most refugee crises. Success in convincing local, rather than central, government to soften the encampment approach and adopt greater refugee integration and self-sufficiency in Kalobeyei points to the different priorities of different arms of government in terms of refugee management, and the potential to positively influence those authorities directly affected, particularly as the perceived effects may be more positive at the level where the economic benefits are likely to be felt.

4. Early decisions about the size, location and composition of camps are likely to have negative implications should a shift in policy towards self-reliance be pursued. Lessons from Uganda, where a policy of refugee self-reliance has been in place for some time, indicate that the allocation of land for refugee settlement should be based on careful site selection, with particular consideration given to access to markets, transport, security and quality of land (Kaiser, 2006). This appears not to have been possible with the Kalobeyei initiative, where the site’s location was determined largely by the pre-existing camp, and negotiations with the authorities.

5. Contrary to claims that camps are an economic burden, Dadaab and Kakuma have increased trading and business opportunities, widened access to employment, services and education and improved markets and infrastructure. It is an indication of refugees’ resilience, proactivity and capacity that, even in the most constrained circumstances, only a tiny percentage of refugees are thought to rely fully on humanitarian assistance in camps, and those in urban settings are thought to be almost entirely self-sufficient. However, the fact that refugees are still being born into a protracted
camp setting designed decades ago constitutes a tremendous waste of human potential and an affront to refugees’ rights and dignity. The civil, political and economic rights and opportunities of camp-based refugees are fundamentally curtailed, their futures remain largely on hold and even their basic survival is precarious.

6. Many of the negative implications of the refugee presence in Kenya appear to hinge on specific policy choices – how refugees are managed, rather than their existence per se. The environmental degradation linked to the camps is a direct consequence of confining large numbers of people in limited geographical areas. Community tensions in areas surrounding camps appear to have some correlation to the limited opportunities for interaction resulting from segregation. In urban areas, Kenyan hosts complain about the limited interaction of Somalis. The benefits refugees bring are highly localised in both camp and urban settings and are unevenly distributed, but in a context weighted against integration, the policy space to harness the development opportunities associated with refugees and to reduce distributional imbalances is extremely restricted. International aid appears to be compounding tensions by reinforcing perceptions of inequality and discrimination amongst host populations.

7. That some refugees in Nairobi have been successful indicates what could be achieved if the camp policy is relaxed. Somalis have transformed Eastleigh into one of Nairobi’s most economically successful districts; Kenyans appear to have benefited from increased employment and higher wages, as well as from the improved supply and lower cost of goods and services provided by refugees. Larger refugee businesses are integrated into the formal economy.

8. Refugees will adapt to whichever economic system is most available. If the receiving society is unwilling to integrate, refugees will adapt elsewhere. Integration is a two-way process between refugees and the host population. With limited opportunities to integrate into the host population in Kenya, there are signs that a natural propensity of refugees towards integration means that they adapt to different economic systems, including the aid community, ethnic enclaves and transnational networks.

9. The presence of a national ethnic group may improve economic opportunities for co-ethnic refugees, but may also hinder integration. Somalis have apparently exceeded the economic performance of other refugee groups in both camp and urban settings. They benefit from the presence, protection and assistance of a co-ethnic national minority; their pre-existing entrepreneurial knowledge in an informal environment; and strong financial and trading links to diaspora networks. However, while some Somali refugees are achieving economic success, this appears to be based largely on ties to a co-ethnic population, rather than through integrating into society more broadly. One recent study found that female Somalis were the least integrated of all refugees.
10. **Refugees with the human and social capital to navigate and do business in Kenya’s informal economy have had the most success.** With formal work effectively outlawed, and land- and livestock holding impossible, it is those refugees able to adapt to the informal economy that succeed, in both camp and urban settings. Those with higher socio-economic status appear more successful in securing diaspora remittances and access to jobs and opportunities within the aid sector. Gender, age and educational levels also appear to be significant, with young men forming a large proportion of the urban refugee cohort, and tertiary education appearing to make it more difficult for some refugees to adapt and integrate. Time plays an important role, as it allows refugees in both camp and urban settings to build up the social capital required to succeed.

11. **Policies aimed at improving the economic situation of refugees risk downplaying the overriding political barriers that refugees face.** The barriers faced by refugees in Kenya are largely political rather than economic. Some refugees have proved adept at circumventing these barriers by operating in the margins of Kenyan society, physically, socially and economically. This has come with major costs to their rights and security. Much of the literature on refugees in both urban and camp contexts has focused on their economic achievements in the context of considerable legal and policy constraints. There is a danger that focusing primarily on the productive capacities of refugees, without also addressing the political and legal barriers they face, risks excluding rights and protection from policy discussions. The Kalobeyei initiative is an important first step in providing routes out of encampment, but it must be part of a comprehensive discussion about refugees’ rights and protection over the long term. With a focus primarily on South Sudanese refugees, the initiative also risks compounding, rather than addressing, the vulnerabilities faced by Somali refugees in particular by promoting different solutions for refugees of different nationalities, on the basis of ethnicity rather than need. Placing the responsibility for self-reliance on refugees themselves may also increase the challenges refugees face.

12. **Policies that build on the current activities of refugees will assist most in their integration.** The informal sector has proved instrumental in promoting the livelihoods of refugees in urban and camp settings alike. The Kalobeyei project is in some ways the antithesis of the ‘bottom up’ approach of refugees, as it predetermines the location and focus of refugee livelihoods. Supporting refugees’ access to information, networks and finance will be an important corollary of this approach to ensure that it links with and builds upon, rather than supplants, the current activities of refugees.
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